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
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Trails, rails and war

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


Photo Gessford Studio, New York

General G. M. Dodge at seventy

TRAILS, RAILS *and* WAR

The Life of General G. M. Dodge

BY J. R. PERKINS

Published under the auspices of
THE HISTORICAL, MEMORIAL AND
ART DEPARTMENT OF IOWA
EDGAR R. HARLAN, *Curator*



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INTRODUCTION

A GENERATION ago a new system of transportation was born—the automobile; to-day another mighty system is coming to birth—the air-ship; but the generation that bequeathed railway transportation to the world made, in a single decade, a great forward stride from the ox-cart of five thousand years ago. Older than any of these was transportation by water, which came to an end in America with the laying of the iron rails and the racing of the Iron Horse, evolving the foremost transportation system yet devised by man.

Certain names are linked with motor transportation and other names are to be joined with travel in the air, while bound up with railway expansion are names that are widely known, as Vanderbilt, Thomas Scott, James Joy, Gould, Huntington, Oliver Ames, Harriman and Hill. But there were other men, lesser known and perhaps forgotten, whose genius for building the iron trails across the plains and through the mountains was no less than the genius of those who promoted, financed and consolidated. And among the engineers and the builders, second to none, stands Grenville M. Dodge, whose railway pathfinding and construction achievements are basic in the transportation system of the western half of America.

Moreover, the whole career of Major-General Dodge is synchronous with railway expansion west of the Mississippi River, and is an integrant part of it. Beginning with his first independent survey across Iowa, in 1853, for the Mississippi and Missouri River Railroad and culminating,

thirty-three years later, in a final active survey for the Mexican and Southern, of which General Grant was president, Dodge's services were basic in railroad pathfinding and building throughout the West. These surveys, considered alone, give him a foremost place in the field of railway engineering, as they total, inclusive of preliminary reconnoitering, upward of sixty thousand miles.

His chief survey was for the Union Pacific, although rivaling it in length, if not in obstacles encountered, was the one he made for the Texas and Pacific along the line of the thirty-second parallel where Jefferson Davis, when Secretary of War, schemed to build the first great transcontinental line. A third survey, while not equaling the other two, was made for the Union Pacific from the head of Salt Lake to Puget Sound,—a survey that became, in later years, basic in the building of the Oregon Short Line, giving the road its first tidewater outlet.

But in addition to his surveys and the building of great trunk lines and their subsidiaries, General Dodge's services on behalf of the railroads west of the Mississippi River were so varied that he stands unrivaled in the range and the duration of his activities. Theodore D. Judah, of the Central Pacific of California, started on a like career almost at the same time, and combined railway promotion, surveying and construction with a potent influence on legislation; but his early death cut him off from participation in the wider development of western railroads.

On the other hand, Dodge was active for sixty years in all of these fields of railroad endeavor; so when we consider his influence on railroad legislation, combined with his work as a projector, builder, financier and director, he occupies an uncommon place in the history of its development. His legislative influence, considered alone, was perhaps greater than that of any other railroad figure in the

long period from 1860 to 1912, when he retired from active participation in railway affairs. His career is so bound up with railway history that to leave the story of his life untold would be to create a definite and unfortunate hiatus. Especially would this be true if there should remain concealed his dealings with Lincoln in Pacific railroad legislation; his relations with Grant in completing the Union Pacific; and his contact with McKinley, Roosevelt and Taft in the railway adjustments that took place between 1898 and 1912.

In lobbying, General Dodge saw none of the evil the word now connotes. He always declared that lobbying against railroads was an art as old as lobbying for them, and for him railroads were as imperative and inevitable as had been ox-carts and canals. He never stopped to question the motives of their projectors, nor does he appear to have analyzed the methods of their financiers and builders. His predilection to work with the groups that were busy in these great enterprises was matched only by his contempt for negative groups that tried hard to frustrate them.

In a new country where railroads were to be built and in a period when building them overshadowed every thing else in the minds of both the promoters and the settlers, a man like Dodge could no more remain concealed or subdued than could Lincoln in the issues of slavery or Grant in the leadership of armies. So the range of his activities, as astonishing as they may be, was but the outpouring of a nature that physical difficulties could not halt or human opposition discourage. He always advanced in a given task with a tenacity of purpose that begot confidence in all his associates. Early builders, like Farnam, Durant, the Ames brothers, Scott and Gould, considered him indispensable to their plans.

Upon the completion of the Union Pacific in 1869,

General Dodge became identified with Colonel Thomas Scott, of the Pennsylvania, in building the Texas and Pacific, and surveyed from Shreveport to San Diego. But Scott failed in the middle 'seventies, and Dodge became associated with Jay Gould, who began to operate in the same field. Gould came to depend upon him in all things save the financing of the roads, although Dodge formulated many of this capitalist's plans for consolidation and extension.

During the 'seventies and the 'eighties Dodge organized the various railroad construction companies upon which the eastern financiers depended in the actual building of the roads. They were modeled after the Crédit Mobilier Company, but without the radical speculative features of this now historic organization.

He organized the American Railway and Improvement Company and built the New Orleans and Pacific; the International Railway and Improvement Company and constructed the M. K. & T. from Fort Worth to Taylor, and the International Railroad of Texas from San Antonio to Laredo; the Colorado Construction Company and built the Fort Worth & Denver; the Oriental Construction Company and built from Laredo to the City of Mexico; the Panhandle Construction Company, and extended the Fort Worth and Denver to Texline. Then he organized the Colorado and Texas Construction Company and completed the Fort Worth and Denver to Trinidad; the Pacific Railway Improvement Company and built the Texas and Pacific from Fort Worth to El Paso. The California and Texas Construction Company, which he had formed even earlier, was to build the Texas & Pacific all the way from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, but the projectors never got out of Texas.

This intensive period of Dodge's railroad career was followed by one of management, and Gould looked to him

to keep intact many of the subsidiary lines upon which the Southwestern System was based. He was president of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas; of the Fort Worth and Denver; of the St. Louis, Des Moines and Northern; of the Denver, Texas and Fort Worth; of the Abilene and Southern; and of the Union Pacific, Denver and Gulf. He also succeeded General Grant as president of the Mexican and Southern, lifting a great burden, at a critical time, from the shoulders of his old commander.

Even the Civil War record of General Dodge was that of the railroad engineer and not the man-on-horseback. As a railway builder he made himself indispensable as a soldier to Halleck, Grant and Sherman in the armies of the West. There were many brigadier-generals who could lead six or eight thousand troops and thereby aid the greater captains commanding ten times this number; but there were few who could, from the debris of destroyed roads and rolling stock, evolve a line of railway communications and bridge rivers over which trains had to run.

“Dodge,” said a military contemporary, “had the knack of straightening a rail that Confederate ingenuity had made to resemble a snake”; while General Howard once asked the question, “Who could build a railroad bridge like G. M. Dodge?” Years after the war, General Sherman used to loaf in Dodge’s offices in New York and tell everybody who would listen how Dodge repaired railroads and built bridges about as fast as the troops marched. And General Howard further added, “Dodge was Sherman’s favorite on account of his work in bridge-making and railway construction, on marches or in battles.”

Both the speed and the durability of his railroad building amazed Halleck and staff when Dodge was transferred to Mississippi in the spring of 1862, and within another year Grant and Sherman considered him without a peer in this

exacting branch of military service in the West. He possessed but little of the military brilliancy of Sheridan, his close friend; not a great deal of the tactical genius of Grant; and less of the grasp of Sherman in handling large bodies of troops; but all turned to him with their problems of railroad building.

It was through design, and not by military chance, that General Grant sent Dodge to conduct campaigns against the Indians in 1865, for the commander-in-chief selected the man he believed to be the best qualified to lead troops whose enthusiasm for service was on the wane, and to meet the Indians in their particular kind of warfare. Nothing could have been more timely in the scheme of building the Union Pacific Railroad, for one had come to the plains at an hour when the work was at a standstill,—a man whose military education and experience, and whose training and genius for building railroads were remarkably balanced.

In the years that followed the Civil War, and when it seemed that the Union Pacific would end, a trail of rust, somewhere between the Missouri River and the eastern base of the Rocky Mountains, Grant and Sherman came to Dodge's support in all the difficulties he encountered as chief engineer; and their friendship, forged in the fires of the national conflict, was welded firmly in the political, industrial and social strife that threatened the very existence of the road. Indeed, but for Grant and Sherman, and their coercion of such strong personalities as Thomas C. Durant, vice-president of the Union Pacific, and O. H. Browning, Secretary of the Interior, it is likely that Dodge would have been forced to resign as chief engineer when the railroad extended west of Cheyenne.

Dodge's correspondence with the outstanding political, military and railway figures from a date as early as 1856 down to the year of his death in 1916, illuminates many

phases of national history. Of this correspondence he once said:

"Men used to write me a great deal because they felt that it would be safe for them to do so. They would not have written if they had thought that their letters would be published in their lifetime. Whether it would do any harm to publish them now, I am unable to say. You know, I never gave away a confidence, no matter how it might affect me, and I don't want anything written that would injure the living or reflect on the dead."

After Grant and other Civil War officers wrote their Memoirs, N. E. Dawson, who assisted Grant in his literary work, urged Dodge to set down in order the things of his own life, and he was induced finally to do so. But he found this a far greater task than he anticipated, for he carried the story down to 1870 and ceased writing. He paused at a most interesting time in his life, and if it were not for his letters, many of which he failed to embody in his autobiography, much valuable railroad history would have been lost.

There is the inevitable propaganda in the unfinished manuscript of his autobiography, and a far greater appraisement of himself as a soldier than as a builder of railroads; and, while both the incomplete manuscript and the letters constitute the primary sources, it is from the latter that we get the untouched portrait, not alone of General Dodge, but also of the national characters with whom he associated over a period of sixty years.

These letters reveal that he did not analyze the bitterness that evolved over railroads after the building of the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific. Legislation by clamor, the Granger movement, the Populistic aggression, and all popular enmity constituted a singular psychology that seemed to puzzle him, and he fought without attempt-

ing to interpret. Railroads, for him, were the dominant factors in the development of a potential country,—a nation that would have fringed the coasts for years but for the expansion of the great transportation systems. True, he came to recognize certain evils that inhered in great railway corporations, but they were far outweighed by the roads themselves and the achievements of their builders.

In the late 'nineties James S. Clarkson, long prominent in the political and the journalistic life of Iowa and Dodge's most intimate friend, wrote:

"I am glad that you are at last compiling a record of your military and civil services. I have always wanted you to do this, and I feared that time would pass and it would never be done. If there is any part in which I could help, I hope you will not hesitate to command me."

Dodge's reply was an invitation for Clarkson to edit his papers and write the biography. "There is no person in the country," Dodge wrote, "whom I would prefer to have do this work more than yourself, for there is no one who knows more about me."

But Clarkson, being in poor health, procrastinated and a decade passed without anything being done. Meanwhile, Edgar R. Harlan had become Curator of the Historical, Memorial and Art Department of Iowa, and his efforts were persistent to get both General Dodge and Clarkson down to work. Clarkson never became keyed up to the task, but Dodge finally deposited his letters, papers and manuscripts in the Historical Department at Des Moines and made provisions in his will, in 1911, to have them published under its auspices. Curator Harlan, mindful that the years were slipping by, made further efforts to bring Clarkson and Dodge together and offered personally to aid them in every way possible in preparing a manuscript. But Clarkson, who

was living in New York, never came west to Des Moines to begin work, although he promised that he would do so; and General Dodge, apparently discouraged over Clarkson's failure to settle to the task, wrote Curator Harlan:

"I have arranged with no one to write the biography while I am living, and do not intend to do so. I have written about myself down to 1870. I don't think it would pay to edit it (the manuscript) while I live, but perhaps after my death the material could be used in a biography."

After General Dodge's death in 1916, Curator Harlan systematized the material deposited in the Historical, Memorial and Art Department and set aside a special room for its care; duplicate material was also deposited in the vaults of the Council Bluffs Savings Bank. In 1926 the trustees of the Dodge estate concluded an agreement with Curator Harlan and the Board of the Historical, Memorial and Art Department of Iowa whereby the author was selected to make a study of the sources and prepare a manuscript of the life and times of General Dodge. The work of writing was completed in October, 1928.

The author finds himself deeply indebted to the trustees of the General G. M. Dodge estate,—Grenville Dodge Montgomery; Edwin R. Jackson; B. I. Gronstal; and Emmett Tinley, the latter, attorney for the estate; to Edgar R. Harlan, Curator of the Historical, Memorial and Art Department of Iowa, under whose direction the index was prepared, and to the Board of this department for cooperation in enabling the trustees to meet the terms of General Dodge's will; to Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Superintendent, State Historical Society, University of Iowa and to his assistants for reading the manuscript and making valuable suggestions and corrections; to Paul Leland Haworth, Professor of History at Butler University, for in-

valuable criticism of Chapters XIII and XIV; to Prof. F. I. Herriott of Drake University whose writings on *Lincoln and Iowa* and *James Grimes vs. The Southrons* were vital in the author's preparation of Chapter V; to Carl R. Gray, President Union Pacific System, N. H. Loomis and Edson Rich, Union Pacific counsel, for reviewing the portions of the manuscript referring to the early history of the Union Pacific Railroad and offering constructive criticism; to R. H. Beerman of President Gray's office staff of the Union Pacific System for a great deal of technical information and for the selection of photographs for illustrations from the Union Pacific's fine historical collection; to Mrs. Lettie D. Montgomery, eldest daughter of General Dodge, and to Mrs. Langford Montgomery, her daughter-in-law, for material aid in reminiscence and the editing of the early diaries; to the staff of the Council Bluffs Library and especially to Margaret Black-Baller, reference librarian, for invaluable research work over a period of sixteen months; to Judge William R. Green, United States Court of Claims; to Mr. and Mrs. William Carleton of Rowley, Massachusetts, relatives of General Dodge, and Captain H. W. Comey, a Civil War veteran of Danvers, who gave assistance in locating early scenes in Dodge's life and in securing photographs; to John M. Henry, managing editor of *The Nonpareil* of Council Bluffs, Iowa, for constant interest, newspaper file research and valuable suggestions; to Ida Pilling, stenographer, and to Toby Katelman, my secretary, whose assistance throughout the preparation of the manuscript lifted to sacrificial service; to the First Congregational Church of Council Bluffs, Iowa, of which the author is pastor, for sympathetic cooperation and understanding throughout the task; and to the great company of men and women of Dodge's home town who interested themselves in the work that was being done and who

offered many constructive suggestions. Finally, it is fitting here that both the author and the Dodge family make acknowledgment of the services rendered by Caroline Dodge, niece of General Dodge, who labored for two years assisting him in assembling and systematizing his letters and manuscripts, and Belle Hoon, his secretary during the preparation of "The Dodge Records" and the typing of his voluminous correspondence.

J. R. Perkins,
October 23, 1928.

TRAITS, RAILS AND WAR

TRAILS, RAILS AND WAR

CHAPTER I

A RAILROAD BUILDER'S BACKGROUND

THERE were Dodges in Essex County, Massachusetts, when the English fought the Narragansetts, and Captain John Dodge—the first of the line to serve as a soldier in the Colonies—"fought with distinction." This fact should have satisfied any democratic genealogist, but the English poet, Martin Farquhar Tupper, anxious to merit his stipend for genealogical research and to please his patron, a Mr. Robert Dodge of New York City, stated that the Dodges of England belonged to the gentry and that the line had been traced back to the beginning of the fourteenth century. This probably was the first attempt to establish the genealogy of the family, although Mr. Tupper was more concerned to assure Robert Dodge that his forebears were of gentle blood than he was to give names and dates. "I have to congratulate you," the poet wrote, "on a matter always pleasing to an intellectual and high-minded man,—the undoubted antiquity and gentle blood of which you can boast. Now let me tell you that this is a point of respectability which many an ennobled man can not boast, and I think it is one which gives secret satisfaction even to a republican nature."

How much secret satisfaction the republican nature of General Grenville Mellen Dodge ever derived from contemplating the coat armor and gentle blood of his progenitors will never be known, but he was deeply interested in his family line and aided Joseph T. Dodge, genealogist, in establishing the historic continuity between the Dodges of Somersetshire, England, and those of Essex County, Massachusetts.

"Richard Dodge appeared at Salem in 1638, and 'desired accommodation,'" says Joseph T. Dodge. "As immigrants were admitted to the colony only by applying to the town and obtaining leave, it is quite certain that Richard and his family came in 1638, and as the King was at that time obstructing emigration, it is probable that he left England without royal permission."

He could not write his own name, judging from his mark appended to his will, but he was known as "a friend of education," and in 1653, in a list of subscribers to Harvard College, his name is first in the amount bestowed. But another half-century passed before any Dodge was graduated from this institution of learning.

Grenville Mellen Dodge, born April 12, 1831, was eight generations removed from this bold and independent progenitor, and between them were scores of sturdy men and women whose lives are interwoven with the simpler history of the commonwealth of Massachusetts. They were eminent in neither politics, finance nor education, but they owned and operated some of the oldest and best sawmills in New England, and one of these that was run by General Dodge's grandfather, Solomon Dodge, of Rowley, is yet in the possession of a kinsman and made to supplement, as it did in the beginning, the uncertain earnings of a New England farm.

Most of the Dodges were farmers and millwrights,

tanners and weavers; small merchants and town office-holders. Now and then school-teachers and soldiers appeared among them; and, which may be of significance to those who search after biological factors, there were occasional "surveyors to lay out the roads."

But the searchers after the biological factors in the career of General Dodge should not go too far afield here, for laying out roads in Massachusetts in Colonial days, while perhaps an art, was a business in which most families participated, and doubtless they were chased by the Indians in so doing, just as the Crows and the unrelenting Sioux kept on the trail of the chief engineer of the Union Pacific in the years that followed the Civil War. There was nothing in his immediate family that was prophetic of his career and very little that contributed to it.

Solomon Dodge, grandfather of General Dodge, in addition to running his sawmill and putting up marsh hay, slaughtered cattle and hogs and peddled the meat from house to house. Transportation honors came early to the family, for he drove the first four-wheel market wagon ever seen on the streets of old Salem. Both families of General Dodge's grandparents lived north of Boston near Rowley. His father, Sylvanus Dodge, was born at the old homestead near the mill. He married a neighboring girl, Julia Theresa Phillips, a kinswoman of the abolition orator. She possessed two traits that were quite marked in her son—zeal for any cause she espoused and tenacity of purpose.

In 1888, Daniel Haskell, who knew the family at an early date, appraised Dodge's parents thus: "His mother was a very smart woman and his father of more than ordinary ability. He was quite a politician and, I am sorry to say, a Democrat. The way I happened to get acquainted with his father was when he would come, now and then, to borrow a little money."

Dodge's parents were living at Danvers when he was born, sharing a commodious house with Elias Putnam, father of the Reverend Alfred Putnam, a Universalist clergyman who has written extensively of the Dodge family. But Sylvanus Dodge did not prosper in Danvers, and the family began a series of moves that added nothing to their fortunes. At Lynn they were poor and unhappy, for typhoid fever nearly terminated the career of the head of the family; at Salem, where they were fortunate enough to know Hawthorne, there were trying experiences; and they finally returned to Danvers "so depleted in household goods," said Nathan P. Dodge, a brother of General Dodge, "that we had neither carpets nor rugs."

Sylvanus Dodge knew how to butcher hogs and cattle, therefore he fell back on the profession of his father in order to keep the family from want. His slaughter-house was on one side of his residence and a cemetery on the other, so between protesting pigs and unprotesting ancestors the family managed to live. But he was far from satisfied and, with an eye to the future, got into politics. True, he often had to borrow money from Whig acquaintances, but he voted the Democratic ticket straight, and when James K. Polk needed support in and around Danvers, Massachusetts, Sylvanus Dodge forgot his butchering business and became active on behalf of the whole ticket.

He picked the right horse, and as a reward he was made postmaster of South Danvers. This was in 1846. Henceforth butchering was but an unpleasant memory, for as postmaster Sylvanus Dodge could take a place even among the old Whig families, and without borrowing any money from them. Being of a literary turn of mind, and also seeing an opportunity to supplement his salary, he opened a book store in one end of the post-office. Here Hawthorne's volumes always occupied a conspicuous place. He could



General Dodge's grandmother,
Lydia Phillips



General Dodge's maternal grandfather,
Nathan Phillips



Sylvanus Dodge,
father of General Dodge



Julia Phillips Dodge, mother of
General Dodge

claim friendship with the author, and it is said that this greatly aided the ex-butcher in selling books.

There was a little schoolhouse on Main Street, leading to Salem, and here Grenville Dodge began his schooling. The family shared a house with a man named Little, who took down with cholera. Dodge's parents were on a visit to Rowley, but the lad of ten stayed with Mrs. Little and helped her with the work until her husband died. None of the Danvers citizens would go near the house, and when Dodge's parents returned home they were amazed to learn that their son was being praised all over the town for not running away when the cholera broke out in the Little household.

When Dodge was thirteen he went to work on a large farm on the outskirts of Danvers, where he met with experiences that gave direction to his whole life. The farm was operated by a Mrs. Lander, and she seems to have been the high and mighty lady of all that section. She had two sons, Frederick and Charles. The former had attended Norwich University for two years and was just about to start upon a career of civil engineering. The latter was in the ice business. He purchased an abandoned church, moved it to Wenham Lake, and "converted it into an ice-house." Frederick surveyed and constructed a siding from the Eastern Railroad to his brother's ice-house, and Dodge, then fourteen, assisted in the work. It was his first survey!

Frederick Lander, who became one of the ablest government surveyors in the exploration of the West, was greatly impressed with young Dodge and told him that he should prepare himself to enter Norwich University and become an engineer. Lander's influence on Dodge was not only potent in firing his ambitions to go to college and fit himself for the profession of engineering, but also gave the youth his first visions of a Pacific railroad. Dodge, in

1912, wrote of this period of his life and made frank acknowledgment of the early forces in his career that impelled him toward these things.

"I lived in those days with Mrs. Edward Lander who had a beautiful estate—the finest in the country. Her people were noted, especially in the War of 1812. From hearing stories from her of the fighting at Concord and Lexington and Bunker Hill, and seeing the veterans of 1812 often lined up, combined to give me a great desire to obtain a military education and become a soldier. My one ambition was to enter the army and fight a battle, but after my first engagement I was willing to see the war end right there. From Frederick W. Lander, who was a civil engineer, I obtained my ambition to become one. Lander entered the army and became a general in the Civil War, and was killed in West Virginia. As a young man he was engaged by the government in making surveys in 1854 over the Northern Pacific route, and I met him on the plains as he was returning from Oregon when I was making a reconnaissance to the west for the Union Pacific."

At the age of fifteen, Dodge entered Durham Academy in New Hampshire and took a year's preparatory work that enabled him to matriculate at Norwich University in the autumn of 1848. The school was then located at Norwich, Vermont, just across the river from Dartmouth College, which was considered a rival institution, and the students of the two schools seldom neglected the opportunity to engage in a fight. The Dartmouth boys always jeered and shouted "brass buttons," and the Norwich students would yell "ladies," and then hostilities would begin!

Dodge was at Norwich University less than three months when his class was suspended for attending a dance in a neighboring town, and the members were sent to Thetford College at Newbury, a Methodist school, and compelled to finish the year. Perhaps the authorities at

Norwich University considered this a punishment, for the religious regulations at the Methodist institution were so strict that the transplanted military class often rebelled, and once rioted with the regular students and broke up a church service. But Dodge liked the school despite the fact that he was up before the faculty often enough to have been expelled.

"The good old times spent at Thetford will never be forgotten," he wrote in the diary he began to keep at this school. "How we gummed the Profs and cheated the buttery; stole marches on the steward and sneaked out at night with the girls. Though arraigned eight times this term, I was not ousted, for Miss Chase, the preceptress, defended me, and she was no pettifogging lawyer."

His class was allowed to reenter Norwich University in the autumn of 1849, and from a rather loosely kept diary we are able to trace a few significant incidents in his school-life.

"Forty-three years ago to-day, October 12, 1807," he wrote in his diary, "Fulton made his first steamboat trip up the Hudson River. How wonderful has been the effect of his discovery. In the short space of forty-three years steam power has revolutionized the world."

Perhaps in no school in the nation was the enthusiasm for railroad expansion at so great pitch as at Norwich University in 1850. The students discussed steam transportation and expansion of railroads from the Atlantic to the Pacific with all the ardor that students to-day discuss airplanes, air-routes and oversea flying. True, there were no lines west of Chicago and but few east of this point that were of any consequence, but there were dreams and dreamers; there were explorers and pioneers, and they were as heroic and as forward-looking as are the men to-day who think in terms of world-flying. Dodge's school-days fell in

the beginning of all this railroad excitement and he was stirred to the depths of his being.

When he went to Danvers for his Christmas vacation he felt that there was a decided change in the attitude of the villagers toward the son of the ex-butcher. "I was lionized considerably," he wrote in his diary. "The military is much respected."

When he returned to Norwich University at the beginning of 1851 he went to live with the widow of a former president of the school, Mrs. Trueman B. Ransom. Ransom fell in leading his New England regiment at the storming of Chapultepec, and his widow, left with three sons, was compelled to take boarders. Nothing could have been more fortunate for Dodge, for his association with this family broadened his outlook, added to his social graces and led ultimately to opportunities that paved the way for his engineering career in Illinois. Fifteen years later, Major T. E. G. Ransom succeeded General Dodge as commander of the Sixteenth Army Corps after the latter was badly wounded in the Atlanta campaign.

Next to the subject of railroads the question of slavery was rife at Norwich University, but there seems to have been scant abolition sentiment. Dodge's own attitude toward the negro is rather puzzling, although he may have seen the fruits of radicalism in his own kinsmen and, youth-like, become prejudiced.

One of his great-uncles, William Bradford Dodge, was a most radical anti-slavery advocate. He had taught school at Salem, but resigned to instruct negro children in the town in a separate organization. He was a forceful figure in Massachusetts for upward of a quarter-century. From teaching school he began to preach, and sought various pulpits to carry on his propaganda against slavery. Indeed, his house became an underground railway for fugitive slaves

as well as a center of missionary agitation. But one is led to believe that his abolition and missionary sentiments did not always evoke spontaneous enthusiasm in the Dodges, some of whom owned slaves, and few of whom evinced any interest in the conversion of the heathen; and, while General Dodge, late in his life, wrote feelingly of his radical great-uncle, there is much to indicate that as a youth he did not share his views. An incident, which he records in his diary, that took place in Boston when he was en route to school bears on the point:

“At noon I went down to Brigham’s to get a dish of oysters. Was insulted by a negro. Told him to mind his eyes and keep them on the worsted and brass buttons. But he was either tight or a fool and continued his insults. Gave him one more warning and then threw the dish of oysters in his face. He scooted and the crowd praised me for giving the nigger his just punishment.”

There was another incident at Norwich University that not only clarifies Dodge’s attitude toward the negro and slavery in 1851, but that seems to have been an index to the thinking of the other students. A fugitive slave by the name of Watson came to lecture, and the students seemed willing enough to hear him until he turned to certain political aspects of his subject, and then they rode him hard. Dodge’s diary says:

“The cadets went with a determination to let Watson go on if he did not speak disrespectfully of the country and her statesmen, but if he followed in the tracks of the rest of his God-forsaken party, to put him down. He began with his slang and we just put him down, but told him that he could go on as long as he held to his subject and spoke properly. He continued his lecture and gave a narrative of his birth and experiences in slavery and was not very much disturbed again.”

This incident is a curious commentary on the thinking of the students of a school that, a decade later, gave more than five hundred officers to the Federal Government in its war against slavery and disunion. There were several outstanding students at Norwich University from southern homes, and wide-spread slavery in New England was too recent for any universal opinion against it as an institution; on the other hand, the colleges of the North were supposed to be hotbeds of abolition sentiment. Norwich University, judging from the incident just narrated, was not.

Dodge's final months at Norwich University were filled with difficulties, and there is a note of rebellion in the diary he kept. Money from home was rare and he performed all sorts of odd jobs to keep himself in school. He hoed potatoes, cut timber, oiled harness, greased wagons, milked cows, and was assistant janitor at one of the buildings. To-day, Dodge Hall stands on the campus as a monument to the assistant janitor!

"What little success I have had in life I credit to my college training," Dodge has said. "For three years I had drummed into me daily a respect for authority, obedience to orders, the disciplining of my mind and actions, loyalty to an employer, patriotism toward my government and honor to the flag."

Undoubtedly, he had all of these homely old integrities "drummed" into him, and in no chauvinistic spirit he carried them into his career. But his last days at college found him in rebellion to discipline, hot-tempered and with a craving for life. His diary reveals this.

"Feb. 2nd—Went to the W. R. Junction on French leave to a ball. Had a small muss; felt quite elated with my bluffing scrape. Came home at five in the morning, the glass being 33 below zero. On Sunday went to the Union village on French leave again. Saw the damsel and the critters."



Cadet G. M. Dodge
Norwich University, 1850



Norwich University - Norwich VT - 1850

Dodge's Alma Mater, picture taken in 1862. The school that gave above five hundred officers to the Federal government in the Civil War

Seeing the "damsel" is fairly intelligible, but the "critters" leaves one in some doubt.

"Feb. 14th—Went to a dance last week. A waitress spilled a bowl of soup over my best coat and pants, and had not politeness enough to make an apology, so I refused to pay the bill, raised h—— and came off."

On the following Monday night he "went up to the dancing school to pick a muss. Succeeded very well. Broke up a set, scared the remainder, and came home pretty well worked up."

But Dodge finished his university course, ranking well in his classes, and was quite a favorite despite his many escapades.

He supplemented his university training with a special course of field instruction in a private school conducted by Captain Alden Partridge, founder of Norwich University and who ranks among the foremost military and engineering instructors of his time. Dodge had been graduated from Norwich in the midwinter class, and from January to June, 1851, he gave strict attention to his work in the Partridge school which, as he said afterward, was just what he needed to give him confidence to face the actual duties of his profession as an engineer.

When he returned to Danvers he surprised and saddened his parents by announcing that he was "going way out west to Chicago." His spirit was as foreign to the staid ways of Danvers, Massachusetts, as the spirit of his bold forebear, Richard Dodge, had been to the sheep-stamped hills of England. He had no ambitions to "lay out the roads" in Essex County as certain of his forebears had done. The West and a new social order beckoned; he belonged, despite his rigid upbringing in a New England village, to the prairies and the mountains; and his work as a railroad builder was destined to link East with West.

CHAPTER II

SENSING THE ROUTE TO THE PACIFIC

Two sons of the widow Ransom of Norwich preceded Dodge to Illinois, and their letters told of new towns, great railway projects, cheap land and plenty of jobs for young civil engineers. In fact, they invited him to join them at the town of Peru, where they worked for an uncle, George W. Gilson, a state senator, a surveyor, a land agent, an associate of Stephen A. Douglas, and one of the projectors of the Rock Island Railroad. So Dodge was not exactly a stranger in a strange land when he went to Illinois in the summer of 1851.

There were only one hundred and twelve miles of railroad in the state of Illinois in 1851. Two embryonic lines—the Galena and Chicago Union, and the Rock Island—jutted out of the prairie town of Chicago. The Rock Island, that played the chief part in Dodge's fortunes before the Civil War, was just getting ready to grade when he arrived. All travel to the West was over the Indian trails, the plank roads and down the canal. Dodge took a packet down this canal for his destination.

While men might travel by canals they talked railroads, and Dodge found himself in groups of passengers who discussed steam transportation with as much excitement as if the subject had been western gold-fields. But no wonder. The first large government land-grant to aid in the con-

struction of Illinois railroads had just been made, thanks to the foresight and energy of Senator Douglas, and more than two million acres had been granted to the proposed Illinois Central. Henry Clay and Thomas Benton supported Douglas in his fight, and the packet passengers declared that the railroads would double the price of Illinois land, and the price was one dollar and twenty-five cents an acre with but few purchasers.

Peru, Dodge's destination, lay a mile below LaSalle, so Dodge picked up his carpetbag and started for an old bus fast filling with passengers. Just as he reached it he witnessed a gun fight and saw his first killing. The affair did not cause much excitement, and Dodge began to wonder what kind of country he had struck. But more was to come, for, on reaching Peru and while waiting for his future employer to write some letters, he wandered along the banks of the Illinois River and saw several men pull a dead man out of the river. He ran to the office of Senator Gilson, uncle of the Ransom boys, and shouted that a dead man had just been taken from the river. "Is that so?" Gilson remarked, and kept on writing. Two incidents that would have called out all the inhabitants of Danvers, Massachusetts, seemed commonplace in Illinois, and Dodge made up his mind not to be surprised at anything.

A day later he had a job surveying lots in Peru. Senator Gilson told him that Peru would soon outstrip Chicago, and he and every one else believed it. He wrote home that he hoped to secure a position "on the Central Railroad, about one hundred miles south," and he lost no time in making a bid for a job.

Settlers poured into northern Illinois, and Dodge, writing to his father, revealed that he had caught the speculative fever. "I can double any amount of money you've got in six months," he wrote. "To start with, buy up a couple of

Mexican land warrants, send them out, and I'll locate them in places where land is selling at this minute for \$2.50 an acre. The warrants are for a quarter-section each and can be bought back east for about a dollar. Now this is no gun-game, but the truth. Don't tell anybody but go to work. This will pay better than all the post-offices and book stores in the kingdom." But the elder Dodge had no money to send, nor was he of a speculative turn of mind, so the family continued in lean circumstances.

Yet Dodge saw clearly, for land along the Illinois Central survey jumped in price from one dollar and twenty-five cents an acre in 1851 to six dollars an acre in 1853, and as high as twenty-five dollars an acre by 1856. The prophecy of Clay, Benton and Douglas had almost immediate fulfillment, for prior to the coming of the railroads this same land had been on the market for upward of thirty years at one dollar and twenty-five cents an acre and with but few purchasers.

In another letter to his father, Dodge revealed that many of the people of Illinois considered the railroad promoters, especially those of the Illinois Central, to be speculators. He seems to have fallen into the same belief for he wrote, "The Rock Island will be the first to be built and it will be better arranged. Its stockholders are residents and have some interest in it besides speculation, whereas the Central stockholders are Easterners and took hold of it for purposes of making large sums of money. They were drawn to it by the vast appropriations of land given by Congress."

The interesting thing here is Dodge's sudden use of the word "easterners," as a term of reproach. But his remarks were immature and colored by the offhand criticism that prevailed in the Middle West against any and all kinds of railroad promotion. Just five years later found him in a verbal battle with settlers in the state of his adoption,—

Iowa,—trying to disprove the same assertions made against the Mississippi and Missouri River Railroad which survey he conducted across this state.

While Dodge might with youthful bias criticize the promoters of the Illinois Central, he was not averse to securing a job with an engineering party, and his first actual railroading was with this company. Robert Rantoul, long prominent in the affairs of the Democrat party in Massachusetts, and a close friend of the Danvers postmaster, had given the young man a letter of recommendation to Colonel Mason, resident engineer of the Illinois Central. The letter possessed undoubted value because Rantoul was one of the attorneys for the road.

But even after this letter of recommendation reached Colonel Mason, Dodge did not secure a position at once. "I don't worry about a place much," he wrote home, "for I am doing well enough for the winter. I am getting acclimated, which will be worth a year's work to me. If I had gone right out on the road when I first arrived probably I would have been laid up for the winter. Not an Easterner who went on the road, except Colonel Mason, ran the gauntlet. They all caught a right smart chain of sickness."

Social life in the village of Peru, if not so polished as in Danvers, Massachusetts, was filled with new interest for young Dodge. There were parties and dinners and girls in flaming calico dresses; there were bob-sled rides over the frozen prairies, skating on the Illinois in the light of great log fires, barn-dances and horseback riding. Most of the young women could ride and shoot, and Dodge met one, Anne Brown whom he later married, who was acknowledged to be first in both of these accomplishments. Yet Dodge was diffident as a youth, and even at the height of his career he was shy at large social gatherings if not bored by them. Once he wrote home:

"I have many invitations out to parties and to dinners, but I do not always go. I am aware that I do not shine in such places, and as my inclinations were never in that direction, why, it is not a great disappointment to me."

The village of Peru had two pieces of artillery, so Dodge and the Ransom boys organized an artillery squad and surprised the natives by evolving a crack outfit. Quite a few of the townspeople could see no need for it as the Indians were peaceful and the British far away. But they had not reckoned with the "furriners" who mined coal in near-by fields. At Vermilionville the state experienced its first labor troubles, the miners went on a strike and threatened to provoke a riot. The Governor sent a hurried call for the Peru artillery squad; the young officers responded in double-quick, planted their guns on the pit-dumps and ended the trouble. The press of the entire state praised the young men from "a back-east military school," and there was less criticism of swords and brass buttons.

In January, 1852, Dodge secured the coveted position with an engineering party on the Illinois Central. The winter was extremely cold, and the chief of the party, on noting that Dodge understood the business, warmed himself indoors and left the running of the line to the youthful engineer. Dodge stuck to his work, but, on concluding that the line would not be accepted by the resident engineer, he quit his job abruptly.

Years later the division engineer, who told the story, declared that Dodge would have been made chief of the party if he had remained. This trifling incident altered the course of Dodge's career, for it sent him seeking employment with the Rock Island Company and his services with this road led him to make the first survey across Iowa to the Missouri River and beyond.

There is much to indicate that Dodge was more interested in the Rock Island building to the west than the Illinois Central to the south. He was barely of age, but he sensed the importance of the railroad projects that pointed toward the Pacific. Older heads had sensed it long before, and the Rock Island leaders perhaps saw with greater clarity than many others. Anyhow, Dodge set his heart on securing a position with this road as it seemed to promise the fulfillment of the dreams of John Plumbe, a Welsh engineer who lived in Davenport, Iowa; of Asa Whitney and like early railroad figures.

After leaving the Illinois Central and while waiting for a job on the Rock Island, Dodge returned to the employ of Senator Gilson, surveying and working on one of his large farms, and while here he wrote a significant letter to his father—one that makes clear his own understanding of transcontinental projects.

“A dispatch was received here with the important intelligence that the Rock Island railroad, 200 miles long, and separate from the Illinois Central, is to be built; Peru is bound to be a great city, and when the various roads under contract are completed we will have direct communication by the Rock Island with Iowa and the far west; for this is the true Pacific road and will be built to Council Bluffs, where a good road from St. Louis will meet it, and then on to San Francisco,—this being the shortest and most feasible route.”

The Chicago and Rock Island was the first railroad to cross Illinois from Chicago to the Mississippi River, and its projectors began a survey to the Missouri River through Iowa even before the road was completed to Rock Island. A group of Illinois and Iowa men had dreamed of this achievement as early as 1845, and in their vision they saw a continuous line of railroad from the Mississippi to New

York City; and their dream, in common with many others, comprehended an extension of this railroad across Iowa and on to the Pacific.

Two years later the Illinois legislature chartered a road to be constructed from LaSalle—the terminus of the Illinois and Michigan Canal—to the Mississippi River. But there was no great amount of enthusiasm on the part of the people and three more years passed with very little being done. There was a lack of money, notwithstanding the pledges the various counties had made, and there was a lack of belief in the whole enterprise. The old Indian trail from Fort Dearborn to the Mississippi River had been good enough for their fathers, and the more timid were saying it was good enough for them.

In Illinois at that time there was a young Yankee from Connecticut—Henry Farnam—and he had come with railroad experience. He met William B. Ogden, of Chicago, and Judge James Grant, of Iowa, the first president of the Rock Island. The Yankee mounted a horse at Chicago and traveled west to the village of Rock Island on the Mississippi River; on his return to Chicago he was convinced that the road could be built. "The wonderful advantages of the entire line so impressed Mr. Farnam," said F. J. Nevins in an illuminating article in *The Rock Island Magazine* in 1922, "that he prevailed on Joseph E. Sheffield, a man of wealth and a sincere friend, to come to Chicago and inspect the proposed new line." The year Dodge went to Illinois the road's charter was amended, authorizing the road to be built on to Chicago, and Farnam and Sheffield contracted to build it.

Sheffield and Farnam, without waiting for the Rock Island to be completed to the Mississippi River, ordered a survey to be made across Iowa, for Iowa's geographic position was vital to direct western extension. Various railroad

builders by this time were competing, with their eyes fixed far west on the Pacific. The builders of the Rock Island had organized the Mississippi and Missouri River Railroad Company, both as an excuse and a reason for making the Iowa survey, and Peter A. Dey was selected to do it. He was an engineer who had been with Sheffield and Farnam building the Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana from South Bend to Chicago, and he afterward became the first chief engineer of the Union Pacific.

At this time Dodge, who had quit his job on the Illinois Central, made the acquaintance of an engineer by the name of Samuel Robbins and they became fast friends. One day in the autumn of 1852 Robbins introduced Dodge to Peter Dey; and, nearly forty years later, Dey said:

“Dodge made application to me and I took him into one of my parties. That was in the fall of 1852. Very soon I discovered that there was a good deal in him. I discovered a wonderful energy;—for instance, if I told him to do anything he did it under any and all circumstances. That feature was particularly marked. In the spring of 1853, I made the survey of what was called the Bureau Valley & Peoria, and I gave Dodge the use of one instrument. He then developed a great deal of energy and so enhanced my opinion of him that, in May, 1853, when I came out here (Iowa City) to make surveys from Davenport west, I took him with me.”

But before Dodge started on the Mississippi and Missouri survey, Peter Dey gave him a position in Samuel Robbins' construction party where he remained until March, 1853; then the chief engineer asked him if he could organize a surveying party and ration it. Dodge said he could, and he did; and when he had done so he completed his first independent piece of surveying near Peoria. When spring came Peter Dey was ready to begin the Mississippi and Missouri survey across Iowa.

"We crossed the Mississippi River at Rock Island on May 27, 1853, and began our survey," said General Dodge. "The location of the bridge that was to span the river in a few months determined the point where we should commence, and the topography of the country was such that the line I laid passed through the premises of Antoine Le Claire, a noted citizen of Davenport, who was greatly disturbed to see a line passing through his orchard. He protested and tried to get me to change it, but I told him the location of the bridge that was being built controlled the line through Davenport. He appealed over my head to Mr. Dey, who sustained me in every way."

Antoine Le Claire was indeed a noted citizen of Davenport, for he founded the town. In 1855, when Ralph Waldo Emerson lectured in Iowa, he visited Davenport, stopped at the Le Claire house and, of course, met the town's outstanding citizen. On his return to Concord, Emerson wrote in his journal:

"Le Claire being a half-breed of the Sac and Foxes (and of French-Canadian) had a right to a location of a square mile of land, and with more than an Indian sagacity of choosing his warpath, he chose his lot, one (part) above the rapids, and the other below the rapids at Rock Island. He chose his lot thirty years ago, and now the railroad to the Pacific runs directly through his log house, which is occupied by the company for wood and other purposes. His property has risen to the value of five or six hundred thousand dollars. He is fifty-seven years old and weighs three hundred and eight pounds."

Le Claire's father was a Canadian Frenchman, but his mother was the granddaughter of a Pottawattamie chief.

It was Emerson who observed that the railroad to the Pacific ran directly through Le Claire's log house, and it was another New Englander, a stubborn and practical en-

gineer, who ran the line, and in so doing was sustained by Peter Dey, the chief engineer. And the bridge that was being built—though the piers had scarcely been placed—was the famous wooden structure that was burned in 1856, when the steamboat *Effie Afton* swung against it, caught fire and destroyed one of its spans. In the suit that followed, a young lawyer from Sangamon County represented the bridge company and the Rock Island Railroad. Lincoln argued that the people had a right to travel east and west as well as north and south and freight the necessities of life. The opposition contended that the Lord had made the river for navigation, and that it should not be obstructed by a bridge—even a drawbridge. There was no decision, and the controversy over this bridge echoed in Congress.

Judge Love of Iowa finally rendered a decision and issued a singular order—that three piers of the bridge “within the state of Iowa” be removed, thus affording navigation up and down on the west side of the river. Four years later, when Abraham Lincoln became president, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision. By this time it had become apparent to many politicians, and others, that the Lord wanted travel east and west as well as north and south.

The final decision that bridged the Mississippi River between Rock Island, Illinois and Davenport, Iowa, gave the latter state a certain railroad preeminence, because its lines were to be the natural and inevitable connecting links between the roads being pushed west of Chicago and the Union Pacific that built ultimately west from Omaha, Nebraska. When Chicago became a railroad center Iowa became the necessary bridge between the Middle West and the Far West. The shortest and the best route to the Missouri River was through Iowa; and across Iowa three great railroads were to race in building.

But if the Mississippi and Missouri River Railroad survey was the first to traverse Iowa from river to river, it was not the first to be made on the soil of the state, although all earlier surveys were limited to eastern Iowa and generally ran north and south from Dubuque to Keokuk. "From early times," says Cyrenus Cole in his penetrating history of Iowa, "the hopes of the settlers were centered in railroads. The first legislature in which Iowa participated—the one held at Belmont, Wisconsin, in 1836—chartered a road from that town to Dubuque and double tracked it on paper." And on paper it remained.

But in 1850—three years before Dodge made the Mississippi and Missouri survey across the state—a railroad company was organized that promised more than plans on paper. This was the Davenport and Iowa Railroad Company. Professor Shambaugh, whose brochure on Iowa City gives an authoritative account of this early road, says:

"It was, however, not so much the sincere object of the Davenport & Iowa City railroad company to build a railroad as it was their purpose to survey a route, obtain a right of way, show the feasibility of building railroads in Iowa, and, when opportunity should present itself, to transfer their rights and property to the first railroad company that proposed to enter the state, provided Iowa City be made a point in the construction and operation of the road. The desired opportunity came with the organization of M. & M. railroad company at Chicago in 1853."

The transfer of all the rights, franchises, property and stock of the Davenport and Iowa City Railroad Company to the Mississippi and Missouri was made after Messrs. Farnam and Sheffield of the latter company agreed to certain stipulations made by the officials of the former company,—the first being the promise of the M. & M. directors to complete the main line from Davenport to Iowa

City in two years. It was this agreement that sent Peter Dey, chief engineer of the M. & M., into Iowa two weeks after the bargain, and with him went, as has been noted, Grenville M. Dodge as "principal assistant."

Just before Dodge started his survey west of Iowa City with the Missouri River as his destination he wrote his father:

"Yesterday I started my line west of Iowa City and tomorrow I leave for good. Today I bought a saddle horse for \$125.00. I have one wagon for camp chest and provisions and one for stocks and baggage. We have in all, six horses and fourteen men, including the cook and the hunter. The season is late and we cannot look ahead without seeing hardships and exposures never experienced by any of us. The snows on the Missouri are unusually severe, nor can we expect to arrive before they come on. There is also a probability, after arriving at Fort Des Moines, of our locating several hundred miles in order to keep ahead of the so-called Lyons road which is nearly parallel with ours west of Iowa City. The projectors have no money, but they are pushing lines through the state and making a cry to get the counties to take stock. We have moneyed men to back us. My expenses reach \$1,000 a month. Oh, that you could come out and overtake me on the prairies of Iowa and take a week's trip with us, look at the country and see how we live. We shall make an examination of the great Platte as far into Nebraska as we think fit."

The M. & M. surveying party reached Iowa City, the state's capital, late in May and halted. West lay a country not very inviting to railroad builders. The directors of the proposed road seemed uncertain about what they should do, and Dodge was ordered by Henry W. Farnam to return to Chicago and "make a reconnaissance for a road from Moline to Milwaukee." But the directors of the M. & M. were stimulated to continue their survey across Iowa three

months later because of a rival railroad group that had entered the state.

The "so-called Lyons road" that Dodge speaks of in his letter to his father was the Lyons and Iowa Central, basic in building the Chicago and Northwestern across Iowa. Originally this road was planned to extend from Lyons, Iowa, on the Mississippi River, by the way of Des Moines, to Council Bluffs on the Missouri; but when eastern capital became interested the route was altered slightly, Cedar Rapids being included and Des Moines left to the south. Beyond Cedar Rapids this line was known popularly as the Iowa Central Air Line because its promoters, in their haste to beat the M. & M. survey across Iowa, ignored the topography of the country and ran their line to the Missouri River as the crow flies.

In the beginning this road seems to have been an air line in more ways than one, for one of its promoters—a Mr. Adams of New York—went far in advance of surveys, drummed up public meetings and was "so eloquent and persuasive that Iowans could almost hear the whistle of the oncoming locomotives and various counties voted bonds." Mr. Adams was said to be a fugitive from justice, so the state of New York sent General Ney west to arrest him. It is said that the General heard one of his railroad speeches and became so convinced of the possibilities of the road and of the great work Mr. Adams was doing that he returned east without him. But when John I. Blair, of Blairstown, New Jersey, came west and interested himself in the Chicago and Northwestern, and its extension into Iowa, the Rock Island promoters faced a real rival in the race to the Missouri River.

The Chicago and Northwestern group in the West had sensed the importance of reaching the Missouri River about as early as the Rock Island group; and there is no more

romantic page in the history of railroad expansion than the struggle of these roads to traverse Iowa and reach the Missouri River at Council Bluffs.

In the surveying race against time across Iowa the Lyons and Iowa Central was headed by Colonel S. R. Curtis, under whom Dodge was to serve at Pea Ridge, and its chief engineer was Allen Slack, also schooled at Norwich University and a capable railroad man who ended his career with the Southern Pacific. The M. & M. was headed by Peter Dey, but Dodge made the active survey.

The Rock Island really hastened the organization of the M. & M. in 1853 to head off the Lyons Air Line, but the latter's road engineer started from the Mississippi River May 3, 1853, two weeks in advance of Dey and Dodge. Slack and his party reached Iowa City September first. The survey up to this point was made with all the care that was being exercised by the Rock Island crew, hard on their heels; but beyond Iowa City, according to Allen Slack himself, the survey became a mere reconnaissance, for Dodge's party caught up with them and the race for the Missouri River was on. Of this race Slack once said, "In order to get through to Council Bluffs before the cold weather there was no time to revise the line."

It was on September 4, 1853, that Dodge started his surveys west of Iowa City. When they crossed the Divide where Grinnell now stands, the seat of Grinnell College, Dodge ordered a large flag-pole to be erected on the summit, "and marked the place definitely as a controlling point in our survey." A year later, J. B. Grinnell came to Iowa City for the purpose of locating a colony, and it was Dodge who recommended that he locate in the colony where the flag-pole had been placed. The party continued west and reached Fort Des Moines, where Dodge selected forty acres for depot grounds.

On leaving Fort Des Moines, which was little more than a settlement, the party pushed into a wilder country along the Raccoon River and reached the home of Daniel Boone, a relative of the Kentucky Boones. Several men were ill with ague, and Dodge was forced to strengthen his party with an occasional man from the scattered settlements. One young man who joined on the Raccoon River was Wiley Lane, "a strong axeman, well up in all wood-craft and a bee hunter. He could follow a bee to its hive in a tree, so he kept us in honey all the way to Missouri."

The flaming sumac along the lazy Raccoon River, the pencils of gold of its willows, the pageantry of mid-autumn touching cottonwood and elm; black oak and hard maple; the long folds of silvered wild grass, and beneath a soil as black as soot in the lowlands and a rich loam atop the interlocking hills,—all combined to fascinate the young engineer from the stony ground of New England!

Dodge encountered his first Indians when about forty miles from the Missouri River. It was evening and he was out alone looking for a young man named Bacon, a correspondent for a New York paper, who accompanied Chief Engineer Dey from Iowa City in an effort to overtake the surveying party before it reached the river. Bacon had not obeyed Dey's instructions about following the trail and was lost.

Dodge came suddenly upon the Indians—Otoes—"who had been south into Missouri stealing hogs; and they had their ponies loaded with meat and were making north to their country as fast as possible. I was greatly frightened and they were, too. They thought I was a Missourian and after them, so we both got out."

On a late afternoon in November, Dodge, who had made a horseback reconnaissance in advance of his party, drew rein at the edge of a great crescent of yellow cliffs and be-



Peter A. Dey, first chief engineer of the Union Pacific and Dodge's old engineering boss in Illinois in 1852, and who secured Dodge to help him survey to the Missouri River across Iowa in 1853, for the Mississippi and Missouri River Railroad—a subsidiary of the Rock Island



Photo by Louis R. Bostwick, Omaha, Nebraska

The wooden bridge across the Mississippi River at Davenport, Iowa, that led to the famous suit in which Lincoln appeared for the Rock Island Railroad

held the Missouri River, sprawled out on the flood-plain like a great chocolate-colored worm, restless, gnawing at fan-shaped sand-bars and twisting a half-dozen times in its sweep between the villages of Council Bluffs and Omaha. Up from the chimneys of scattered cabins along the edge of the cliffs came the blue smoke of wood fires, and a little farther down on the bottoms was a cluster of buildings that marked the business center of Council Bluffs, which became his home and, partly through his efforts, the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific Railroad.

Council Bluffs was not founded by the Mormons, but they gave the town its first impetus. They reached this point on the Missouri River in 1846 but established themselves on the Nebraska side in what was known as "Winter Quarters," some six miles north of the village of Omaha. But the Indians were all about them and many of them began to drift back across the Missouri River to Council Bluffs, then known as Kanesville. They settled in this village and remained until 1852, when another exodus to Salt Lake City began. Their leave-taking reduced the population of six thousand to less than two thousand five hundred within twelve months.

The importance of the village was not lessened, however, as it remained the strategic outfitter's point for emigrants between St. Louis and St. Paul. The town was to harbor some of the strongest types in the history of the development of Iowa; but it also contained weaker elements who, after having drifted with the emigrant trains as far as the Missouri River, feared to cross the plains, for, twenty miles beyond this point, the Pawnees, the Omahas and the Sioux held sway.

Into this colorful setting on November 22, 1853, came the first railroad surveying party to traverse Iowa from east to west. Six years later Abraham Lincoln was to visit this

village and to meet the young engineer who had won the surveying race to the Missouri, and ten years later Lincoln, as president of the United States, would designate this village as the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific Railroad, whose chief engineer Dodge was to become.

"The citizens welcomed us," said Dodge, "pleased and excited over the possibility of a railroad coming to them, so they gave us a reception and a ball."

In a few days Colonel Curtis and the Lyons Air Line surveying party arrived, and the citizens welcomed them as royally. The two parties seemed to have united temporarily and joined in another big celebration of eating and speech-making in anticipation of the coming of railroads. But they had to wait fourteen years before any rails crept to the town, and they were the rails of the Chicago and Northwestern and not of the Rock Island that had won the surveying race; and Dodge, then chief engineer of the Union Pacific, hastened from the mountains where he was racing the Central Pacific to help the Northwestern close its last sixty-mile gap to the Missouri River in order to speed up the shipment of building materials from the East to the Far West.

CHAPTER III

TRANSCONTINENTAL BIRTH PANGS AND SURVEYS

ON COMPLETING the location of the Mississippi and Missouri River Railroad to Fort Des Moines, Dodge secured a leave of absence and went east to marry Anne Brown, the girl he met at Peru, Illinois. She was visiting his parents in the old home at Danvers, and there they were married May 28, 1854. By the time Dodge got back to Iowa with his bride a panic had halted all railroad promoting as well as building, although he was kept on the pay-roll of the Rock Island, which afforded him one thousand five hundred dollars a year. He had taken up a claim out on the Elkhorn River, twenty-five miles west of Omaha, and to this claim he now took his wife. He entered claims for his father and his brother, Nathan P. Dodge, and they left Danvers and joined him in March, 1855. They put up a log cabin, plowed the virgin prairie and began to farm.

They had been housekeeping less than four months, when, one hot day, two worn and ill men rode up to their cabin on lean spent horses. Dodge was amazed to recognize one of them as Frederick Lander, the man who influenced him to enter Norwich University and become an engineer, and Lander was just as much surprised to meet the man who had been "hired out" as a boy on his mother's farm at Danvers. Lander was completing his survey for the government from Puget Sound to the Missouri River, and of the six men who started with him only one had survived.

That night they sat out on the banks of the Elkhorn and watched the fireflies down in the bottoms and talked railroads.

"Dodge," Lander said, "the Pacific railroad is bound to be built through this valley and if it doesn't run through your claim, I'll be badly mistaken."

"I've already figured that it will," Dodge made known seriously. "How else could it go from the Missouri River if built this far north?"

"The Secretary of War doesn't think it should be built this far north," Lander revealed. "He wants the Pacific railroad to be to the south. I'm going to oppose his views as soon as I get to Washington."

Lander belonged to the engineering corps authorized by the thirty-second Congress to "ascertain the most practicable and economical" route for a railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean. Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, selected the engineers, and he believed that he could control their decisions. The future president of the Southern Confederacy seems to have had set opinions on the subject of a route even before the surveys started. That he wanted the engineers to recommend the route along the thirty-second parallel, or a route not farther north than the thirty-fifth parallel, becomes obvious in the light of his own summary of the reports submitted to him.

Mr. Davis got a world of comfort out of the report submitted by Captain Humphreys, chief of the corps of topographical engineers, for he favored the route of the thirty-second parallel and said that was "the most practicable and economical" and the "shortest" to the Pacific from the Mississippi River. Moreover, along this route the railroad could be built to the Pacific Ocean at a cost not to exceed sixty-eight million dollars, whereas a railroad built along the route of the forty-second would cost one hundred

seventeen million dollars or a little matter of nearly fifty million more. And in addition to this unnecessary expense was the "insurmountable obstacle" of the Rocky Mountains to the north. Captain Humphreys made a fair guess at the cost of building a railroad near the line of the forty-second parallel, but probably his estimates for a line along the thirty-second parallel were fifty or sixty million dollars too low.

But Mr. Davis was highly pleased with Captain Humphreys' conclusion, which the Secretary of War doubtless helped to make up. All would have been well but for the report of the survey of Lieutenant Beckwith along the forty-first parallel and the report of the reconnaissance of Frederick Lander. They found good and sufficient reasons, so they declared, for building the Pacific railroad far to the north of the thirty-second parallel and even north of the thirty-fifth. Mr. Lander's report—a classic of its kind—is a frank comparison of the route of the thirty-second parallel with that of the forty-second. He said:

"The northern route is longer than the southern, but of central position, it can be more readily defended in time of war; it can be more cheaply constructed; and, when built, will command and unite important and conflicting public and private interests."

But there is something else to be gleaned from Mr. Lander's report—the valley of the Platte as the definite line from a point on the Missouri River very near Omaha.

The Lander reconnaissance did not please Jefferson Davis nor the South. For business reasons—if not for political—the South wanted to control the route of the Pacific railroad, and Mr. Davis was in an advantageous position to promote the cause of southern politicians and business men. That he did his best to do so is evidenced by his own

preface to all reports. But southern railroad connection with the Far West seems to have been a business rather than a political ambition of the South in its first battles to have the Pacific railroad built along the line of the thirty-second parallel.

Ten years before these surveys began there was a railroad convention at Memphis that expressed the hopes of the South, and out of this convention grew plans, championed by no less personage than Calhoun, to hasten the building of a road from Charleston to Memphis and to Vicksburg. Indeed a portion of such a road had already been built; and, five years later, or by 1850, it extended as far west as Chattanooga. But far to the north railroads were being pushed across the prairies of Illinois and they were to tap the Mississippi River at Rock Island before the southern road would reach Memphis from Charleston. It was a race for trade between the merchants of the North and the South—a race for the trade of the West.

“More disastrous than the economic failure was the political failure that resulted,” says R. S. Cotterill in *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, March, 1917. He continues:

“The west had been southern in interest, sentiment, and sympathies as long as it looked to New Orleans for an outlet; when its trade went to New York, its interests and sympathies soon followed. A civil war in 1840 might have arrayed the west and south against the north. The south realized her economic failure but only imperfectly comprehended the political aftermath.”

One is led to believe that Jefferson Davis, by 1856, comprehended the political significance of building the Pacific railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean along the route of the thirty-second parallel, despite

the fact that northern railroads had pushed beyond the Mississippi and were building across Iowa to the Missouri. He feared the forty-first and the forty-second parallel routes and did what he could to prove them impracticable and costly.

The route of the forty-second parallel was being backed by the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific, and with this company Dodge stood identified. He had made a private survey through the Platte Valley and on the strength of it the Rock Island hoped to induce eastern capital to help complete the road across Iowa, for the Mississippi and Missouri River Railroad Company, a subsidiary, had failed, and the Rock Island promoters believed that they could get their money back by making a gesture west of the Missouri River. But more than this, they believed that the first road to be built across Iowa would control the route to the west from the Missouri River, and the company selected the village of Council Bluffs as the most strategic point for the Rock Island to end and the Pacific railroad, should the government decide to build, to begin. The move was adroit and far-seeing, and Dodge's decision to settle in or near the town was based on the moves of the company and on his understanding with its directors.

It should be made clear at this point that this particular route to the West, basic in the building of the Union Pacific, was not the discovery of any white man; buffalo and Indians made it an old trail and Mormon emigrant trains lurched along it years before the government and railroad promoters thought of it as a possible route to the Pacific. Lander was quick to see its natural advantage, and so was Dodge, who once remarked that any engineer who overlooked the Platte Valley route as a natural highway to the mountains would not be fit to follow the profession.

Dodge's almost prophetic belief that the Pacific railroad

would be built from a point on the Missouri River near Council Bluffs and through the Platte Valley was, in reality, predicated on his research and devotion to the subject. Peter Dey, his old engineering boss, has revealed this:

“Dodge and I read up everything on the subject;—we read Fremont’s opinion and all of the reports; and we read up Stanbury’s reports of Salt Lake; and we read all the government reports of everything that had been discovered regarding the routes across the continent. Dodge was deeply interested in them and I was to a considerable extent. I think it was in contemplating the possible and probable route of the Pacific railroad that he made his claim on the Elkhorn river,—certainly it was his belief, when gold was discovered at Denver, that the Platte valley would be the line.”

Dey also said that Dodge “took a great fancy to the Missouri River during our survey into Nebraska in 1853.” The sprawling muddy stream seemed to hold a fascination for him, and he always felt at home along its shores. The Elkhorn was a miniature Missouri, and Dodge never tired of studying this little river that was choked with sand-bars and lined with cottonwoods and willows. But Dey demurred when Dodge settled on its bank and said, “It was Indian territory. There were no white men living over there. Sarpy had an Indian trading house down at Bellevue, but there was no one else living on that side of the river.”

Emigrants crossing Nebraska in 1855 never saw a white man’s house between the Missouri River and Denver after passing the Dodge cabin on the Elkhorn. Northwest of the Dodge claims was an embryonic town called Fontenelle, after the chief of the Omahas,—a settlement of people from Quincy, Illinois. Settlers came in fast, and as early as April Dodge went as far as the Loop Fork and laid out the town of Pawnee, now Columbus. While on this trip, his party

had an experience with the Pawnee Indians that indicated how early the issue of the toll bridges threatened the peace of Iowa and Nebraska—which it does to this day.

It seems that the emigrants who had to build bridges across small streams often halted for weeks and charged other emigrants toll. The Indians were quick to follow the white man's example. The Pawnee Indians controlled a bridge over one of the small streams—a bridge built by emigrants who had moved on—and when Dodge and his surveying party came to it, the Indians demanded toll. "The chief came up to Jack Shinn, who was driving our leading wagon," Dodge said, "and told him he was big chief and that the party could not cross until they paid. Shinn got out of the wagon, struck his breast with his hand and told the Indian that he was also a big chief, and we forced the Indians to let us cross without paying."

Dodge began to collect oral and written information about the country west of the Elkhorn, and this led him to study the routes and possible routes from the Missouri River to the Pacific coast. Finally, he decided to sketch a map of the country, basing it on maps by Frémont and others, who had explored between the Missouri River and California. He secured valuable information from the Mormons and other emigrants who were crossing and re-crossing, and the map he made played no small part in controlling later emigration and in concentrating it at Council Bluffs, Iowa, his future home. He said:

"I gave an itinerary on the way, showing each camping place all the way to California,—giving the fords, and where water and wood could be found, etc. This map was published by the citizens of Council Bluffs for the purpose of controlling emigration; and it was the first map of the country giving such information, it had greater influence in concentrating a large portion of the Oregon and California emigration at Council Bluffs—after 1854."

The real value of this map lay in its accuracy regarding fords and places for water and fuel from the Missouri River to Denver, and in its definite influence on emigration between Council Bluffs and Denver, for "when gold was discovered at Denver," Dodge goes on to say, "Mr. Crofutt took this map and cut it in two, on a meridian running through Denver, and changed the route of the emigration so as to turn it through Denver, by the way of the South Platte instead of the North Platte, as shown by the original map. Mr. Crofutt sent me half of the map he had used and I have it framed and hanging in my office."

So the pioneering of the Dodge family on the Elkhorn River thirty miles west of Omaha in the middle 'fifties becomes of more than ordinary significance, for from the hour of his settlement the youthful engineer began his fight for the proposed Pacific railroad to pass through his claim and go up the valley of the Platte River.

In the summer of 1855, the covered wagons, having outfitted at Council Bluffs on the Missouri, began to roll past the Dodge cabin out on the Elkhorn. There were usually trains of twenty wagons, and the Dodge settlement was just far enough west of Omaha to afford a halting-place. The covered wagons often circled between Dodge's house and the Elkhorn River and formed a corral; the stock was driven inside, and the emigrants built fires from the scraggly timber along the stream.

Dodge and his wife often went down to the emigrants' camps, spending the evening and learning of the hopes of the westward-drifting settlers. Occasionally, a few rickety wagons drawn by half-starved horses or oxen would be east bound, coming from Salt Lake and short of provisions; and now and then belated Mormon emigrants, who failed to reach the Missouri River in time for the vanguard of the Mormon exodus from Council Bluffs from 1849 to 1852,



Salt Lake City, foundation of Temple in foreground. The gabled house is Lion House



Photos from Union Pacific Museum

Early street scene in Salt Lake City

halted at the Dodge settlement on the Elkhorn before the final step beyond all settlements and out on the unknown plains.

Twenty-five miles east was the village of Omaha with a population of about five hundred, and to the west were the plains, while all about were Indians that resented these new settlements and planned to wipe them out.

Twelve miles west of the Dodge cabin, on the south side of the Platte River, was the village of the Pawnee Indians. They were scarcely the noble red men of fiction, being cowardly, unreliable and thieves. "They could be beaten off your wagons or premises with a hoe handle," Dodge declared. The Omahas were at Bellevue on the Missouri River and were a stronger tribe. There were roving bands of Poncas, old enemies of the Pawnees, and they usually attempted to involve the settlers in their conflicts.

Late in the summer of 1855 it became evident that the settlers in eastern Nebraska would have to fight it out with the Indians or abandon their homes and retire to the shelter of the village of Omaha. Dodge wanted to fight it out, and the heads of twenty families living within a radius of ten miles of the Dodge claims assembled at his home to consider what to do. Nathan Dodge wrote back to his mother in the old home at Danvers and said: "Gren is a leader out here. The settlers gather in his cabin whenever the Indians become troublesome." The settlers finally decided to await further developments, which came swiftly.

A band of Pawnees suddenly appeared and accused Dodge of befriending and hiding certain Poncas, their old foes, in his house. He ordered them to leave his place and his aggressive manner won the day, although he once admitted that he was badly frightened. But when war broke out between the Omahas and the Sioux the situation became

different. The Omahas camped near Dodge's cabin on July twenty-fourth, and with them was their dead chief, Fontenelle, lashed to teepee poles attached to a pony. He had been killed in a battle with the Sioux who, emboldened by their success, decided to clean out the whites as well. The settlers were forced to leave their crops and homes, and Dodge took his family to Council Bluffs, where he spent the winter.

In the spring he went back to work for the Mississippi and Missouri River Railroad with headquarters at Iowa City. Peter Dey, the Rock Island engineer, had journeyed from Iowa City to the Dodge settlement on the Elkhorn in Nebraska one bitter day in January and told Dodge that the railroad company wanted him to begin work again, as the prospects for renewing railroad building seemed good.

Different villages along the Missouri River, both in Iowa and in Nebraska, began to compete for the western terminus of the Mississippi and Missouri River Railroad in 1856, though it was not any farther west than Iowa City, nor was it to reach the Missouri River until eleven years later, and then as the Rock Island. But the fight for these villages to secure the terminus of what was thought to be the first railroad that would cross Iowa and reach the Missouri really foreshadowed a more intense struggle between these same towns to secure the terminus of the Union Pacific in 1862. Council Bluffs, Iowa, opposite Omaha, and Florence, Nebraska, six miles north of Omaha, were the chief contestants for the M. & M. terminus. Dodge waged the fight for Omaha and Council Bluffs against a powerful land-bank group of Davenport with large holdings in and around the village of Florence.

He succeeded in convincing the directors of the M. & M. that it would cost the company an extra quarter-million dollars to pass up Council Bluffs, swing the line to the north

of the original survey and cross the Missouri River to the village of Florence, Nebraska. His estimates may have been about two hundred thousand dollars high, but he won his point.

All this activity was occasioned by large grants of land from the state of Iowa in 1856 on behalf of four railroad companies,—the Burlington and Missouri, the Cedar Rapids and Missouri River, the Dubuque & Sioux City, and the Mississippi and Missouri. These roads were respectively the genesis of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy; the Chicago and Northwestern; the Illinois Central; and the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific.

The directors of the old M. & M. themselves stimulated the fight for the terminus between Council Bluffs and Florence in order to get the counties to vote bonds in favor of the road. This was the plan of John A. Dix, president; of Henry Farnam, the road's builder; and of Thomas C. Durant—later the first vice-president of the Union Pacific—who enters the picture for the first time in railroad affairs in western Iowa and eastern Nebraska, and who was a dominant figure from that time on. Durant was probably the master mind behind the plan, for his ability to create rivalry between the towns of Nebraska and Iowa was one of his chief characteristics in the ten-year period that followed.

No shrewder railroad promoter than Durant ever operated in the railroad history of the country. For this particular work he remained in the background and Henry Farnam, on behalf of the railroad, became the spokesman. He went before the citizens of Pottawattamie County, in which Council Bluffs is located, and said that if the county would vote bonds to the amount of three hundred thousand dollars he would begin to grade the M. & M. railroad at Council Bluffs and work back east across Iowa, thus guaran-

teeing that the line would not be built to the north to terminate at Florence, Nebraska. He then crossed the river to Omaha—a bitter rival of the village of Florence—and said that if Douglas County, of which Omaha is the county-seat, would vote two hundred thousand dollars in bonds to the M. & M. the work would start in Council Bluffs during the year.

The move was adroit, for the M. & M. was at the end of its tether as neither Federal nor state aid was forthcoming,—Federal aid in Iowa being prohibited by the state's constitution to the extent of the amount desired. Durant was shrewd enough to learn all about the population, trade and financial status of the county of Pottawattamie, and he believed that both Omaha and Council Bluffs were inevitable termini for future transcontinental railroad building.

He learned from Dodge that the village of Council Bluffs, owing to the great volume of emigration that poured through it, had a one million dollar a year wholesale and retail business, notwithstanding that the entire population of the county in 1857 was less than eight thousand. Moreover, great tides of emigration were often checked in this section for upward of a year outfitting for the final journey to the Far West.

But no sooner did the Council Bluffs citizens get Florence, Nebraska, out of the way than a new danger presented itself—Omaha—although up to this time Omaha had worked with Council Bluffs to secure the terminus for the latter place. The village of Omaha feared the rival village of Florence six miles north more than it feared the village of Council Bluffs across the river in Iowa, but Council Bluffs feared Omaha.

The directors of the M. & M. sought to allay the fears of the Council Bluffs citizens by stating again that if Pottawattamie County would vote the bonds desired to the

amount of three hundred thousand dollars, they "would commence work at the Missouri River and grade east" until the grading met and joined the grading that had stopped at Des Moines. So the bonds were voted June 13, 1857; but in October the road went into the hands of receivers without a foot of grading having been made from Council Bluffs eastward, although Dodge, subsequently, graded twelve miles.

In the readjustment, the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific became the dominant company, and Messrs. Farnam and Sheffield, trying to keep faith with the people of western Iowa, ordered Dodge to begin grading in November, 1858. However, the work soon halted, as the bonds could not be sold. The truth is, a fight that lasted ten years began between the directors and stockholders of the Rock Island. One group in New York City, designated by the Council Bluffs *Nonpareil* as the "gang" and "stock-jobbers of Wall Street," opposed extending the M. & M. beyond Des Moines, "clamoring for larger dividends"; and the other group was enjoined from "further expenditure in building west of Des Moines."

But the failure of the first proposed railroad across the state of Iowa was occasioned by more than a quarrel between the directors. The national panic of 1857 contributed heavily to the collapse of all railroad projects. Western Iowa and eastern Nebraska were caught in the midst of land speculations; the panic checked the flow of eastern money and land values tumbled—land that had been boosted to seven dollars an acre fell to the original price, one dollar and twenty-five cents.

Dodge finally decided to make his home in Council Bluffs, and he became a partner with John Baldwin in banking, milling, merchandising, contracting, freighting and real estate. This reveals how varied were the interests of

men in the Missouri River towns during the late 'fifties. He decided to settle in the town because he believed it to be the logical and inevitable terminus of the proposed Pacific railroad; and when he went there it was quite evident that it would become the termini of the roads building west from Chicago. Moreover, he believed—and many others with him—that fortunes would be made in land when that terminus was fixed.

In the former belief he was right; in the latter he was to be disappointed, for the location of the terminus of the Union Pacific in Council Bluffs made no one a fortune in real estate, although among those who thought it would were several of the nation's outstanding financial and political leaders, including Norman B. Judd, John Sherman, Henry Farnam, William B. Ogden and Abraham Lincoln. But the general belief that fortunes were to be made in real estate in Council Bluffs because of the coming railroads brought many charges against their promoters.

Out of the factional fights in railroad circles, out of the speculation of individuals who rushed into real-estate ventures as men do into a gold-field, and out of the general panic of 1857 there emerges clearly the "Iowa mind" on railroads and railroad promoters. Iowa railroad psychology, in the years that followed, was unyielding. When Dodge, Farnam, Durant, Norman Judd or John I. Blair bought an acre or a lot, charges were made that important surveys were altered to cause the line to pass through the real-estate holdings of the promoters. It mattered not that the engineers, feeling their way across a state where railroads had never gone, sought the best routes and the best termini; those who stood by and looked on came to disbelieve and finally to accuse. As *The Council Bluffs Bugle* said:

"It has been rumored that G. M. Dodge, in consequence of being so largely interested in the Riddle Tract, and in other lands in and around Council Bluffs, was bound to make his surveys in such manner as would insure his own investments and investments of other Mississippi & Missouri Railroad Company promoters. If fraud has been committed it should be known."

So there was talk of "lot jobbers" and of "floating railroads" on swamp-lands, and disbelief grew in the ulterior motives of railroad builders. This was the situation when Abraham Lincoln visited Council Bluffs in the summer of 1859.

CHAPTER IV

LINCOLN VISITS DODGE'S HOME TOWN

AFTER Dodge and his wife boarded up their log cabin on the Elkhorn and moved to Council Bluffs on the Iowa side of the Missouri River he wrote his mother of the change, expressed his belief in the town's future as a railway center, and, in a more critical mood, revealed the complete break he had made with his New England environment.

"We are on the borders of civilization, yet in daily contact with St. Louis by first-class steamers, and with the Mississippi river at Rock Island, Illinois, by a line of stages. At this point [Council Bluffs] five railroads are concentrating, and in four years you can step from your house into a car and be whirled along by steam across a country that was wild and inhabited by wild beasts and red men. I hear you do not like western character and people, but I believe I can convince you of the purity, honesty and talents of these people by an extract from Senator Seward's speech on the Nebraska Bill. The speech is a just tribute to the west, and when I look at the east and see its disposition to bear down and tread on the west, why I am tempted to disown her."

The Baldwin and Dodge real-estate firm, owing to the influences of the near panic, made slow progress. Money was scarce, and Dodge went east and tried to borrow. He met with indifferent success and wrote a dispirited letter to his wife, complaining about the weather, his loneliness and

the "fashion of Fifth Avenue, which is above my standard." Finally, he got in touch with a money-lender who seemed willing to take a chance on Council Bluffs becoming a railroad center and borrowed nine thousand dollars to invest for his firm. This loan was to prove his financial undoing when he was campaigning with Grant in Mississippi and with no opportunity to guide his own affairs. But with the money in his pocket he hurried back to his home, and the Baldwin-Dodge Company broadened its investments and included a freighting business on the plains, sending the first flour from the Missouri River to Denver.

It was at this time that he purchased, on behalf of the Mississippi and Missouri River Railroad Company, the piece of land down on the flood-plain of the Missouri River known as the "Riddle Tract." The company ordered him to retain a portion of the land for the road's contemplated shops and yards and to subdivide the remainder and place it on the market. Among the purchasers of these new town lots was Norman B. Judd, attorney for the M. & M., and a legal and political associate of Lincoln.

Norman Judd believed that this land would become of great value when the Mississippi and Missouri River Railroad reached Council Bluffs and, as a direct consequence, linked up with the proposed Pacific railroad. So he bought seventeen lots—for which he paid three thousand five hundred dollars—that were but a stone's throw from where the M. & M. had decided to make its terminus. He does not seem to have done this fully upon his own reconnaissance since Dodge, as a member of the Dodge and Baldwin real estate and banking firm, conducted an intensive campaign to market these lots and doubtless helped Judd to a decision.

But Judd—the future ambassador to Germany under Lincoln—had borrowed the money to invest in this land,

his rate of interest was high and he began to wish that he hadn't made the bargain. The panic of 1857 came and the bottom fell out of land values. Dodge was in just as deep and advised Judd and the other investors to hold on and await developments. There was nothing else to do but hold on; they couldn't let go.

Business life irked Dodge and he was anxious to return to active surveying for the M. & M. He wanted to be on the go, he craved action, he yearned to do things; and the Rock Island Railroad Company, despite the hard times, put him back on the pay-roll, and he busied himself with completing surveys in western Iowa.

Unable to free himself of his love for military things, he organized the Council Bluffs Guards—the first company on the western border of Iowa—and equipped it with money out of his own pockets. This military gesture was looked upon with suspicion by many of the settlers, but the organization was to play a conspicuous part in the opening days of the Civil War,—the people who criticized it finally running to its shelter. Moreover, he lobbied in the Iowa legislature vainly trying to get a militia bill passed. The legislators yawned over the proposition and some made sarcastic remarks about the recently arrived "easterner with militaristic notions."

In the spring of 1859 he went to the valley of the Platte on a third railroad reconnaissance for Henry Farnam of the Rock Island, and he took time to look after business at Fort Cottonwood where his firm had established a relay station and opened a store with his father in charge. He got back to Council Bluffs on August eleventh, the day before Abraham Lincoln and the Honorable O. M. Hatch, of Illinois reached the village by boat from St. Joseph, Missouri.

Carl Sandburg may have been but romancing about the

actual words of Lincoln when he wrote, "In the year just passed (1859) Lincoln had traversed the western frontier. He had stood in Council Bluffs and told a man, 'Not one but many roads will center here.' The youth of the country, the field of its future, was in his bones." But Sandburg wasn't romancing about Lincoln's presence in Council Bluffs in the summer of 1859 nor about railroads being one of the main topics of conversation among the citizens of this potential railroad town.

Lincoln had been down in Kansas making a political speech and on reaching St. Joseph, instead of taking the only line of railroad across Missouri at that time to return to Illinois, went aboard a stern-wheel steamboat that toiled up-stream nearly two hundred miles to the old outfitters' town, sprawling down on the flood-plain of the Missouri River at the base of the yellow cliffs.

It is now evident for all who care to see it, that Lincoln was brooding over railroads as well as slavery in 1859, and his visit to Council Bluffs, when stripped of traditions, contains a body of facts that holds great significance for those who are interested in the route of the first transcontinental railroad and in the fixing of its eastern terminus on the banks of the Missouri River. Lincoln did, in his second order on March 7, 1864, locate the initial point of the Union Pacific in a township in which Council Bluffs is situated, and near a tract of land to which he held a quitclaim deed. The story must be told in detail to appreciate its salient features.

Residing in Council Bluffs in 1859, and among its leaders, were two families from Springfield, Illinois—the Puseys and the Officers. They had known Lincoln and were intimate enough to have him call them by their first names. Lincoln, upon arriving at Council Bluffs, mixed business with pleasure, for he was happy to see his old acquaintances and to know that they prospered.

But he had gone far out of his way for business rather than social reasons. Norman Judd, who had managed his debates with Douglas, had asked him for a loan of three thousand dollars, being short of money as usual, and he offered as security the seventeen lots purchased from Dodge two years before. Lincoln wanted to see this land before he made the loan, and more than this, there is certain evidence to show that he made his trip to the West in 1859 to learn what he could of the railroad situation of western Iowa and eastern Nebraska, for this section seemed about to become basic in Pacific railroad legislation.

Lincoln's brief career as a railway attorney for Illinois roads is augmented by his far-seeing plans to identify himself with the building of the first great transcontinental system. His connection with the Rock Island, then pointing toward Council Bluffs through its subsidiary, the M. & M., was well known from his representing the company in the celebrated bridge case on the Mississippi; and it is more than probable that he planned to link closer his career with the great enterprise of building a road to the Pacific Ocean. When he went to Council Bluffs he wanted to see the piece of land Judd offered as security for the loan, but he also desired first-hand information from various railroad groups of the Northwestern, the Burlington, and the Rock Island that were rapidly concentrating their efforts to reach this strategic town on the Missouri River.

So Lincoln came to town, although there is a dispute whether he arrived unheralded or whether a delegation of citizens met him at the ferry "and drove him around in the best carriage to see the sights." It is probable that his visit was unexpected and that he rode along the road from the river to the Pacific House in an omnibus, and then made his presence known to his old Springfield acquaintances. Anyhow, *The Nonpareil* of August 12, 1859, said:

"Hon. Abe Lincoln and the Secretary of State for Illinois, Hon. O. M. Hatch, arrived in our city last evening, and are stopping at the Pacific House. The distinguished 'Sucker' has yielded to the solicitations of our citizens, without distinction of parties, and will speak on the political issues of the day at Concert Hall this evening. The celebrity of the speaker will most certainly insure him a full house. Go and hear old Abe."

Although Lincoln registered at the Pacific House—a famous hostelry whose chief characteristics were sagging floors and great double porches—W. H. M. Pusey hastened to give him a reception and many attended, including Ly-sander Babbitt, editor of *The Bugle*, a Democratic paper that afterward manifested marked copperhead tendencies.

The next morning Lincoln, accompanied by Pusey and others, walked to a high cliff overlooking the town, and the man from Illinois was deeply impressed by what he saw. From the point where he stood, now marked with a stone shaft, the vast flood-plain of the Missouri River stretched before him for twenty miles north and south and for four miles from his position to the western banks of the Missouri on the Nebraska side. The bottom-lands, instead of being a checker-board of railroad tracks as they are to-day, were unbroken fields of wild grass and sunflowers, while beyond the river, the few streets of the rapidly growing town of Omaha ran up and down the river hills. But the only thing that Lincoln saw that remotely resembled a railroad was a couple of miles of grading that Dodge had done for the M. & M. the year before to stimulate the sale of bonds. All railroads, as far as Council Bluffs was concerned, were nearly a decade in the future.

Tradition has it—Council Bluffs tradition—that as Lincoln stood on this eminence the morning of August 13, 1859, he told his companions that the distant flood-plain of

the Missouri River was the logical place for the terminus of the Union Pacific Railroad and that he would so designate it. But of course Lincoln said nothing of the kind, for there was no Union Pacific Railroad Company; its charter was three years in the future; there was no chosen route for the Pacific railway; nor did Lincoln or any one else, in 1859, possess authority to decide termini and designate routes.

But Lincoln, according to Pusey, his host, did say, "Not one, but many railroads will center here," which would have been in keeping with the things that he was thinking.

In honor of the man who debated with Douglas, the citizens planned a "bowery dinner" and selected a little park in the center of the town for the place of the feast. The ladies prepared a spread of many things, but in an unguarded moment, about an hour before supper, "a gang of marauders," watching the proceedings, crashed the gate, seized the fried chicken and cake and made off. They knew not Abraham Lincoln! But the Illinoisan joked about the incident and remarked on the astuteness of the food-snatchers. Then he went to the Pusey home and had his supper.

After the meal, Lincoln strolled over to Concert Hall where he was to speak, and it was packed. The young Republican Party in the town, taking no chances on a crowd, had literally sowed down the community with hand-bills. In addition to announcing Lincoln, they also revealed that a Judge Test, recently from Indiana and a Democrat, would speak. Now, as Judge Test was supposed to be in opposition to Lincoln's views on slavery, it promised to be a warm evening in more ways than one. But Test had changed his views, almost overnight as it would seem, and become a Republican, so "the affair was nearly a love feast."

Lincoln's speech at Concert Hall was never recorded, but Council Bluffs' two newspapers commented according to their political bias. Said *The Nonpareil*:



Union Pacific bridge, Missouri River, at Council Bluffs, involved in famous suit of 1874



Pacific House, Council Bluffs, Iowa

"In the brief limits of a newspaper article it were impossible to give even an outline of his masterly and unanswerable speech. The clear and lucid manner in which he set forth the true principles of the republican party, the dexterity with which he applied the political scalpel to the democratic carcass, beggars all description at our hands. Suffice it that the speaker fully and fairly sustained the great reputation he acquired in the memorable Illinois campaign as a man of great intellectual power, a close and sound reasoner."

But *The Bugle*—incidentally an old foe of Dodge—sourly remarked:

"He apologized very handsomely for appearing before an Iowa audience during a campaign in which he was not interested. He then announced his intention to speak about the 'eternal negro,' and entered into a lengthy and ingenious analysis of the nigger question, impressing upon his hearers that it was the only question to be agitated until finally settled. He carefully avoided going directly to the extreme ground occupied by him in his canvass against Douglas, yet the doctrines which he preached, carried out to their legitimate results, amounted to precisely the same thing. His speech was of the character of an exhortation to the republican party, but was in reality as good a speech as could have been made for the interest of the democracy. He was listened to with much attention, for his Waterloo defeat by Douglas has magnified him into quite a lion here."

Dodge was in Lincoln's audience that night, but he never made any comment on the address. The following afternoon, while Lincoln lingered in town waiting for his steamboat to undergo slight repair for the down-river journey, Dodge joined a group of citizens on the big porch of the Pacific House and heard Lincoln deliver an informal speech in answer to certain questions. Shortly after the talk, and when most of the crowd had dispersed, Pusey saw

Dodge—whom he did not know was in town—and pointed him out to Lincoln, telling the Illinoian that the young engineer knew more about railroads than any “two men in the country.”

Lincoln studied Dodge intently for a moment and then slowly crossed the porch to where he sat on a bench. Pusey introduced them, and Lincoln sat down on the bench, crossed his long legs, swung his foot for a moment and said:

“Dodge, what’s the best route for a Pacific railroad to the West?”

“From this town out the Platte Valley,” was the instant rejoinder.

Lincoln pondered the reply for a time and then drawled: “Why do you think so?”

Lincoln’s question was more of design than Dodge then understood, so it started him on an argument for the route of the forty-second parallel as the “most practical and economical” for the building of the Pacific railroad, and with his home town as the “logical point of beginning.”

“Why do you consider this town the logical beginning point for the Pacific railroad?” Lincoln asked in his slow penetrating manner.

“Because of the railroads building from Chicago to this point,” Dodge replied.

Lincoln weighed every word, and each time Dodge checked himself Lincoln stimulated him with a question that was half a doubt, and in this adroit manner he led the young engineer on until the Illinoian was in possession of all the information Dodge had gleaned privately for the Rock Island Railroad Company on the best route to the West. Or as Dodge once put it:

“He shelled my woods completely and got all the information I’d collected for Henry Farnam, my employer.”

Dodge’s conversation with Lincoln on the porch of the

Pacific House that summer afternoon of 1859 lasted less than an hour, but it may have altered the railroad history of the nation. How Lincoln recalled this meeting when he was president and confronted with serious railroad problems, and how he leaned on Dodge to help him solve them, will be told in another chapter. Too much need not be claimed for Dodge on the score of helping Lincoln to decide the question of the Union Pacific's eastern terminus and, as a consequence, the route across the plains to the base of the Rockies. It is quite enough to establish certain relations and to interpret them in their true light.

But Dodge's home town, unto this day, speaks with pride and joy of the visit Lincoln made to it nine months before his nomination; of the reception tendered him at the Pusey home; of his speech in Concert Hall in the dim light of the tallow candles; of his stroll up the ravine to the top of a great hill, Moses-like to view the landscape; of how he sat on the porch of the Pacific House and talked with the citizens; and finally, of his departure, standing at the rail of the steamboat as it swung out into the river, with his hat in his hand and his face toward the yellow cliffs that lifted above the sun-scorched village on that mid-August afternoon.

CHAPTER V

RAILROAD INFLUENCES IN LINCOLN'S NOMINATION AND AFTER

AFTER Lincoln's visit to Council Bluffs, Dodge, at the behest of the Rock Island Railroad Company, went to New York to make a report of his surveys west of the Missouri River. Certain directors of this company who had lost heavily in the failure of the Mississippi and Missouri River Railroad felt that they might recuperate these losses and revive financial interest in the Rock Island by announcing to the public the results of Dodge's surveys west of the Missouri River. Their theory was that new investors could be secured for the Rock Island if Dodge's surveys showed that the road's western terminus at Council Bluffs was also the logical eastern terminus of the proposed Pacific railroad.

So Dodge met the directors of the Rock Island Railroad Company, and the secretary read his report of the preliminary surveys through the Platte River Valley and on through the Rocky Mountains. Most of the directors "seemed bored and left the room," but there was one man who lingered and pondered everything that Dodge said: Thomas C. Durant, who became the first vice-president of the Union Pacific and its guiding genius for the first five years of its history.

"I believe your road will draw the bulk of emigration crossing the Missouri to Council Bluffs," Dodge told the officials of the Rock Island. "It will then go up the north

side of the Platte River along the Mormon trail. The Pacific railroad is bound to be built along this trail."

Dodge returned to Council Bluffs and tried to settle down to business, but his diary for this period reveals how restless he was, and he roamed from Council Bluffs to Chicago, to St. Louis and through the valley of the Platte again. He wanted to build railroads; he loved the surveys through the virgin country; he was fond of the life of the camp. May came and Norman B. Judd, then doing yeoman service on behalf of Lincoln, wrote him and said, "I want you to come to the Republican convention at Chicago and do what you can to help nominate Lincoln."

Dodge seems to have entered Iowa as a Democrat, following politically in the footsteps of his father, the Danvers, Massachusetts, postmaster who had been thus rewarded for his support of James K. Polk. But an old book of city ordinances of Council Bluffs reveals that he was a Republican alderman as early as 1859. We learn from his diary that he attended the Iowa Democratic State Convention that nominated Curtis Bates for governor and there is no indication of a change of political thought then or up to the beginning of 1856. "Attended Democratic Convention. Colonel Sharpe of Missouri spoke. Made a good speech. Bates nominated for governor. Very full convention." But Curtis Bates was defeated by James W. Grimes, the last Whig to be elected governor of Iowa, for the birth of the Republican Party was at hand in the state.

Dodge, however, had no love for the Whigs,—back in the old home they had always fought his father; and, despite the fact that he had supported James K. Polk, the Danvers Whigs nearly succeeded in getting another man appointed postmaster. So a Whig was a Whig, whether in Massachusetts or Iowa, and perhaps he would have always remained a Democrat but for the significant thing that

happened in Iowa in 1856. Governor Grimes, who had been nominated on a Whig platform in 1854, was slowly leading Iowa into the young Republican Party, and Dodge, in keeping with hundreds of Iowa Democrats—Free-soilers—followed him a year later.

At this distance it seems that it was President Buchanan's inaugural address that caused Dodge's final break with the Democratic Party. He feared that the doctrines of "squatter sovereignty," carried to their logical conclusions, might even prevent the Federal government from building the Pacific railroad. Wouldn't a state have the right to say whether a railroad should traverse it, and wholly regardless of what Congress might legislate? If the theory of state rights prevailed could there ever be agreement about the building of railroads? Anyhow, he comments on Buchanan's inaugural address and doubts its logic. "The inaugural address sticks for state rights, but squatter sovereignty is no additional help for the Pacific railroad. The address is milk-warm and digs the Republican Party."

Dodge greatly admired Stephen A. Douglas, and when he made his famous vindication speech in Chicago, Dodge wrote in his diary: "Five thousand attended and disturbed him very much. But it was able." But Abraham Lincoln had begun to define "squatter sovereignty" as the very essence of the Declaration of Independence in the clause that declared all men to be free and equal, and from this no party, or faction within a party, would ever be able to appeal. So when in 1857 Dodge wrote in his diary once more, "Attended the Republican State Convention as a delegate from Pottawattamie County," the break with the party of his fathers was complete.

The Iowa delegation to the Chicago Republican Convention went uninstructed, but Senator Seward was supposed to be the favorite, although on the first ballot Iowa gave

Seward two votes and Lincoln two, and scattered the remainder between Bates, Cameron, Chase and McLean.

Dodge was acquainted with very few of the Iowa delegation, but he knew those most interested in the state's railroad projects. There were H. M. Hoxie, of Des Moines, who would receive the contract to construct the first one hundred miles of the Union Pacific; John A. Kasson, of Des Moines, attorney for the Mississippi and Missouri Railroad, who drafted the major portion of the Chicago platform; J. B. Grinnell, who founded the town and college of Grinnell along the line of the M. & M. that was now the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific; and William Penn Clarke, active in extending the M. & M. from the Mississippi River to Iowa City, then the capital of the state.

At Chicago Dodge joined himself to a group of railroad men who considered the candidacy of Abraham Lincoln vital to their plans of building a Pacific railroad from the Mississippi River, or perhaps from the Missouri, somewhere along the forty-second parallel. They were John A. Dix, president of the Rock Island; Thomas C. Durant, later the moving spirit in the Union Pacific; Sheffield and Farnam, builders of the Rock Island; John I. Blair, then promoting the Cedar Rapids and Missouri Railroad across Iowa; and Norman B. Judd, attorney for the Rock Island and a leader in Lincoln's political affairs.

Late in his life General Dodge was asked if there was any concerted effort on the part of railroad groups in the Chicago convention to nominate Lincoln; and, although he had said many things in an earlier day to indicate that Lincoln stood quite close to certain railroad interests, he was reluctant to connect his nomination with a powerful corporation that was not popular with the people. Dodge avoided the question by stating that if there were combinations of railroad interest at work he knew nothing of them.

A railroad attorney wrote the railroad plank for the Lincoln platform—John A. Kasson, of Iowa. This within itself may not be convincing, but added to it is the fact that at the midnight conference in the Tremont House, where leaders of the Iowa delegation decided to cast the vote of the state for Lincoln on the following day, all the railroad influences of Illinois and of Iowa were brought to bear. When Norman B. Judd urged Dodge to attend the Chicago Convention and work for Lincoln he understood it to be a railroad call as much as anything else and, behind the scenes, he worked unceasingly for the man who the railroad promoters believed meant more to them than all the other candidates combined.

After Lincoln's nomination Dodge went on to New York and conferred with the directors of the Rock Island, and plans were laid, in the event of Lincoln's election, to move directly upon him and urge him to support measures calling for the building of a railroad from a point on the Missouri River near Council Bluffs, Iowa, to San Francisco. The first move of this railroad group is significant enough to all who care to see it. Lincoln's nomination was so interwoven with the work of Chicago railroad promoters who, in turn, were so close both to political and railroad groups in Iowa, that to narrate something of the state's attitude toward his nomination and of its political leaders' influence on him after his inauguration is vital to an understanding of men and motives.

Iowa had been slow to recognize the greatness and the genius of Abraham Lincoln. Editorial "leanings" in 1858-1859 included Frémont, Seward, McLean, Chase, Bell, Crittenden and others. But Lincoln did not fully appear in the picture as presidential "timber." His debates with Douglas had received but passing notice save in two or three papers, and few sensed the strength of his utterances.

Douglas had defeated him in the political race, so the forensic struggle was not to be considered. Lincoln had lost, and perhaps many thought that he was also undone. Months passed before the people began to grasp the significance, and even the eternity, of what he said in his contest with Douglas. The Morrissey-Heenan fisticuff in Canada in October, 1858, attracted more attention than the debates at Quincy and Alton the same month. *The New York Herald* and *The Tribune*, which had wide circulation in Iowa, gave many Iowa editors both their political and sporting cues. Of course there was considerable interest in Iowa in the debates, and people in the eastern part of the state took advantage of the excursions to hear them at Freeport, Galesburg, Rock Island and other points, but there was more curiosity than understanding.

The young Republican Party in Iowa prepared for a hot campaign in 1860 in so far as state offices were concerned, but the leaders shied at attempting to name a presidential candidate. Eastern papers for the most part were backing Seward and Chase, and Iowa editors perhaps warmed to their candidacy above that of other aspirants. But the State Convention chose its delegates to the National Convention and left them uninstructed. Horace Greeley pondered this action on the part of Iowa Republicans and likely feared it, but he merely said:

“The delegates from Iowa will go to Chicago to nominate a Presidential ticket—the strongest ticket possible—and to this end will be glad to listen to the suggestions of well informed friends at Washington and elsewhere; but they go unpledged and at liberty to hear all suggestions and then to do what shall commend itself to their unfettered judgment as best for the cause. As it is in Iowa, so it will be elsewhere.”

But as it was in Iowa, Horace Greeley was praying that it would not be elsewhere, for *The Tribune* by this time had sensed that the struggle at Chicago would be between Seward and Lincoln, and it favored Seward. *The New York Herald* predicted that Iowa's vote would go to Cameron. But the Iowans went to Chicago divided among a half-dozen candidates. "Iowa is discordant and uncertain," Greeley said in *The Tribune* on the eve of this convention. And this was true.

But accompanying Iowa's thirty-two delegates to the Republican Convention at Chicago were a number of able young Republicans who favored Lincoln and who went to Chicago for the express purpose of trying to influence the delegates unfavorable to him. Samuel J. Kirkwood, Iowa's governor, became chief among them after reaching Chicago. Henry Farnam, president of the Chicago and Rock Island Railroad Company, had sent him a pass. "I take it for granted," wrote Farnam, "that you will be in Chicago during the session of the Republican Convention next month, and I write to say that Mrs. Farnam and myself will be most happy to see yourself and Mrs. Kirkwood at our house during that time. Enclosed is a pass for yourself and lady which please use at your pleasure. My house is 163 Michigan Avenue."

This was a great convenience to Iowa's Governor, for he wasn't a delegate and he would have had to pay his own and his wife's expenses; moreover the Chicago and Rock Island just reached Iowa City and the Governor would not have to stage it to Chicago. The move of Henry Farnam, president of the Chicago and Rock Island, was most adroit, for Governor Kirkwood had wavered between Chase and Seward, and Iowa's delegation appeared to be two-thirds in favor of the latter.

Neither William B. Allison, John A. Kasson, Coker

Clarkson nor William Hepburn were for Lincoln on the first ballot. But Kirkwood persisted and with him stood Alvin Saunders, later Nebraska's territorial governor through Lincoln's appointment, and Charles C. Nourse of the Iowa delegation—two men of undisputed power. And farther in the background was a persistent railroad group made up of Farnam and Judd, of Illinois; and Dodge, John F. Dillon and Hiram Price, of Iowa—a group that never lost an opportunity to impress Iowa's halting delegates that in Abraham Lincoln the nation would have a president whose program was bound to include the building of the Pacific railroad, and along the line of the forty-second parallel, which meant that it would cross Iowa.

After Lincoln's nomination Dodge tried to settle back into the groove of business, but rumors of war stirred him greatly. He felt that the North should not yield to the South in a single matter touching the Constitution, but he had no strong predilections for the negro. Under date of December 16, 1860, he wrote his mother:

“No amount of clamoring should move the North and the South should not be allowed to break up this Union. Old hypocritical Boston, I see, trembles. She had better pattern after a western city—Chicago—that stands to its guns to defend the negro from Nebraska being taken back into that territory as a slave, when, under the constitution, he is free.”

He was not an abolitionist at this time, nor did he ever become one in a radical sense. When the war broke out he took the position that the sooner the slaves were prevented from doing the work of the South the sooner the conflict would end and the Union be preserved.

Dodge worked to secure favorable action to establish an arsenal at Rock Island, Illinois. Henry Farnam, of the

Rock Island Company, and Dodge's friend, Peter R. Reed, of Moline, were foremost in securing the desired legislation. Under date of December 14, 1860, Reed wrote Dodge a letter that bears out further the fact that Lincoln was identified with railroad interests and that certain promoters expected much of him. Reed said:

"I was in Chicago last week and saw Farnam and he told me that he expected you here soon. Things look bad in business matters. Everybody is scared and don't know whether they are to be killed or not. We are all looking anxiously to Washington for relief. On returning to Moline from Chicago I went by the way of Springfield and saw Lincoln. He assisted us in warding off the attack of Major Lindsay before the legislature of this state. I wanted to see him on the arsenal matter and when I got through with it I called his attention to the needs of the people of Nebraska and the western slope of Iowa. I said to him that our interest had been badly neglected. I told him that I expected to see some men from Council Bluffs in regard to this matter and that you were one of them. He said that his sympathies were with the border people as he was a border man himself. I think that we are all right with Mr. Lincoln, especially as we have N. B. Judd with us and Herbert Hoxie, of Des Moines."

So Dodge planned to attend Lincoln's inauguration and to remain in Washington and help secure legislation favorable to the route of the Platte Valley for the Pacific railroad. Railroad promoters descended on Washington as never before. The subject of transportation had become vital to the government.

The whole story of Dodge's journey to Washington, of his work there, and of the rapidly unfolding drama of the war is filled with interest and significance. He left Council Bluffs in February and was caught in one of the heaviest snow-storms in the history of Iowa. Drifts were from

ten to twenty feet deep and cattle were buried beneath them; scores of ill-prepared emigrants, en route to Colorado because of the gold excitement, were caught in this storm and suffered greatly, leaving their dead scattered from Des Moines to the Missouri River.

At Des Moines Dodge was joined by John A. Kasson, who was going to Washington to fight for the position of first assistant postmaster-general and who would secure it, and together they journeyed to New York. This proved the deepening of their friendship—a friendship that lasted until 1866 when Dodge defeated Kasson for his seat in Congress that he held from 1863 to 1867—a seat that Kasson lost ultimately because of his advocacy of the policies of Andrew Johnson.

In New York Dodge met the railroad promoters, and they laid their plans to descend on the President and Congress. Accompanied by Farnam and Thomas C. Durant, he went to the capital just before the inauguration of Lincoln. Three days prior to this event Dodge wrote his wife, "I came here with Farnam, Durant, Blair, Tracy and Cook, and we are busy before the railroad committees. Compromise measures have passed the House but will be killed in the Senate, and a general railroad convention of the people determined upon."

This little group was in Washington on the eve of the war contending for a single route for the proposed Pacific railroad,—the route of the Platte River Valley, and with the eastern terminus at Council Bluffs, Iowa. Norman B. Judd was there and helping them, although his chief thoughts were on the ambassadorship to Germany. But there were others in this group besides Judd who were after political plums, and among them were the Iowans who had been smart enough to advocate Lincoln's nomination long before the state as a whole thought well of him. But Dodge

had an eye single to the cause of the Pacific railroad, although he worked to help the job-seekers get what they wanted.

This Iowa group at Washington was notable. Besides Dodge there was Allison, who would be in Congress in two years; Kasson, about to become first assistant postmaster-general; Hoxie, who would receive the contract for building the first one hundred miles of the Union Pacific; Blair, soon to prove the dominant figure in the expansion of the Northwestern across Iowa, and Curley and David, both young attorneys of promise. These rented a house near the National Hotel, and to it came Harlan, who had been in the Senate since 1855; Grimes, who had been elected to the Senate from Iowa the year before; Curtis, who had been in Congress two terms and who was to resign and win the battle of Pea Ridge; James F. Wilson, just entering upon congressional duties, who would become outstanding as a government director of the Union Pacific Railroad; and Hiram Price, who would enter Congress in 1863, and who was then prominently identified with Iowa's railroad building.

It is not too much to say that these Iowans, working with Farnam, Durant, Sheffield, Tracy and Cook, played a powerful rôle in influencing the legislation that, a year later, led to the act "to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri river to the Pacific ocean"; nor is it undue emphasis to assert that these combined groups finally moved Mr. Lincoln to throw the weight of his influence in favor of the route along the forty-second parallel, beginning at Council Bluffs. Railroad bills flooded Congress, for the nation was astir with the possibilities of expansion. And as a forerunner of the railroad and telegraph there was legislation augmenting the old mail route. Dodge wrote his wife:

"A daily overland mail and pony express bill passed the last night of the session. Starting from Council Bluffs it will bring all the stock from the Butterfield route, and pays that company a million dollars to carry it overland, via Council Bluffs and Fort Kearny."

The inauguration came and Lincoln prayed in his address that "the mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone" might "yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely as they will be, by the better angels of our nature." But the better angels of our nature were not on guard; the mood of Washington, no less than that of Richmond, was belligerent, and Dodge wrote his wife again:

"Old Abe delivered the greatest speech of the age. It is backbone all over, and Washington with its hundred thousand Republicans is very, very high tonight. The city bristles with bayonets, and old Scott is praised by everyone for his great measures for peace. The ball is a great affair, but I am not in attendance. Thousands can't get in. It looks as though we can get all our measures through and then I'll make tracks for home. But if secession keeps on the great fight will occur right here and old Scott and Abe will have enough troops to hold Washington against the combined forces of the Confederacy."

Just before Dodge left Washington Henry Farnam, railroad builder, sought him and urged him to get out of business at Council Bluffs and give all his time to the Rock Island. "You will see a great advance in railroading in Iowa in the next twelve months," Farnam said. It was a declaration of war to all railroads that the Rock Island expected to push its lines to the Missouri River in the shortest time possible and be at Council Bluffs to connect with the first foot of track of the proposed road from the Missouri

River to the Pacific Ocean. Dodge wrote his wife of Far-nam's offer and expressed his belief that he should accept it, and in this letter he spoke of a visit he made to Lincoln.

It was on March seventeenth that he called on Lincoln, accompanied by Generals Ney and Draper. Ney wanted to become governor of the Nevada territory, and the railroad interests were anxious for him to do so. By this time it had become evident that trouble was nearer than some believed.

"Politically the skies are dark," Dodge wrote his wife. "Lincoln has a hard task before him, but he says that he thinks he can bring the country out all right. Sumter must be evacuated. Socially, the country is well represented here. There are many ladies, and they press the claims of their husbands, importuning every one. I have carried all my points except one. Reed is in doubt; Judd goes to Berlin; the governorship of Nebraska lies between Saunders of Mount Pleasant [Iowa] and Carter of Ohio. I hope the latter gets it. Kasson will be first assistant postmaster-general, which is a great victory for our crowd."

Dodge decided to visit his old home at Danvers, Massachusetts, before returning to Iowa, so he left Washington and went to New York where he conferred three days with the promoters of the Rock Island. Again they urged him to give up his business in Council Bluffs and identify himself with the Rock Island interests. But the East suddenly palled on him and he wrote a homesick letter.

"I leave for Danvers today. I shall visit there a day or two and then start home. I bought a set of teaspoons and dessert spoons yesterday and a bracelet for Lettie. If I knew what kind of a spring hat to get I would bring one for Ella. I stop at the St. Nicholas, but I am tired of the East. I was in to Niblo's one night this week. That is the only place of amusement I have seen, though there are several



Courtesy Union Pacific Historical Museum

Pony Express saluting the telegraph building in advance of the Union Pacific



From the Illinois Central's Souvenir volume to General Dodge
on the fiftieth anniversary of the completion of the road

This pass was issued to Abraham Lincoln, at that time attorney for the
company

new takes in the way of comedies—one at Wallack's, one at Laura Keen's and a third at the Winter Garden. I will send you some seed so you can have the garden planted. I think I shall cross the state coming home;—it is about as quick as by St. Joseph."

However, Dodge returned by the way of St. Joseph, Missouri, owing to the bad condition of Iowa roads, and in doing so he had his first adventure with "secession military companies" then forming in northwestern Missouri. At St. Joseph he learned that these companies, under the leadership of a Colonel Pondexter, afterward a picturesque bushwhacker, had planned to capture two companies of government troops en route from Fort Randall to the East by the way of St. Joseph. Dodge would have telegraphed from St. Joseph to Washington, but feared detection. Instead he sent a post-haste letter to Kasson at Washington, and then hurried home. The War Department sent Dodge an order to board the steamboat at Council Bluffs and have the Fort Randall troops disembark and journey east across Iowa. The order was obeyed, and this was his first act to aid the government in the crisis. A few days later the Confederate guns were thundering against Fort Sumter and all Dodge's railroad interest, plans and dreams paled in the presence of the issues of war.

CHAPTER VI

BLUNDERING THROUGH WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IOWA was less prepared for war than any state in the North when Fort Sumter was bombarded. The Nebraska territory had four military posts, Kansas three and Minnesota two; Iowa had none, and its people were as unmilitary as any state in the nation. There were a half-dozen independent companies in the state, but no organized militia. War caught Iowa flat-footed.

The best-trained military man in the western part of the state—and one of the few within its entire border—was Grenville M. Dodge, and he soon became a dominant figure. When Governor Kirkwood appointed Judge Caleb Baldwin, of Council Bluffs, to organize companies in western Iowa, he, like any other civilian, knew little of what to do and practically nothing of how to do it; but he did know Dodge and to Dodge he turned, making him his acting adjutant. Adjutant Dodge got action, and one month after the opening gun of the war was fired he had fourteen companies, or skeleton companies, combined into a sort of State Guard.

The First Iowa Infantry was forming, and Dodge offered the Council Bluffs Guards—the company he had organized in 1856—to Governor Kirkwood to be merged into this infantry. The Governor said that the Council Bluffs Guards should remain on the western border and protect it. Dodge persisted and, a week later, offered his company to the Governor to be merged into the Second Iowa Infantry, and

again the offer was declined. This peeved Dodge, who notified Kirkwood that he would make application to go into the regular army. When Kirkwood learned that Dodge was about to start for Washington, he hastened to place him on his staff, and sent him on a difficult mission.

At Fort Kearny, far removed from the bellicose Missourians, there were three thousand guns that the Iowa Governor wanted, so he commissioned Dodge to go to St. Louis and secure these guns through an order from General Harney. "Should it be deemed proper by you, when at St. Louis, upon conference with General Harney, to go to Washington in order more readily to obtain these arms, I desire you to go there at once." It was this mission that brought Dodge into unexpected prominence within a few weeks and paved the way for larger military opportunities.

Dodge hurried to St. Louis and met General Harney, but Harney seemed to know nothing of any guns that could be secured, either at Fort Kearny or Fort Leavenworth. "But I think there are some in the Allegheny Arsenal at Washington that have not been issued," he said in a casual manner. Harney may have been feeling none too good, for Lyon was about to succeed him in the West.

The tip was sufficient and Dodge started for Washington, armed with a letter from Kirkwood to Fitz Henry Warren, the Washington correspondent of *The New York Tribune*. Warren was an Iowan and listened to Dodge's story, but doubted it. It was the first week in June and surely all the arms and ammunition had been taken by this time. "Every state has been after arms," Fitz Henry Warren told Dodge, "and Senators Harlan and Grimes have failed to secure any for Iowa troops." But he offered to introduce him to Simon Cameron, Secretary of War.

So Dodge met Cameron and told him what General Harney had said. Cameron professed ignorance of

any guns in or near Washington that had not been issued. Weren't the Confederates even then making a reconnaissance from Yorktown to Newport News? Idle guns? General Harney was badly mistaken.

Dodge asked Cameron if Iowa could have any stand of arms he could find that had not been issued, and the Secretary of War got rid of the young man by replying in the affirmative. Now Dodge happened to know a man in the Ordnance Department, and when he communicated Harney's tip to him they went to the arsenal and found nearly six thousand Springfield muskets that had not been issued. Dodge quickly returned to Secretary Cameron with the news. Cameron tried to get out of the agreement, but Dodge persisted and finally got an order for the guns. But these guns, ultimately, were diverted from their original channel and most of them were scattered over Illinois, Missouri and eastern Iowa.

But Dodge had made a good impression on Cameron, who offered him a commission as captain in the Fifteenth United States Infantry. He declined, telling the Secretary of War that the first call on his services was due the state of Iowa, and Iowa was about to form four more regiments. Cameron then went to Lincoln concerning Dodge and they agreed that he should be made a colonel, and given command of the Fourth Iowa Infantry, into which the Council Bluffs Guards, at last, were to be merged. Again Dodge refused and his reasons are none too clear, although it would seem that he thought there was a chance of being made a brigadier-general, for Iowa was to have one.

Secretary Cameron appears to have favored Dodge for the position, but it went to Samuel R. Curtis, then in Congress and Colonel of the newly formed Second Iowa. Curtis was a graduate of West Point and had served as Colonel of the Third Ohio in the War with Mexico. There was

considerable controversy over who should be Iowa's first brigadier-general; Warren, *The Tribune* correspondent, backed Dodge for the place and Cameron favored two men above Curtis, but Curtis secured the commission and deserved it. Dodge finally told Cameron that he did not have enough experience to take so important a command.

But while these matters were pending Dodge was losing no opportunity to witness the stirring scenes around Washington. He secured a temporary position on the staff in order to be near the scene of action, for a battle seemed imminent. In a letter to his mother, dated June tenth, he reveals his whereabouts and throws light on the military situation around Washington.

"I am about starting for the point of interest just now, Harper's Ferry, and ere a week you will hear of a battle or a great run in that direction. I am a Lieutenant Colonel of cavalry, got my appointment since I reached this place. I don't know whether I shall be kept in active service or not. I go to Harper's Ferry on the staff and hope to see some fighting. Eleven regiments left here yesterday in that direction; the whole country around is one undivided camp. I have been beyond Alexandria and to within two miles of Fairfax Courthouse, but was on duty and could not stop and see Sylvester. Our scouts are close together and fire on each other every night. The volunteers are highly spoken of by the ladies of the city, as being gentlemen and well behaved. A few days ago 60,000 were encamped here and on the outskirts and nothing but uniforms met the eye. I suppose you are anxious to hear the plan. Well, it is to attack Harper's Ferry from four points, via Leesburg, Frederick, Hagers-town, and from the west by Cumberland. The levies thrown into Virginia will at the same time march and threaten Manassas Gap, so that they cannot go to the help of Perger's Ferry, and General Butler will also make a forward movement on Richmond thus holding in check Davis and his forces."

The Confederates evacuated Harper's Ferry a week later, and the day after they did so Dodge's affairs seemed to have come to a head, for he wrote his wife that he had been made Colonel of the Fourth Iowa.

"President Lincoln and Secretary Cameron have been pressing me to take the colonelcy of the 4th Iowa, and to-night Mr. Kasson and Judge Rankin came and both attacked me, so I gave in and have accepted. I have been requested to go to New York to buy arms for the state. I have already secured arms from the arsenal here and shipped them today."

Dodge's military sight-seeing around Washington came suddenly to an end when Governor Kirkwood, of Iowa, ordered him to join Ezekiel Clark in New York, an Iowa banker and the Governor's brother-in-law, and purchase supplies for the state's troops. They had been authorized to offer the credit of the state; but the New York merchants not only demanded Iowa's paper, they asked for the personal endorsement of Mr. Clark and Colonel Dodge and got it. "This was the first time I ever knew a personal endorsement to be better than that of a state's," Dodge once said.

But in six weeks the secretary of Governor Kirkwood wrote Dodge: "The Governor directs me to say that he has no funds to pay this or any other bill. These bills must all go before the auditing committee appointed by the general assembly and be allowed before payment can be made." This was right and proper, but it did not prevent the New York firm from pressing the Iowa banker and the young Colonel of the Fourth Iowa to make good their personal guarantee that the money would be forthcoming in less than sixty days, all of which reveals the blind alleys down which men moved in the opening weeks of the war.

Before leaving Washington for New York, Dodge, in

his first flush of enthusiasm, and yet in a very sober manner wrote his mother :

“Dear Mother :

“I am ordered to rendezvous with my regiment at Council Bluffs and I leave for New York and thence home immediately. I go into the field in twenty days with as fine a body of men as ever drew a sword or shouldered a musket. I go into this war on principle—pecuniarily it will ruin me. I trust you will write my family a letter approving my course. I put my trust in God; and if I come out safe, I hope no one will have cause to regret my course.

“Yours,
“Gren.”

When Dodge reached Council Bluffs he found difficulties other than organizing his regiment. His business venture was in a bad way, and a New York money-lender to whom Baldwin and Dodge Company was indebted, wrote and chided him for hurrying west merely to organize a regiment.

“I am sorry you left New York when you did. If you had remained here a few days longer we could have made something out of war contracts. Undoubtedly there has been, and will be, good pickings. If this war is to be protracted there will be plenty of good chances, and if it last two years it will pay us to spend some time in Washington.”

The final organization of Dodge’s regiment revealed only fifteen native Iowans in it, but there were more than one hundred southern-born soldiers, few of whom were abolitionists. There was a paucity of New Englanders in the Fourth Iowa Infantry, and this fact properly introduces the subject of Iowa’s social and political complexion on the eve of the Civil War.

So much has been said—and will always be said—about Iowa being a bit of transplanted New England that very

little impression has been made by more careful Iowa historians who have found that the pioneers of the state were predominantly southern. At the time Dodge entered Iowa—1853—there were less than seven thousand New Englanders in all its borders as against more than thirty thousand from distinctively southern sections. Virginia alone contributed as many settlers as New England, and Kentucky contributed more; consequently, Iowa's native population of nearly sixty thousand had "southern leanings." Iowa was not dominated by abolitionist sentiment, but its people were not at all sympathetic with the South's determinate purpose to leave the Union. Governor Kirkwood, writing the Secretary of War a few days after Fort Sumter was fired on, truly said: "Ten days ago we had two parties in this state; today we have but one, and that one is for the Constitution and Union unconditionally." Still, this apparent fusing of political parties in Iowa to resist disunion did not prevent the rise of a powerful copperhead group in the state, and this group seems to have been made up of members from all political beliefs.

Copperhead sentiment was strong in Dodge's home town at Council Bluffs, and by 1863, due largely to Federal reverses, the secret order, known as "Knights of the Golden Circle," had a strong lodge in the village, as well as upward of forty thousand members in the state. But their aims were more political than pacific, although they did succeed for a time in making it difficult to raise troops.

The Council Bluffs copperheads gave Dodge and his family no little trouble throughout the war, and Mrs. Dodge's letters—some of which appear in another chapter—tell a significant story. The so-called "Peace Men" in Iowa in 1862 were determined to have the "boys out of the trenches by Christmas." But the boys in the trenches before Vicksburg in 1863, at Corinth, and on other battle-

fields wrote home a series of resolutions and one paragraph was decidedly pointed.

"That we regard the teachings of the so-called Peace Men of Iowa as not tending to stop the war, but only to prolong it; and that we will hold them responsible for the lives of all loyal soldiers sacrificed by reason of such disloyal conduct."

In Dodge's home town was a paper called *The Bugle*, edited by Lysander Babbitt, whose "trenchant pen," unfortunately, gave far too much comfort to the copperheads of Council Bluffs. This paper had its incipiency in a Mormon publication that "flourished in Council Bluffs from the time they arrived until their first exodus in 1848"; but that Mr. Babbitt was one of the ablest editors in Iowa can not be gainsaid.

Mr. Babbitt never quite forgave Dodge for leaving the political party of his fathers, especially during the very campaign when the editor of *The Bugle* was trying to become lieutenant-governor on the Democratic ticket. But he had fallen out with Dodge and the company known as the Council Bluffs Guards as early as 1857 because some member of the company had failed to lower the windows of the hall they rented from the editor, and the rain ruined the plaster. Moreover, it seems that the rent had not been paid promptly and Mr. Babbitt wrote a couple of paragraphs to express his contempt for "the bankers and merchants" at the head of the Council Bluffs Guards, "who had forgotten that they owed a note."

So the Council Bluffs Guards, led by Dodge, had in 1857 hired another hall. Three years later when Dodge hurried from Washington with his commission the editor of *The Bugle*, compelled to say something, begrudgingly stated:

"We understand that our fellow citizen, G. M. Dodge, has received the appointment as colonel of the 4th Iowa regiment. It is well known to our citizens that Colonel Dodge and ourself are bitter political opponents; but notwithstanding our bitter political hostilities towards him, we will do him the justice to say that as neighbor and citizen we entertain the highest respect for him. We understand that he is a graduate of the West Point Military Academy, and we know that he is an excellent tactician; and if, as we hope, Colonel Dodge's discretion, moderation and wisdom as a commander are equal to his energy and ability as a tactician, no better appointment could be made."

Comment is useless except to emphasize that *The Bugle* never sanctioned any of Dodge's war-time policies even though admiring him as a "tactician." Whenever he came home—as he did two or three times during the war to recuperate from bad wounds—*The Bugle* felt impelled to invite everybody to the reception and compelled to refrain from any remarks that might have bordered the treasonable.

In July the Missourians and the Iowans near the Missouri River, glared at one another and each state wondered what the other had up its sleeve. The Missourians decided to feel out the Iowans, and Colonel Ponexter made a feint at the Iowa border. He had a motley array of several hundred men, most of whom spoke of Iowans as "nigger lovers," which they were not.

That the soldiers of the Fourth Iowa were not a set of New England school-teachers with strong predilections for the negro is evidenced by a statement one of them made after their chaplain had preached a sermon on the issues of the war. He said, "If the chaplain wants to be popular with this outfit he'd better give us more brimstone and less nigger." These sentiments would have shocked the few extreme abolitionists in the state, and it may come as a surprise to-day.

Pondexter's threat was the first hostile move made in western Missouri, and Colonel Dodge replied by marching a portion of his command toward the Iowa line, but as Pondexter got no closer than forty miles of the northern border of Missouri, and as his forces scattered on the approach of the Iowa companies, there was no conflict. "I discovered that Missouri was as badly frightened as southern Iowa," said Dodge, "so I returned to Council Bluffs."

Colonel Dodge's command was ordered to Jefferson Barracks and left Council Bluffs three days before the battle of Wilson's Creek, the outcome of which convinced the Iowans that "Price's cowards," as the Iowans had called the Missourians, were men like themselves.

On reaching Jefferson Barracks the Fourth Iowa was attached to the brigade of General S. R. Curtis, who, in a few months, would break the backbone of the Confederacy in the West at Pea Ridge and whose military star would be in decline, for some reason, ever afterward.

But the Fourth Iowa went into Missouri poorly armed, and even as they went, Governor Kirkwood, through his adjutant, was trying to explain to Dodge why the guns he had secured from Cameron at Washington never reached Council Bluffs. The blame—where most of the blame usually fell—was laid at the door of General Frémont, who had seized the guns and armed a regiment at Keokuk, Iowa, to ward off another feint the Missourians were said to have made against the southeastern section of the state. To cap the climax Judge Baldwin wrote Dodge two days after his command reached St. Louis to hasten and "express at your earliest opportunity" the few guns he had taken out of Iowa. "We need them at Council Bluffs."

By the last of August, the Fourth Iowa was moved from Jefferson Barracks along the line of what was called the Pacific railroad to the village of Rolla, a little over one hun-

dred miles southwest of St. Louis. This was to be the Federal outpost in the West throughout 1861. This one hundred miles of rust and weeds designated the Pacific railroad, whose promoters hoped and believed would become a portion of the first transcontinental line, was in such ill-repair that Colonel Dodge took a portion of his command and tried to put it in running order.

This was the first war-time railroading by a military command performed west of the Mississippi, and it was a hint of the character of service he would render throughout the war. The work was done through September, 1861. The little line, which was one-fourth of all railroad mileage in Missouri at that time, was the basis of the Atlantic and Pacific—a road that was chartered by Congress, July 27, 1866, and the first company to receive aid to build a Pacific road along a southern route.

The Federal outpost in the West at Rolla, Missouri, from the summer of 1861 to the spring of 1862 was the scene of alternating comedies and tragedies, and here was organized the little Army of the Southwest under General Curtis—a force of not more than nine thousand effectives that would cut loose from its base in the beginning of 1862, lose itself in the mountains of Arkansas, and finally emerge, after anxious waiting at the North, miraculous victor in the hard fought battle of Pea Ridge against a force of sixteen thousand under Van Dorn, Price and Ben McCullough.

In the first place the remnant of the Federal army from Wilson's Creek fell back on Rolla so demoralized that it didn't have heart to throw itself between Price—who had advanced to Lexington on the Missouri River—and Springfield and cut him off. General Frémont, who had been in command in the West since July twenty-fifth, seemed to lack initiative, although his military establishment at St. Louis was a regular beehive when it came to issuing orders and

then countermanaging them. A little Federal initiative would have cut Price off when he advanced as far north as the Missouri River and perhaps dispersed his force of four thousand men. Frémont once ordered Dodge to come to St. Louis, but he failed to get past the guards that lined the steps of the Thomas Benton mansion where Frémont had his headquarters, so he returned in disgust to his regiment at the post.

When the Federals settled into winter quarters they were badly in need of reorganization. At Rolla, the Federal outpost, there was a trying state of affairs. No younger and less experienced men ever assembled to prepare for a campaign than the ill-equipped and ill-trained regiments at this post. Dodge's own regiment, perhaps better drilled than the others, possessed less equipment. His men were armed with old pattern muskets of 1818 and 1829 and the first time they were fired thirteen of them burst.

Kirkwood, Iowa's governor, had promised to stir up things and send Dodge's regiment the guns their young commander secured from the arsenal at Washington, but the Governor was helpless for the guns were scattered through southeastern Iowa and northeastern Missouri and held by various groups who imagined they were about to be attacked by General Price, who was, by this time, near the Arkansas border. But Dodge kept his Iowans drilling and marching through the brush in anticipation of a coming type of warfare of the same kind. They made bitter complaint and when asked their reason replied, "Our clothes get torn."

Four months later this Iowa regiment bore the brunt of the first savage assault Price hurled on Curtis' rear at Pea Ridge, and the Confederate rough-and-tumble fighter sent his compliments to the youthful Iowa officer and his men.

About the time the Union troops settled into winter

quarters, Colonel Dodge wrote a letter to his mother that reveals something of the uncertainty of the military situation, from a Federal standpoint, that existed in Missouri in the autumn of 1861.

"Dear Mother:

"I believe I have neglected to write you for a long time. Nate left too soon; he had ought to have seen the Army come in from Springfield. It is a grand sight, the whole valley is white with their encampments. I have now at this post, which I will command, nearly 20,000 troops; along with the army some 7,000 families of Union people who dared not stay. Some of them are good people but have had to leave their old homes, stock farms and all they have to be fed by me and they are really thankful. You know I could not turn any one away. I do not know whether the government will sustain me, but they must be fed. Price and McCullough are on the advance here. I sent out 1,000 men last night to cut off his Texas Rangers;—have been expecting them to run.

"This army is a very fine one, but it wants a McClellan to handle it; its discipline under Frémont was bad. Halleck takes hold to suit me. If he will only stop the stealing both of officers and men and go to shooting for the outrages committed by many of our troops, draw everything down to the Army regulations and to a well disciplined army, we shall always succeed. They must put the troops of each State in the same divisions under their own generals and each nationality by itself. Frémont was a big enthusiastic man, but had poor discipline and was very extravagant. I have a very fine regiment. I know I can lead them through a hot place; they will follow me until the last man drops. I do not think I have an enemy in the regiment."

But the winter of 1861 fell heavily on the Federal outpost at Rolla, and if the Confederate government had appreciated the situation and united all its available forces in Missouri and Arkansas under Sterling Price, the outcome

west of the Mississippi River would have become extremely doubtful. The nation is grateful that Jefferson Davis disliked General Price and distrusted him. One of General Price's sons—Colonel Celsus Price—said that Mr. Davis was haunted by the fear that another confederacy of states would be set up west of the Mississippi River, comprising Missouri, Arkansas, Texas and the Indian territory, with General Price at its head. But the quarrel between Price and Mr. Davis dated back to the Mexican War. Anyhow, affairs in Federal circles were bad and no remedy seemed near. In lieu of a superior officer, Dodge assumed nominal command of the Rolla post and soon found his hands full. He wrote home:

"Here I am filling the place of a brigadier-general, doing work of a major-general and holding a colonel's commission. You have no idea of the incompetence of the field officers; many are lukewarm in the cause and go in for the pay—they will not do their duty unless forced, but they never fail to use their political influence to secure promotion."

As Frémont was always getting ready to fight but never fought, the authorities at Washington decided to relieve him and place Hunter in command. It fell to the lot of General Curtis to notify Frémont. Lincoln wrote Curtis in a more personal manner and said that if Frémont had "in personal command, fought and won a battle, or shall then be actually in a battle, or shall then be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation of a battle," to hold up the order and await further instructions. Evidently Frémont was doing none of these things, for he was relieved of his command. Then the measles broke out in camp and four hundred young Iowans were down at the same time. Dodge sent for his wife to help nurse. Years after the war she said:

"Most of the Iowa men were quite young, averaging not more than nineteen, and as they were away from home for the first time they were easily discouraged when taken ill and died off rapidly. But no wonder—the commissary stores were of a kind that made it impossible to give them delicacies of any kind. There were but few women in the camp, and there was nothing of a social nature at all,—just anxiety every hour. The officers had to work hard and the few women tried to care for the sick."

The one bright spot in this drab existence for Dodge was when a young officer by the name of Philip Sheridan became quartermaster of the Army of the Southwest. Twenty years later General Sheridan, while visiting in Iowa, was asked if he recalled the post at Rolla, Missouri. "That's where I got my start," was his reply. And it was literally true, and largely through the efforts of Colonel Dodge, for General Curtis, who had been assigned to command the District of Southwest Missouri, never fancied Sheridan and couldn't get along with him. Curtis was older, but he was less the tactician than Sheridan and without the initiative of Dodge. He was personally brave; a rough-and-tumble fighter, and just the kind of commander to send against Sterling Price and beat him at his own game.

The chief difficulty Sheridan encountered as quartermaster of the Army of the Southwest was in securing the cooperation of untrained officers. In this particular body of Federal soldiers and perhaps as in no other similar group in the first months of the war, did the citizen-soldiers maintain the traditions of their complete independence as Americans and refused to "be bossed."

Sheridan and Dodge, occupying the same tent in the beginning of Curtis' campaign, would sit and talk over the situation and plan to get the chief in command to sustain the quartermaster. But Curtis was slow to do this. More-

over, his dislike for Sheridan was not diminished when that young officer insisted that his new-found friend, Colonel Dodge, should be given command of the Fourth Division of the Army of the Southwest in the reorganization that took place just before Curtis started for Arkansas and Pea Ridge. The command went to Colonel Carr, though General Halleck subsequently reversed General Curtis' decision, but this was after the battle of Pea Ridge and then Dodge was on his way to Grant. Dodge was assigned to command the First Brigade of the Fourth Division of General Curtis' little army, which was honor enough for one so young despite his training, although his commission was dated earlier than the commission of Colonel Carr.

Sheridan's difficulties began when he started to organize wagon trains for Curtis' southwestern campaign. Eight regiments had twenty-eight four-mule wagons, and everybody wanted to ride instead of march. Sheridan ordered each regiment to reduce to two wagons, the remainder to go into the train. The order started a row; letters were written home in protest against the high-handedness of the "West Pointer" and governors were wired. But Dodge stood by Sheridan, stripping his own regiment first. The others followed reluctantly enough, and the expedition into the enemy's country started. Sheridan's troubles were only beginning.

General Sigel—in a bad humor because of being superseded by Curtis—refused to furnish details from his command to help forage and run the mills. The little army had no base of supplies; it had gone far beyond the line of the Pacific railroad and was plunging deeper and deeper into a mountainous country with the Confederates slowly retreating before it. Shoes and clothing became worn and threadbare; supplies grew less and less, and Sheridan appealed to Dodge, who detailed the entire Fourth Iowa to

assist the young quartermaster. Years after the war Sheridan said:

"Several times I was on the verge of personal conflict with irate regimental commanders, but Colonel Dodge so sustained me before General Curtis and supported me by such efficient details from his regiment—the 4th Iowa—that I shall hold him and it in great affection and lasting gratitude."

General Curtis, who seems to have had scant appreciation of Phil Sheridan's military ability, finally relieved him. Dodge and other friendly officers went to Curtis and protested but in vain. So Captain Phil Sheridan returned to Springfield, Missouri, a week before the battle of Pea Ridge and was there when it was fought. Dodge has said:

"After Pea Ridge a great effort was made by reporters and officers in General Sigel's command to give him the credit. These dispatches were sent to Springfield by special messengers and telegraphed north. Now Sheridan was back at Springfield and in charge of the telegraph. He was soldier enough to know that it was General Curtis who had fought this battle and won it, so Sheridan held up Sigel's dispatches until dispatches came from Curtis. Sheridan then sent Curtis' dispatches out first, manifesting soldierly qualities after the treatment he had received."

Curtis' little army plunged on into northwestern Arkansas, and Price fell back until his troops joined nearly an equal force under General McCullough. This united Confederate force came under Van Dorn's command. The Richmond military authorities sent him to supersede both Price and McCullough just a few days before the battle of Pea Ridge. He could have rendered more efficient service if he had taken a musket, gone into the ranks and fought, for he was but little more than a bewildered stranger in a

strange country. He turned to Price in his dilemma and Price bluntly told him that Curtis should be flanked. This flank movement brought on the battle.

The Confederates outmaneuvered the Federals at Pea Ridge, completely flanking Curtis' army of ten thousand with a force of fifteen thousand, and then Van Dorn made a blunder that proved fatal to the success of his movement. He allowed his forces to become divided by the Boston Mountains, separating Price and McCullough by three miles, and Curtis defeated him in detail. This is the whole story of the battle of Pea Ridge. The Confederacy never fully recovered west of the Mississippi from the blow the Federals dealt it at Pea Ridge. No one knew it at the time, but the outcome of this battle decided the amount of pressure the Confederates would be able to bring against Grant's right flank in the descent on Vicksburg, and that pressure was decidedly weak.

The Fourth Iowa Infantry under Dodge caught the brunt of Price's first assault, and its losses were heavy. Dodge was wounded and was unable to leave the battle-field for two weeks. It seemed that most everybody—both Federal and Confederate—was transferred east of the Mississippi after Pea Ridge, and old foes would meet on new fields. The blundering through west of the Mississippi was at an end, and the Federals, blundering nearly as much as the Confederates, came out a little the better. But down in Arkansas to this day the natives call the battle of Pea Ridge "a draw."

CHAPTER VII

BEHIND THE SCENES IN MISSISSIPPI

DODGE remained on the Pea Ridge battle-field for two weeks, then by easy stages went to St. Louis, and Mrs. Dodge came down from Iowa and nursed him for two months. His railroad friends in the North, with the exception of Peter Dey, the first chief engineer of the Union Pacific, wrote or visited him at St. Louis and urged him to leave the army. Somehow, he seemed vital to their railroad ambitions and they thought that he had done enough for his country. Dimly but certainly, Dodge, in keeping with other officers, saw that a prolonged struggle was ahead of the nation and his reply was, "I have enlisted for the period of the war." Moreover, his praises were being sung; his picture appeared in *Leslie's Magazine*, and Danvers tried to tell the whole world that he was born there. But none of these things healed his wounds nor paid his debts, and from this hour to the close of the war his family was in financial straits, and he in uncertain health.

"For meritorious and distinguished services at Pea Ridge" Dodge was made a brigadier-general and sent to Halleck. At Corinth, he met Phil Sheridan again, and Sheridan had told Halleck that Dodge could build railroads as well as fight. Halleck assigned him to a division and he reported to General Quimby, who ordered him to repair the Mobile and Ohio Railroad between Columbus, Kentucky, and Corinth.

In a letter to his wife, dated June 8, 1862, Dodge revealed the great activity going on in Mississippi in repairing the railroads the Confederates had tried to put out of commission.

"I am at my old job again—railroading. Our army is scattered as follows—Pope and Buell are south of Corinth; Sherman is at Grand Junction building the railroad to Memphis; McClernand is at Bellevue building the road north to Columbus; Halleck himself has settled down at Corinth but is building railroads and only puts out his army for observation; Mitchell is building the railroad from Huntsville to Corinth; and I am building the road 64 miles south to Corinth. I went over it on a hand-car yesterday and staked out three large bridges."

But there was paucity of capable railroad builders in Mississippi in 1862 and the Union armies were soon to learn it. In recounting battles and in telling of the deeds of leaders the historian has overlooked the work of the railroad builders in the war between the states.

The chief aim of the Confederates, in both the East and the West, seems to have been the destruction of railroads rather than their conservation, but nowhere as in Tennessee and Mississippi was the damage so extensive and the problem of rebuilding so great, owing to the fact that this section was far removed from industrial centers where materials could be secured. The Confederates seemed to think that if they could overturn engines, tear up rails and burn depots, the Federals would not be able to make repairs and push after them, and it must be said that they came near making a good guess. In the beginning the Federals went at the work in a haphazard manner, but they soon learned that separate commands were needed to railroad—commands made up of trained engineers and construction crews.

When it came to railroading, Dodge was in his element,

and the Federal commanders saw that the man they were looking for had arrived. Told in terms of battles and commands, the Civil War career of General Dodge may have but little significance for the general historian. Aside from Pea Ridge and the battle of Atlanta, where he commanded the Sixteenth Army Corps and helped check Hood's fierce flank assault, Dodge's battles were on a minor scale.

A popular writer, in a highly colored eulogy of General Forrest's strategy and initiative in hovering on Grant's flank, has seen fit to make Dodge out as a slow-witted and incompetent officer. It does not detract from the bold Mississippi cavalry leader now to tell, and truthfully, that Dodge devised the only means of ever stopping him from destroying most of the railroads in the state and thereby menacing Grant's line of communications in the descent on Vicksburg.

When Forrest made his celebrated raid between Grand Junction and Jackson and destroyed all bridges, he was signally checked along the line of the Mobile and Ohio, through a simple expedient devised by Dodge, who hit upon a plan of building blockhouses and stockades at all the bridges and stations. A single company, so fortified, could hold off a regiment, because Forrest's fast-moving cavalry seldom had any artillery to train against this form of defense. Later, when Grant came to command in western Tennessee he was greatly impressed with this unique railroad defense and ordered all bridges and stations to be fortified in like manner; moreover, he became curious to meet the man who had devised the method against the cavalry raids of General Forrest.

Grant's appraisement of Dodge as an army railroad builder is significant because he ranked him the ablest officer in the field of this exacting work in the West. He not only considered Dodge's services indispensable in keeping open

the line of communications in the descent on Vicksburg but also in the critical campaign before Chattanooga. Of this latter period Grant said:

"I gave Sherman an order to halt General G. M. Dodge's command of 8,000 men at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur, north toward Nashville, and to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. All the bridges over these had been destroyed and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. All locomotives and cars not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. All bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis & Charleston and the Nashville & Chattanooga roads unite. The building of this road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the army.

"General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. He had not tools to work with except those of the pioneer—axes, picks and spades. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building; axemen were put to work in getting out timber for bridges; car builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars. Thus, every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with and supplying the workingmen with food, was all going on at once and without the aid of a mechanic or labor except what the command furnished. General Dodge had the work assigned him and finished in forty days after receiving his order. The number of bridges to rebuild was 182, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of the road repaired was 182 miles."


This was an extraordinary war-time railroad achievement, but in the background were Dodge's experiences in railroad building that covered a full decade. There was

nothing spectacular about this sort of service,—just the reverse in fact; and the deeper military factors involved often go unnoticed. The work that Dodge performed as a railroad builder for Grant and Sherman precluded the possibility of his becoming a horseback general, or a brilliant cavalry officer like Forrest, whose exploits were more picturesque than permanent. But railroad building and repairing in Mississippi and Tennessee in 1862-1863 were more vital to the success of the general campaigns of the Federals than the military historians have ever seen fit to admit. Grant understood it, and so did Sherman, which is enough. "Dodge," Sherman once said to Grant during the critical campaign in the valley of the Tennessee, "is two weeks ahead of us as usual."

In June, 1862, when Dodge was first assigned to rebuild and hold the line of the Ohio and Mobile road between Columbus and Corinth, the situation seemed hopeless. The road was practically useless; bridges were out, telegraph lines were down, water-tanks were destroyed, tools had vanished, and the road-bed itself was overgrown with grass that caused the wheels to slip.

Given any sort of equipment at all and it would have been better if a new road had been attempted. But Dodge's greatest virtue—and vice—was always to go through with what he was ordered to do. He had a command of eight thousand men and one of the regiments was the Twelfth Wisconsin, led by Colonel George Bryant, a classmate at Norwich University. Nothing could have been more fortunate; moreover, the men from Wisconsin—many of them—were skilled lumbermen. Dodge organized a pioneer corps after taking a census of trades and vocations, and every man who knew anything about forging, building and running any kind of engine was included in this group.

His orders were to speed up but to build well. They



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General H. H. (William) Dodge, General Dodge's Headquarters, Corinth, Mississippi, first served in Mississippi, Spring of 1862
General Dodge, 7th Staff, Corinth, Mississippi, September, 1862
General Dodge seated at left
General U. S. Grant from a photograph presented to General Dodge by General Grant, at Mississippi, 1863

worked so fast that Halleck and staff were amazed, and they sunk crib-piers in the bayous and bolted them together in such fashion that, after the war, when the officials of the Mobile and Ohio Company ordered the crib-piers to be taken out and truss-bridges put in, one was said to have remarked, "General Dodge must have thought the war was going to last forever."

Dodge's railroad engineering under Halleck, Grant and Sherman from 1862 to 1864 included the rebuilding and defense of the Mobile and Ohio from Columbus, Kentucky, to Corinth, Mississippi; the Memphis and Charleston from Grand Junction to Tuscumbia, and from Huntsville, Tennessee, to Athens in the same state; and the building of portions of destroyed lines in the advances from Chattanooga to Atlanta. In the descent on Atlanta, Dodge not only commanded the left wing of the Sixteenth Army Corps, but he also personally directed a pioneer corps of fifteen hundred men rebuilding railroads and bridges in advance of Sherman. Sherman said that the greatest single piece of bridge construction was at Roswell, where Dodge's command built a bridge fourteen hundred feet long.

In order to do this and not delay Sherman's army, Dodge marched from the extreme right to the extreme left of the entire command—a distance of thirty-one miles—and arrived at Roswell on Sunday; on Wednesday the Army of the Tennessee crossed over the completed bridge. Of this period Sherman, in a note written in the field, said:

"General Dodge,
"Roswell, Georgia.

"I know you have a big job, but that is nothing new for you. Tell General Newton that his corps is now up near General Schofield's crossing, and all is quiet thereabout. He might send down and move his camps to the proximity of his corps, but I think Roswell and Shallow Ford so important

that I prefer him to be near you until you are well fortified. If he needs rations tell him to get his wagons up, I think you will be able to spare him day after tomorrow. I know the bridge at Roswell is important and you may destroy all Georgia to make it good and strong."

In a letter to James J. Wilson in 1904, General Dodge enlightens us upon Grant's difficulties in building lines of communication over which his troops could be fed.

"In the winter of 1863 and in the beginning of 1864, after we had built the road from Nashville to Decatur and had it running, we were sending about twice as much stuff over it as was being sent over the Chattanooga road, although it had double my equipment. General Grant sent General F. W. Smith to see me to find out just how this was being accomplished, for the army in Chattanooga faced a crisis on account of scarcity of food and general supplies. Smith came down to see me, returned to Grant and urged that I be sent over to the Chattanooga road. I was in the Army of the Tennessee and the other road was in the Army of the Cumberland, so Grant declined and said, 'We've put enough of that kind of work on Dodge already.' But I gave General Smith the system I established of running everything in sections, putting in ample sidings at passing points, keeping the trains on time, not allowing them to be overloaded."

Dodge also warned Smith that no officer should be allowed to interfere with the running of a road. In the beginning, he had considerable trouble with officers who gave conflicting orders to the train crews, and sometimes the officials of the road interfered with the military orders. Railroading was new; much of the machinery was defective, and the art of road building was all but in its infancy; moreover, but few military men were schooled adequately in the methods of railroad transportation; the ox-cart, the mule team and the canal boat had too recently

given way to the coach and the box car for the attainment of a great amount of efficiency.

Charles Warren Hunt, Secretary of the American Society of Civil Engineers, wrote General Dodge in 1915, inquiring about the salient features of his engineering career, and he gave an illuminating account of the extreme difficulties under which the war-time engineers worked.

"The civil engineers in the Civil War have never received the credit due them. Their invaluable services were performed under discouraging conditions. When the military commands were organized and put in the field, there was a great demand for engineers. We had no power to commission them or to enlist them. Therefore, we had to make details from the different commands, and they were often enlisted men. They showed great adaptation for their work, and ability and bravery in mapping the country in advance, tracing and making roads, and handling the pioneer corps in their duties.

"They were universally reported for promotion by their superior officers, but due to the fact that they were detailed from their companies and regiments, state authorities refused to promote them in their regiments. One of the prominent engineers of my corps was an enlisted man of the 2nd Iowa. He was named 'Major' by the men, by which title he was known and acknowledged, yet when he left the service at the end of the war, he was mustered out as an enlisted man with an enlisted man's pay, and afterwards became a prominent engineer in building the Pacific roads as well as the Canadian Pacific. Many of these young engineers, after the war, rose to the height of their profession and held responsible positions."

After completing the repairs along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad Dodge was assigned to command the Central Division of the Army of the Tennessee with headquarters at Trenton. He was in need of rest; his old wounds harassed him, and his business affairs in Council Bluffs were

in bad shape,—indeed, the firm with which he was connected had collapsed. Moreover, the political situation in Iowa was dispiriting, for the copperheads, emboldened by the defeat of McClellan, made things rather embarrassing for the families of Federal officers.

“Your enemies sneer at you,” his wife wrote. “You might as well be dead so far as they are concerned. Oh, when will this war end?” He replied in a gentle but hopeful letter and tried to reassure her, urging her not to worry about him as he was pleasantly situated.

“Trenton is a beautiful place, but it is Secesh all over,—especially with the women, who are very bitter. What would you think of the men in the north congregating every day to play marbles in the shade of the trees? They seem to have nothing to do but play marbles and plot mischief. The ladies are accomplished in a way;—they read, sing, paint and play the piano. Every house has a piano, and they congregate of evenings and sing Southern songs. The *Bonny Blue Rose* and the *Flag of One Star* are the favorites. The houses are all built Southern style—long porches and many pillared fronts. The Southern dames sit on the porches with their accomplished daughters and plot treason. The younger girls are toted around by negroes, and the negroes call them Missus, while the white children often exhibit their authority by giving sharp and short commands. Still, the woolly-headed negro children and the little white girls often play together, jumping the rope and playing the hoop.”

But General Dodge’s wife was living under adverse circumstances at her home in Council Bluffs, Iowa, and the situation almost became unendurable. It mattered not to the copperheads that her husband was in the South giving all that he possessed to help preserve the Union,—he was so much a target, so outstanding in Iowa that they overlooked no opportunity to belittle him and embarrass her.

Mrs. Dodge often was snubbed socially, for the Knights of the Golden Circle were as adept in making things unpleasant for the wives of Union soldiers as they were adroit in keeping just within the bounds of loyalty in order to save their hides. But when matters grew worse, she wrote her husband fully, and a series of letters passed between them that illuminate the political, social and military situation both north and south. One of the letters Mrs. Dodge wrote General Dodge was a singular combination of pathos, indignation and something of a questionnaire.

"No one seems to care up here whether you resign or get shot;—it would be but a few days wonder—and all over. I guess business is very dull with Nate now. Mrs. Boyers has moved into our house. I went up twice and it looked lonesome. Had a cry when I came back. The roses and vines are all over the front yard, and the grapevine is running all over and needs training. The elm trees grow beautifully, but the yard is full of rank weeds. I can not endure the thought that I am not to have a home somewhere before the year is out, but I keep up by hoping that better times will come before long. Do keep well this summer and take good care of yourself. Do not expose yourself to the sun and don't get sick. Why do you need to be in skirmishes if you are in command of the post? How far is General Halleck from you? Have you seen Ned Ransom? What officers have you there at Columbus? Do you go out of the town much? You don't write any news at all. I wish you could come up the last of August; we could have some grand rides, for the buggy is in good order; Nate had a pole put in it and drives the ponies to it."

His reply indicated his own weariness with it all, but his determination to see it through, and he sought to strengthen her in the belief that the cause was too great to end other than in victory.

"I think you had better come down and stay with me until I go into active service. You know that under present circumstances I can not leave the war. Richmond must be avenged by western boys; we will soon roll down south on them and wipe out that stain; Richmond must be taken, but other heads are now planning it. It is all humbug about Beauregard's army being in Richmond; only the conscripts are there; his old army is right in front of us and is watching for a weak point in our lines. What is up at home? *The Bugle* is out after me; something must be wrong. What you wrote about the old house touches me to the quick and makes me long for home. But with all your troubles, Annie, ours has been a pleasant life, so we must school ourselves to bear present burdens. I would give much for a quiet spell at home, where troublesome wounds could get some relief. But it is no use,—I could not get a resignation accepted now if I desired it, and my heart is in the war; every day tells me that I am right, and you will see it in the future."

Mrs. Dodge finally went south for a visit with her husband while his headquarters were at Corinth, and during a lull in hostilities. On her return to the North, and by the beginning of autumn and renewed activity throughout Mississippi, she became quite apprehensive again and wrote:

"Where is General Price now and his army? As you are now on the front you can tell me all about the movements of the rebels. But don't let ambition get ahead of your prudence, and don't let any rebel get you. I think I would die of fright and of embarrassment if you should be captured. Are they reenforcing Grant? Do you expect to have a battle down there soon? This will be a hard winter; everything we eat, drink or wear is very high. I'm afraid I will have to go along without new furs or a piano. A brigadier's pay doesn't go far in St. Louis. I don't know what I would do if I spread out like most general's wives and lived at Barnums or the Planters and paid a hundred a month for board. I hope you will draw your pay the first of December;—if you don't I will have to sell my gold."

This letter reveals that Mrs. Dodge at that time was the guest of a Mrs. Pegram of St. Louis. Pegram had been in business with Dodge and Baldwin before the war. He became a cotton speculator and finally fell out with Dodge because he refused to enter into cotton speculations with him. Mrs. Dodge's letter was gossipy and pointed:

"Pegram came back from Helena yesterday; says the army down there expected you to command it; says you could get rich down there, but I told him you wouldn't do it. I guess Pegram has not done any great things down the river, but he hopes to when he gets his new boat on the river. He sneers at the military and says that generals are so common they aren't much account. Mrs. Pegram is wild about General McClellan, but his day is over and Burnside now has a splendid chance; but I can not say that I have any such ambition for you, for the higher a man goes the more weighty the responsibility and the less of real happiness. But I would never stand in the way if you decided to go to the top."

The summer wore on; McClellan was whipped and a shake-up seemed imminent in the army in the East. Late in July Dodge wrote his brother: "Halleck was here yesterday on his way to Washington. Grant will take command while Halleck is gone. If Halleck remains in the east he will order me there, so he said."

There was a period of uncertainty in the West as well as in the East. The South was fighting its best and the outcome was so doubtful that thousands of people in Tennessee, Kentucky and Mississippi, who were known as "loyal," were shaken in that loyalty. All that they possessed was bound up with the institution of slavery—a problem growing more and more acute because of Federal reverses and because of the uncertainty of the government's attitude. Dodge felt that the policy at Washington was timorous and

divisive and he advised a more aggressive attitude toward slavery. Divisions in the army itself were sources of great mischief and even some of the Federal officers in Tennessee and Mississippi seemed to tend toward the southern view.

The retention of the institution of slavery became the dominant aim of large groups of loyal southerners in Tennessee, Kentucky and Mississippi. They felt that the Federal armies would triumph, but they saw no reason for slavery to be abolished as a by-product of a Federal victory, so they began an intensive campaign to promote their sentiments among the soldiers from the North.

In the Federal armies were thousands of young men from the North, some of whom had been taught to abhor slavery, but many of whom were indifferent to the issue. All saw the negro at close range and any romantic notions that may have been instilled by abolition propaganda lessened as the contact with negroes increased.

Besides, the ways of the old southern families were quite taking, to say the least. Young soldiers who had come from the sod houses of Nebraska, the log houses of Missouri and Illinois and the mean little structures that dotted the prairies of Iowa were now in a country where were the great houses of plantation owners and the old settled towns with a fine background of social and domestic life. And the daughters of the South were beautiful and different.

Throughout 1862 the Federal commanders in Mississippi and in Tennessee were not only struggling against powerful Confederate armies but also against the slow but sure poisoning of the minds of the soldiers by so-called loyal southerners whose chief aim seems to have been the securing of office and the retention of the institution of slavery.

General Dodge does not appear to have had any sentiment about the customs and the manners of the South, and he had little patience with the halting manner of certain



Mrs. Grenville M. Dodge

Federal officers who, along with many of the soldiers, were inclined to a charitable view of the motives of prominent families in Mississippi and Tennessee. Dodge believed that the South could prolong the war—perhaps indefinitely—by preventing the Federal armies from interfering with slavery. Matters reached a crisis with an incident that transpired between the officers of the Seventh Kansas Cavalry and the plantation owners.

The Seventh Kansas Cavalry, on a march from Columbus, Kentucky, to Corinth, took it upon themselves to gather up the negroes and take them along. The feeling of the Kansas soldiers, in the light of their training and background, is not difficult to understand. But the act itself was a clear violation of the orders of General Halleck. The officers of the Kansas regiment held that these negroes were really contraband of war, being within the Federal lines. When the southern planters appealed to General Halleck, he ordered Dodge to see that the Seventh Kansas Cavalry was "stripped of all negroes," and he enforced the order, though it nearly required a fight to do so. He then assembled the negroes in the town square, and the planters came after them.

But Dodge placed his own interpretation on Halleck's order; and, in answer to the slave-owners, he said, "No, my orders do not require that I return the negroes to you. If you want them, why go and get them." The negroes, emboldened by being within the Federal lines, refused to return to the plantations and scattered. The Seventh Kansas Cavalry, from whom the negroes had been taken, caught the point and cheered the act. And the act established a precedent in Kentucky, Tennessee and Mississippi, forcing a more liberal interpretation of contraband orders, and really paved the way in these states for a bolder stand in the Union armies against slavery.

Matters reached a crisis in Tennessee with the coming of the election. Among the loyal southerners seeking offices was a prominent man named Etherage, who made a speech at Trenton, and hundreds of Federal soldiers heard him. He made a strong bid for Union support but frankly said that he was opposed to freeing the slaves. A few days after this political meeting, George S. Boutwell, of Massachusetts and Charles A. Dana, of New York, arrived at Columbus, ostensibly on a tour of inspection of the Federal armies.

In reality, President Lincoln had sent them into Kentucky and Tennessee to test the sentiment in the army on the subject of the proposed Emancipation Proclamation. General Quimby, who was in command, assembled his officers and Boutwell made a rather indefinite statement about the whole negro problem. Several officers were then called upon to express themselves and some of them spoke guardedly. But General Dodge, who at that time had established a precedent by employing nearly one thousand negroes on the railroads and in the camps, decided to be bolder and he made a frank statement to Boutwell and Dana. He said that Iowa had sent him into the army for the purpose of putting down the rebellion and that he was ready to use any plan that would accomplish this objective. "I believe that the negroes should be freed," he said. "They are the mainstay of the South, raising its crops and doing its work while its able-bodied men are fighting the government."

Dodge's position helped clear the atmosphere in Tennessee and had direct bearing, not alone on the troops, but on the loyal southerners who wished to retain slavery. His attitude gratified Charles A. Dana who, on returning east, wrote him and requested him to put his views in writing. He did so and Dana published the article. Its effect was

instantaneous in the North and was far-reaching in bringing matters to a head; indeed, the article and letters which Dodge wrote home at this period not only enthused Iowa to take a firmer stand regarding slavery but also aroused its people to another danger—the near failure of new enlistments being undertaken in the state.

Dodge did not stop with this; he believed the time had come for a bolder stroke in Tennessee and Mississippi, so he frankly advocated arming negroes. The problem of hundreds of idle and helpless and ignorant slaves became pressing, and when his command returned to Corinth all the negroes in the valley of the Tennessee tried to follow. Two thousand of them moved into his lines, and they were an irresponsible lot. General Dodge thus explained the situation:

“When we got to Corinth I camped these negroes on an abandoned plantation near our entrenchments and placed them in charge of Chaplain Alexander and a few soldiers. But the soldiers objected to guarding negroes, so the chaplain said that if I would organize two companies of negroes to guard the camp of their own people he would guarantee their conduct. I had no authority for such procedure, but we went ahead anyhow and armed them. This solved the problem in part, for the negro soldiers took keen delight in making men of their own race go to work on the plantation to help support their families. But my action in arming the negroes raised a storm of criticism, and protests from Southerners poured in on the authorities at Washington. General Oglesby stood by me and my superior officer did not report me at least.”

The South blazed with anger, and there were insistent demands made on General Forrest and other Confederate officers to capture Dodge at all hazards and hang him without trial. Not being able to capture him, the southerners

tried another expedient—they managed to create strong sentiment against arming the negroes among the Federal troops. Many soldiers rebelled and matters came to a head when Generals Thomas, Oglesby, Sweeney and Dodge assembled the Union forces and had a frank discussion of the problem. Some of the officers seemed uncertain, but Thomas and Dodge declared that negro soldiers had come to stay and that a regiment or two would be organized. This settled the matter and the South at once began a plan to scare out negro troops.

The Confederate authorities began by indicating that captured negro soldiers would not be treated as prisoners of war. The Federal government gave direct reply to the Confederate threat and stated that the Union armies would also retaliate for any treatment of negro prisoners that was different from the treatment accorded white troops. A test case came just one month later, when a negro lieutenant and twelve enlisted negro soldiers were captured by the Confederates at Grand Gulf and taken to Mississippi to the home town of Jefferson Davis. They were charged with committing depredations and there was talk of lynching them; but the Confederate government promptly intervened and the captured negro soldiers were treated as prisoners of war.

By the middle of June a regiment of negro troops—the First Alabama—had been mustered in, and General Dodge placed officers over them who had rendered distinctive service. "There was a great change in the sentiment of the army after the troops saw this negro regiment organized, drilled and on duty," said General Dodge, "and there were a great many applications to me from officers in the white regiments for authority to recruit other colored regiments."

At first there was considerable fraternizing between the white and the colored troops, and the regulars presented a

set of colors to the negro regiment. Colonel Bane, of the Fiftieth Illinois Infantry, made the speech of presentation and urged the negro regiment to defend its colors to the last.

"Two negro soldiers responded, fixing the attention of all who could hear. One had made his way to Corinth after a hard journey of two hundred miles. He told his colored listeners that they had often heard of the old banner and longed for the freedom it promised; and, although they could not deny having had plenty of stripes they certainly had never before received the stars."

But the result from organizing negro regiments did not prove wholly salutary, for hundreds of negroes drifted into Corinth, idle, shiftless and somewhat puffed up over the attention accorded new regiments composed of negroes. To dispose of them became a great problem, for many insisted on becoming soldiers and did not want to work; and by November, hundreds of others, flocking in from middle Tennessee and northern Alabama, caused Dodge to issue an order that they should be placed upon the various plantations, and proprietors were instructed to feed and protect them. Others were put to work cutting wood and clearing roads.

The call for more troops had met with but little enthusiasm in Iowa, and Dodge's wife wrote: "The call for troops has raised a breeze among the Secesh, and all the leading lights have gone suddenly lame, halt, or near-sighted. Some can't eat salt-pork and some are too old. And I don't believe you could get fifty recruits from this place even if they knew the war would end in a month."

But Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation came and stimulated enlistments throughout the country, and Iowa was among the first to fill its quota, fighting hard to overcome powerful copperhead sentiment. Political issues of every kind were raised by Iowa copperheads, who charged Dodge

with discrimination against soldiers not of his own political faith. He took time to make rejoinder:

"I could scarcely tell you the political affiliations of any of my officers, much less of my men. We never think of these things; we just pray for an undivided front to the enemy. Every convention held in the north and every speech that is halting and apologetic, comes south and is fuel for the fire down here. The army has a great work before it, but the people at home have as great. We must kick every prop from under this rebellion. In the north as well as in the south. There is nothing that so weakens the south as to take its negroes. The slaves constitute the subsistence and quartermaster department of the Confederacy. The negro men raise the corn and meat and the women spin the cloth that clothes the Confederate army. Shall we hesitate to kick away this powerful prop of the South?"

So went on events behind the scenes in Mississippi, but the Union armies fought. Dodge could have resigned, left the army and stepped at once into the position of chief engineer of the Union Pacific at a salary of five thousand dollars a year. Durant, vice-president of the road, so wrote him and others connected with the movement urged this upon him. His personal fortunes were low; his family almost in need; and his health was precarious. But he remained at the front.

Into his career had come two men, who, from that time on, would share his fortunes, whether low or high—Grant and Sherman. Perhaps few have ever known of the attachment of these men for one another,—at least Dodge has never been fully included in the picture. But when Grant took command in the District of West Tennessee and when Sherman came with him and met Dodge, a friendship began that deepened and ripened,—a friendship that played a significant part in the building of the first great transcontinental railroad.

CHAPTER VIII

FEDERAL SECRET SERVICE IN THE WEST

GENERAL DODGE built up a secret service organization for General Grant composed of one hundred men. Their names were carefully guarded and very little was ever revealed about any of them. Long after the war he kept inviolate both their names and their deeds, for some of them lived in the South and publicity concerning their exploits, even a quarter of a century afterward, would have brought opprobrium if not persecution. Even as late as 1909, when several magazine writers sought to secure information concerning them he was reluctant to comply, although most of them were in their graves.

Grant thought that the secret service men of the Army of the West were to the forefront in this exacting field of military service, and Colonel George E. Spencer once said:

"Under the direction of General Grant a large secret service force, organized by General Dodge, operated all over the Confederacy. It was probably the most effective secret service in the Federal army, and General Grant came to rely on the information received from it. During the investment of Vicksburg many of General Dodge's secret service men operated in the rear of that objective and furnished Grant with authentic information."

When Halleck went east and Grant succeeded to the command in the West the hour had come for guessing and

blundering through to give way to strategy and even to cunning. No one knew the strength of the South, and the Confederates fought as if they had plenty of reserve. Moreover, rumors were everywhere about the superior strength they would bring to bear in the campaign at hand. It was thought that there were sixty thousand Confederates south of Grant and nearly as many to the east of him. A loose and inefficient system of secret service in the first eighteen months of the war had left the Federal officers in the West believing no one. It was to obviate this condition and to secure authentic information that General Grant turned to General Dodge and gave him the responsibility of reorganizing the whole system.

Grant's position was anything but salutary; he had only fifty thousand troops, although Halleck a few months before was said to have had a force of nearly one hundred thousand. At any rate the Confederates believed that it was a good time to strike and they did so. Iuka was fought and the outcome emboldened Van Dorn and Price to attack Corinth.

Corinth came near being taken—only the lack of initiative of General Lovell on the Confederate right prevented a more serious outcome. Corinth, although a Confederate reverse, aroused Grant to the seriousness of the situation. What reserve strength did the South have? This question bulked in his thinking as he pointed toward Vicksburg. Van Dorn's raid at Holly Springs made him all the more uncertain about the strength of the Confederates. They were putting their best foot forward, but the Federals did not know it. In later years Grant told Dodge that this was the most anxious period of the war for him in the West.

It was General Rawlins, chief of staff, who told Grant that Dodge could organize and direct the secret service for the Vicksburg campaign. Grant, prior to succeeding Hal-

leck, had not met Dodge, but on the suggestion of Rawlins he went to Columbus—then Dodge's headquarters—to size up the Iowa brigadier. He told Dodge that he was going to change his command, but he didn't tell him what the change would be. This was in September, 1862. In October Dodge received a dispatch from General Rawlins ordering him to report at Corinth at once.

When the dispatch came Dodge was in the field repairing a line of railroad and was dressed in working uniform—an old pair of baggy trousers stuffed in muddy boots, a soldier's blouse, and a hat that resembled a crow's nest. The dispatch seemed so imperative that Dodge took the first train that came along, not taking time to change his uniform. At Jackson, Tennessee, Grant's headquarters, Rawlins got on the train and asked if Dodge was aboard. He had never met Dodge, consequently the conductor had to point him out to Grant's chief of staff. Rawlins hurried to him, introduced himself, and told him that Grant was on the platform and wanted to see him. Dodge left the train, regretting that he was so poorly dressed to meet his chief. "Never mind about the clothes," Rawlins said. "We know all about you."

But Dodge felt greatly relieved on seeing General Grant's own uniform. They shook hands and Grant bluntly said: "I have assigned you to command the second division of the Army of the Tennessee, and I want you to understand that you are not going to command a division of cowards."

Dodge was at a loss to know what Grant meant, but later he learned that after the battle of Corinth General Rosecrans had denounced this division for retreating into the town before Price's charge. General Price, in his own report, paid the division a high compliment, and Rosecrans afterward admitted that he based his report on what

one of his staff told him. This did not help matters, for Grant himself had organized this division at Cairo and it served with distinction at Fort Donelson. This incident made a breach between Grant and Rosecrans,—one that was never quite healed.

Grant then told Dodge that he wanted him to perfect a spy system and “get only facts” about the strength of the enemy. How Dodge organized the Federal secret service and got the facts about the strength of the Confederates, both on Grant’s front and at his rear, is one of the most fascinating pages of the entire war. It should be told at length if not in detail, for the work of these spies had great bearing on Grant’s movements. Their operations extended from Memphis to Mobile and from Atlanta to Richmond, and they rendered invaluable service to the Union cause at a time when the outlook was dark.

Grant had good reasons for changing Dodge’s command and giving him the task of reorganizing the secret service to aid him in his Vicksburg campaign, for Dodge perhaps had more experience in organizing and directing both scouts and spies than any officer in Grant’s western command. Moreover, he had a knack for this sort of military work.

As early as the autumn of 1861, and while in command of the Federal outpost at Rolla, Missouri, he organized a body of scouts to aid General Frémont to clear up wild rumors that were in circulation, for fiction and not fact played the greater rôle in military circles west of the Mississippi in the first year of the war. General Frémont was usually more upset by rumors of the Confederate strength and position than by battles actually fought. Dodge—then a colonel—began to discover that most of the reports filtering through to the Federal lines were not reliable, and what convinced him that a body of scouts had become imperative came from a Captain White who commanded an indepen-

dent company of loyal Missourians. "Colonel," he said to Dodge one day after having been on a fruitless chase, "what's the use of wearing out all your cavalry horses trying to run down rumors? I've got men in my company who know this section by heart, and I can get reliable information if you'll let me do it in my own way."

Dodge gave his consent and the first body of Federal scouts organized west of the Mississippi began to operate. Gradually a spy system developed from this group of scouts, and with both forces operating valuable service was given, not only to Frémont, but later to General Curtis in his campaigns that ended with the battle of Pea Ridge. "When we were camped near Fayetteville, Arkansas," General Dodge says, "it was one of these scouts who brought us the news that Van Dorn's army was right on top of us, and this information saved us."

When Dodge was transferred east of the Mississippi in the spring of 1862 and attached to General Quimby's command with headquarters at Trenton, he found it expedient to organize another scout troop and to devise another system of secret service, for military lies were as rife in Tennessee and Mississippi as they had been in Missouri and Arkansas.

But the first scouts in his new field of operations were practically forced on him, for he had been at Trenton but a few weeks when down from the mountains of western Tennessee came a certain Colonel Hurst leading as nondescript regiment as any officer had ever seen. Colonel Hurst requested to be mustered into the service and at once. Dodge finally ordered the loyal Tennessean to assemble his mountaineers near the depot at Trenton and went down to inspect them. He was followed by about half his command, for all had heard of the odd group from the mountains and the veterans wanted to see the performance.

The Tennesseans wore every conceivable type of uniform. Colonel Hurst had a tall silk hat, a long coat with brass buttons, baggy jeans pantaloons, and an old sword. Dodge was accompanied by Colonel Ord—afterward General Ord—who said, "Dodge, do you expect me to muster in such a crowd as that?" And Dodge laughingly told him to go ahead with the ceremony. They proved to be an independent lot, though they were great fighters and were invaluable in securing information. But many of them were apt to be absent when wanted, for they paid scant attention to army regulations.

"Most of them lived in western Tennessee," said General Dodge, "and I noticed when I went out on expeditions through their country that in the afternoon Colonel Hurst's regiment would grow less and less until by night he had hardly a company left; then they would gather in the morning and catch us on the march, for they seemed to know our position intuitively, and by noon he would have a full regiment present. I often told Colonel Hurst that if I got into a fight I hoped it would be about noon so I could have the services of his regiment."

Dodge detailed Colonel Hurst's regiment to do scout duty, and it proved to be highly dependable. The Tennesseans were a shrewd lot and soon learned to sift fact from fiction in all military reports. Some of these scouts could tell a company, regiment, brigade or division by the space occupied in the field or along the road, and exaggerations—the gravest danger to western military operations—grew less and less. Out of the scouting grew the spy system, and the spies finally were organized into a trained group of secret service men.

Dodge saw the necessity of keeping many of these men within the lines of the enemy for months at a time, having them send out their reports by women who usually deceived

the Confederates by begging to be allowed to go into the Federal lines to see relatives, who were refugees. Dodge alone knew the names of these men; they went by number or initial and reported to him in cipher. But General Hurlburt, commanding the Sixteenth Corps at Memphis, insisted on knowing their names and where they operated. Realizing that it meant capture and death if the movements of these men were known to any one except himself, Dodge appealed to Grant, who ordered them to operate directly between Dodge and himself.

Dodge perfected his secret service organization in November, 1862, and he set the spies to work to discover the strength of Pemberton on Grant's front and of Johnston on his rear. Thirty days later he was able to inform Grant that Vicksburg, originally garrisoned by about six thousand troops, had been reenforced by eighteen thousand; that Mobile was held by one small force; that the Memphis and Charleston Railroad had but little rolling stock that could be used to bring up more Confederate troops; and that Van Dorn had scoured Mississippi for recruits with little success. By the first of the year Grant had the important information that less than forty thousand Confederates were on his front.

But what was at the rear? Of rumors there were many: rumors that both Bragg and Lee were to strike and catch Grant between two armies of about forty thousand each. Dodge's secret service men, operating out of Meridian, Selma, Jackson and as far east and south as Atlanta, secured definite information of Johnston's movements and of his strength just before the battle of Champion Hill, consequently Grant knew what disposition to make of his forces, and the Confederates were defeated in detail. The work of the spies within General Johnston's lines refuted the information the Confederates gave out that they

had sixty thousand troops on Grant's rear. Two of Dodge's men got through to Grant with the information that Johnston's force was less than thirty thousand, and from that hour Grant said he felt that the pressure on his rear would not be greater than he could bear.

Among the many exploits of Dodge's hundred secret service men the work and the adventures of Philip Henson are outstanding. He joined Dodge's secret service force in November, 1862, after having been used by Rosecrans against Bragg, and remained with him throughout the war. Henson lived in Mississippi and knew the state. His devotion to the Union amounted to a mania, otherwise some of his acts would scarcely pass the ethical military standards of a later generation. For example, he pretended to be a spy for General Polk in the services of the Confederacy and received pay while in reality serving the Federal cause. He won the confidence of Polk by giving a lucid account of the position and the strength of all Federal forces on Polk's front, just as Dodge instructed him to do. "My instructions to Henson," said General Dodge, "were simple. He was never to tell a lie about our strength, for I felt, being in the enemy's country, that a lie would be useless and dangerous."

Henson served the Union cause throughout the Vicksburg campaign without any doubts being raised by the Confederate commanders. After the fall of Vicksburg Dodge sent him to Atlanta and even on to Richmond to learn about the movement of Confederate troops to the west. Henson returned with Longstreet, whose confidence he gained, as that Confederate officer came west to reenforce Bragg. He managed to get away from Longstreet at Jonesboro, east Tennessee, and then he communicated with General Dodge.

General Dodge communicated with Grant and with Rosecrans, who was threatened by Longstreet's advance.

General Forrest finally became suspicious of Henson, arrested him and sent him to General S. D. Lee at Tuscaloosa, and recommended that he be shot. Henson made out a good case to Lee, who sent him to Meridian for trial. He was tried on the charge of being a spy in the employ of the Federals and for "buying cotton for the Yankees and investing \$200,000 in Confederate money in lands for General Dodge."

The truth was, Henson had handled large amounts of Confederate money that Dodge gave him to defray his expenses traveling through the South. At times he carried as high as ten thousand dollars in Confederate or state bank money and scattered it lavishly to gain his point.

The land and cotton speculation charges against Henson soon circulated through the Federal army in the South and General Dodge came under fire. He had sold cotton to help finance his hundred secret service men, but he was challenged to prove that he expended the money as he declared. It was something of a dilemma, for Dodge refused to reveal the names of the secret service men to whom he had given the money for fear the information would reach the communities in which they lived. They were loyal Union men living in southern towns, and secrecy was imperative. Finally, Dodge was accused of speculating in cotton for personal gain and the matter was carried to Grant.

Grant told Dodge that he would have to grin and bear it, and Dodge did. But grinning and bearing it resulted in the belief that he enriched himself in cotton speculation during the war which, in view of the fact that his family was in near-want, was something that he did bear but over which he could not do much grinning.

It was late in February, 1864, when General Forrest started Dodge's chief spy under guard as a conscript to the Virginia Army. Forrest gave orders to imprison Henson

for the remainder of the war and said, "He is the most dangerous Federal spy operating in the Confederacy."

But Henson made a daring escape from a train on the Meridian and Selma Railroad while passing through Alabama. Under cover of the night he made his way to the home of a Union man whom he knew. In this house he came face to face with a wounded Confederate soldier who had been placed on the retired list. Henson soon won his confidence and the Confederate gave him valuable information, including a passport into the Confederate lines as well as papers—which Henson filled out himself—that served as a furlough from the Confederate general, Dick Taylor.

With these papers Henson went at will through Alabama, picking up valuable information. He had a sister in the northern part of the state and he made for her home, for the news of his escape had stirred all Alabama, and General Roddy had orders to capture him and hang him forthwith.

Henson was suddenly stricken with rheumatism while at his sister's home and lay ill for nearly a month, while General Roddy searched in vain. But one day word came that his place of concealment was known, and that night, for he couldn't walk, his nephew carried him a mile to the banks of the Tennessee River.

On the second day Henson succeeded in signaling a Federal gunboat and was carried into the Federal lines in safety. The information he secured proved of inestimable value to the Federal cause in the spring of 1864, but Dodge, under whom Henson served, had been transferred to the Department of the Missouri. Henson finally made his way to St. Louis and, broken and in ill health, staggered into Dodge's headquarters and told the story of his exploits.

General Dodge rated Henson as the ablest spy in the war and after peace came he often opened his purse to the

man who risked his life on a score of occasions to aid the Union cause. Twenty years after the war Henson, then living in the South and in poor circumstances, wrote General Dodge:

"I have concluded to visit the Grand Army of the Republic at St. Louis next month and put myself on exhibition as the only living Federal spy residing in the south, and possessing the longest beard of any living man. It is 6 feet 3 inches long. As Congress has refused to allow me anything for my services as a spy during the war, I have decided to adopt this method to help keep myself and wife in our old age."

Not only did Philip Henson fail to establish his claims with the congressmen of that period,—whose beards doubtless were as long,—but uncertainties were expressed about his being a Union man at all.

The property confiscated from him at Rienzi, Mississippi, by the Confederate authorities was never returned. He lived until 1912, and throughout these years General Dodge assisted him in every way possible. "He was probably the ablest man in our secret service," was Dodge's final appraisement.

Perhaps General Bragg relied more on scouts and spies and manifested greater ability in organizing and directing them than any of the Confederate commanders in the West. At any rate, his secret service men were constantly matching their wits with those Dodge directed, and in the autumn of 1863, while supporting Sherman in raiding the valley of the Tennessee River, Dodge captured Captain Coleman, Bragg's chief of scouts; Samuel Davis, Coleman's special messenger; and a Joshua Brown who, years after the war, became a broker in New York and told General Dodge many things that had never been revealed.

These men had penetrated Dodge's lines and were captured by James Hensal of the Seventh Kansas, who was then directing the Federal scouts and spies in the Tennessee Valley. So much romancing has been done about Davis, who was hanged, that the story will be told here, based on General Dodge's own reports and statements.

When the Federal scout, Hensal, brought in the batch of Confederate prisoners none knew just how important a catch had been made. There wasn't a shred of evidence found on Bragg's chief of scouts, Captain Shaw, or Captain Coleman as he was known both to the Confederates and the Federals. Incriminating letters were found on but one man—Sam Davis; but General Dodge had no suspicion that Coleman was among the prisoners, for on November twentieth in writing Sherman and telling him of the letters found on Davis, he said:

"I enclose herewith copy of a dispatch taken from one of Bragg's spies. He had a heavy mail—papers, etc. Captain Coleman is pretty well posted. I think I will have him in a day or two."

The information Davis had attempted to carry through to Bragg was accurate. The letter was addressed to one of Bragg's officers and it gave correct information of Sherman's movements and of Dodge's position, strength and plans. The letter was signed by Bragg's chief of scouts—Captain Coleman. Dodge read the dispatch and sent for Sam Davis.

"Davis met me modestly," said General Dodge. "He was a fine, soldierly-looking young fellow, not over twenty. He was dressed in a Federal soldier's coat, one of our army soft hats and top boots. He had a frank, open face and was bright. I tried to impress on him the danger he was in, and told him that I knew he was only a messenger, and

urged him, on the promise of lenient treatment, to divulge the source of all the information contained in the letters found on him."

But Sam Davis refused to answer General Dodge's questions and a commission was appointed to try him. This commission met at Pulaski, Tennessee, November 23, 1863, and adjudged him guilty of being a Confederate spy caught within the Federal lines with information that had great bearing upon the campaign against Bragg, and he was ordered to be executed.

Every effort was made to induce Davis to talk,—the provost marshal, the chaplain, and Dodge's own scouts and spies, "all of whom had taken a liking to Davis," worked with him down to the last. But he went to the scaffold carrying the secret of the sources of his information and the greater secret that his chief, Captain Coleman, was Dodge's prisoner at that very hour. General Dodge said:

"I did not know all the facts in the case until after the war. Joshua Brown, a New York broker, came to me and told me the whole story. He said that Bragg's chief of scouts was named Shaw, but he always operated under the name of Captain Coleman. Brown stated that each time I sent for Davis to question him Captain Coleman would become greatly disturbed for fear Davis would weaken."

After the war Dodge contributed liberally to a monument for Sam Davis erected in Tennessee.

Captain Coleman, Brown and a few other prisoners were finally exchanged, so Bragg's chief scout was at liberty once more to serve the Confederacy, thanks to Davis whose spirit was far greater than that of the man he shielded.

Dodge has said, "The secret service men were braver than the average soldier in the line." He held that the information they secured often turned the tide of battles

and even altered whole campaigns. They were the men behind the scenes and their exploits, until long after the war, went unsung. It was usually a posthumous fame they attained, for most of them came to tragic ends. The few who survived, if living in the South, had to keep the facts of their service a secret, and some who became known, like Philip Henson, were ill treated in the South and not looked upon with any too much favor in the North.

In full explanation of how his secret service men were financed, Dodge said:

"It took large sums of U. S. money, a large amount of Confederate money and money of the local banks in Southern states to pay the expenses of scouts and spies. In travelling through the South they used Confederate money. The greenbacks they had for emergencies. A spy, in starting on a long trip, was given from five to ten thousand dollars in Confederate or state bank money. As we occupied the enemy's country we gathered up large amounts of this money, and my correspondence with General Grant will show how we obtained other funds and how they were expended."

The correspondence to which Dodge refers began in the opening days of 1863 and continued until spring. The first letter is dated January third and was written from Corinth. It said:

"I have the honor to report that the cotton mentioned in the enclosed communication was seized and sold by my orders at public sale. The funds taken and accounted for are being used for secret service. The quarter-master department being unable to furnish me funds, and it being necessary to have them for this work, the cotton was sold publicly, the money disbursed under my direct supervision, and the vouchers retained by me to be forwarded at the proper time."



Monument erected in Nashville, Tennessee, to Samuel Davis, confederate spy, executed by order of General Dodge at Pulaski, Tennessee, in 1864. Dodge contributed liberally to the building of this monument

But there was some disagreement between the Federal officers at Corinth over the sale of this cotton and the use of money to employ men for the secret service, and Dodge wrote Grant a second letter a month later:

"I respectfully request that the funds raised here from the sale of cotton be turned over to me and used as a secret service fund. It is impossible to obtain competent men for such service unless they are well paid in cash. I have assembled a group of highly efficient men for the secret service and unless I can have funds to use I can not hold them together. The sale of cotton up to this time amounts to about \$20,000."

Grant replied that pay vouchers, certifying that the money had been expended by Dodge in payment of men in secret service, would be all that would be required. "But," Grant added, "when prudent to obtain receipts, do so to protect yourself." Dodge's difficulty, sensed by Grant, was to secure receipts from the secret service men he paid. Many of them lived in the South and refused to sign vouchers or to give receipts for fear of being known as Federal spies, for it was inevitable that some of the vouchers and receipts fall into the hands of certain Federal officials at Corinth and at Memphis and the names of the secret service men be bandied about. The situation was both delicate and difficult and threatened to break up the organization.

Three years after the close of the war the auditors of the War Department discovered that Dodge had spent money during the war for spies for the armies of Grant and Sherman, and peremptorily ordered him to make an accounting of the exact sum. General Dodge referred the auditors to the report of Grant's provost marshal at Corinth, and the War Department replied nineteen years later to this effect:

"Your secret service accounts for the years 1863 to 1865, amounting to \$17,099.95 have been examined and adjusted, and are now closed on the books of this office."

Dodge's secret service force of one hundred men broke up shortly after Grant went east to command, although a few of the more outstanding spies attached themselves to the Sixteenth Army Corps that Dodge commanded up to the time he was wounded before Atlanta. After that, he knew but little of their whereabouts until Henson, as has been told, came to his headquarters at St. Louis.

CHAPTER IX

WAR-TIME DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD

THROUGHOUT the war Dodge remained in close touch with the Union Pacific developments; and, while he did not become chief engineer until January 1, 1866, and did not take charge until May, its promoters kept its affairs constantly before him. The legislative history of the road filtered to him through the press and at no time was he isolated from its progress.

But the legislative history of the first transcontinental railroad need not concern us here save as it has direct bearing on the career of the subject of this biography. The passage of the Pacific Railway Act chartered the Union Pacific Railway Company. As sectional interest at the north could not agree on a starting-point from the Missouri River for this road, the act called for the main line to begin on the one hundredth meridian, out in Nebraska near Fort Kearny, and build to the west. Four branches were to start from four different points on the Missouri, build west, and form a junction with the "trunk line" in central Nebraska.

The fourteenth section of the act held the greater interest for the group of railroad men with whom Dodge had been associated even before the war. It said, "And be it further enacted that the said Union Pacific Railroad Company is hereby authorized to construct a single line of railroad and telegraph from a point on the western

boundary of the State of Iowa, to be fixed by the President of the United States, upon the most direct and practicable route, to be subject to his approval, so as to form connection with the lines of the said company at some point on the 100th meridian of longitude aforesaid."

To make this "single line of railroad" the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific itself, and therefore the trunk line instead of a branch, became the dominant idea of Dodge's old railroad associates, who laid their plans to secure control of the entire road from the western boundary of Iowa to the Far West. They planned to influence the government to concentrate all its efforts on breaking the first ground for the Union Pacific at Omaha; they believed, and not without justification, that the main line of the road would first be built from this point west *to* the one hundredth meridian instead of west *from* the one hundredth meridian, as provided for in the act. In a word, they relied upon the natural geographical position of the "western boundary of Iowa" to aid them in making the "Iowa branch" of the Union Pacific the main line itself.

Their reliance, however, was not in geographical positions alone,—they were secretly building up a powerful political organization to aid them. Thomas C. Durant seems to have been the foremost figure in all these plans for the control of the first transcontinental railroad. He came to power in the first year of the Union Pacific's history and held it until late in the 'sixties, despite the efforts of the Ames brothers to oust him.

Durant began to urge Dodge to leave the army and identify himself with the building of the Union Pacific from the day the bill became a law, and he never ceased his efforts. He wrote him urgent letters and he saw to it that Dodge's friends did likewise. Even before the passage of the act great pressure was brought to bear on Dodge to

retire from military life and enter the railroad business. For example, he had just entered on his campaign in Mississippi in May, 1862, when he received a letter from Peter Reed, of Moline, Illinois, calling his attention to certain promises that Reed claimed Dodge made to him. Reed was an old acquaintance, a politician and one of the arsenal promoters at Rock Island. He was intimate with Henry Farnam of the Rock Island Railroad and with Peter Dey, who became the first chief engineer of the Union Pacific. He wrote:

"You may rely on it that the Pacific railroad bill as it passed the House will shortly become a law. You may depend on this. I saw Grimes and Harlan of your state and they told me it would go through the Senate with but little opposition. Now, young man, you once told me that if we could get the Pacific railroad through you would quit the army and identify yourself with it. In the first place, Dodge, you cannot possibly last where the labor and excitement are so great. I want you to take this matter under serious consideration. You owe it to yourself, to your family, and to me to stop before you are entirely gone. I tell you the Pacific railroad is a big lick in your affairs and mine, and as Farnam and Dey are in, you can hardly keep out. Remember me to your wife and ask her if you didn't promise me at Rolla that if the Pacific railroad bill passed you would leave the army."

The incorporators authorized to organize the Union Pacific met in Chicago in September, 1862, but Durant did not secure much of a foothold at this meeting. Peter Dey, of Iowa City, chief engineer of the old M. & M., and Dodge's former boss, was in attendance on this preliminary organization meeting and he wrote Dodge quite freely about it. He said:

"The convention was large and ably represented from most of the loyal states. General Curtis was chosen tem-

porary chairman—as a compliment to his zeal for the cause while in Congress.

"Ogden was elected president; Poor of New York, secretary; and Olcott of Albany, treasurer. These officers will, without doubt, be retained in the permanent organization, and I am inclined to think that it will be well if they are.

"The general feeling that pervaded the meeting was this,—that the road had become a national necessity, and that if this government calculated to retain permanent sovereignty over the Pacific coast, it must be built. The two millions of stock will, I think, be taken and the track be laid for some distance next spring.

"I am going out as far as Denver, probably to Salt Lake, and if I can get through I will go to Cheyenne and the Bridger passes, and return by South Pass. Governor Evans of Colorado urged the Berthude Pass on the convention, which he proposes to reach by sixteen miles of one hundred foot grade and a tunnel of more than three miles, and descend into the middle South Park. From there he proposes to jump into the Uintah mountains, the highest of the range west of the Rockies, and roll down thence into the Basin.

"Mr. Farnam seems to take hold of the project with a great deal of energy. I wish he was ten years younger. I don't know if I shall have anything to do with the project, but may, and shall if they want me to and will pay what the services are worth. How would engineering west of the Missouri suit you after the war is over? I do not advise you to give up your position in the army provided your health permits you to retain it to the close. I fear that Durant has eternally damned the Mississippi and Missouri."

But Thomas C. Durant was not idle. His plans were running far in advance of those of any other man in any railroad group. Peter Reed reveals this in a second letter written to General Dodge, dated at New York, August 20, 1863:

"I arrived here this morning. I find they are about to organize the Union Pacific Railroad Company. Durant is determined that it shall be so organized as to terminate at Omaha. He asked me this afternoon if you could be induced to leave the army and take hold of the Union Pacific railroad. I told him you could. He will write you today on the subject. There's got to be hard work done to guard against the efforts north and south of us. Durant wants you to write him your opinion of the Platte valley as a place to build the road, so he can show your letter to conflicting interests here in New York. You know the St. Louis folks want to take everything south."

Reed's letter is a striking commentary on Durant's thinking. It reveals that Durant was leaving nothing undone to locate the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific at Omaha. In this he was being opposed by a powerful group of railroad promoters at St. Louis, who were insisting that ground for the first branch of the Union Pacific be broken at Kansas City; and, as a matter of railroad history, ground was really broken near the mouth of the Kansas River for the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad Company even before the Durant group succeeded in having ground broken at Omaha.

The opposition was by the Kansas Pacific group, operating under the same charter, and they aimed to annul the line from Omaha by building rapidly from Kansas City to the one hundredth meridian. There is no question but that the St. Louis railroad interests sensed the scheme of Durant to hasten construction of the so-called branch from the western boundary of Iowa to the one hundredth meridian in the belief that it would become the eastern extension of the trunk line itself, and they hastened their own project. But this rival branch collapsed at a critical time—in 1864—and the Durant group gained the ascendancy farther north.

Reed's letter also reveals that Durant considered Dodge

vital to the whole scheme, for in another communication, written about two weeks later, Reed expressed the fear that Dodge had not received his former letter with its appeal for him to leave the army.

"I wrote you to this effect—that you write a letter to Durant that he could show to friends of the branch of the Pacific railroad to terminate at Omaha. He said you knew more about it than any other man. He wanted it to aid him in making sure of the termination in Omaha. I talked with Durant about the location in case the company, when organized, could not agree about terminals, and he said that in that case President Lincoln would have the say."

All of which reveals that Thomas C. Durant had already made up his mind to approach Lincoln ahead of any one else with his railroad plans.

Meanwhile, Peter Dey had gone west at the instigation of Henry Farnam of the Rock Island Railroad Company in a rather hasty trip to attempt to determine a route for the proposed transcontinental road. In sending Engineer Dey to the West immediately after the close of the Pacific railroad convention at Chicago, Mr. Farnam betrays that it was the belief of the Rock Island promoters that they might be able to control the selection of the road's eastern terminus, for the Rock Island Company was making desperate efforts to build across Iowa to Council Bluffs on the Missouri River. Peter Dey returned from this preliminary survey in March, 1863, and wrote Dodge:

"The trip to me was full of interest and I learned enough to satisfy myself that no railroad will—at least in our day—cross the mountains south of the Cache La Poudre and probably not south of the Cheyenne Pass. I know but little of the position or prospects of the Pacific Railroad Company. Into whose hand the management will fall is a serious

question. Mr. Farnam would, if ten years younger, take hold of it. I think as a general rule that there was more confidence felt in him at the railroad convention in Chicago than any other prominent railroad man there. We have finished the road to Brooklyn (the Rock Island to Brooklyn, Iowa), and are slowly laying track toward Grinnell, but when we shall reach that place is all in the future, depending entirely upon Thomas Durant and how he feels about it."

Peter Dey's letter, aside from its historic railroad interest, is the first indication that there was a growing breach between him and Thomas C. Durant—a breach that was to widen rapidly and to have marked bearing upon the building of the first fifty miles of the Union Pacific Railroad; and, consequently, upon the Crédit Mobilier investigation of the early 'seventies.

Before the fall of Vicksburg, while Dodge was in command of the District of Corinth, Grant ordered him to go to Washington to "see President Lincoln on important business." Dodge went with misgivings, for he had caused a storm of protest in Mississippi and Tennessee by arming negroes, and he felt that Lincoln was going to reprimand him and ask him to modify his military policy.

But Lincoln had sent for Dodge because Washington was filled with representatives of rival railroad companies and their lobbyists, contending for the eastern terminus of the recently chartered Union Pacific.

"Dodge," Lincoln began, "I want you to help me decide the commencement point of the Union Pacific Railroad."

Dodge, greatly relieved and also secretly delighted, entered upon a long discussion of various routes and terminal possibilities. Told in his own words, the story of his visit to the President is of absorbing interest to students of railroad history.

"When I went to the White House, the President met me cordially and said to me that he was considering the question of the Initial Point of the Union Pacific railroad on the Missouri river under the law of 1862. He also informed me that Mr. Peter A. Dey, who was at that time in charge of the surveys of the Union Pacific, and other members of the Company, had been before him. The fact was there was a great competition for this initial point, extending from Sioux City to Kansas City. President Lincoln had not forgotten his interview with me in 1859 on the porch of the Pacific House and had called me there to talk with him, knowing that I made most of the reconnaissance and surveys west of the Missouri river. He took out the maps and discussed with me for quite a long time the different lines and different views. I saw that he was very thoroughly posted in the demands of the different places and I also saw that no other railroad company or place had made any such explorations either east or west of the Missouri river as had we, and that they had no such reliable information. After a long talk with the President I was satisfied that he would decide the terminal point, in accordance with Mr. Dey's and my own recommendations. He did not then indicate to me that he would do so, but in November, 1863, he made the terminal as we recommended in the section of land in Council Bluffs where the present Union Pacific Transfer is. After discussing the question of building the road, I told him very decidedly that in my opinion private capital could not be obtained to build the road."

Lincoln and Dodge had a frank discussion of the provisions of the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862, and the latter gave it as his opinion that the government should build the road, and stated that the "job is too big for private enterprise." Lincoln replied that the government had its hands full but that he was willing to do all within his power to aid "private enterprise." Dodge then, voicing the sentiments of General Dix, president of the newly organized Union Pacific; of Thomas C. Durant, vice-president, and of all of

its directors who seem to have been agreed that the act of 1862 was inadequate, launched into a criticism of the wording of the act and told Lincoln that no one was going to purchase second mortgage bonds at any price, and that capitalists would not invest in the railroad unless the company's bond became a prior lien to the subsidy bonds of the government. "Lincoln intimated," Dodge declared, "that he was willing to advocate a change in the law so that the government should take the second mortgage and the promoters of the road the first."

This conference had great bearing upon the fixing of the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific, but it proved of deeper significance in amending the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862.

The act of 1862 was "to aid in the construction of a Railroad and Telegraph line from the Missouri river to the Pacific ocean, and to secure to the Government the use of same for Postal, Military, and other purposes." This act granted the Union Pacific Railroad Company the right of way through public lands two hundred feet on each side of the track for the entire distance; the use of material from government lands; annulled Indian titles when and where necessary; granted every alternate, odd-numbered section of public land to the amount of five sections per mile on each side of the railroad, except mineral lands; and bestowed subsidies of sixteen thousand dollars a mile for the plains, and from thirty-two thousand dollars to forty-eight thousand dollars a mile for the hill and mountain construction.

Furthermore, the act provided that on the completion of each forty miles of the road, thirty-year six-per-cent. bonds of the United States, equal to the amount of the stated subsidies, would be paid to the railroad company,—the bonds with interest to be redeemed at the end of thirty years and to constitute a first mortgage on the road and rolling stock.

The capital stock of the road was to be one hundred thousand shares at one thousand dollars each, with not more than two hundred shares to be held by any individual.

The Union Pacific Railroad Company had been organized under the provisions of this act, and it was believed universally that the concessions would attract plenty of capital. The act resulted in plenty of enthusiasm and ended there; no great financial leaders fell over one another in an attempt to invest, but there were railroad groups watching the whole enterprise and they were maturing plans to secure control of the first transcontinental road. In order to do so, and enable them to swing the proposition, they decided to wage a battle in Congress to amend the act of 1862.

They succeeded in placing an act before Congress that increased the number of shares from one hundred thousand to one million and reduced the price of shares from one thousand to one hundred dollars. The amended act also called for more liberal terms in "mineral lands," granting coal and iron to the company; the land grant was doubled and the subsidy bonds were to be paid on the completion of each twenty miles of road, instead of on each forty miles as under the act of 1862. And the lien of the government became a second mortgage, subordinate to the first mortgage bonds of the company.

Thomas C. Durant, the first vice-president of the Union Pacific, was the leader in the fight to secure the desired amendments to the act of 1862, and the enemies of railroads from that hour to this have never failed to damn him. The amended act was bitterly fought in Congress, but the railroad company assembled a lobby that was more powerful than its foes, and the amended act was passed.

That Mr. Lincoln advocated the amended railroad act and that his position had great bearing upon its final passage is beyond question, although it was opposed by one-fourth

of the members of Congress. Ten years later, with Lincoln in his grave and the road built, charges of bribery were freely bandied about during the Crédit Mobilier investigation.

The Union Pacific was accused of spending nearly five hundred thousand dollars to secure additional concessions. In later years when the Union Pacific prospered and when the construction company was being investigated men were quick to say that the amended Pacific Railroad Act of 1864 had paved the way for unparalleled national thieving, but when the original bill of 1862 was amended most men, including Abraham Lincoln, believed that the road could not be built without increased subsidies and greater concessions.

The facts are that no one knew, nor could very well estimate, the cost of building a railroad from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean, or to the basin of Salt Lake. The engineers who made the surveys in the middle 'fifties attempted to estimate the costs along the different parallels, but they had scant precedent to guide them. Railroading in the nation was in its swaddling-clothes, and the little construction that had taken place through the hills and small mountains of the East could not and did not furnish criteria for western estimates.

Lincoln, beset with the responsibilities of a national conflict and believing with all his heart that the settlement of the Pacific railroad problem would keep the entire Pacific coast polar to Federal aims, gave his best in the solution. So did the congressmen who supported the amended act, and so did most of the promoters of the first transcontinental railroad. Despite the controversies of later years, nothing is clearer than this.

There is one thing more to add—Dodge went from Lincoln's presence straight to the directors of the Union Pacific at New York and said, "Lincoln will help us." It

was a critical hour for the proposed railroad to the Pacific; these men knew it, and Lincoln knew it. So they sat down and talked the whole situation through and through and decided to ask Congress for more liberal concessions. They knew that they would be involved in a bitter fight, for there were men in Congress who had fought the act of 1862, and could be expected to oppose, with greater bitterness, the proposed amendments.

Oakes Ames, when on trial before the Wilson Committee investigating the Crédit Mobilier and the Union Pacific, said:

"I would like to make a statement to the committee as to the reasons why we asked Congress for just what we did in 1864. We did it after a consultation with Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Lincoln said to us that his experience in the West after many years was that every railroad that had been undertaken there had broken down before it was half completed, and the original projectors had lost all their money. He had but one advice to give us and that was to ask sufficient aid of Congress. He said further that if he would hurry it up so that when he retired from the presidency he could take a trip over it, it would be the proudest thing of his life that he had signed the bill in aid of its construction."

Six weeks after the fall of Vicksburg Dodge, who had been ill since May, became worse and was sent to his home at Council Bluffs to recuperate. There were rumors that he was to be made a major-general for his services in protecting Grant's left flank and in building and holding an all-important line of railroad communication. Grant, in reality, had Dodge's name first on the list of promotions, but the friends of a score of soldiers were bombarding Congress with letters and telegrams to make their favorites major-generals, and Dodge's name became lost in the shuffle.

He was too exhausted to care, and hurried home to rest although he didn't get much of an opportunity to do so. The citizens—even some of the copperheads—insisted on giving him a reception, and he had to make a speech. Regardless of the presence of old foes, momentarily eager to attend the reception and later to go to the ball and the oyster supper, Dodge bluntly stated:

“Nothing but the utter defeat of the rebel armies will ever bring peace. No mild policy will accomplish it. I have buried some of my best friends in the South, and I intend to remain there until we can visit their graves under the peaceful protection of that flag that every loyal citizen loves to honor and every soldier fights to save.”

During this period while Dodge was convalescing at his home in Iowa, Thomas C. Durant redoubled his efforts to get him to leave the army and help build the Union Pacific Railroad.

Durant and his associates were playing for high stakes, and the Union Pacific organization was slowly slipping into their hands. He was shrewd enough to realize that Dodge, as chief engineer of the road, would have far more weight with Lincoln than Peter Dey could ever hope to have. Durant really believed that Dodge's influence with Lincoln in railroad matters was all potent, otherwise he would not have brooked the opposition Dodge always gave him.

Durant knew that Dodge had been called to Washington to discuss railroad routes and termini with the President, and he knew that Dodge had maintained to Lincoln that the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific should be placed in Council Bluffs, Iowa, and that the route west should be through the Platte River Valley. But Dodge was in the war and it did not appear that he could be

persuaded to resign, so Peter Dey became the first chief engineer of the Union Pacific.

Dodge left Council Bluffs late in September to return to his command, but upon the earnest solicitations of the Union Pacific directors he went by the way of New York, and they renewed their offer to him to become chief engineer, giving him until the following spring to reply. He remained in New York several days and finally told the railroad group that he would stay in the war until the end. Then they urged him to go to Washington and interview Lincoln again and see if he could be persuaded to make public his decision regarding the location of the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific. But Dodge refused to do so. He said that he had been asked by Mr. Lincoln to state, from an engineering point of view, the best location on the Missouri River and the most feasible route west, and that the President should be bothered no more about the matter. So he left New York and returned to his command at Corinth the middle of October. A few weeks later Durant wrote:

"We carried the election of directors—and have organized the board. J. A. Dix, president; T. C. Durant, vice-president; if Dey will only get his preliminary surveys on here at once we will make a bold stroke for the location. We must get at work immediately on the line and have a good force on before Congress meets. I think I shall write Hoxie or telegraph him to come on and help look after the location of the starting point. There will be an effort made to get it north and also south. I note what you say in regard to this and am much obliged to you for posting me. Will write you in a day or two."

Durant's letter makes it clear that the Rock Island interests had at last gained temporary control of the Union Pacific—the first transcontinental railroad to be chartered

by the government. The newly elected president, General J. A. Dix, had been president of the old Mississippi and Missouri, a Rock Island extension across Iowa, while Durant himself had been identified with the company almost from the beginning. The Hoxie that Durant mentions in this letter was H. M. Hoxie, of Des Moines, Iowa, one of the first men Dodge met on coming to Iowa; prominent in its political life; and, at the time of his death in 1886, vice-president of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company.

It was Hoxie who received the contract for constructing the first one hundred miles of the Union Pacific and who was charged by the government in 1873 with having at once assigned this contract to the Crédit Mobilier Company that was controlled largely by Durant. That Hoxie was watching railroad developments on behalf of Dodge is clear from a war-time letter to him:

"I was in Omaha to look after matters connected with the road. I hear you have some notion of quitting the army and going to railroading. I wouldn't do it yet for the reason that the Union Pacific isn't firmly in Durant's hands. It will not be until after another election of officers and some more fighting. It may slip from him at any time."

But the Union Pacific didn't slip from Durant, and Peter Dey, contemplating the hold this party had secured, wrote Dodge:

"Mr. Durant has got the whole thing in his hands, but he is managing it as he does everything else—a good deal spread and a good deal do nothing. He considers it a big thing—the big thing of the age—and himself the father of it. Durant needs common sense more than anything else, and I have been so disgusted with his wild ideas that I have been disposed repeatedly to abandon the whole thing. I hate to do it as there is a great future in this thing if judiciously managed."

But Engineer Peter Dey was mistaken about Thomas C. Durant doing nothing; indeed, he was doing a great deal. He stirred all the railroad interest between Chicago and the Missouri River at this time; played group against group, town against town, and otherwise upset the more conservative calculators. On account of some difficulties he had both in Council Bluffs, Iowa, and Omaha, Nebraska, he let it be known that he intended to locate the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific either north or south of these two places.

At the very hour Durant made his threat he carried in his pocket an executive order from President Lincoln defining the initial point of the road. This order, destined to become the basis of a great railway suit after Lincoln's death, seems to have been the exclusive property of Thomas Durant. He guarded it carefully, so much so that few seem to have ever seen it, and in breaking ground for the building of the Union Pacific he placed his own interpretation upon it.

Durant finally announced that ground would be broken for the Union Pacific at a point nearly two miles north of the town of Omaha. On December 2, 1863, to the blare of horns and the roll of drums the citizens of Omaha and Council Bluffs—those who were not in the army—assembled on the west banks of the Missouri River to witness the ceremonies. George Francis Train, president of the Credit Foncier of America and the storm petrel of railroad politics, was the orator of the day. An auspicious beginning!

But just when Omaha real-estate speculators began to breathe more easily, Durant, despite the breaking of ground north of Omaha, took another tack, veered off ten miles south to the village of Bellevue, and coldly announced that the road should be built from this point. Dodge's brother wrote him of the situation:

"Omaha is in trouble again over the treatment received of Durant and his clique. Orders came yesterday to land all iron at Bellevue and Omaha people are given to understand that the terminal of the railroad is to be down there."

A few days later Dodge received a letter from Herbert Hoxie, already identified with the first construction contract, saying, "I just got a dispatch from Durant to ship to Bellevue instead of Omaha, and he says he has ordered freight at Omaha reshipped. This is damn bad."

General Dodge wired a protest to Durant. Durant replied that the leaders at Omaha had brought the trouble on themselves. "My plan will be carried out or the work abandoned," he wrote Dodge. "Iron is being shipped from St. Joseph to Bellevue. This is too important an enterprise to be controlled by local interest. The road can be built by the Kansas line if in no other way. No road through Iowa will terminate at Omaha."

By this he meant that he was going to change the route of the Rock Island Railroad through Iowa, run north of Des Moines, connect with the Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad Company, and cross the state to the Missouri River from ten to twenty-five miles north of Omaha and Council Bluffs.

Dodge, from the army, wrote him a sharp protest, pointing out that the Missouri River Valley north of Omaha was eight miles wide, with four miles of overflow, while the valley between Council Bluffs and Omaha was less than three miles in width. "Besides," Dodge added, "you ignore the two most important cities on the Missouri river—Council Bluffs and Omaha,—and this will bring the legislature of both states against you."

But the legislature of all the states could not deter Thomas C. Durant, and he went straight ahead with his plans until an Iowa congressman introduced a bill to compel

the Rock Island Railroad Company to build through Des Moines, on the line of the original survey, and thence to Council Bluffs.

Whatever Durant's motives may have been he was accused, finally, of stock manipulation. It was charged that he ran Rock Island stock up to one hundred forty-nine and then quietly sold out and bought Galena and Chicago, purposing a relocation of the latter road so far north that its connection with the Cedar Rapids and Missouri would be direct, thus eliminating the Rock Island as a pivotal road across Iowa. Anyhow, it is now history that Rock Island stock went down to one hundred and ten and Galena and Chicago rose to one hundred forty-nine, and some one must have cleaned up a quarter-million dollars.

Dodge seemed convinced that Durant's move was more than a threat. From scheming with John I. Blair, then building a road across Iowa, known as the Cedar Rapids and Iowa Falls that desired connection with the Union Pacific, but far north of Omaha, Durant now threatened to throw his influence to the Kansas branch and ignore the Platte Valley route altogether.

The situation was complex from more angles than one. Durant and Peter Dey were in an acrimonious dispute over routes out of Omaha, and the former, who may actually have preferred Bellevue to Omaha as a starting-point for the road, on account of his land options, seemed to think the time had come for a bold move. But Dodge wrote him a warning letter:

“Your plan won’t work. If you attempt it the government will stop you on the grounds of its former decision. There is one thing certain,—the government, Congress and the people will demand that the first forty miles of the road west of Omaha be built by December the first and from the initial point as fixed by President Lincoln.”

Dodge's final letter to Durant on this score was written just after the death of Lincoln, for the controversy had raged throughout 1864 and into the first months of 1865. Perhaps Durant felt that he could influence the Johnson administration to share his point of view, but the government ruled against him and the Union Pacific Company was ordered to consider Omaha as its initial point and to build its line accordingly. Moreover, Durant did not want to alienate Dodge, so the shrewd vice-president and general manager of the road faced about and began to cultivate the communities of Omaha and Council Bluffs.

But Durant had already alienated one of the builders of the Rock Island—Henry Farnam,—and the breach was never healed.

Both Dodge and Peter Dey always believed that Farnam failed to identify himself with the building of the Union Pacific because of difficulties he had with Thomas C. Durant in financing the old Mississippi and Missouri across Iowa. But in all probability the breach between Farnam and Durant had widened because of the latter's association with John I. Blair and the Northwestern interest. It seems quite evident that Durant really aimed to assist Blair to build his road from Cedar Rapids, Iowa, to a point on the Missouri River opposite Fort Calhoun in Nebraska, and even extend it west to the one hundredth meridian to connect with the "trunk line" of the Union Pacific, thereby ignoring Omaha altogether. Only when Durant saw that this might involve him with the government did he turn and attempt to work with the communities of Omaha and Council Bluffs.

So the war-time development of the Union Pacific becomes a fascinating page in the history of railroading, revealing as it does the struggle of isolated villages on the Missouri River to secure the terminus of the first trans-

continental railway; the battle of the roads pushing west of Chicago to secure the first contact with this great route; the rivalry of banking and real-estate groups to secure options on thousands of acres in proximity to its eastern terminus; and, finally, the epic-like race between it and the Central Pacific of California in an attempt to become the dominant road of the nation.

CHAPTER X

DODGE'S CIVIL WAR RELATIONS WITH GRANT AND SHERMAN

GENERAL DODGE has written at length of his military and personal relations with Grant and Sherman. Two years before his death he compiled several loosely written articles on both generals—articles originally composed a few years after the war—and published them privately. These brochures are uncritical, laudatory, and sometimes deal with matters relatively unimportant. On the other hand, they recite colorful incidents, both of war and peace, that are not without their value in illuminating the hidden factors in military campaigns and also in the building of the Union Pacific railroad. But this chapter will treat only of their Civil War connections; future chapters will unfold their post-war experiences.

Neither Grant nor Sherman, in their Memoirs, speaks extendedly of Dodge, and from reading the little they do say, one receives no intimation of anything more than a formal relationship. But when one turns from their Memoirs to the personal and unofficial letters they exchanged with him the conviction grows that the three sustained a relationship that was close and constant.

Moreover, there is ample evidence to indicate that Grant and Sherman not only confided in Dodge personally but also entrusted to him delicate tasks, military and otherwise. They believed in him: believed that he placed duty above all else; believed that any promise he made was as good as

fulfilled. Grant felt that Lincoln had the utmost confidence in Dodge's judgment, and he brought them together more than once that Dodge might frankly express himself to the President. Sherman's own faith in Dodge amounted to a passion, and he believed that Dodge could come as near achieving the impossible as any officer in his command. Dodge always told Sherman the truth, no matter how Sherman might feel about it; and when many dealt in praise, Dodge would bluntly deal in facts.

It is fortunate that Dodge reserved his laudation of Sherman to a later period in the lives of both, for if he believed Sherman to be in error in things military he frankly told him so, and sometimes altered his views. General Howard always said that Dodge could talk to Sherman as no other officer dared to do. This frankness intensified their friendship, for Sherman was great enough to learn even from an Iowa brigadier-general, and especially from one whose spirit could be conquered by no adverse circumstance.

In January, 1913, General Dodge wrote a letter to Mrs. John A. Logan, in answer to an inquiry concerning General Logan's operations in Tennessee, and took occasion to explain Grant's plan of campaign after the fall of Vicksburg—a plan that was abandoned owing to the opposition of both Mr. Lincoln and the War Department.

"In December, 1863, General Grant called the officers of the Army of the Tennessee to Nashville, or those officers who were to take part in a winter campaign against Mobile. General Logan was absent. His corps was to remain and hold the country north of the Tennessee. Grant proposed to take 50,000 men from the Chattanooga army and go down the Ohio and the Mississippi to New Orleans, and from there go to Mobile. Sherman was to go to Meridian, pick up what forces he could on the Mississippi, take the

17th corps and move it to Meridian and then join Grant at Mobile. I was to take the 16th corps, with 8,000 additional cavalry under General W. S. Smith, and move south from Decatur to the Tombigbee, then east destroying and wiping out the railroads and provisions that had been stored in that country and in Mississippi so that no Confederate army could occupy it again.

"Sherman started immediately to do his part, but when Grant presented his plans at Washington, Lincoln disapproved them because Longstreet would undo what we had accomplished in the battle of Chattanooga. There really was no danger of this, but the movement was stopped and Grant was greatly disappointed."

General Dodge has given us certain insight into the conference held by Grant and his western generals at Nashville in December, 1863.

Besides Grant, there were Sherman, Sheridan, Granger, Rawlins and Dodge. But these officers who had met in Nashville to make final plans for the crushing of the Confederacy in the West seem to have played as much as they worked. General Dodge told the story several years after the war.

He said that on December sixteenth he was ordered to report to Grant at Nashville, and there he met him and the other officers. The officers of the Army of the Tennessee "were a hard-looking crowd," for they had been in the field for weeks, foraging and building railroads. Andrew Johnson was the military governor of Tennessee and General Grant thought it would be right and proper to pay him a call, so the men in their travel-stained army blouses were introduced to the Governor, who was quite immaculate.

Perhaps the Governor looked at them disapprovingly, for Grant mumbled something about his officers having no time to change their uniforms, though he knew they had no others. The military Governor claimed to be quite radical

in handling rebels and told Grant none would receive any consideration from him. "He banged his fist down on a piano in the room with such force that we all jumped," Dodge said. Grant and his officers finally left, though Dodge declared that he hardly ever got his hands on Confederate supplies without Johnson objecting.

That evening General Sherman, who loved to go to shows, suggested that they attend the theater, so the six generals "went to the opera-house to see *Hamlet*." As they were strangers in Nashville, they bought tickets for the balcony and pushed in among the townspeople and many soldiers, who were on furloughs, without being recognized. The interpretation of *Hamlet* displeased Sherman, and he expressed himself quite freely. Dodge kept warning him to keep quiet lest some of the soldiers should recognize him.

By and by came the scene where Hamlet soliloquizes over the skull of Yorick. Dodge said the audience was very still during this part of the performance until a soldier, far back in the crowd, jumped to his feet and called out to the actor who held the skull, "Say, Pard, what is it, Yank or Reb?" In the uproar that followed Grant and his generals managed to find the exit.

Sherman, disappointed over the play, suggested that they go to an oyster-house, and, conducted by Rawlins, who claimed that he knew where there was a good place to eat, they strolled down the streets of Nashville at ten o'clock at night. They entered a restaurant, but there was only one large table and a patron was seated at it. The six generals were as unknown to the late diner as he was to them. General Rawlins politely asked him if he would change to a smaller table, and allow them to use the larger one. "This table's good enough for me," the man growled and kept on eating. The officers looked at one another and finally backed into the street.



Courtesy Iowa Historical, Memorial and Art Department, Des Moines, Iowa

The Gorge, Scott's Bluff, line of Union Pacific sketched in 1865 when Dodge
was on his second trip as far as Green River

Then Sherman took the party in tow and finally anchored it in an oyster-house conducted by a woman. But instead of eating they fell to discussing military plans, and shortly before midnight the proprietress informed them that they would have to get out, for, under the military rules, her house had to be closed before twelve o'clock.

"So we got out," said General Dodge, "and made our way to Grant's headquarters, where we bunked down the best we could for the night. Some of the staff heard of our evening adventure, and gave the news to the press. The next morning, before breakfast, all parties concerned were present to apologize to Grant, but he told them, in his modest way, that they had done the right thing. But there poured in on us complimentary tickets to all the shows and invitations to scores of social gatherings."

The following morning Grant and the officers of the Army of the West began the perfection of the plans as outlined to Mrs. Logan in General Dodge's letter of January, 1913. Grant had a veteran army of seventy thousand men, and he wanted to take the bulk of this force in a gigantic flanking movement that would have placed him between all Confederate forces and the sea. He figured that with Mobile taken the Alabama River would be open, and, using the river as a base, the movement against Atlanta would be made from the south instead of the north. The War Department did not consider this plan feasible, although it was favored by every corps commander in the West.

Its feasibility will never be known, but Grant's disappointment was so keen that he decided to drive Longstreet out of east Tennessee, thereby removing Lincoln's chief fear, and then go ahead and carry out his plans to take Mobile and advance on Atlanta from the south. Grant actually started out to do this very thing, but on reaching Knoxville, and learning of the poor condition of General

John G. Foster's command, on which he had to rely, he suddenly changed his mind and returned to Nashville.

Perhaps Grant learned that Lincoln's position on this score was sound from a military standpoint. But even then he was reluctant to lay aside his own plans, and in a half-hearted manner he did send Sherman to Vicksburg and on to Meridian; and ten thousand cavalry under General W. S. Smith were ordered to form a junction with him. But the Confederate cavalry officer, General Forrest, took exceptions to this Federal move and compelled Smith to retire.

March came, Grant was called to Washington and given his commission as lieutenant-general in command of all the Union forces. When he returned to Nashville he again called his generals about him and told of his visit to Washington. General Dodge said that Grant made a frank revelation of all that transpired at Washington.

"Grant told us that he accepted the commission of lieutenant-general and command of all of the armies on condition that his plans should not be interfered with at Washington, and that he should have the command of the staff department of the army. The staff department had always considered itself independent of the commander on the field; in fact, in the beginning of the war, the officer of commissary ordnance and quarter-master departments declined to obey the orders of the commanders under whom they were serving except upon the order of their chief at Washington. Grant settled all of this. Grant told us of the visit to the army of the Potomac, which he described as the finest army he ever saw. But he said his friends gave him warning that he hadn't, as yet, faced Bobby Lee."

This conference at Nashville on March seventeenth was a memorable one, for Grant told Sherman, "I expect you to give Johnston no rest and to prevent him from sending any portion of his army to reinforce Lee, and if Lee detaches

any part of his army to aid Johnston, I will send you two men to his one."

Grant went east and proposed a plan to organize all the territory embraced in the Department of Missouri, Kansas and Arkansas and the Gulf. Dodge came very near being sent to this military graveyard as a department commander with the rank of major-general.

General Sherman protested so vigorously against Dodge being sent west of the Mississippi that Grant pressed the matter no further, but he did begin another move—his third within twelve months—to have Dodge made a major-general. Grant first requested Dodge's promotion three weeks after the fall of Vicksburg; he had taken up the matter personally with Lincoln on March 7, 1864; three weeks later he telegraphed Washington requesting the promotion, and in May, after the battle of the Wilderness, he made a final request. Of course by this time Dodge was on his way with Sherman toward Atlanta, commanding the Sixteenth Corps, and the situation was rather anomalous, for he was but a brigadier-general.

The fact that Dodge had been placed in command of a corps while only a brigadier-general caused considerable ill-feeling among certain other officers. On hearing of this, Dodge sent Sherman a note and said that to avoid further criticism it would be well to give him a command suitable to his rank. Sherman's reply was, "Suppose you wait until some one complains who has a right to do so. Go ahead and do your duty and do not trouble yourself about others." It was a personal note and not signed officially, but it heartened him to go ahead, and he fought to within a few miles of Atlanta as a brigadier-general. He received his commission as major-general a short while before he was badly wounded at Atlanta.

Dodge reported to Sherman at Chattanooga on the

fifth of May. He asked General Sherman where he could get a good breakfast and Sherman recommended a certain hotel. When Dodge went to the hotel he found the knives and the forks chained to the table. On his return to Sherman's headquarters he said, "Sherman, these folks must have had some queer experiences with you when you were here before." Sherman asked what he meant and Dodge replied, "At the hotel where you sent me to get breakfast the knives and forks are chained to the table to prevent the Army of the Tennessee from carrying them away." McPherson, who was at Sherman's headquarters discussing a dispatch about to be sent to President Lincoln, overheard the conversation and began to laugh. "But Sherman," Dodge said, "instead of taking it in a humorous way, got mad, though his generals thought it was a good joke, and they often told it much to Sherman's disgust."

Sherman's sensitiveness may have been enhanced by the fact that he was already under fire from people all over Tennessee who protested to Lincoln and the War Department against an order prohibiting any stores being sent by cars to the citizens of the state.

The gist of Sherman's argument was that the railroad was not equal to hauling provisions and equipment both to soldiers and citizens. Lincoln had even appealed to Grant for Sherman to modify his orders, and the very hour Dodge reached headquarters Sherman replied to Lincoln in a dispatch, saying:

"We have worked hard with the best talent of the country and demonstrated that the railroad cannot supply the army and the people too. One or the other must quit, and the army does not intend to unless Joe Johnston makes us. We have paid back to Tennessee ten to one for provisions taken in war. I will not change my order, and I beg of you to be satisfied that the clamor is partly humbug and

for effect; and to test it, I advise you to tell the bearers of the appeal to hurry to Kentucky, make up the caravan of cattle and wagons and come over the mountains by Cumberland Gap to relieve their suffering friends, and on foot, as they used to do before a railroad was built."

Sherman crept on toward Atlanta, and the Confederate government removed all the obstacles from his path they possibly could by relieving General Johnston and placing Hood in command. Dodge has told the story of how this change of Confederate commanders affected Sherman:

"On the morning of June 19th one of my spies came out from Atlanta bringing the morning papers containing the orders changing the command from Johnston to Hood. My corps was with Sherman and was the extreme left. I knew that Sherman was marching with General Schofield that day, and as soon as I received the Atlanta papers I rode over and joined them. They were discussing Hood, for there had been rumors of the change that was now confirmed by the Atlanta papers. Sherman sat down on a stump and issued an order, at once concentrating his army. Sherman asked Schofield what kind of a man Hood was, as they had been classmates at West Point, and Schofield replied that it meant a fight. He gave it as his opinion that Hood would attack immediately."

Nearly fifty years after the war one of Dodge's officers—Colonel Jonas—wrote him his own recollection of what occurred the day Sherman, Schofield and Dodge discussed Johnston's being relieved. Jonas declared that Sherman, on seeing Dodge, hurried toward him and, waving an Atlanta paper, yelled, "Dodge, Dodge, glorious news—Joe Johnston is relieved and Hood is in command, and we will butt his brains out before to-morrow morning."

General Hood, just as Schofield warned, struck fast the very next day and brought on the battle of Peach Tree

Creek. Forty-eight hours later—and in the night—Hood debouched from the fortifications at Atlanta and risked his whole campaign in a desperate assault on Sherman's left and rear. It was a bitter and critical battle; the Sixteenth Corps under Dodge suffered heavily, and General McPherson was killed not far from where Dodge rallied his troops.

Ten days after the battle of Atlanta, which was the hardest of Sherman's campaign and one in which Dodge displayed a high order of courage and military acumen, he wrote his father a letter that is of more than passing interest:

“It is a very rainy day and everybody, except the skirmishers, are lying still and taking a long breath. Our guns are throwing their shells into the Gate City, and tearing down big blocks.

“Blood enough has been shed to establish empires in the Old World,—still the rebels stand up, bleeding and ready to receive more. God has spared my life, though with many a bullet aimed at me. How many of my friends have fallen!

“I have strong friends here, and none more so than Sherman. But I think that I shall quit military life. I have struggled up about as high as I can go, against ill-health and with but few influential friends.”

Dodge, in keeping with several other officers in Sherman's army, was feeling none too good over General Howard succeeding General McPherson as commander of the Army of the Tennessee. Dodge felt that General Logan should have been given command, as did most of the other officers. But General Thomas threatened to resign from the army if Logan was appointed and feeling ran high at a most critical time in the campaign. Howard learned of Dodge's attitude and this did not help matters. The new commander became exceedingly critical of the Sixteenth

Army Corps and matters would have come to a head but for the incident that nearly ended Dodge's career.

The Union army pinched in upon Atlanta the middle of August, and on the nineteenth Dodge was ordered to feel the Confederate front and break through. He went in person to look over the field and it came near being his last look. He has narrated the story of his being wounded:

"It was 2:30 when I reached the entrenchments and my line was so exposed that one could not show himself above the entrenchments without being hit. The boys cautioned me about exposing myself, and one of them said that if I wanted to see the enemy I could look through a peep-hole they had made under a log. I put my eye to this peep-hole, and the moment I did so, I was shot in the head. I went down immediately."

It was a bad wound, Dodge was unconscious for two days, and the report went north that he was mortally wounded. Years after the war, as late as 1913, an old acquaintance of Danvers, Massachusetts, wrote General Dodge:

"When you were wounded at Atlanta the news came that you had been killed. We were just going into the salt marsh at the time, and Ignatious, who had been up to Georgetown the night before, was going with my grandfather and father to cut salt hay. It was about four o'clock in the morning and as we started, Ignatious remarked, 'I was up to the corner and got the news that Gren Dodge was killed.' That was a hard one and it hit home, as they all knew you. But there was not much said;—they lit their pipes, farmer style when they get hit hard, and did no talking."

The second day after Dodge was wounded, General Sherman managed to reach him just as he was regaining

consciousness. "Doctor," Sherman said, "Dodge isn't going to die. See, he's coming to." But the wound ended his services with Sherman's army, and on August twenty-fifth, he was sent north, reclining in a hammock swung in a freight car. His wound was treated at Chattanooga, and he went on to Nashville where his wife met him; together they continued to Greenfield, Indiana, to the home of Mrs. Dodge's brother. In September Dodge and his wife went to their old home at Council Bluffs and the whole town turned out to meet him. "I trust that I can return to Sherman's army in a few days," was about all that he said. But Dodge never returned to the Sixteenth Army Corps for two reasons—his severe wound, and the merging of his command into the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps.

Dodge had been at home but a few days when he received a telegram from Thomas C. Durant, vice-president of the Union Pacific, urging him to come to New York as soon as he was able to travel. He went east the first week in October and conferred with the Union Pacific officials. The affairs of the Union Pacific were almost at a standstill; there was uncertainty and even confusion; and Dodge was urged to leave the army and accept the long-deferred position of chief engineer.

But he was thinking of but one thing—getting back into the field. Grant had invited him to come to City Point, Virginia, headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, and pay him a visit. Dodge reached Grant's headquarters on October seventh and remained one week. It is now evident that Grant had a definite motive in the invitation extended to Dodge. It was a period of uncertainty for the Army of the Potomac. Grant was under fire from a noisy minority who kept up a systematic effort to discredit him with Lincoln and the War Department. Grant was feeling these barbed shafts, although he made no complaint and did not reveal

his feelings to Dodge. Dodge could see that his old commander was sorely troubled. But Grant apparently forgot his own difficulties and entered sympathetically into Dodge's own affairs.

Seated one night in front of the tent before a big campfire, he asked Dodge if he wanted to accept a command in the East, and Dodge frankly replied that he preferred to serve in the South or the West. Grant said no more but suggested that he make a tour of the various headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. He did so and sensed a feeling that was strange to western commanders. He heard caustic comments on Grant's strategy and realized that the feeling between the different headquarters was none too good. He confided in Rawlins, Grant's chief of staff, who simply remarked, "This is not the old Army of the Tennessee."

Dodge thought that he was well enough to return to his command at Atlanta and Grant humored him in it, although the Commander-in-chief did not believe that he was physically able to do so. Just before Dodge left City Point Grant suggested to him to go by the way of Washington and call on President Lincoln. He was surprised, for Grant offered no explanation. But he was really glad to get away from the Army of the Potomac because many of Grant's officers were discouraged, some were on a leave of absence, and desertions were heavy—as high as fourteen hundred leaving within a single week. There was an atmosphere of pessimism at City Point.

Dodge went to Washington on Grant's own boat and was accompanied by Major-General Doyle of the British Army. His course on reaching Washington was decidedly uncertain for he had no engagement with Lincoln. But he went to the White House and was fortunate enough to come upon Senator Harlan, of Iowa, and Harlan conducted him to the President.

Lincoln greeted Dodge cordially enough, but the latter was at a loss to explain his presence. He finally told the President that he had been at Grant's headquarters for a week and was on his way south to join Sherman, and simply stopped off at Washington to pay his respects. Then Dodge got up to leave, but Lincoln reached out a detaining hand and told Dodge that if he wasn't in too much of a hurry to remain until he could rid the room of numerous individuals crowding into it. By and by they were alone with the door locked. Instead of renewing the conversation, Lincoln picked up a little book by Artemus Ward and told Dodge that he wanted to read him something. He read at length and both laughed under the droll wit of this humorist, and before Dodge realized it the lunch hour arrived.

While at lunch Lincoln suddenly took up the subject of the Army of the Potomac and asked Dodge question after question about all that he had heard and seen at Grant's headquarters. Then he pointedly asked for Dodge's opinion of Grant and of the plans to take Richmond, and Dodge said that he thought that Grant ultimately would defeat Lee. Lincoln reached across the table and laid his hand on Dodge's and, in tones that betrayed deep emotion, he all but cried, "You don't know how glad I am to hear you say this."

Grant told Dodge not to be in a hurry to rejoin his command, so he retraced his steps and visited Danvers, his birthplace. From there he went to Boston and attended a war demonstration at Faneuil Hall. Edward Everett was one of the speakers and, much to Dodge's surprise, paid him glowing tribute, announcing that he was in the audience. He was called upon to make a speech and as he rose to his feet a woman tossed him a large bouquet. The stem struck him full in the forehead, opened his old wound, and covered him with blood. There was a moment's pause, and low

cries of excitement swept the room. Dodge recovered himself and calmly began his speech. It was brief and pointed, and expressed the conviction that Grant would defeat Lee.

He left the East the last week in October and went to Nashville under rather vague orders from General Grant. As neither Grant nor Sherman believed that Dodge was able to go into the field, he was ordered to report to General Howard commanding the Army of the Tennessee. He went to Nashville and there received an order from General Howard to proceed to Vicksburg and take command of a column to move toward Montgomery or Mobile, as the military exigencies of the situation might require, and create a diversion in favor of Sherman's army on its march to the sea. But at Cairo he was checked by a telegram from Secretary Stanton and directed to go to St. Louis and await further orders. He was puzzled but he obeyed.

CHAPTER XI

THE DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI

IT IS pertinent here to inquire if Grant had any particular design in urging this change of commanders in the Department of the Missouri. The friends of Rosecrans have always said that the change was predicated on Grant's dislike of the man who had commanded at the battle of Corinth. There may be a modicum of truth in this. Basically, Grant sent Dodge to command the Department of the Missouri because he was thinking in advance of any temporary military situation in the department. He was thinking, as will be shown later, of the problems confronting the government from the Indian situation on the plains—problems that had to do with the overland mails, with great tides of emigration and with the building of the Union Pacific Railroad.

There is ample evidence of Grant's forethought in these particulars, and he placed a man in whom he had implicit faith as near the field of the problems as he could get him.

Before Dodge would enter upon these larger operations he had to face what five other officers had faced since 1861—the Department of the Missouri—a department whose problems had proved the undoing of other strong commanders.

*"Executive Mansion
"Washington D. C.
"January 15th, 1865.*

"Major-General Dodge
"St. Louis, Missouri.

"It is reported to me that there is so much irregular violence in northern Missouri as to be driving away the people and almost depopulating it. Please gather information and consider whether an appeal to the people there to go to their homes and let one another alone—recognizing as a full right of protection for each that he lets others alone—barring only him who refuses to let others alone,—may not enable you to withdraw the troops,—their presence itself a cause of irritation and constant apprehension,—and thus restore peace and quiet and returning prosperity. Please consider this and telegraph or write me.

"A. LINCOLN."

Lincoln sent this telegram to Dodge less than a month after he became commander of the Department of Missouri. This department had always been troublesome to the Washington authorities, for the state was the most extreme illustration, during the war, of a house divided against itself. Four military and a half-dozen civil administrations had failed. Missouri troubled Lincoln greatly. Neither Frémont, Schofield, Curtis nor Rosecrans seemed to fit into the thinking of the President concerning this state.

Perhaps General Curtis, more than any of the other commanders of the department, held the confidence of Lincoln, and in the beginning of 1863 the President wrote:

"I am having a good deal of trouble with Missouri matters, and I now sit down to write you particulars about it. One class of friends believe in greater severity and another in great leniency in regard to arrest, banishments, and assessments. As usual in such cases, each questions the other's motive. Now, my belief is that Governor Gamble is an honest and true man, not less so than yourself. Each

knows something which the other does not, and that acting together you could about double your stock of pertinent information. May I not hope that you and he will attempt this?"

Dodge did not come to the Department of Missouri under favorable auspices, for Rosecrans' friends in St. Louis—a powerful group of cotton speculators, military attachés and social parasites—raised strong objection to his removal. Grant, who was back of the change, went straight ahead. Rosecrans was not relieved by Grant simply to make room for Dodge, but because of his failure—an old one—to cooperate with his superiors, and for other reasons mentioned in the preceding chapter. The War Department was greatly dissatisfied with his failure to reinforce General Thomas against the movements of General Hood; and also because of his dilatory tactics in going after Price, who raided Missouri with a force of less than eight thousand effective men. Rosecrans had estimated Price's forces from sixteen thousand to twenty-five thousand and with thirty pieces of artillery.

Basically, Grant mistrusted Rosecrans' military abilities. Grant always believed that the blundering of the Confederates in the attack on Corinth, rather than the strategy and foresight of Rosecrans, saved the Union army from a disastrous defeat at a strategical point in one of the most crucial periods of the war in the West. And the military student of tactics of the battle of Corinth is bound to admit that the incapacity of General Holmes, commanding Van Dorn's extreme right, probably prevented the Confederates from taking the town. Then, too, Grant could not forget that Rosecrans, after the battle of Corinth, had called one of his old Cairo regiments, "a gang of cowards." Now, the feeling between these two soldiers was strained to the breaking point in 1864, and Grant made a special trip to

Washington to consult with Lincoln about having Rosecrans removed; and when Secretary Stanton wanted to know what to do with him, Grant made tart reply, "Rosecrans will do less harm doing nothing than on duty."

The situation was anomalous from another standpoint. Price's raid a few months before not only emboldened southern sympathizers in Missouri but it also stimulated and solidified the copperheads of Iowa who had long considered Dodge a personal foe. *The Bugle*, published in his home town, kept after him throughout the war, although he never gave this paper an opportunity to damage him. But now that he was in the Department of Missouri, long considered the military graveyard of Federal commanders, the copperheads of his own state, hard by, were not to allow this unexpected opportunity to pass without a final effort to embarrass and belittle him and, if possible, involve him in the old controversy between radical groups on both sides.

A letter from George W. Rust of *The Chicago Times* reveals Dodge's difficulties and, at the same time, betrays the feelings of the copperheads in the West.

"I am sorry that I can not congratulate you on your assignment to command the Department of Missouri. I sincerely regret that you have been assigned to a field in which no degree of ability or amount of good intentions can achieve success. You can not be a claybank and a charcoal at the same time. The dilemma is all horns and if you can come through without being gored you must add to your ability and to your good intentions the best luck any man ever had in the world.

"You have just this single advantage—if you fail the world will say you did all any man could do, for to prevent an explosion where fire and powder are brought together is to do a trifle more than people have a right to expect. I

think there are two things, however, you should do—let the claybanks and the charcoals cut one another's throats as soon as possible and let *The Chicago Times* have a free circulation everywhere. Since we have been so generous as to allow Lincoln to be elected over little Mac—a good deal better man—can you not be charitable enough to confess that all the talk about disloyalty was mere flummery? We were very anxious to support an administration and so wanted McClellan, but since we can not have him we will give old Abe all the support to which we think he is entitled—which is simply paying his taxes and giving him men when he needs them. He is not entitled to the support which would compel us to say a thing is right when we conscientiously believe it to be wrong. You have got old Abe for four years longer and I suppose you are satisfied—as for us, we can not mend matters and so must be satisfied too."

So advice poured in on Dodge from every quarter, indicating the seriousness of the task ahead of him. The old factions tried to influence him, and one group in St. Louis insisted on making a social lion of him but he refused to roar as society usually bored him. Then, too, it was said that social functions had ruined the administration of General Rosecrans. Another group soon apprized him of the fact that there was enough powerful southern sentiment in St. Louis and up-state to make or break any commander of the department.

This interested but also provoked him, and he was very impolite to a polite committee of southern sympathizers who called on him. General Dodge was perhaps more blunt toward this sort than any other Federal officer east or west of the Mississippi. He was not well liked in St. Louis among its powerful group of southern sympathizers. They wished that he would fail as other department commanders had failed. Nor did he succeed from the standpoint of half-hearted Union men who were anxious for peace at any price. He seemed to please no one and wrote John A. Kasson, then

in Congress from Iowa, to this effect. Kasson showed the letter to Lincoln, and Lincoln, who was being urged by both factions to remove Dodge from the Department of Missouri, said that he would not again attempt to make any change. About this time Dodge received a letter from General Oglesby, who had become governor of Illinois.

"I shall try to run Illinois if you will promise to keep Missouri straight and respectable. I fear you will find this a troublesome job unless you make up your mind to go straight ahead. Missouri seems to be loyal;—to keep her so and keep in subjection the rebellious spirits of her temporary subjects would seem to be the cardinal consideration."

Lincoln's appeal to Dodge, as the new commander in the Department of Missouri, gives emphasis to the serious, if not desperate, situation in the state. Price's raid, largely overlooked by the military historian, reopened all the old wells of political, civil and military poison. There was a sharp line of cleavage between the city and the country; St. Louis, Dodge's headquarters, was despised by people in the rural sections. It was called "Dutchtown," and many of its inhabitants were looked on as foreigners. Some of the Confederates who had participated in Price's raid a few months before were bent on revenge, and when his fast-moving columns struck the Missouri River at Boonville, near the center of the state, depredations were committed against many German families by irresponsible elements in his command. As has been said, when Dodge came to command the Department of Missouri all the old sores—political, social and economic—were open and running deeply. Lincoln was hopeful that Dodge could do what

all other commanders of the Department of Missouri had failed to do—bring peace apart from force.

Lincoln himself was despised in the rural sections of Missouri—especially in the counties bordering the Missouri River between St. Louis and Kansas City—and it was not until long after the war that the people of the state understood either the motives or the methods of the President. Perhaps they never understood Lincoln's efforts to establish peace apart from violence.

There were two supreme factors in the way of Lincoln's plan: first, the will to peace was not in the souls of certain dominant southern elements in Missouri; and second, peace by conquest bulked in the thinking, not alone of the Federal military authorities, but also in the plans of the Federal civil authorities. Governor Fletcher, who had just succeeded Governor Gamble, was a striking illustration of the military tendencies among the civil authorities. For example, Lincoln wrote Governor Fletcher under date of February 20, 1865, giving added emphasis to his wishes as expressed in his telegram to General Dodge three weeks before. Said Lincoln:

“It seems that there is now no organized military force of the enemy in Missouri and yet that destruction of property and life is rampant everywhere. Is not the cure for this within easy reach of the people themselves? It can not but be that every man, not naturally a robber or cut-throat, would gladly put an end to this state of things. A large majority in every locality must feel alike upon this subject and, if so, they only need to reach an understanding one with another. Each leaving all others alone solves the whole problem, and surely each would do this but for this apprehension that others will not leave him alone. Can not this mischievous mistrust be removed? Let neighborhood meetings be everywhere called and held of all entertaining a sincere purpose for mutual security in the future,

whatever they may heretofore have thought, said or done about the war, or about anything else. Let all such meet, and waiving all else, pledge each to cease harassing others and to make common cause against whomever persists in making, aiding or encouraging further disturbance. The practical means they will best know how to adopt and apply. At such meetings, old friendships will cross the memory, and honor and Christian charity will come in to help. Please consider whether it may not be well to suggest this to the now afflicted people of Missouri."

Governor Fletcher sent this letter to General Dodge, as commander of the Department of Missouri and commented thus:

"City of Jefferson
"February 25th, 1865.

"G. M. Dodge

"Commander, Department of Missouri.

"I inclose you copy of letter of President Lincoln received today for your information. It is passing strange that he is still unable to comprehend Missouri affairs. I am willing to try his policy, but will try to have every man in Missouri ready for active duty, so as to be prepared to meet all the consequences of its failure. With your knowledge and mine of the real condition of the state, it is heart-sickening to be put off by such a policy."

Neither Governor Fletcher, Dodge nor Grant believed that Lincoln's policy could settle conditions in Missouri in the beginning of 1865. Certainly the psychology of the Missouri guerrillas was not a peace psychology. In their ranks were many Confederate soldiers who had fought a losing battle and whose families had suffered greatly. The state, half Union and half Confederate, constituted a political and social paradox without precedent throughout the

war. Federal dominance of any sort, always carrying with it a personal sting, was unendurable. The southern element of the state, especially in the rural sections, looked upon the outcome in the beginning of 1865 as a "Dutch" triumph and they assembled all their fast-waning strength to strike back in guerrilla warfare.

The troublesome section was in the north central portion in the counties bordering the Missouri River equidistant between St. Louis and Kansas City. This portion of Missouri had been settled by families from Virginia and Kentucky; and, while it was not over a hundred miles from the Iowa line, it was more distinctively a bit of the old South than was any portion of Iowa distinctively New England.

The strongest Confederate families in Missouri came from this section, and the very heart of it was the home of General Sterling Price himself. For more than a generation, prior to the beginning of the war, families like the Prices had been engaged in building a social order patterned after that of Virginia and Kentucky. Now it was destroyed; slavery was gone; the hated "Dutch" were in the ascendancy, maintained by the military,—the "Dutch" that were strong in the counties that environed their own and who were rapidly encroaching upon their domains,—the "Dutch" who held their sons prisoners at St. Louis, Alton, St. Joseph, Kansas City and Macon, Missouri. Their future was dark.

Although there were many southern families broken, beaten and subdued by the war, there were bolder spirits—the wilder elements of these families and many not of them at all—who felt neither broken nor subdued. They operated in bands of not more than fifty and were a picturesque lot. They could ride and shoot as few Federal troopers were trained to do, and they rode and shot. Force was all that they would ever understand and they elected to match blow for blow. It was inevitable that this new brigandage should

follow the larger theater of war in Missouri, and men would cry peace when there was no peace. General Dodge put it bluntly in his reply to Lincoln when he said, "Unless troops are kept in the Missouri River counties no loyal people can live there."

But Dodge had seen enough to know that veteran Federal troops must give way to another kind of organized force, and he advised a new militia bill that would empower the commander of the department to organize a force within the troublesome counties themselves—a sort of citizenry police. This was done and, while it did not relieve the tension at once, it paved the way for new adjustments that finally led to better conditions. Into these county unit organizations there went the more peacefully inclined of both Union and southern sympathizers and a third powerful organization evolved to offset the radicals on both sides—an organization that became a group of interpreters with power to carry out more just decrees.

St. Louis was filled with refugees who had fled before Price's advance in the autumn of 1864, many of whom were destitute. As they claimed that they could not return to the rural sections of the state because of the dominance of southern families, Dodge issued what was known as Order No. 7, which was drastic and which was not calculated to salve anybody's wounds. He ordered all guerrilla leaders to leave the state and warned the citizens of the various counties to notify the Federal authorities of the presence of either guerrillas or bushwhackers.

A few days after the order was issued a Federal officer, on discovering a citizen hiding a band of guerrillas, took the citizen out and shot him. Scores of southern families felt that their lives were no longer safe in Missouri and left the state, but bolder spirits turned and fought back. Bitter protests were wired the War Department, even by Union

men, and Dodge suddenly found himself under fire. He refused to withdraw the order, although not sanctioning the shooting of the citizen who violated it. The matter then came to the attention of President Lincoln. Lincoln, already standing within the shadow of his assassination and bowed by uncertainty of Grant's death-grapple with Lee, paused in the midst of momentous issues and made a final effort to bring peace apart from violence.

General Dodge and Governor Fletcher gave serious consideration to the President's policies for Missouri. Perhaps there was no strong organized force of Confederates in Missouri at the beginning of 1865; perhaps it would have been better all around if there had been, with some decisive battle fought. Lincoln was right in stating that the presence of Federal troops in northern Missouri was a source of irritation itself. Dodge wrote Lincoln a long letter and tried to explain the situation as he saw it, for the military and the civil authorities in Missouri were decidedly adverse to Lincoln's plans to preach peace and good will when there was neither. Lincoln may have imperfectly comprehended the situation, but he was sick of strife.

Dodge was in command of the Department of Missouri but two months, yet his repressive measures were so severe that he quieted the state more than it had been since the opening of the war, which is saying a great deal. His methods were rough but effective. Perhaps no commander in this department, of the five or six it had during the war, was more despised, but he was also respected. He accomplished two definite results: he scattered the powerful guerrilla leaders, expelling most of them from the state, and then he turned and united the long-standing factions among the Union men.

Lincoln, in his assignment of various commanders to head the Missouri, has been accused of ulterior political

motives. Even Major S. H. M. Byers, an Iowan, in his history, *Iowa in War Times*, speaking of the removal of General Curtis from the department in the summer of 1863, says:

"Lincoln had to make his peace with the conservative element of Missouri, or lose the state's vote in the convention for the presidency. He lost the vote, notwithstanding his sacrifice of one of his best commanders."

Byers refers to the fact that the Missouri delegation was the only one that failed to cast its vote for Mr. Lincoln in the Republican National Convention of 1864. Lincoln once said that he removed General Curtis because he had allowed himself to become the head of a Union faction in Missouri, Governor Gamble being the head of another.

Lincoln understood the human heart if he did not understand the military situation in Missouri, and he also understood that the proverbial two-sides-to-any-question applied with double force to the state. Even in the midst of weightier duties he paused to study impartially the problems of the people. He seems to have had confidence in the opinion of the Honorable William A. Hall, a Union Democrat Congressman from Missouri, for Hall was trustworthy, high-minded and ardently sought peace. He was greatly misunderstood by all factions, but he was also trusted by most of them. In a letter to General Dodge under date of January 19, 1864, Hall inadvertently reveals how much his opinion of affairs in Missouri influenced Lincoln.

"Complaints have been made by me as well as the others about the management of affairs in northern Missouri. In all that I have stated to the president I have distinctly said that the matters of which I complained did

not grow out of your administration, and I have firmly refused to take any part in any movement which looked to a change in the command of the department. The character this bears satisfies me that you will seek the welfare of our state. The only fear I have is that you may not be correctly informed. My life has been sought because I complained of Truman. It is understood that those who make complaints expose themselves to great danger and most persons are afraid to complain. Those who are culpable will deny or palliate abuses. Of one fact there can be no question—that most of our best citizens have fled from their homes or are preparing to leave. This can not be without real cause."

Dodge was about to leave the Department of Missouri, at the instigation of Grant, to conduct a campaign against the Indians, but on the eve of his departure the citizens of St. Louis presented him with a magnificent silver set in recognition of his services as a department commander. The incident is mentioned here because most of the factions united in the purchase and the bestowal of the gift. Missouri seemed headed for peace.

Several years after the war General Dodge was near Boise, Idaho, on a railroad mission for the Union Pacific. He had left his private car on a siding and had gone to look over an irrigation project. On his return he was amazed to see his car well stocked with Boise Valley fruit. He was at a loss to understand the gift until the station agent told him that a number of former Missourians, then farming in Boise Valley, had visited his car during his absence and left the fruit. They represented a great company of Missourians who emigrated to Idaho after he put Order No. 7 into effect in the Department of Missouri. They had explained everything to the station agent and said that there was a time when they would have hanged Dodge if they could have

captured him in Missouri, but they were now thankful that his severe methods had driven them into the wonderful Boise Valley.

An attempt on the life of General Dodge was the final chapter in his experiences as commander of the Department of Missouri. He was driving from the Lindell Hotel in St. Louis to his headquarters when he was fired on. The assassin missed him and killed his negro driver who was seated beside him. Dodge had been warned that there had been a plot to assassinate him, but he paid scant attention to the rumors. The attempt on Dodge's life seems to have been part of a plot to assassinate many Union officers, especially in the West. Rumors were everywhere that officers were to be slain from Grant on down the line. Earlier in the year one of Dodge's old spys had sent him an advertisement from a paper published in Selma, Alabama, that announced:

“ONE MILLION DOLLARS WANTED TO HAVE PEACE BY THE 1ST OF MARCH. If the citizens of the Southern Confederacy will furnish me with the cash, or good securities for the sum of one million dollars, I will cause the lives of Abraham Lincoln, William H. Seward and Andrew Johnson to be taken by the first of March next. This will give peace, and satisfy the world that cruel tyrants can not live in a land of liberty. If this is not accomplished, nothing will be claimed beyond the sum of fifty thousand dollars, in advance, which is supposed to be necessary to reach and slaughter the three villains.

“I will give one thousand dollars towards this patriotic purpose. Everyone wishing to contribute will address box X, Cabba, Alabama, December 1st, 1864.”

There may be but little to choose between the military administration in Missouri from Frémont to Dodge, but the latter did restore order, although he dealt severely, and

here we come upon the basic difference between himself and certain other commanders in this department. Dodge did not believe in living over a volcano without some means of readjustment in the event it erupted; consequently, he did not hesitate to hit hard and was rather unmindful about where the blows might fall. He was not beloved but he was respected and, finally, understood and obeyed.

CHAPTER XII

THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS AND THE UNION PACIFIC

NO SINGLE factor was more vital in the construction of the Union Pacific than the campaigns General Dodge made against the Indians in 1865-1866. It is doubtful if any one connected with the government, the army or the railroad grasped the essential relation between these campaigns and his position as chief engineer. Neither Grant, who was chiefly instrumental in having Dodge conduct the campaigns, nor Sherman, who became the target in the controversy that raged over them, realized at first how mutually dependent was one task upon the other.

Lincoln was living when the campaigns began and doubtless gave his sanction that they be conducted, but they were less than three months old when he was assassinated, and his successor, hostile to the Indian policy, soon came into conflict with the military chiefs who had just brought the Civil War to a successful conclusion. To appreciate all the forces in play we must consider the action of the Lincoln administration in dealing with western problems in the beginning of 1865.

On January 30, 1865, the Department of Kansas was merged into the Department of Missouri, and General Curtis was transferred to the Department of the Northwest. The headquarters of the Department of Missouri was transferred to Fort Leavenworth and Dodge was placed in command. General Pope, who had been assigned to command the military division of all this area with headquarters

at St. Louis, received a message from Halleck that said, "Go to St. Louis at once and have General Dodge relieve General Curtis. The whole overland mail route requires protection from Indian hostilities."

In anticipation of these military changes Grant had written Dodge and asked if a campaign could be made against the Indians in winter, and his reply had been, "Yes, if the troops are properly equipped for it."

At this time the Indians occupied the Santa Fé route leading to New Mexico; the South Platte from western Nebraska to Salt Lake and Denver; and the North Platte by the way of Laramie and South Pass. All the Indians north of the Arkansas River had united and declared war on the whites. The fault appears not to have been with the aborigines but with a Colonel Chivington, who descended on the lodges of the Cheyennes, the Arapahoes and other tribes in Colorado and killed hundreds. These Indians had always been considered friendly to the whites, but they were stirred to madness and, with united tribes, defeated the scattered detachments of soldiers, drove overland emigration back to the Missouri River and all but destroyed the mail routes.

When Dodge took up his headquarters at Fort Leavenworth in February, 1865, the situation appeared hopeless. A terrible winter had set in and for nearly a month the temperature stood between zero and thirty below, and the snow was two feet deep. Both soldiers and citizens were depressed, and the activities throughout the old Department of Kansas were paralyzed. In Colorado the people were well-nigh in a panic because they were cut off from the troops of the department, and the bands of Indians of all tribes had united to avenge the Chivington massacre. The troops along the routes of travel were in the stockades and at the posts and were disinclined to budge.

Dodge, always a man of action and quite unhappy when not on the move, started to work, and at once came hard up against politics and military insubordination. He sent for B. M. Hughes, agent of the overland stages and for Edward Creighton, general manager of the overland telegraph, and outlined his plans. They concurred, but others did not, and the old-timers on the plains declared that the lines could not be opened and maintained in the winter.

Dodge set a good example by going to the plains himself, and there he began to learn things. He discovered that certain powerful groups made excursions from Canada into the Indian territory, stealing the cattle of friendly Indians and committing other depredations. Several army officers were involved. He also learned that officers were out in the state on a political campaign, directed by Senator Jim Lane. Dodge ordered the ring of cattle thieves to disband and all officers to return to their commands. Lane hinted that no one in Kansas could long remain in command and stay out of politics. Dodge replied that he would remain in command and also stay out of politics. In two weeks he was ready to give his first general order; it was sent to all district commanders on the plains, and read:

“Place every mounted man in your command on the South Platte route; repair telegraph lines, attack all bodies of hostile Indians large or small; stay with them and pound them until they move north of the Platte or south of the Arkansas. I am coming with two regiments of cavalry to the Platte line and will open and protect it.”

But it was one thing to give an order on the plains in the winter of 1865 and quite another to get it obeyed. He met with insubordination when he ordered two Kansas regiments to start across the plains for Fort Kearny. The Eleventh Kansas was in comfortable winter quarters at Fort

Riley and refused to budge from the line of the Kansas River. Fort Kearny was due northwest of Fort Riley one hundred and sixty-two miles. Between, was Fort Sibley on the Republican River. As the situation along the Platte was desperate, Dodge insisted that the troops make the march. He sent an order to Fort Riley to arrest any officer of any company who refused to obey command and he let it be known that he intended to accompany the troops. Members of the staff at Fort Leavenworth demurred, saying that it would be impossible for him to reach Fort Kearny. Dodge's reply was to start on the long journey.

From the fifth to the thirteenth of February, in weather from five to ten degrees below zero, every man on the Platte was in the saddle instead of by a fire in the stockades, and Edward Creighton, general manager of the overland telegraph, notified Washington that telegraphic communication had been resumed from the Missouri River to California. Grant wired Creighton, "Where is Dodge?" and Creighton telegraphed back, "Nobody knows where he is but everybody knows where he has been." The campaign continued, and by the first of April emigration and private freighting companies that had been halted at the Missouri River from Kansas City north to Council Bluffs, started west once more—a stream that would never again be checked.

General Dodge, on his first expedition in the winter of 1865, cultivated the Indians whenever possible. He organized two companies of Pawnees under the command of Major North and sent them as far as Powder River in March, where they were caught in a terrible blizzard and only the craftsmanship of the Indians saved the command. These two companies of scouts and guides were destined to play no small part in military and railroad operations within the next two years. Major North, years later, became

manager of the Indians in Buffalo Bill's show. He was greatly beloved by the Pawnees and his influence kept them from disintegrating.

It was while Dodge was on this first campaign along the line of the Platte that he came into contact with a few Indians he had met on the plains several years before the beginning of the Civil War. In those days, using his engineering instruments he could see so far that the Indians named him "Long Eye," and now word went out among them that "Long Eye" had returned and was fighting them. They became increasingly superstitious about his powers, and it was rumored among them that he could shoot as far as he could see, and that he could see them assembling at great distances. Dodge has told of their attitude:

"When the overland telegraph was built they were taught to respect it and not destroy it. This was done after the line was opened to Fort Laramie by stationing several of their most intelligent chiefs at Fort Laramie and others at Fort Kearny, the two posts being 300 miles apart, and having them talk to each other over the wire and note the time sent and received. Then we had them mount their fleetest horses and ride as fast as they could until they met at Old Jule's ranch, at the mouth of the Lodge Pole, this being about half way between Kearny and Laramie. Of course this was astonishing and mysterious to the Indians. Thereafter you could often see Indians with their heads against the telegraph poles, listening to the peculiar sound the wind makes as it runs along the wires and through the insulators. They thought, and said, it was 'Big Medicine' talking. I never could convince them that I could go to the telegraph poles the same as they did and tell them what was said, or send a message for them to some chief far away, as they had often seen me use my traveling instrument, cut into the line, and send and receive messages."

In the first short campaign against the Indians, conditions became so improved by the first of April that Dodge

left the plains and went to St. Louis to confer with General Pope, and he was there at the time of Lee's surrender and of Lincoln's assassination.

On April fifteenth at midnight he was awakened by a messenger who notified him that Lincoln had been shot. He got up and hastily dressed and worked until dawn on orders for all citizens of the state, and especially in St. Louis, to remain at their homes. Both he and General Pope were afraid that the old strife would break out in Missouri. Yet the death of Lincoln made a complete change in the psychology of southern sympathizers in Missouri. "The day after Lincoln's assassination St. Louis was so quiet that it was oppressive," Dodge said. With his staff he went to Springfield to attend the funeral and then returned to Fort Leavenworth, for there were persistent rumors of another Indian uprising.

In order to meet this new trouble Dodge was assigned to command all United States forces in Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado and Utah, with headquarters in the field. He began to prepare for active campaign.

When the officials of the Union Pacific Railroad Company heard of this they made strong objections, reminding Dodge that he had promised to become chief engineer of the road upon the expiration of the war. They offered him ten thousand dollars a year and stock in the Crédit Mobilier Construction Company to resign from the army and begin work at once. But he pointed out to the promoters of the Union Pacific that no railroad could be built across the plains until the Indians were subdued. Moreover, General Grant was urging Dodge to remain in the regular army with the rank of major-general, but Sherman now viewed the matter in a different light from either Grant or the Union Pacific officials, and began to pave the way for Dodge to combine the work of chief engineer of the road with

military duties on the plain. The correlation of the Indian campaigns and the task of the chief engineer of the Union Pacific had dawned fully on General Sherman who, henceforth, would back Dodge in everything he did.

The Union Pacific railroad directors had the good sense to see the point and told Dodge that the position of the chief engineer would be held open for him, pending the conclusion of his second campaign against the Indians. The wisdom of this policy soon became manifest, for in the spring of 1865 three powerful tribes of Indians controlled the country north of the Platte River, along which the Union Pacific was to be built, and they were banded together to oppose further advance into their country.

First, there was the dominant nation of the Sioux, whose tribes were scattered from the Platte to the head of Powder River and north to the Yellowstone. North and west of them were many lesser tribes, with whom they were at war most of the time. They were the Snakes, Crows, Blackfeet, Pegans, Little Robes and Groants. The Sioux were split into three principal bands. These three bands always remained north of the Platte and wandered between Powder River and the Little Missouri. They had about five hundred lodges and were hostile. Numbered among them were such noted chiefs as Spotted Tail, Little Thunder, Standing Elk and Swift Bear. The Cheyennes were a tribe with some five hundred lodges who were bitter toward the government, with the exception of one small group. The Arapahoes occupied the country west of Cheyenne and operated between the Platte and the Powder Rivers for hunting-grounds. Some of the tribes were as far south as the South Platte and the Arkansas Rivers. They had been friendly to the government, but were sometimes easily influenced against it. Their notable chiefs were Medicine Man, White Bull, Little Shield and Black Bear.

Following the fights at Mud Spring and Rush Creek in February, most of these tribes had been pushed toward Powder River, and General Dodge sent a column of troops, with the celebrated James Bridger as guide, from Fort Laramie north to Powder River on a reconnaissance. Just before they started, a large band of Sioux Indians under Little Thunder and Spotted Tail arrived at Fort Laramie and said they wanted peace. They claimed the Cheyennes made them go to war against the whites. The troops under Colonel Moonlight and James Bridger captured Blackfoot and Two Face, both desperate Sioux chiefs who had held a white woman prisoner for several months and mistreated her.

The activity of the troops stirred the Indians to unite in a new move, so they swept down to the North Platte and played havoc with the telegraph stations and the stage lines. But affairs along the overland route in the Arkansas Valley, where five thousand Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas and Comanches had confederated, became equally threatening. To make matters worse, the military authorities came in conflict with the commission that the government sent out to try to treat with the Indians.

Senator J. R. Doolittle, at the head of this commission, observed that the trouble was due to the "brutal and cowardly murder of Cheyennes,—an affair in which the blame is on our side." The peace commissioners, on the third of June, ordered Colonel Ford, commanding in the Arkansas Valley, to suspend all operations against the Indians. Colonel Ford appealed to General Pope at St. Louis, and Pope in turn passed the responsibility to General Dodge at Fort Leavenworth. Dodge concluded that the quickest way out, if not the only way, was to deal the tribes, north and south, a decisive blow. But in this crisis there was a scarcity of troops.

"Nothing that we could do could convince the veterans who had come from the Civil War," said General Dodge, "that they were not entitled to their discharge. They became so dissatisfied that only the five regiments known as Reconstructed Rebs, and the cavalry, that was on the plains before the war ended, were of much use to us."

Late in July two thousand Indians of different tribes launched a campaign to destroy all telegraph stations along the Platte; and, owing to a lack of troops, they came very near accomplishing their purpose. Matters reached a crisis in August, when the War Department, that had been influenced by Doolittle's congressional committee, ordered General Pope to reduce all commands on the plains.

General Dodge received this order with consternation, and he made a vigorous protest. Pope also pointed out that all the tribes of Indians east of the Rocky Mountains were in open hostility, and that with diminished forces he was expected to protect the great overland routes which, combined, constituted three thousand miles of road.

Along these routes pressed the United States mails, great trains of supplies for the mining regions and hundreds of emigrants. Gold was luring thousands, and thousands of others were traveling west hoping to establish homes. Then there were irresponsible bands of white adventurers journeying these routes who often made excursions into sections where some of the Indians were trying to live peacefully, and robbed and killed them. Pope well stated the whole pathetic situation when he wrote Washington:

"There is not a tribe of Indians on the great plains or in the mountain regions east of Nevada and Idaho but which is warring on the whites. The first demand of the Indian is that the white man shall not come into his country; shall not kill or drive off the game upon which his subsistence depends; and shall not dispossess him of his lands. How can

we promise this, with any hope or purpose of fulfilling the obligation, unless we prohibit immigration and settlement west of the Missouri river? So far from being prepared to make such engagement with the Indians the government every day is stimulating immigration. Where under such circumstances is the Indian to go? It is useless for the government to think of undertaking to subsist large bodies of Indians in remote and inaccessible districts. Whatever may be the right or wrong of the question our past experiences in America reveal that the Indian must for the most part be dispossessed. The practical question to be considered is how the inevitable can be accomplished with the least inhumanity to the Indian. My duties as a military commander require me to protect immigration, United States mails and all the settlements."

The government was faced with the problem of going on or backing out. The older treaties had sufficed when no great lines of immigration and no great transcontinental railroad pushed through the Indian country.

But with the close of the Civil War the social order of the country expanded immediately; great throngs of home-seekers were astir; the tides had set in. It mattered not that the commissioner of Indian affairs claimed that the Indians and the whites were officially at peace; it was inevitable that the strife go on. Washington was decidedly muddled over the situation on the plains; even Stanton thought that there were more than twenty thousand troops operating in the Indian country, when there were less than twelve thousand well-armed soldiers in all the territory between the Missouri River and Utah. The national capital was alive with rumors that the Indian campaigns would cost fifty million dollars, and the congressional committee that had made a leisurely jaunt through the Indian country insisted that two thousand five hundred men were a sufficient force on the plains.

The military authorities on the plains and Senator Doolittle's committee clashed more in the summer of 1865 than did the soldiers and the Indians. Even the commissioners claimed that it would cost upward of fifteen million dollars to subdue the Indians and that peace could be made with them if the military authorities would keep their hands off.

It was the belief of General Dodge that the Indians were talking peace to the commissioners and, at the same time, committing depredations. In confirmation of this he pointed to the attacks they made the last of June on five different posts, and to their efforts to capture a train of two hundred and forty-six wagons between Fort Riley and Fort Bent. On hearing of this state of affairs he sent out a general order for the troops to close in on the Indians and compel their chiefs to assemble and sue for peace. But before the campaign could start, word came from Washington that the returning commissioners had reported that it would not be necessary further to oppose the Indians.

Dodge was at a loss to understand the attitude of the Johnson administration in this particular move, but he was soon to learn that there was growing hostility between the Cabinet and General Grant as commander of the army—hostility that grew in intensity throughout 1866 and had decided bearing on the building of the Union Pacific and the whole history of western emigration. In desperation Dodge wrote:

"The government must understand that it will have to meet the problem of Indian warfare or abandon the western country. There are 25,000 Indians on the plains, north and south. We need more troops, not less, for there are 5,000 teams that are trying to cross the plains each month, and it is my understanding that I am to protect this travel at all hazards."

Washington's answer was that all campaigns against the Indians must end before the middle of October. When Dodge received this order he had over three thousand five hundred miles of mail and telegraph to keep open and there were less than six thousand effective troops in all the region between the Missouri River and Salt Lake. From this order, and from the general attitude of the authorities at Washington, it is evident that the Johnson administration utterly failed to comprehend the situation on the plains. Speaking of a Cabinet meeting held August, 1865, Gideon Welles says:

"Stanton submitted a number of not material questions, yet possessed of some little interest. Before the meeting closed the subject of the army on the plains came up. Stanton said that there were three columns of 22,000 troops moving into the Indian country with a view of making a campaign. Inquiry as to the origin and authority of such a movement elicited nothing from the secretary of war. He said he knew nothing of the subject. He had been told that there was such a movement. The expense of such a movement, he said, could not be less than \$50,000,000."

So a telegram was sent to General Grant demanding his authority for starting another war against the Indians, and Grant replied that he knew nothing of any new war to be started against them. The old one had never been completed; the Indians had never ceased their depredations; and General Connor, who fought them throughout the Northwest, said that they never would.

All the trouble was occasioned by the fact that Dodge was about to close in on the Indians north of the Platte River and deal them a final blow. It was admitted, several years later, that if he had been allowed to do so the uprisings that resulted in the death of Custer would have been avoided.

But no one in Johnson's Cabinet saw the necessity of fighting it out with the Indians, and Johnson himself comprehended imperfectly the problems arising from the tides of emigration that set in at the close of the war. The Indians stood in the path of that emigration; it was tragic that they did so; it was even more tragic that the government was unable to sense the situation and meet it when it had to be met. It could have been met and, as a problem, solved in the summer of 1865, and the nation spared the terrible consequences of later Sioux wars.

When Browning succeeded Senator Harlan, of Iowa, as Secretary of the Department of the Interior, Andrew Johnson secured a man whose enmity to anything proposed or sponsored by the friends of Lincoln amounted to hysteria. Browning's dislike for the Lincolns was more than political—it was personal and it was persistent. Even the passing of Lincoln did not hold him back from bitter remarks concerning Mrs. Lincoln, whom he accused of stealing White House silver. Browning came to Johnson's Cabinet with a deep-seated dislike for General Grant as well as for many of the other officers of the Federal armies. His bitterness of spirit toward Grant and Sherman came to include Dodge, and his enmity toward the whole project of the Union Pacific Railroad was as deliberate as it was continuous. It became evident from the first that he would oppose the army's Indian policy.

In August, Dodge made up his mind that he would make a trip across the plains and through the mountains and study conditions. Not only did he desire to learn more about the Indian situation; he also wanted to know if there was, in all the range of the Wyoming Black Hills, a pass with a grade of less than one hundred feet to the mile over which the Union Pacific could be built. This was nearly twelve months before he became chief engineer of the road, but

reports of all surveyors and of the division engineers were being sent to him even then.

From Fort Leavenworth on the Missouri he ordered his headquarters outfit to proceed to Fort Kearny out on the Platte, and then he went to Council Bluffs. There he was joined by his brother, Nathan P. Dodge, by John A. Kasson, the Iowa congressman whom Dodge would be opposing within another year, and by Brigadier-General Williamson, his adjutant, and together they staged it from Omaha out to Fort Kearny, where they arrived on August sixteenth. On meeting his staff he formed a strong escort from soldiers of the Twenty-first New York Cavalry and the Fourteenth Pennsylvania, all seasoned troops from the Army of the Potomac. The train consisted of twelve four-mule wagons and two ambulances, and the whole force headed up the Platte River, into the Indian country.

They reached old Fort Cottonwood two days later and camped near the Post, which Dodge had renamed Fort McPherson in memory of General McPherson who was killed at the battle of Atlanta. The country was inviting; timber and grass abounded, and Dodge noted that there were plenty of cedars for telegraph poles. But beyond the fort the country grew monotonous and treeless; long trains of freighters and emigrants toiled out the valley, and they were so numerous that Dodge's command was in sight of them for twenty miles at a stretch. Julesburg was reached the morning of the twenty-fourth, but the town had been raided by the Indians so often that the stage station was gone and only a few scattered huts remained. Here Dodge secured the services of Leon Pallady, a noted mountain guide who knew every trail and footpath between the Platte and the Arkansas.

From Julesburg, Dodge led his command up Lodge Pole Creek, passed Scotts Bluffs on the twenty-seventh and

reached Fort Mitchell the following day. It was a mud fort, lonely and wind swept, commanded by Captain Shuman. Fort Laramie was reached the morning of the twenty-ninth and game began to be plentiful. Great herds of antelope roamed the valley and the sandy hills, and the command feasted royally.

At Fort Laramie Dodge met several old acquaintances, including Nick Janis, a celebrated French guide who knew the country north of the Platte, and Major Bullock and General Connor. Janis, in honor of Dodge's presence, gave the entire command a party and "peace-smoke." The feast was held in a large Indian council-house in the valley of the Laramie River and was attended by many Indians as well as white men. The sutler produced wines and canned goods, but the *pièce de résistance* was a large pan of steaming soup. So all sat down on the ground, and after the wine had flown and most of the soup had been eaten, General Dodge became overly curious, seized a large wooden spoon and turned up a rather suggestive paw that had lain in the bottom of the pot.

"A squealer?" he inquired of Nick Janis, the French guide, as he held it up.

"No," replied Nick, shaking his head emphatically. "A bow-wow."

John Kasson, who drafted a large part of the platform on which Lincoln ran, Horton, a brother-in-law of General Pope, and General Williamson got up quickly, ran from the council-house and returned in about twenty minutes, looking pale and drawn. "Puppy-soup" had been too much for them.

But Major McElroy, the handsomest and most fastidious officer in the command, even called for more soup. He was far from ready for the party to break up, for by his side sat the lovely daughter of Nick Janis and she had

fallen in love with the soldier. She was part Cheyenne, and all the troops swore that they had never seen a more beautiful Indian girl. Major McElroy became deeply attached to her, but Dodge broke up the love-making and sharply reprimanded the rather obstinate officer, who seemed willing to take the girl along.

From General Connor, Dodge learned of Indian depredations and also of the menace of irresponsible white men traveling through the Indian country. After a consultation with Congressman Kasson, a letter was addressed to President Johnson in which Kasson urged him to take a personal interest in the Indian question and halt the Indian commissioners in their determinate purpose to prevent a northern expedition against the irrepressible Sioux. But President Johnson, as has been said, was being guided in all these matters by Secretary Browning, and Kasson's appeal fell on deaf ears.

On a frosty morning the first week in September, Dodge's escort moved out of Fort Laramie, leaving Nick Janis, the Frenchman, and his half-breed daughter standing outside the fort with their eyes on Major McElroy, who rode away without lifting his head. The escort now plunged into a country little known to white men, and on the sixth they reached the divide between the Platte and the Powder Rivers and saw their first signs of hostile Indians. Smoke-signals rose constantly and the prairies were afire in several places. The following day the command descended from the ridge and went into camp a mile below Fort Connor. Northwest loomed the Big Horn Mountains, rendezvous of the Crows, Sioux and Arapahoes, now uniting to resist white progress.

Dodge was now in a territory that was the key to a route from Fort Laramie to the West, being four hundred miles shorter than any other route, but as this country was

dearer to the Indians than any other section in the Northwest, he felt satisfied that they would not give it up except after a bloody war. It was at this time that he made up his mind that the Union Pacific Railroad should be built far south of the Fort Laramie country, provided a pass could be found. The inherent right of the Indians to the Big Horn country helped him to his decision.

Dodge led his escort back to Fort Laramie the middle of September, little dreaming that an experience was just ahead that would lead to an important discovery in the history of the Union Pacific, albeit at the risk of his life if not the destruction of his little command.

It was on September eighteenth that he turned south from Fort Laramie and began the ascent of the valleys of the Wyoming Black Hills, Denver being his ultimate destination. Two days later he reached the valley of the Chugwater River and journeyed up it for thirty miles. The valley skirted the Black Hills and revealed unsurpassed mountain scenes. On the night of the twenty-first, while camped near Bear Creek, a wild hail-storm swept down from the towering range on their right and blew over their tents, and the cavalry horses broke their hobbles. But Pallady, the guide, told General Dodge that Indians had really caused the stampede, and in this he was confirmed by several friendly Pawnees who had come out with the escort from Fort Laramie.

The next morning, after rounding up the stock, Dodge ordered his troopers to take up the southward journey. On reaching Lodge Pole Creek he took Leon Pallady and a dozen picked cavalrymen and began the long ascent of Cheyenne Pass toward the summit of the Black Hills. He instructed the train to follow along the trail at the base of the hills as far as Crow Creek. They were now in sight of Long's Peak and the chief range of the Rockies.

All the way up the Chugwater, Dodge had scanned, through powerful glasses, the slopes of the Black Hills looking not for Indians but for some indications of an undiscovered pass through which a railroad might be built down into the Laramie plains on the other side. Nothing had come of his observations, so he decided to ascend Cheyenne Pass, gain the summit of the range and follow the divide on southward, keeping his eyes open for a possible break through the granite slopes. He knew that on the western side of this range there was a grade not to exceed ninety feet to the mile, but on the eastern side, where he traveled, no pass had ever been discovered with a grade less than one hundred and sixteen feet to the mile, which made it impossible for the locomotive of that day to ascend with freight. For three hours Dodge and his thirteen men crept along the ridge of the mountains when Leon Pallady reined in his horse and, pointing down the eastern slope, said:

“Indians, and a lot of ‘em.”

Dodge lifted his glasses and looked. A large band of Crows had worked in between him and his train.

“How many?” he asked.

“ ‘Bout three hundred,” Pallady responded.

“Do they see us?”

“They’ve likely followed us all day, and aim to close in at night,” was the guide’s cheerful conclusion.

Dodge was certain that the Crows were hostile, so he dismounted his men, placed the horses on the west side of the ridge and moved slowly down the summit. When they came to fuel they lighted a fire, for he had arranged signals with the remainder of his escort. But the distant train toiled on along the base of the mountain unaware that the commander and his little escort were in danger.

The skirmishing soon began and Dodge quickly made the comfortable discovery that their rifles carried farther

than those in the hands of the Crows. But the Indians began to creep from rock to rock, narrowing the semicircle they had formed, and getting to where their fire might be effective; moreover a band of about fifty started to scale the mountains with the obvious intention of cutting off retreat either north or south. Leon Pallady tumbled a venturesome Indian with a well-directed shot and two others had horses shot from beneath them. This caused greater caution on the part of their foes, who now began a slow and increasing accuracy of fire from more concealed places.

Dodge's anxiety increased as the shadows began to lengthen down the slope, so he selected a strong position, built another great signal-fire and waited. The Indians crept closer and the spat of their bullets sounded against the boulders behind which the white men crouched.

"Our men—the cavalry," Leon Pallady unexpectedly cried, pointing toward a ravine that lay below them.

Dodge's troops at last had seen his signal-fires and were making their way up the mountainside. The firing of the Crows suddenly ceased, and thirty minutes later Dodge and his little escort were surrounded by seasoned soldiers and Indian fighters.

"Boys," Dodge said, as he gazed down a slope that seemed to lower gently to the plain, "I think we've discovered a pass through which we can build the Union Pacific."

The men were about as much excited over this as they had been over the proximity of the Indians and crowded around him for explanations. He pointed out to them that the Crows had fled down a slope to a creek bed—a slope that looked as if it had a grade of less than one hundred feet to the mile. Ordering his troops to follow, down the slope he plunged, and sure enough it led, not to a great drop-off as might have been expected, but to a gentle depression.

Crossing this depression, the company found a gradual descent to the plain and to their camp. The grade and pass thus discovered did not exceed ninety feet to the mile. Dodge marked the place by a lone tree, and over this ridge the Union Pacific was finally built.

After Dodge's return from the mountains he communicated with Grant, who urged upon President Johnson the necessity of Sherman being given full authority in the management of Indian affairs. "Of course I opposed his views as crude," says Browning in his diaries, "and as certain to involve us in a general war, which I believe could be prevented by the policy I recommended. The President and cabinet sustained me. I called attention to Indian affairs and the movements being made by the army west of the Mississippi to bring on an Indian war. Mr. Stanton promised that they should be checked."

It became an obsession with Browning that Grant, Sherman and Dodge did not have enough of strife and sought further outlet for their militarism by making war on the Indians. Dodge, by this time, was chief engineer of the Union Pacific and was pushing the road steadily across the plains, but he was in close touch with Grant and Sherman and knew Browning's position. Dodge wrote Sherman:

"You will need 5,000 men east of the mountains and north of the Platte river. To put it strong, you will need 10,000 for Nebraska, Colorado, Utah, Montana and South Dakota. At any rate, don't do as I had to do—get well after the Indians and then have the Department of the Interior stop you. The Indians now look upon us as a lot of old ladies who do not know whether we are for war or peace or both."

As the breach widened between the Department of the Interior and the military authorities, the Indian traders on

the plains were quick to take advantage of the situation and stir up more trouble. They doubled their output of arms and ammunition to the Indians and thus placed them in a stronger position to resist the whites.

Generals Hancock and Augur, active in the campaign on the plains, protested to General Dodge, and the traders were warned to sell no more guns to the Indians. No sooner did Browning hear of this than he felt that his authority as Secretary of the Department of the Interior had been interfered with. He appealed to the Cabinet, but for once the Cabinet did not fully sustain him. In his diary he says:

“Military commanders west of the Mississippi have issued orders prohibiting licensed traders from supplying friendly Indians with moderate quantities of arms and ammunition, which it is necessary they shall have to enable them to subsist, and the withholding of which is the cause of great discontent among the Indians. These orders were justified by Mr. Stanton on the grounds that an Indian war was imminent, and traders must be subordinated to military authorities. I oppose them on the grounds that the supplies were to friendly Indians only.”

But President Johnson seems to have sustained Browning, for guns were allowed to be sold to the Indians, and by spring they became bolder. The Indians, now well armed and sensing the strained relations between the authorities at Washington and the troops on the plains, renewed hostilities on a large scale.

Browning placed every obstacle that he could in the path of Sherman. The Secretary of the Department of the Interior gave heed to Indian traders and half-breeds, but not to the soldier who commanded in the march to the sea, nor yet to the one who received Lee's surrender at Appomattox.

Nearly forty years after the Indian troubles that came near preventing the building of the Union Pacific Railroad perhaps for nearly a decade, General Dodge, in a letter to Senator E. A. Hitchcock, Secretary of the Interior, made important revelations concerning his reasons for insisting upon a treaty that would not allow the Indians to come south of the Belle Fourche Fork of the Cheyenne River:

"HON. E. A. HITCHCOCK

"Secy. of the Interior

"Washington, D. C.

"My dear Sir:

"Can you furnish me the exact date on which the Sherman-Harney Commission went to Fort Laramie to treat with the Indians occupying the country north of the Platte? I desire to fix the date on which this Commission, Generals Grant, Sheridan and others, visited me at Fort Saunders—now Laramie City, while I was building the Union Pacific railway. Generals Sherman and Harney came there to consult me concerning my negotiations with the Indians at the end of the 1865-1866 campaigns. I did not agree with the Indians on the southern limit of their reservation,—they wishing to come down to the North Platte and Southern Cheyenne and I demanding they should remain north of Belle Fourche, leaving the Black Hills open to settlement. My reason for this was that in the campaigns my soldiers had discovered gold throughout those hills, and I well knew nothing would keep them out of there. As my officers and the Indians could not agree, I made a temporary truce with them to last until such time as the government could send a regular commission to them.

"Very truly yours,
"G. M. DODGE."

Dodge always said that the government never kept a single important treaty made with the Indians; that some group seeking land or minerals, or both, had always man-

aged to circumvent treaties; and that the Sioux wars, resulting in the Custer massacre, could have been avoided either by concluding the Indian campaign launched as early as 1865 or by the government living up to the treaty negotiated by the Sherman-Harney Commission of 1868.

In this connection Dodge once gave an interesting account of an incident that transpired in New York several months before the Custer massacre. He said that General Custer, then involved in certain military scandals and under arrest, had come east for the purpose of having his arrest suspended so he could take part in the campaign to be made against Sitting Bull. To complete the story in General Dodge's own words:

"From Washington Custer came on to New York and Charles Osborn, Jay Gould's broker and a personal friend, gave Custer a luncheon in the rear of his office. Gathered there were several of Osborn and Custer's friends. I had been invited and was present. Custer in his conversation, and in his assertion of what his regiment could do, said that his regiment could whip and defeat all the Indians on the plains, and was very rash in his statements. The lunch was a long one and the champagne flowed freely. I paid very little attention to them because I knew they were all talking big. The next day Custer was in my office and I said to him that my experience with the Indians in the campaigns of 1865-1866 was very different from his view of it; that my experience told me that one Indian on the plains, with his mode of warfare, was equal to one of our soldiers, and that if he was going out to fight the Indians with any idea that they were to be easily whipped, he was greatly mistaken. Custer still seemed to carry the idea that the reason the Indians had not been thoroughly punished was because the right kind of troops had not gotten after them; therefore, he went out not only to fight the Indians but determined to wipe out the disgrace of his arrest and be relieved from the charges that had been made against him."

It was General Dodge's opinion that Custer was brave but too indifferent to military tactics to have come off victorious in his battle, even under the best of auspices. His death and the slaughter of his troops awakened the nation, though fully a decade too late, to the blundering of the Department of the Interior from 1865 to 1876. When the Indians insisted, in 1866, that they be allowed to roam at will as far south as the North Platte River, and when they were supported in this by traders and by cattle thieves on the plains, as well as by Secretary Browning, the compromise that was finally reached, permitting them to descend as far as the south fork of the Cheyenne River, was a compromise that could only end in strife. The disbanded soldiers soon scattered the news of the discovery of gold in the Black Hills from Maine to California, and hundreds of irresponsible parties poured into that section, encroached upon Indian domains and committed outrages against the more peacefully inclined tribes. Therefore it was not difficult for the warlike Sioux finally to inflame most of the Indians of the Northwest against the whites. Basic in this final chapter of Indian wars was the conflict between the Cabinet of Andrew Johnson, with Secretary Browning as chief protagonist, and the army with Grant, Sherman, Rawlins and Dodge in personal disfavor with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior.

Edgar S. Welles, son of Gideon Welles, carried on an animated correspondence with General Dodge in 1912 in defense of his father's conclusions so forcefully expressed in his diary, for Dodge had seen fit to call in question Welles' opinion of Andrew Johnson. Edgar Welles wrote:

"Regarding your opinion of President Johnson, you should remember that no man in the country did more and sacrificed more for patriotism than he. It was his business to try and unite the disunited country. In doing so

he was opposed by a narrow-minded set of radical bigots who never sacrificed anything for the Union. And regarding your observations and comments on the Welles Diary—your criticism should be directed against the Cabinet. The Cabinet was only allowed to know what pertained to military matters that the War Department wanted revealed. My father did not think the Johnson administration had been dealt with fairly, openly and properly by the military authorities."

Dodge may have modified his views on Andrew Johnson, especially on the impeachment proceedings, but he never got over his belief that Lincoln's successor was something of an obstructionist.

CHAPTER XIII

BUILDING THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD

SEVEN months after Dodge discovered the Lone Tree Pass over the Wyoming Black Hills, or on April 24, 1866, he met Durant at St. Joseph, Missouri, and held a final conference on the subject of becoming chief engineer of the Union Pacific. The meeting was hardly peaceful. Dodge's old boss, Peter Dey, the first chief engineer of the road, had severed all connection with its construction, being unable to get along with Durant. Dodge was perfectly conversant with all the issues between the two, and he knew Peter Dey to be as high-minded as Thomas Durant was crafty and bellicose.

But there was something else—something far more serious than a squabble over routes out of Omaha: Durant was under fire, both in his own company and in Congress, charged with having built up his personal fortune, through construction contracts, at the expense of the Union Pacific and the Federal government, joint agencies in the building of the road. For the task of constructing the first transcontinental railroad, begun so auspiciously with the breaking of ground at Omaha, had halted, and the first five hundred thousand dollars ever raised had melted away, half of it, so it would be charged, into the pockets of Thomas C. Durant, vice-president and general manager.

The truth is, the Crédit Mobilier Company, whose speculations will be treated in a future chapter, was in action,

or had been, and somebody made a lot of money out of the construction of the first forty miles of the road; and all the Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Federal government had out of the whole transaction was a rusty and uncertain line that jutted out from the banks of the Missouri River on to the prairies of Nebraska as far as the Elkhorn.

Durant secretly believed that Dodge was the only engineer in the country who could go to the plains, reorganize the construction crews, fight the Indians and, at the same time, build the road. Moreover, Durant had been in touch with Grant and Sherman and these two popular heroes and idols told him that he would have their full support if Dodge became chief engineer.

"We will pay you ten thousand a year and give you stock in the Crédit Mobilier Company if you will take the job," Durant temptingly said.

Grenville M. Dodge needed the money badly enough; the war had ruined him financially, just as he wrote his mother that it would; and his pay as a soldier scarcely enabled him to keep his family. But he knew that he could remain in the army—Grant had so hinted—and he preferred the certainty of his military position to the uncertainty of dealing with Thomas C. Durant.

"I will become chief engineer only on condition that I be given absolute control in the field," Durant heard Dodge say in his deliberate manner. "I've been in the army long enough to know the disastrous effects of divided commands. You are about to build a railroad through a country that has neither law nor order, and whoever heads the work as chief engineer must be backed up. There must be no divided interests; no independent heads out west, and no railroad masters in New York."

Whatever Thomas Durant may have thought and felt, he was far too shrewd to oppose the ideas of the man that

both Grant and Sherman wanted to become chief engineer of the Union Pacific. Besides, Durant had the good sense to know that Dodge's initiative, experience as a soldier and training as an engineer made him the one man for the position. So the bargain was struck and Dodge returned to his command at Fort Leavenworth and wired Grant for a leave of absence from the army, for Durant told him that it was imperative that he come to Omaha at once and assume charge of engineering affairs.

Grant grumbled a bit, for the Indian situation was none too good, but Sherman, more conversant with railroad affairs, pressed the matter, and Dodge's request was granted. This leave of absence marked the end of his army days.

It was on May sixth that Dodge entered the chief engineer's office in the second story of a little brick building occupied by the United States Bank at Omaha. Disorganization was apparent, for there was no regular head to the company west of the Missouri River, and the engineering, the construction and the operating departments were all reporting separately to New York. And in New York City was a little group of railroad promoters who knew nothing of building across the plains and who, as a consequence, were quarreling among themselves.

The Union Pacific Railroad Company, at this hour, may be likened to that individual in the popular song who said, "I don't know where I'm going but I'm on my way." In other words, the final surveys for the road were never far ahead of its actual construction, and when Dodge assumed charge no one knew whether it would be built out the North Fork Platte toward Fort Laramie; out the South Fork Platte to Denver; or due west from where the Platte divides, out Lodge Pole Creek. And as to building across the mountains after traversing the plains, there was neither agreement nor understanding. Isolated engineering parties

were roaming both the plains and the mountains, and had been for upward of twelve months; but, decimated by the Indians and discouraged by receiving no pay, some of them had disbanded and others sat down to await developments.

One may keep well within the bounds of truth and say that General Dodge knew more of the possibilities of the country from the Missouri River to Salt Lake, from a railroad standpoint, than any other American engineer. He was the first engineer to be employed by a railroad company to make surveys out the Platte River Valley and on to Salt Lake. He had been sent by Henry Farnam of the Rock Island ten years before the Union Pacific drove its first spike at Omaha, and his surveys were something more than horse-back reconnaissances, for he had used his instruments and the Indians had named him "Long Eye."

But nothing is more difficult in the history of the first transcontinental railroad than to determine the value of surveys and the place of surveyors. Many claims have been made for many men, all of whose work doubtless entered into determining the best route for a railroad from the Missouri River to Salt Lake and beyond. First, there were the buffalo trails, and no one knows how old they were before the Indians rode them; there were the emigrant routes superimposed on the Indian trails; there were the routes of the Overland Mails superimposed on both; and then came the builders of railroads. As Dodge said:

"There was never any very great question, from an engineering point of view, where the line, crossing Iowa and going west from the Missouri river, should be placed. The Lord had so constructed the country that any engineer who failed to take advantage of the great open road out the Platte valley, and then on to Salt Lake, would not have been fit to belong to the profession."

In thirty days Dodge completed his organization, and on a military basis. Isolated engineering parties, scattered from Fort Kearny to Salt Lake, were brought into coordination, provided with heavily armed escorts and ordered to swing into action again; construction parties, long idle, were stimulated to activity; materials began to move, and the thud of the sledges on the spikes told of the new beginning.

When Dodge completed this organization that was to build the Union Pacific in record time from the Missouri River to Promontory Point, Utah, he had grouped about him a half-dozen men destined to make western railroad history. There were J. E. House, who had been with Dodge in the old M. & M. survey across Iowa in the early 'fifties; Samuel B. Reed, superintendent of construction and unrivaled as a mountain engineer; James A. Evans, who, next to Reed, knew more of mountain railroading than any man in the West; M. F. Hurd, who had been a private in the Second Iowa Infantry and who became one of the craftiest Indian fighters in the exacting science of fighting and building railroads at the same time; and two brothers, General J. S. and Dan Casement whose track-laying achievements gave them prestige throughout the railroad world.

Three months after Dodge became chief engineer, Jack Casement assembled a thousand men and one hundred teams out on the prairies of Nebraska, forty miles from Omaha, and told them what he expected. It was a mixed crowd of ex-Confederate and Federal soldiers, mule-skinners, Mexicans, New York Irish, bushwhackers, and ex-convicts from the older prisons of the East. Somewhere in California was another group pushing the Central Pacific eastward.

"Boys," Dodge said, "I want you to do just what Jack Casement tells you to do. We've got to beat that Central Pacific crowd."

With a wild raw yell Casement's men swung into action and the track-laying of the Union Pacific increased to three miles a day within a month. The East heard of it and out came bankers, statesmen, magazine writers and special correspondents. The Union Pacific Railroad, a dream, a theory in the opinion of many, was lifting to reality. And this is what they saw:

Long lines of grading teams sinking scrapers into the soil of Nebraska where plows had never gone before; great wagon trains of ties rolling in from the Far West; a hundred bronzed men dropping the timbers in their place; a hundred others pulling iron rails from flat-cars and dumping them along the embankment; a dozen brawny Irishmen tugging the rails to their position; the falling of the sledges; the rhythmic bending of the bolters; the laying of four rails to the minute; and the steady creeping, like a great brown worm, of the track to the west.

But this first group of easterners saw something else: they saw the beginning of the "Moving Town," of the "Hell on Wheels," for at each base, in increasing ratio, there assembled the strumpets, the gamblers, the liquor dispensers of a dozen states; and Paddies, troopers, Indians and frontiersmen drank, sang, danced, gambled and fought.

The first moving town sprang up at Fort Kearny on the Platte River, the second at North Platte, and the third at Julesburg, which turned out to be the worst of the three. The rougher element figured that Julesburg was far enough west to be beyond the pale of law and order. A group of gamblers took possession of the town as soon as Casement and his crew began to work west of it, jumped the land that Dodge had set aside for shops and defied all creation. Dodge ordered Casement to return to Julesburg and restore order. Three weeks later the chief engineer had occasion to visit the town.

"Are the gamblers quiet and behaving?" he inquired of Jack Casement.

"You bet they are, General," Casement replied.
"They're out there in the graveyard."

He had descended on the town with a hundred seasoned soldiers and wiped out the ringleaders.

It was in August, 1866, that the Indians first began their attack on the builders of the Union Pacific. The road had reached Plum Creek, two hundred miles west of Omaha, when a powerful band of Indians swept down on one of the freight crews, captured it and held the train. The situation was acute from more angles than one. Dodge had no hesitancy in cleaning out troublesome whites, but the Indians, being wards of the government and the subject of much emotional oratory, presented another problem.

He was ten miles west at the end of the line when word came to him of the trouble. He ordered his private car—an arsenal on wheels—hooked on to the handiest engine and with twenty men raced back to the scene of the capture. Halting his train he deployed his men on either side of the track and opened fire on the Indians, who had set fire to the freight. They mounted their ponies and ran without making a show of resistance. It wasn't much of a fight, but it marked the beginning of twenty months of bitter warfare against the building of the first transcontinental railroad.

Three weeks after the fight Dodge left headquarters at Omaha, went to the end of the track beyond Plum Creek, and then with a picked escort started for the mountains to make a final selection for the line through the Wyoming Black Hills. Accompanying him were Colonel Seymour, consulting engineer; J. S. Williams, a government director; Samuel Reed, superintendent of construction; and Commissioners Carter and Harbaugh.

But more than Indian troubles now confronted the chief

engineer: there were bitter disputes between the government directors and the Union Pacific officials over the route of the road through the mountains. Some favored one pass and some another, but the chief engineer had plans of his own. He headed straight for the lone tree that marked the defile he discovered the year before when beset by Indians.

A thorough examination of both the eastern and the western slopes of the Wyoming Black Hills convinced Dodge that the road should be built through the pass he had discovered and he instructed his engineers to make the exact location. His decision marked the beginning of his disputes with Durant over the location of the line from the eastern slopes of the Black Hills to Green River, far to the west,—disputes that all but halted the building of the road.

At La Porte, on October second, Dodge came upon two of his old mountain guides, Bennett and Janis. He tried to induce Janis to negotiate with the Indians who were organizing to oppose the building of the Union Pacific past Cheyenne, but Janis frankly told him that as the government was using a military road from Fort Laramie through the Indian country, in violation of the very agreement Dodge had made with them in 1865, peace talk meant nothing.

"I'm on the side of the Indians now," Janis said. "The government is wrong in allowing gold-seekers to go north into the Indian country."

Dodge knew this to be true, but now he was building a great transcontinental railroad and he could not pause to settle the differences between the Indians and the government. The issue had to be fought out.

On October eighth, Dodge and escort plunged into Boulder Canyon to hold a conference with one of his engineering parties when a heavy snow-storm swept down on them and caught them in a critical situation. The teams refused to face the snow that was fast turning to a stinging

sleet. Dodge ordered the packs to be taken off the mules to let the animals shift for themselves, and after a hard struggle he succeeded in leading his men to the shelter of an old stamp mill near a mine. For three days they were snowed in and provision ran low, and Dodge saw enough of Boulder Pass to convince him that the main line of the Union Pacific could never be built any closer to Denver than a point a hundred miles to the north. While cooped up in the mountain storm he was elected to Congress, having been drafted by the soldier element of Iowa early in the spring to oppose John Kasson for the Republican nomination. "But I'd even forgot," Dodge said, "that it was election day."

By the middle of October Dodge was back at headquarters in Omaha. A letter from Thomas C. Durant conveyed the information that the vice-president of the Union Pacific was about to lead a large party of eastern people to the prairies of Nebraska to see the railroad. Durant was short of money and he planned the trip to interest certain well-known capitalists from New York, Boston and Philadelphia. Dodge was not in a very good frame of mind over the proposed excursion, for he was beset with many problems. But there was nothing to do but get ready to receive these joy-riders of 1866, and he made up his mind that he would stage a few acts not on the program.

He got in touch with the quartermaster general at Omaha, secured a great number of tents and set up a first camp out on the Loup Fork River. He sent for Major North, who had commanded the Pawnees in the Indian campaign of 1865, and told him to select fifty of his best red men, put them in their war paint and camp them on the opposite side of the river under cover of the darkness and await orders.

A week later, Durant arrived in Omaha with "one hundred fifty prominent citizens and capitalists and ladies to

see the railroad and the country." Indeed, it was a notable group composed of Sidney Dillon, John Duff, John Sherman, Senator Wade, Joseph Medill, George M. Pullman, Robert Todd Lincoln, Monsieur Odilon Barrot, Secretary of the French Embassy, Marquis Chambrun, and "Mr. and Mrs. George Francis Train and maid." In addition to these there were certain government directors of the Union Pacific, "the Hon. W. M. White, General Simpson and General Curtis," all of whom were out to inspect the road. These three rode in a coach that had been built for Abraham Lincoln—the one that also bore his body to Springfield.

When Durant and party arrived in Omaha their equipment resembled an old-fashioned traveling show. There was a band, a caterer, six cooks, a photographer, three "tonsorial artists," a "sleight-of-hand performer," and a printing press. They had provisions enough to feed a regiment and of a kind that a regiment never ate. One of the menus included beef, mutton, roasted ox, broiled ham, corned beef, roasted antelope, Chinese duck, Roman goose, peas, tomatoes, asparagus, salad, potatoes, cheese, pickles, pineapples, strawberries, damsons, peaches and cherries, "to which should be added, as representing the principal feature of the unpublished wine-list, Verzenay, Ve Max Sutaine Et Cie, T. W. & G. D. Bayaud, Sole agents of the United States and Canada."

From Omaha the excursionists went out over the new Union Pacific Railroad to the camp Dodge had prepared on the Loup Fork River, and, after a big supper, a bonfire dance and a musical program, they retired to their tents. At three o'clock the next morning Dodge took an engine and crossed the river to where Major North was camped with his Pawnee scouts, loaded them on the coal-tender, the pilot, and wherever an Indian could cling, and at dawn backed across the river to the camp of sleeping easterners.

The Pawnees, following instructions to the letter, stole into the camp fully dressed in their war trappings and began to whoop at the top of their voices. The surprise was so complete that for the next minute great excitement prevailed and a couple of the ladies found it convenient to faint. But the whole affair ended in a friendly dance around the fire followed by breakfast, and the Indians left the camp laden with gifts.

Dodge conducted the excursionists on to the end of the road, and there were hunting parties in which buffalo and antelope were rounded up in droves so great that the amateur hunters could not miss them, and many Union Pacific bonds were negotiated over the fires that roasted the meat, just as the shrewd vice-president of the road had planned.

Dodge went east after the excursion was over, presented his plans for building the Union Pacific through the mountains, secured the consent of the directors to construct over the Lone Tree divide, and then hurried back to the West. More difficulties than he had ever dreamed of were at hand, for Durant was beginning his struggle with the Ames brothers for the control of the road; moreover, the Indians were fully organized to give their best blows.

Dodge wrote Sherman a long letter, told of his plans to reach Fort Sanders—two hundred and eighty-eight miles west—in another twelve months, and frankly declared that he must have more troops and more authority.

"It will take more soldiers to enable us to get more workers," he wrote. "Soldiers give the men confidence. We need 5,000 soldiers east of the mountains and north of the Platte."

Sherman replied:

"It is almost a miracle to grasp your purpose to finish to Fort Sanders in 1867, but you have done so much that I



Courtesy Union Pacific Historical Museum

Presented to State Historical Department, Des Moines, Iowa, by J. R. Perkins for the Dodge collection, October, 1928. It is said by Mr. Beerman of the Union Pacific to be a photograph of the boats and the T. C. Durant excursion party from the East to the plains in 1866 to see the Union Pacific then built as far West as Kearny, Nebraska. Notables in the group include George Pullman, George F. Train, Durant, John Sherman, etc.

mistrust my own judgment and accept yours. I regard this road as the solution of Indian affairs and of the Mormon question, and I will help you all I can. You may rest easy that both Grant and I feel deeply concerned in the safety of your great national enterprise."

Sherman sent Dodge's letter to Grant and he replied:

"I have carefully read the enclosed letter from General Dodge. Now that the government has assumed the obligation to guarantee the bonds of the Pacific railroad it becomes a matter of great pecuniary interest to see that it is completed as soon as possible. Every protection should be given by the military, both to secure the rapid completion of the road and to avoid pretexts on the part of the builders to secure further assistance from the government."

Grant and Sherman moved at once and General Augur was given command of the Department of the Platte and told to cooperate with Dodge in the building of the Union Pacific Railroad. Augur came and asked Dodge what he wanted and Dodge replied:

"I want strong military escorts with each party of engineers and I want detachments strung all along the line from Alkali to the Laramie River."

During the winter and the spring Dodge fought snows and floods. In March tracks were blocked, for no one had anticipated snow blockades. In April great floods swept through western Nebraska, tore out miles of track, bridges and telegraph poles. The damage at the Loup Fork bridge alone exceeded fifty thousand dollars. And just at this inopportune time the company sent its representatives west to see what Dodge was doing. No visit could have been more inauspicious. Moreover, Durant and Dodge were quarreling. Dodge was frank with Oliver Ames, the president of the road, who came out.

"Durant is in the way," he told Ames.

Oliver Ames sized up the situation and sat down and wrote:

"It shall be the duty of the chief engineer of the Union Pacific railroad to take charge of all matter pertaining to the construction of the road."

Oliver Ames said more than he wrote. Although the latter was enough for Durant to understand he gave no heed. Dodge, however, felt stronger with the company and went ahead as his judgment dictated. And he could move faster, for the Chicago and Northwestern had reached the Missouri River and building materials from the East would not have to await the slow-moving wagons and steamboats.

The floods of nature and the disputes of human nature had been unable to halt the chief engineer of the Union Pacific, so the Indians took a hand. From the deep ravine of the Wyoming Black Hills they swept down to Lodge Pole Creek, pulled up the stakes that marked the line of the road, stole the teams and drove the workmen back upon the base; they struck another party on the Laramie Plains, cleaned it out and burned everything in sight; and they wound up by tackling one of the best-protected engineering groups on the road, killed a soldier and a tie-hauler, and playfully burned the stage stations along a fifty-mile front.

Dodge, greatly troubled if not discouraged for the first time, wrote Sherman on May twentieth:

"I am beginning to have serious doubts of General Augur's ability to make a campaign into the Powder River country and at the same time give ample protection to the railroad, the mail routes and the telegraph. His forces are too limited. When we went into the Powder River country

in 1865 we had more mounted troops to hold the stage routes alone than Augur has in his entire department. If the Bent brothers are with the Cheyennes they will play hell with the completed road."

Dodge tried to keep the facts from the press, for it was becoming increasingly difficult to get workmen to advance with the building of the road. The situation was made doubly difficult because of the refusal of Congress to allow Sherman to clean out hostile Indians in the Republican River country fifty miles south, so Dodge was caught between two fires.

The last week in May three government commissioners, White, Simpson and Frank P. Blair came west and went to the end of the track to examine the road. They had just completed their task and were standing talking with Dodge when more than one hundred Indians suddenly swept down a ravine and made a fierce assault upon the workmen at their lunch. A company of soldiers was less than a mile away, but they were unable to render any assistance so swift was the rush of the red men. The whine of the bullets, uncomfortably close to the government commissioners; the desperation of the attack; and the indifference of the Indians to their own fate convinced Blair and the others that the red men were now fighting for their country and not merely to steal a few head of cattle.

Dodge left the commissioners standing on the hill, jerked his revolver and hurried down to the tracks, yelling at the chief graders to grab their guns and go after the Indians, but the workmen were demoralized and sought the shelter of the freight cars and would not budge. He stormed about, upbraided the graders for allowing a band of savages to rush them without firing a shot in return, and then went back to the commissioners and tartly said:

"We've got to clean the damn Indians out or give up

building the Union Pacific Railroad. The government may take its choice."

He was despondent, ill, and had begun to feel that he stood alone in his efforts to complete the Union Pacific in the time allowed under the act of 1862. But Blair told him that he had seen enough to be convinced that the road could not be pushed through the mountains without heavy reinforcements from the army and he promised to go back east and stir up things. He did so and three additional companies of cavalry were stationed along the line for scouting purposes, and to keep the Sioux and the Cheyennes pushed back into their own country.

In June Grant wrote Dodge and conveyed the sad intelligence that General Rawlins, his chief of staff, had been pronounced tubercular and should live in the West for a year. Dodge communicated at once with Rawlins and invited him to spend the remainder of the summer and the autumn in the mountains along the line of the Union Pacific's building. So Rawlins came west, accompanied by John R. Duff, son of an official of the road, Colonel Silas Seymour, consulting engineer, and Blickensderfer, an able engineer chosen by President Johnson to determine where the Union Pacific should first touch the eastern base of the mountains, in accordance with the act of 1862. Rawlins had an escort of two companies of cavalry under Colonel Mizner, and his physician, Doctor Terry, was also in the party.

When General Rawlins and party arrived, Dodge conducted them to the end of the track, where they were joined by General Augur who had been ordered by Sherman to establish a strong military base on the eastern slope of the mountains. Dodge was about to form a fifth railroad base, and he had already selected a spot. It was the present site of Cheyenne. General Augur agreed to establish the military post near, and Fort D. A. Russell resulted.

The united parties pushed out Crow Creek to the new railroad base, and ten thousand people, alert to every advance the road made, poured into Cheyenne in advance of the track-laying. It was like a gold-rush; they milled through the new streets, quarreled and fought over town lots, put up gambling houses and saloons as well as shacks to live in, and clamored for the railroad company to establish its shops there.

"The company will do nothing of the kind unless there is more law and order here than we had at Julesburg," Dodge made known.

White adventurers were about to disorganize his construction crews and he threatened them with the military in the new post hard by. A remnant of the old Julesburg crowd that Jack Casement had cleaned out decided to be good—as good as they had to be—and a city government was organized.

But the Cheyenne Indians up Crow Creek, ignoring the compliment Dodge attempted to pay when he named the new town after their tribe, hovered on the outskirts and waited for an opportunity to strike. Cheyenne stood at the gateway to their mountain fastness, and they had no intention of standing idly by and seeing a railroad—which meant white supremacy—tap that very territory. So they watched Cheyenne's first fourth of July celebration from afar, heard the reverberation of "anvil-shooting," heard, though faintly, the playing of the band, saw the shooting of rockets when night came, and if they had been close enough they would have heard General Rawlins deliver the first oration ever given in Cheyenne.

On the morning of July fifth, when not a few of the celebrants were sleeping off the effects of whisky, the Indians slipped down the hills, rushed a party of graders, killed a few, stole the horses, circled the town and, yelling like mad,

vanished up Cheyenne Pass. General Rawlins, up at dawn and walking in the hills, witnessed the attack and marveled at the boldness of the red men.

"Dodge," he said seriously, "I'm going to tell Grant that this road can't be built without double the strength you have."

Two weeks later Dodge and his party started on the long march to Salt Lake. Rawlins, already improved, went along. They ascended to Granite Creek and moved slowly up to Evans' Pass. When half-way up they saw a swift-moving herd of antelope headed straight for them. Something had frightened the animals and they rushed headlong at the troops. Dodge acted quickly, for he saw the danger.

"Halt," he yelled. "And don't shoot."

His escort obeyed instantly and in a moment the herd, to the number of a hundred, was upon them. The antelopes were so close that the troopers reached out their hands and touched them. It was a strange sight: scores of frightened antelopes stood panting and half defiant among as many men and not a shot was fired. One shot, one false move, and the high-strung animals would have leaped and pawed with disastrous results. Sol Gee and Jack Adams, the guides, said that they had never witnessed such a sight before. It appeared to be the game hunting the men, and the men were glad when the antelopes scattered, and then the guides bagged a couple.

The escort toiled to the summit of what is now known as Sherman Pass, eight thousand two hundred feet above sea-level and descended to Dale Creek, the most serious obstacle to the building of the Union Pacific, for this stream required a bridge one hundred and twenty-five feet high and one thousand four hundred feet long.

Fort Sanders was reached in a few days, and there Dodge met General Gibbons, one of Grant's most trusted

officers of the Civil War. Nothing could have been more fortunate in the building of the Union Pacific from this fort west to Green River than the presence of General Gibbons, who entered sympathetically into all of Dodge's problems. He was in conference with Gibbons when a rider, with foaming horse, dashed up to the post with the news that the Percy T. Brown engineering party, engaged in the difficult work of making locations across the Great Divide had been severely beaten by the Sioux, and Brown had been killed.

Dodge bowed his head and groaned, for not only was Percy Brown a capable engineer but he was devoted to his chief and trusted above any one who had ever operated between Rattlesnake Pass and Green River. Then Dodge heard the story. Brown and thirteen men, beset by a powerful band of three hundred Sioux Indians, fortified themselves on an elevation in the Great Basin and fought from noon until night, when their foes, for reasons unknown, withdrew. Brown, badly wounded, begged his men to leave him, but they refused, made a litter of their carbines, and carried him twelve miles to a stage station, where he died within an hour.

General Gibbons was not surprised at the attack and told Dodge that building the road from Fort Sanders to Bridger's Pass would constitute the gravest problem from the standpoint of the Indians.

One of the government commissioners, having talked to several members of another engineering party, wanted Dodge to halt all work for six months, awaiting stronger military organizations. But his reply was an order to place other engineering parties in the field.

"If we stop now we may never get started again," he wrote east to Oliver Ames. "I'll push this road on to Salt Lake in another year or surrender my own scalp to the Indians."

Gibbons gave him another company and Dodge pushed on west to strengthen his badly disorganized engineering parties all along the line. At Rattlesnake Pass he discovered coal and later sank a mine, which was the first that ever supplied the Union Pacific along its own route. On reaching the North Platte he found it to be swollen from heavy mountain snows. He ordered it to be forded, but two of the young officers who attempted it were swept back to their starting-point, and the remainder of his escort refused to budge.

Dodge jumped on his own horse, Rocky Mountain, and plunged into the stream, calling on his entire command to follow. It proved to be a desperate undertaking and three of his men had narrow escapes from drowning.

"If you are going to help me build the Union Pacific through this country you've got to learn to swim horses across more rivers than this one," the chief engineer said.

Near this crossing of the North Platte he and General Gibbons established Fort Steele, for just to the south was the Medicine Bow range, rendezvous of the Crows, the Sioux and the Cheyennes, and no railroad could be built until they were held back.

West of the North Platte they rode into a barren country; night came and the command had been without water for several hours. Quite by accident, Dodge and Rawlins came upon a spring that gushed out of a wall of solid rock. Grant's chief of staff, dusty and weary, knelt and drank deeply.

"It is too beautiful for words, Dodge," he said.

Dodge stood for a moment in deep thought and then replied, "General Rawlins, we will name this spring after you."

And this is how Rawlins, early a division point on the Union Pacific, got its name,

The next day they came upon the Percy Brown engineering party, strongly reenforced it, started it to work and then pushed toward the Great Divide. At their feet was a vast basin. Dodge lifted powerful glasses and looked in every direction.

"I see some teams down there," he told Rawlins, who stood by his side. "Must be white men—perhaps returning emigrants."

He plunged down into the basin, followed by his escort, and an hour later came upon one of his own engineering parties,—the one headed by Charles Bates that had been ordered to survey from Green River back east to meet Brown. Bates and his men were in bad condition, without water and with swollen tongues. But they were at work, running a true line, for they were the kind of men who made the Union Pacific possible. Colonel Steptoe had attempted to cross this portion of the basin on his first trip to Oregon, but he had to turn back. Later, Dodge came upon old broken wagons, anvils and other tools that Steptoe had abandoned.

It was late in August when the party reached Fort Bridger, but the famous guide was on a scouting trip. He and Dodge were close friends and when Bridger died in 1881, Dodge launched a movement that resulted in a monument being erected to him in a Kansas City cemetery.

From Fort Bridger they pushed on rapidly toward Salt Lake. When they came to Weber Valley, thereby entering the Mormon country, General Rawlins became curious to learn something about the Mormons' mode of living. They entered a large double house and, on the pretext of wanting some milk, began to note their surroundings. The woman of the house was cordial enough and readily entered into conversation about the country and its opportunities. By and by a small boy entered and said:

"I came over for Pa's slippers. He's going to stay with us this week, so my Mom says."

The two soldiers could hardly keep their faces straight, and when they got outside Dodge said, "Well, Rawlins, I guess you have learned something about the method of living among these folks, eh?"

Rawlins shook his head, grinned and then became very thoughtful.

"Yes, and more than I really cared to know," he replied.

Dodge's party reached Salt Lake the afternoon of the thirtieth and camped south of town. They had scarcely settled when out came Brigham Young and his favorite wife, Amelia Folsom, who was from Dodge's home town, Council Bluffs. As Grant was running for the presidency and as Rawlins was chief of staff of the United States Army, Young tried in every way to get him to discuss political matters, but Rawlins diplomatically turned the questions. The head of the Mormon church was quite agreeable. He was watching all surveys, even participating in a few, for he wanted to be sure that the first transcontinental railroad touched Salt Lake. So he gave Dodge's party the freedom of the city, passes to the theater for the officers, and entertained Dodge, Rawlins and Gibbons at dinner. Sunday came and he invited them to the tabernacle to hear him preach. His subject was "The Duty of Marrying," and Dodge said that he "wound up his sermon by saying that if the young men did not marry the young women, the old men would."

On September fourth, Dodge led his command out of Salt Lake for the seven-hundred-mile trip back to Fort Sanders. He had it in mind to examine the approaches to Snake River with the view of running a line from Promontory Point in Utah to Puget Sound and thus affording the Union Pacific a tidewater outlet, for it had slowly dawned

on him and on every one else connected with the road that the Central Pacific would block the way to San Francisco. Moreover, he learned to his own satisfaction that the valley of the Snake River would afford the Union Pacific its most feasible route to Idaho, Oregon and Washington.

On arriving at Fort Sanders, Dodge made preparations to go to Washington and take up his congressional duties. In an unguarded moment, so he always declared, he had permitted himself to be drawn into a factional fight in the Republican Party in Iowa and defeated John A. Kasson of the fifth district for the nomination. Kasson had espoused the policies of Andrew Johnson, angered his constituents, who literally drafted Dodge, and in the race against General Tuttle, his Democrat opponent who had long been identified with the copperheads of the state, Dodge won a signal victory.

Dodge entered Congress almost at the beginning of the legislation that was hostile to the Union Pacific, and the railroad company, whether he did or not, always counted it most fortunate that he was a member of the Fortieth Congress. But not for a day did he relinquish his hold on the railroad situation in the West. From his office in the Department of the Interior, especially placed at his disposal for his double task, he sent out his orders to the division engineers who, in turn, kept him posted on all developments. And there were many developments!

Near the close of the session of the Fortieth Congress word came from the West that Durant, in violation of every agreement made with Dodge when he became chief engineer, was changing locations, altering the line over the Wyoming Black Hills, and circulating rumors that the Union Pacific Company would make Laramie City, and not Cheyenne, the mountain division of the road. Moreover, the construction crews between Cheyenne and the new terminus town of

Laramie City were threatened with extinction by a powerful gang of gamblers and whisky venders operating in a half-dozen camps.

When Dodge received this news he drew down the top of his desk, packed his valise and caught the first train out of Washington for the West. On reaching Cheyenne, he found a muddled state of affairs. Scores had left the town, trekking across the mountains to the new base at Laramie City which, according to Durant, would soon have the shops of the Union Pacific Railroad. The citizens of Cheyenne—those who had invested heavily in town lots—called on Dodge and demanded an explanation.

"You can't prevent an exodus from an old base town to a new one. You fellows ought to know that," Dodge said. "But on the score of the removal of the shops, well, Durant lied. The shops will remain in Cheyenne; the branch line will be built from Denver, and this will be the division."

Dodge ordered his private car hitched to an engine, wired for the track to be cleared and raced west across the mountains toward Laramie City, then the end of the line. It squatted on the western slope of the Wyoming Black Hills and felt its importance, for it was, in May, 1868, the end of the freight and passenger division and the beginning of all the construction work west to Green River. The same crowds that had flocked from Fort Kearny to Julesburg and from Julesburg to Cheyenne had poured into Laramie City, and they had grown wilder as they progressed.

The "Big Tent" was up and doing a thriving business the evening Dodge arrived. It was the town's social and civic center and it was just a little bigger and a little tougher than it had been at the other points. From a platform a German band played noisily; and while the mule-whackers, miners and railroad workers danced with the strumpets, scores of others crowded the gambling tables, played



General S. Grant and Party at Fort Sanders, two and one-half miles south of Lutonie Station, Western and Union Railroad, 1868, the day of the Dodge-Dixie conference.

monte, faro and rondo coolo; and against the long bar, with its background of cut-glass goblets, ice pitchers and high mirrors, leaned those who drank hard whisky and sang the sentimental songs of their childhood back in the older states.

Dodge's visit to Laramie City was a dash of cold water.

"The shops will remain at Cheyenne," he said. "And if the gamblers and saloon-keepers here don't let the railroad employees alone, I'll have General Gibbons send down a company of soldiers and we'll proclaim martial law. Take your choice."

Then he hunted up Thomas C. Durant, and the meeting was far from pleasant. Durant was making a final bid for power and authority, for he was at war with the Ames brothers who were pushing him steadily into the background. But Durant held as much stock as any one, and other directors of the company feared him. He had used Dodge in pushing the Union Pacific across the mountains, but he now believed that he could get along without him; indeed, he felt that Dodge was in his way, and he planned to elevate Colonel Seymour, consulting engineer, to the position of chief engineer.

"Durant," Dodge said in his deliberate way, "you are now going to learn that the men working for the Union Pacific will take orders from me and not from you. If you interfere there will be trouble—trouble from the government, from the army, and from the men themselves."

Dodge turned abruptly and left Durant standing in the dusty Main Street of Laramie City, and the rails of the Union Pacific began to be laid faster than ever before. Thousands of emigrants rolled along the trails in covered wagons; the engineers, obeying Dodge to the letter, linked up their lines from rivers to mountains; the road crossed the North Platte and pushed into the desert; the town of Benton—the last wild terminus of the road—was born; the

grasshoppers came in great armies and ruined the crops of the settlers; flour jumped to eight dollars a hundred pounds; the Cheyennes struck savagely at a dozen points, killing and scalping graders and even the crews of freight trains; but the chief engineer of the Union Pacific, dominant and in his full powers, raced from one end of the track to the other and drove unceasingly.

With everything moving along the line of the Union Pacific, Dodge took a strong escort, left Benton the first week in July and pushed west to bolster the morale of the advanced engineering parties. The journey is the record of a man whose whole powers were fully dedicated to the task of pushing to completion the first great transcontinental railroad.

Between July third and twenty-third, Dodge inspected sixteen grading camps from Rawlins to Salt Lake; held conferences with his division engineers, Reed, Evans and Hurd; settled an ugly strike at Green River; established the Red Desert station; changed the route near South Pass; treated with the Snake Indians and secured their cooperation; worked an entire day with a discouraged bridge crew at a difficult crossing; and pushed on to Echo Canyon to settle the question of the final route to the basin of Great Salt Lake.

On July twenty-third, while camped near Salt Lake, Dodge received a telegram from Sidney Dillon, a director of the Union Pacific, requesting him to return to Fort Sanders with all possible speed to meet Grant and Sherman. The dispatch also carried the information that Durant had, in Dodge's absence, secured larger powers from the company and would stand on that authority in the conference to be held with government commissioners and military heads en route to Fort Sanders from the Sherman-Harney Indian treaty at Fort Laramie.

Dodge staged it back to Benton as fast as he could and then caught a train for Fort Sanders, where he met his old commanders. With them were Generals Sheridan, Harney, Kautz, Potter, Dent, Hunt and Slemmer. Grant had made up his mind to take a hand in the affairs of the Union Pacific, for the troubles of the company had aroused the authorities at Washington to the seriousness of the situation.

It was on Sunday, July 26, 1868, that this notable group, augmented by Sidney Dillon, Thomas Durant, Colonel Seymour and Jesse L. Williams, a government commissioner, met the chief engineer of the Union Pacific in a conference that had marked bearing on the building of the final six hundred miles of the road.

Durant, believing that his new powers with the Union Pacific Company gave him undisputed authority, took the floor and boldly charged the chief engineer with having selected impossible routes, wasted money in useless experiments, ignored the sound judgment of his associates and failed to locate the line as far as Salt Lake.

"What about it, Dodge?" General Grant inquired, leaning back in a cane-bottom chair and smoking vigorously.

"Just this," Dodge began deliberately, "if Durant, or anybody connected with the Union Pacific, or anybody connected with the government changes my lines I'll quit the road."

There was a tense pause; Grant shifted his cigar, Sherman's seamy face was immobile, but the others were ill at ease. Durant's delicate fingers pulled at his Van Dyke beard; he glanced at Colonel Seymour, his henchman, but he said nothing. Grant finally broke the silence.

"The government expects this railroad to be finished," he said slowly. "The government expects the railroad company to meet its obligations. And the government expects

General Dodge to remain with the road as its chief engineer until it is completed."

It was a dramatic moment; it was even a critical moment in the building of the first great transcontinental road. Durant looked at the man who would soon become president and doubtless did some quick thinking. Anyhow, whatever he thought, he turned to Dodge and said:

"I withdraw my objections. We all want Dodge to stay with the road."

An hour later the entire group posed for a local photographer, little dreaming how significant the picture would be for another generation.

Three days later Grant, Sherman and Sheridan were Dodge's guests at his home in Council Bluffs, and he did not overlook the opportunity to post the future president on all the moves of the Central Pacific, for the race of the rival roads was at hand, and the Union Pacific, from the standpoint of the next administration at Washington, seemed to hold the pole.

CHAPTER XIV

THE RACE OF THE RIVAL ROADS

NEARLY a half-century after the race between the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific in their battle for subsidies, lands and minerals, Mr. E. H. Harriman, whose genius had consolidated the two roads and given the Union Pacific its first direct connections with San Francisco, made a statement in justification of the early builders:

"I stated at the Denver dinner that we expended \$6,700,000 on the Rocky Mountain Division of the Union Pacific railroad. On 392 miles of that line we constructed 158 miles of new railroad; threw away 188 miles of the old road and expended something like \$2,800,000 on the line between Cheyenne and Omaha. Now in the whole distance of 1,030 miles, with that expenditure and by the elimination of curvature from ten degrees of maximum to four degrees, and by the reduction of grades in the mountains from 90 feet to 43 feet, the whole distance was, in consequence of those changes, reduced only thirty miles.

"Now when we come to the Central Pacific the same conditions exist. With an expenditure of \$8,600,000 we shall reduce the grade from a maximum of 97 feet to 21; we shall eliminate curvatures from ten degrees to a maximum of four degrees of 585 miles of railroad. To get a 21 foot grade we save three miles. So you can realize what the location was before and how these roads were built and how marvelously well it was done. We save but 79 miles in a total distance of 1,615, and 46 out of the 79 miles saved represents the reduction in mileage from con-

structing the line across Salt Lake, thus showing that those railroads were originally constructed on true lines and not for land grants and subsidies."

Nearly a year before the Union Pacific broke its first ground at Omaha to build to the Far West, the Central Pacific broke ground in Sacramento, California to build "back east." The Central Pacific, incorporated under the laws of California, had been promised government aid on about the same terms as the Union Pacific.

Theodore D. Judah, a young engineer from the East, had gone to California in 1854 and devoted all his energies to building a railroad from the Pacific coast to the East. His work was basic in the organization of the Central Pacific, although he died in 1863, ten months after ground was broken and with less than seventy miles of road built. But associated with him were men as strong and as determined, and they would carry on. They were Leland Stanford, Governor of California; C. P. Huntington, who became president of both the Central Pacific and the Southern Pacific; Mark Hopkins and the Crocker brothers.

But the first years of the building of the Central Pacific were as deliberate as those of the Union Pacific, and by the beginning of 1867 the California road had barely reached the summit of the Sierras, a scant one hundred miles from Sacramento. But it should be noted that the elevation in that distance was something like eight thousand feet. There were fifteen tunnels to be blasted; there were blinding snow-storms to be encountered; there were millions to be expended, and yet, by the beginning of 1868, trains were running through these tunnels east of Sacramento, one hundred and fifty miles. It was a marvelous achievement.

On the surface, the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific companies paid little attention to each other until they were about one hundred miles apart in their construction work,

then their advance surveying parties began to cross and re-cross paths. Trouble became imminent and neither group did very much to avoid it.

The situation is without parallel in the history of railroad building. The chief emphasis has always been on the race made by these rival roads to reach a given point and very little attention has ever been paid to the motives and the forces impelling the companies in this struggle. Here and there railroad historians have stated briefly that it was a race for subsidies; but the contest was waged for more than subsidies: it was a battle in which the competing roads made spectacular bids for public favor.

The promoters of these rival railways believed that the winner would achieve the strongest position, not alone in the eyes of the government, but in the good graces of the nation at large. Basically, it was not a contest to determine which construction crew could lay the greatest amount of track in a given number of weeks, nor yet was it a race, in the beginning, toward a fixed goal; primarily, it was a conflict between two irreconcilable groups of early railroad projectors to determine how far one road could build *west* and the other *east* before the government became strong enough to make them join their tracks. And it was the intention of all Pacific railroad legislation that the tracks should join.

No one dreamed—certainly not the Congress that passed the Pacific Railway Act of 1862—that it would require special legislation and all the powers of the government to compel the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific to join tracks in Utah. While the specific point where the roads should unite had never been determined, yet section eight of the act of 1862 defined the western limit of the Union Pacific as the western boundary of Nevada, and section nine of the act authorized the Central Pacific to construct its

road from the Pacific coast to the eastern boundary of California. Furthermore, the law required the roads to unite on, or near, the California line. It is clear from the wording of the original act that the government did not expect the Union Pacific to build *into* California and did not expect the Central Pacific to build *out of* California.

On the other hand, there is a rather vague clause in section ten of the act of 1862 that authorized the Central Pacific, after completing its road to the eastern border of California, to aid the Union Pacific to conclude its own construction to the western boundary of Nevada.

What was a happy contingency in the eyes of the railroad law-makers must have been quite unacceptable to the railroad companies. On the surface it appeared that the Federal government had empowered two groups of railroad builders to push construction work across the plains and through the mountains, and then build a bonfire to celebrate the completed task; but in reality there were two hostile groups, acting, at times, wholly independent of government supervision, battling for subsidies, privileges and power.

Between the passage of the Pacific Railway Act of 1862 and certain amendments from 1864 to 1866, there is a great gulf fixed, into which went fame and fortunes.

The clause in the act of 1862 that limited the building of the Central Pacific to California had never been acceptable to the company and its promoters were unflagging in their efforts to secure amendments that would authorize them to build to some point east of Salt Lake. The Californians sensed the importance of building to a point that would enable their road to control the business of the Great Basin and contiguous territory, bearing the trade west to the Pacific. The Union Pacific promoters were just as shrewd and planned to capture all this commerce and bear it east to the Mississippi Valley.

Two amendments resulted. The first authorized the rival roads to continue their construction until their rails met. But Congress failed to make it clear just where the tracks should join. The second amendment permitted both companies to locate their lines three hundred miles in advance of actual construction. And these amendments, one indefinite when it should have been definite and the other specific when it should have been general, started the roads on their now historic race, paved the way for the scramble for subsidies, made a battle-ground of all the country between Humboldt Wells in Nevada and Echo Cañon in Utah; and provoked a rivalry between the companies that led to subterfuge, violence and a general lowered tone in railroad development.

The Central Pacific underestimated the Union Pacific's ability to build into the West and suddenly woke up to the fact that the rival road would reach Ogden far in advance of all that the Californians could do; moreover, they saw that the Union Pacific would be able to lay its track to the western shores of Salt Lake by the time the California road built to Promontory Point and thus shut the Central Pacific out of all the coveted territory. But the affairs of the California road were in the hands of no less personage than C. P. Huntington and he made two quick and potent moves. First, he led Andrew Johnson's Cabinet to believe that the Union Pacific, in its efforts to reach Salt Lake first, had built flimsily; second, he filed the line of the Central Pacific three hundred miles in advance of its actual construction and over a portion of a line that the Union Pacific had already graded east of Salt Lake. In this act he was championed by Browning, Secretary of the Interior, who, in turn, ordered the Union Pacific to halt all its construction at the eastern end of the line Mr. Huntington had filed. As the tracks of the Union Pacific were then west of

this point and as the company had filed its own line far beyond Promontory Point, the action of the Secretary of the Interior precipitated the fight, involved the Union Pacific in a battle with the Johnson administration, and led to the knottiest railroad problem ever faced by the new administration under Grant.

Dodge foresaw this trouble and prepared for it. He told Grant the whole story, and this soldier, soon to become president, listened sympathetically. As soon as Grant, Sherman and Sheridan went on east from Council Bluffs, Dodge faced west again on August third, determined to take the field against the Central Pacific's construction forces. He was accompanied by his wife, by Sidney Dillon, and by White and Blair, government directors.

The party reached Salt Lake on the twelfth, and Dodge went straight to Montague, chief engineer of the Central Pacific, and said:

"I intend to build the Union Pacific to the north of Salt Lake. Our tracks will reach Ogden the first of March. Yours can not possibly be within two hundred miles of this point by that time. What we should do is to get together and decide upon a meeting-point somewhere west of Salt Lake. How about it?"

The chief engineer of the Central Pacific shook his head. He did not possess the authority in dealing with his road that Dodge assumed in constructing the Union Pacific. But he did convey the pleasing information that the Central Pacific had also decided to build north of Salt Lake. So both roads would leave Salt Lake City to the south, and in so doing they brought down on their heads the wrath of the Mormon hierarchy.

The Central Pacific kept its intentions from Brigham Young as long as it could; but Dodge, acting for the Union Pacific, went to the Mormon leader and made a clear state-

ment of the final decision of the company. Young was furious and informed his followers that he would deliver a sermon on the subject of railroads in general and the Union Pacific in particular. A large audience greeted him in the tabernacle the third Sunday in August, and Dodge went also.

Young's sermon ended in a savage assault on the Union Pacific promoters, and he made bold to say that the impious chief engineer of the road, ignoring the Lord's will, had really influenced the company to build north of the lake and miss Salt Lake City. The truth was, Young had told his church that the Lord, in a revelation, made it clear that the Union Pacific would build to the town, so the Mormon leader tried in his sermon to let himself and his followers down as easily as possible.

Brigham Young turned at once and began to court favor with the Central Pacific; he urged his followers in Nevada and in Utah to take this road's building contracts and to advance its interest in every way possible. His influence was powerful enough to cause Dodge no little trouble, so the chief engineer of the Union Pacific decided to tell Young the whole truth. He called on the head of the Mormon church and said:

"The Central Pacific isn't going to build south of the lake and into this city, so you needn't look to that road for any assistance. You drew a lot of hasty conclusions in your sermon last Sunday and you were wrong. Let me give you facts."

Brigham Young called in the twelve apostles of the Mormon church and Dodge told them of the plans of the Union Pacific to build a first-class railroad from Ogden down to Salt Lake; of the necessity of building the main line north of the lake; and of the impossibility of the Central Pacific's ever tapping the town owing to the fact that the Union

Pacific would beat the California road to Ogden and shut out any attempt it might make to construct its own branch to the Mormon city.

Brigham Young was far too shrewd not to see the logic of Dodge's position, so he planned a great tabernacle service, explained the whole situation and "told his followers that the Lord, in another vision, had commanded the Mormons to help the Union Pacific."

Dodge, whose life had been threatened by the more irresponsible types in the Mormon town, and who had been urged by his family and friends to leave, now became the center of new interests and Young and his followers vied with one another in entertaining him and his wife, while presents were lavishly bestowed upon his young daughter.

But the hour for social amenities had passed; both roads tuned up for the race; and each secretly determined to avoid a meeting-point as long as possible. This meant that they would grade parallel to each other and by the law of physics never meet. Dodge saw the folly of this procedure and tried to get Durant, still a voice of authority, to make a proposition to the Central Pacific to meet at Promontory Point.

"That is the logical point," Dodge urged, "and both roads are about the same distance from it."

This was in October and the conference was held at the Townsend House in Salt Lake City. "But Durant stormed over my proposition," Dodge said, "for each mile we could push our road to the west meant thirty thousand dollars subsidies."

Dodge lost no time; instructions were sent to all engineers west of Salt Lake to double their crews, hasten definite locations, grade with all possible speed and push toward Humboldt in Nevada, far west of Promontory Point. Sawmills buzzed from the Wyoming Black Hills to Uintah

Mountains; a thousand tie-makers hacked at the great forests of the Rockies; every mountain stream was choked with logs; three thousand graders clawed at the sides of the hills; three hundred track-layers hurled the iron rails to position; far back on the Missouri, now touched by the Northwestern, the Union Pacific train-crews hurried materials to the front.

From Benton to Green River the graders and the bridge-builders worked night and day; the iron rails wormed across the Great Divide at the rate of five miles a day, crawled through the dust of the desert, touched the Black Buttes just eight hundred miles from the initial point on the Missouri River, bent northwest, southwest and crossed Green River, where the Moving Town and the Hell on Wheels died, and with them a desperate group of adventurers who had clung to the building of the Union Pacific from its first base-town at Kearny, Nebraska.

When Browning heard of the Union Pacific's activity west of Ogden he wrote a sharp letter to Oliver Ames, president of the road, and ordered him to end its construction forty miles east of Ogden. Browning's threat, recorded in his diaries under date of October sixteenth, to "decide the question myself" had been made good. But the Union Pacific ignored the order and continued to build to the west. By this time it had become evident to the directors of the road that Browning, if not President Johnson himself, was decidedly hostile. This hostility came near being personal animosity to the martyred Lincoln, to Grant and Sherman at the head of the army, and to General Dodge, whose stubbornness and initiative always irked the Secretary of the Interior.

Both the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific maintained powerful lobbies in Washington during the winter of 1868-1869 and contested every foot of ground from central

Nevada to central Utah. The Central Pacific, in the good graces of Johnson's Cabinet, held the whip hand and drove. Dodge fought back and tried to encourage the Union Pacific directors by saying:

"Things will be different after Grant's inauguration."

But Oliver Ames, president of the road, was pessimistic; the company had no money; Browning withheld the subsidies that were due; the notorious James Fisk, having secured a large block of the road's shares, tied it up in an injunction suit that all but destroyed the company's morale; government commissioners, bold beyond belief, refused to report favorably upon the construction of the Union Pacific unless paid handsomely to do so; and internal quarrels came almost as the last straw.

"We may have to quit," Oliver Ames wrote Dodge.

The personal fortune of the Ames brothers had long since vanished, and his spirit was all but broken. But Dodge's reply was to speed up his construction crews. Jack Casement forced his track-layers through the heaviest snow-storms ever known to descend upon the Rockies, and the rails of the Union Pacific touched Ogden in March. The Central Pacific's track was one hundred and fifty miles to the west.

"And now we'll contest the remainder of the distance with the Californians," Dodge told Casement grimly.

Huntington heard, Browning heard, and there was considerable uneasiness in Central Pacific circles. Dodge had won the strategic point for his company and was going after more. But Huntington had something up his sleeve, or perhaps it was up Browning's sleeve, for without warning, on March second, the day before President Johnson went out of power, he directed that one million four hundred thousand dollars' worth of bonds be issued to the Central Pacific Railroad over a line that the Union Pacific had

already graded between Echo Cañon and Promontory Point. The action was tantamount to saying:

"Now let the Union Pacific go ahead and build west of Ogden if it wants to, but it will not get a dollar in subsidies, for the Central Pacific has already received government subsidies for this particular portion of the road."

It was a bold cunning move, and it all but floored the Union Pacific, for it cleared the way for the Central Pacific to build to Ogden and automatically checked the Union Pacific from building beyond the same point. That is, both Browning and Huntington thought it would, but neither quite knew Grenville M. Dodge. In the first place he kept his construction crews at work west of Ogden; in the second place he turned to the new President of the United States—General Grant.

The last official act of the Johnson Cabinet was the authorization of one million four hundred thousand dollars in bonds to be issued to the Central Pacific Railroad over a line in the disputed territory; the first official act of President Grant was to annul this order, prohibiting bonds to be issued to either company until a complete investigation could be made of both roads and of the issues involved.

It was a striking victory for the chief engineer of the Union Pacific, but it should not be thought that Grant's personal relation with him determined the question, for the President went far beyond what the promoters of either road expected and ordered a searching investigation into the affairs of both.

Dodge, in a letter to his wife under date of March 29, 1869, makes clear his relations with Grant in railroad affairs. Incidentally, the letter reveals trouble between Sherman and Rawlins, Secretary of War, on the conduct of this office.

"Washington, March 29th, 1869.

"Dear Annie:

"While we are fighting here the two tracks will come together out west. They are only 110 miles apart today and with both companies doing their utmost. I am trying to bring around a compromise and may do it. The fight is bitter but I have shipped them so far. Grant sent for me night before last and I spent three hours with him, reviewing the situation.

"Rawlins got his temper up and demanded a revokal of the order giving full power to Sherman and making Rawlins only a clerk. I advised Grant to revoke the order and told him that it was causing trouble. He has done so and the Secretary of War has taken his old position. Sherman said that he didn't know how long Rawlins would be able to hold the position in the cabinet but that if he left he hoped I would be in position to take any thing offered to me. I told Sherman that my only desire, after finishing the Union Pacific, was to go to China and build railroads."

It was about this time that Dodge wrote Sherman and made it plain that Grant, railroad or no railroad, should not be placed in a compromising position:

"Grant looks to me to see that the Union Pacific is completed, but I shall not consent to anything whereby he might be misled. Will you say to him, in confidence, that I think he should hold a portion of the bonds of both railroad companies until the tracks are completed. I have no doubt that both companies will complete up to requirements, but if anything should happen I would want the President safe. I would not want Grant to do anything that would cripple the Union Pacific, but I want him to be safe."

But Grant's order did one thing: it caused Dodge to go forward with greater confidence than ever and settled the question of whether the Union Pacific should halt its construction at Ogden or continue until the rails of the two

roads met. Their grading now paralleled each other and their gangs fought at the slightest provocation. But one thing was certain: the two roads were building straight at each other and a meeting was possible somewhere near Promontory Point. Dodge knew that if the track-laying ever began to parallel a far graver problem would present itself.

Dodge went straight to Huntington and proposed a meeting-place for the tracks on Promontory Point. He told the Californian that unless the two companies got together the government was certain to step in and take charge of the whole situation. Huntington finally agreed to join tracks with the Union Pacific west of Ogden on Promontory Point provided the Central Pacific secured an outlet to the town, either by purchasing or leasing the Union Pacific road from the meeting-place back to Ogden. Dodge took up the matter with his company and Ames agreed to sell the line of the Union Pacific between Promontory Point and Ogden. Having got together, the two companies went before Congress and stated their agreement, and Congress, glad to get out of the difficulty, solemnly enacted a law that ordered the two roads to join tracks on Promontory Point.

Ultimately, the Union Pacific sold this portion of its line to the Central Pacific for over a million dollars and also received government subsidies for the entire distance between Promontory Point and Echo Cañon, which was no small stroke of financial genius on the part of the chief engineer. On the other hand, the Central Pacific really gained a victory of its own when it maneuvered successfully to get into Ogden. The outcome was half a loaf for each company and a whole one for the general interest of the country, although the cost of the battle to the government was a couple of millions in excess of what it was expected to be in building railroads across Utah.

The final race of the rival roads to see which would be the first to reach Promontory Point, while devoid of the bitterness that characterized the manipulations of the railroad promoters to win Ogden, was really the most dramatic of all contests; for very much as schoolboys might run to attain a certain goal, so now the construction crews of the competing companies girded themselves in a track-laying battle that had all the ear-marks of a prize-fight, a foot-race and a weight-throwing contest rolled into one.

On the first day of April the two roads were nearly equidistant from Promontory Point, the Central Pacific being fifty-four miles to the west and the Union Pacific fifty-seven miles to the east. The construction crews, numerically, were about the same strength, not ten thousand to a side as has often been said, for so vast an army would have impeded, rather than accelerated, track-laying. In the final contest there were about twenty-five hundred men on each side, which included graders, tie "shovers," haulers, bridge builders, track-layers, bolters, spikers, train crews and "cooks and bottle washers." The Central Pacific had used Chinamen, who were adept enough with pick and shovel, but when it came to track-laying the Irish of the Union Pacific proved superior, so the former road now perfected its system by employing fifty of the ablest Irish track-layers in the country; and it is said that Thomas Durant lost ten thousand dollars in a wager that this Central Pacific gang could not lay ten miles of track in a day.

April, 1869, was the month that witnessed the fastest track-laying in the history of railroading, and each road went forward on an average of five miles a day. Materials were now plentiful, for, in anticipation of the battle, the Central Pacific, months before, had started great ships around the Horn with iron from the East, while the Union Pacific linked up the Northwestern at Council Bluffs and

kept a steady stream of flat-cars laden with materials coming up to the front. And the eyes of the nation, if not of the world, centered on the contest.

May came, the roads were but a few miles apart, and Thomas C. Durant, whose bold spirit had not been checked by the strength of the Ameses nor yet by the specific orders of President Grant that he be eliminated from the road, prepared to go west and take part in the ceremonies of the union of the tracks. Accompanied by John Duff, a member of the executive committee of the Union Pacific, Durant's train had just passed Green River when it was held up by a group of contractors and Durant was made a prisoner. The contractors then wired the Union Pacific offices at Boston and said that the vice-president of the road would be held until the company paid its bills. President Ames, frantic lest Durant should meet with violence, wired Dodge at Salt Lake and told him to go and release the officials at all hazards. Dodge hurried a message to Fort Bridger and requested that a company of soldiers be sent to the scene of the trouble.

But the soldiers never got there, for the telegraph operator at Piedmont, in sympathy with the workmen, took the dispatch off the wires, and the contractors sent another message to Dodge warning him that the trouble would spread to a general tie-up unless the company met its obligations within twenty-four hours. Dodge moved fast, but he was not quick enough, for the action of the contractors spread all along the line of the Union Pacific from Ogden to Omaha, and a great strike seemed imminent. Dodge telegraphed Oliver Ames for a million dollars to pay off hundreds of employees, including trainmen, who had received no money for months, and the president of the Union Pacific, alive to the situation, wired the full amount, the men were paid and the wheels began to move.

It was this same week that Dodge wrote his wife and gave an intimate picture of the final days of the race of the rival roads, revealing incidentally that the Central Pacific was the first to reach the point agreed upon.

"Devil's Gate, May 2d, 1869.

"Dear Annie:

"I am returning tonight from Promontory Point, writing in a car as I get a chance at the stopping places. Dillon is at Echo; Duff and Durant are at Salt Lake.

"The Central Pacific laid their track to Promontory Summit, the meeting point, on Friday. A rock cut will keep us from making the connection until Saturday. We have five miles to lay. There will not be much of a time here;—no demonstration; but in the east and farther west I expect they will celebrate. You'd better put your flags on the outer wall.

"Our road is in excellent condition to Wasatch. I have seen some of the Central Pacific track. I saw them lay their special ten miles on that wager, but they were a week preparing for it, and bedded all their ties beforehand.

"I never saw so much needless waste in building railroads. Our own construction department has been inefficient. There is no excuse for not being fifty miles west of Promontory Summit. Every thing connected with the construction department is being closed up and closing the accounts is like the close of the Rebellion.

"The Californians have plenty of strawberries. I saw them at the end of their track today. We ought to go to California in July. Since I have seen the Chinese at work on the Central Pacific I am anxious to see more of them. We could get a good servant for a Chinaman is excellent at any task.

"Thine, Ocean."

On May ninth the rival crews came within sight of each other and the rails of both roads extended down into a little valley on Promontory Point. When the sun went down that day the Central Pacific and the Union Pacific were just

one hundred feet apart. The crews cheered each other and did not fight. That night they slept but a few yards apart, but when the morning of May tenth dawned there was the greatest of activity, for it was the day appointed when the last rail would be laid that linked the two oceans for the first time in their history with a great transportation system.

The engines of the rival roads were brought up to the ends of their respective tracks and between them there crowded the most notable group of railroad builders in the world; for there were Stanford, Huntington, Hopkins, Crocker and the chief engineer of the Central Pacific, and there were Durant, Seymour, Duff, Dillon and the chief engineer of the Union Pacific; and, in an ever-widening circle, were all others that had made the transcontinental possible: soldiers from Fort Douglass, Mormon bishops and elders from Salt Lake, Chinese from San Francisco, Irish from Boston, Mexicans from the Rio Grande, negroes from Dixie, Indians from the deserts and the mountains, and the omnipresent Jewish traders from many lands, good-humored and thrifty, but wide-eyed and wondering at the energy and genius of a Nordic race.

General Jack Casement, whose genius for railroad construction pushed the Union Pacific from the Missouri River to Salt Lake seven years earlier than the government expected, mounted the pilot of one of the engines and called the assembly to order; Edgar Mills, toastmaster of the last-spike program, asked the Reverend Mr. Todd, of Massachusetts, to offer prayer, and men of all creeds and of none stood silent and respectful while a clergyman from the old Puritan town of Pittsfield prayed.

A man at the preacher's left—Doctor Harkness, of Sacramento—cleared his throat and said:

"Gentlemen of the Pacific railroad: the last rail needed to complete the greatest railroad enterprise in the world is

about to be laid; the last spike needed to unite the Atlantic and the Pacific is about to be driven."

He turned, handed a golden spike to President Stanford of the Central Pacific, while Governor Trittle of Nevada held out a silver spike to Thomas Durant, vice-president of the Union Pacific. The Nevada executive said:

"To the iron of the East and the gold of the West, Nevada adds her link of silver to span the continent and wed the oceans."

President Stanford spoke impressively and concluded, "And now, gentlemen, with your assistance, we will lay the last tie and drive the last spike."

Voe, of the Pacific Union Express Company, gave Stanford a silver sledge; Reed, superintendent of construction for the Union Pacific, and Strowbridge, of the Central Pacific, shoved the last tie to position—one of California laurel, finely polished and bearing a silver plate with the inscription,

The last tie laid in the completion of the Pacific Railroad, May 10th, 1869.

A wire was attached to the gold spike and when Stanford struck it an electric spark signaled the nation that the first transcontinental railroad stood completed.

But the spike of gold was not driven home, neither was the silver spike, for they would have been pulled from the laurel tie by some thief or taken by a souvenir hunter; instead, the regulation iron spikes were driven by other hands, the rails clinched to position, and then the cheering began. The rival crews cheered each other; the competing officials followed suit, and Thomas Durant seized Stanford by the hand and cried, "There is but one Pacific railroad now." Sidney Dillon, afterward president of the Union Pacific, mounted a pilot and shouted, "Three cheers for the

THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

MISS. T. FUKERT, Genl Secy | WILLIAM ORTON, Pres | NEW YORK
D. R. PALMER Secy

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Dipteridae, *Sp. 1* (186)

Received John C. H. Smith
The State of Maine 1861

The work will now best be done
in working the Union Pacific
with the Central Pacific at
the mountain summit this will greatly
facilitate . . . or miles West of
the 1000 ft. level East of 5000 ft. mts.
will have an influence upon the
culture & upon the commerce &
travel, it is my wish that no one
can today estimate the congratulation
you upon the success of the
enterprise -

George Hodges

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Witness William

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11. 11. 1923

Telegram sent by Dodge and others to Oliver Ames, President of the Union Pacific, on completion of the road, May 10, 1869

men whose hands actually built these roads." They were given lustily.

A telegraph operator squatted along the tracks; his instrument clicked: "General U. S. Grant, President of the U. S. Washington, D. C. Sir: We have the honor to report the last rail laid and the last spike driven. The Pacific railroad is finished." Once more the instrument sounded: "To the Associated Press: The last rail is laid, the last spike driven, the Pacific railroad is completed. Point of junction, ten hundred eighty-six miles west of the Missouri river and six hundred ninety miles east of Sacramento.—Leland Stanford, Thomas C. Durant."

Two hundred feet from where the tracks joined stood Leland Stanford's private car laden with California fruit and ready with lunch for the directors of both roads. "A goodly number of champagne bottles were uncorked," and the speech-making continued long afterward.

Leland Stanford made a rather unfortunate speech. He criticized the Federal government and stated that the subsidies granted the Central Pacific were more of a detriment than a help to the road. In view of the fact that the California company had received millions from the government, his assertion dumfounded every one, including some of his colleagues.

Dan Casement, co-partner with General Jack Casement in the track-laying of the Union Pacific, mounted to the shoulders of his brother and shouted at Stanford:

"Mister President, if this here subsidy has been such a big detriment to the building of your road, I move you, sir, that it be returned to the government with your compliments."

There was a painful silence; Stanford flushed, started to reply, but suddenly turned away, and the lunch broke up unceremoniously.

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1326

As night came on the two engines were run forward until their pilots touched, and so they stood while the rival crews slept. And Bret Harte wrote:

“What was it the engines said,
Pilots touching, head to head,
Facing on a single track,
Half a world behind each back—?”

CHAPTER XV

DODGE AND THE SOUTHWESTERN SYSTEM

AT THE beginning of 1870, or about eight months after the completion of the Union Pacific, Dodge resigned as chief engineer, and was thus without a salaried position. He owned four thousand shares of the road's stock, but the company owed him seven thousand dollars, which it was slow to pay for its resources had been exhausted in rushing the line to completion. The Grant administration, instead of falling into the arms of the directors, warned them that the road would be scrutinized by a new type of government commissioner and that unless it was up to standard no bonds would be forthcoming.

Believing that Dodge knew the mind of Grant better than any one connected with the road, the directors called him to Boston and asked him if anything could be done with the President to insure a more favorable attitude toward the company. Dodge replied that Grant was not hostile to the Union Pacific Company, but that the constant friction with the Central Pacific and the internal quarrels had bored the President, who had other things to trouble him besides a couple of competing railroads.

"The quickest way to get your bonds is to fire Durant from the board and to place the road in first-class condition," Dodge made known. "Grant expects you to do both things."

The Union Pacific Company might get up courage

enough to oust Durant from the vice-presidency, but what would it cost to get the road in first-class condition?

"About six million dollars," the retiring chief engineer stated flatly.

The information just about floored the directors of the road, and Oliver Ames, whose personal fortune had gone into its construction, said that he was ready to retire from the presidency, and he meant it. But the company set itself to the task. Durant was ejected from the board and the additional money pledged to raising the road to the required standard. Durant turned at once, made common cause with James Fisk, who had come into possession of a good block of Union Pacific stock, and the two plunged the road into litigation that all but tied it up.

Dodge's devotion to the Union Pacific Company throughout 1870 constitutes a very bright page in self-abnegation, for he toiled in every direction, and without salary, to meet the new conditions that confronted the road, and he directed a score of legal battles that were to determine the relation between the railroads and the government—a relation that had been poorly defined and highly unsatisfactory to both.

But chief among his tasks of 1870 was his final battle with the Central Pacific of California. The good-will that attended the joining of the tracks had ended in strife and bitter competition. The operating departments of the two roads failed to get together and the supposed connections at Ogden were not being made. While the roads fought the public suffered, and the government did not seem strong enough to compel them to work in harmony for its best interest.

Dodge told the directors of the Union Pacific that the Central Pacific might be brought to terms by extending the surveys of the former road all the way to California. Two

weeks later Dodge set in motion the forces that caused consternation in Central Pacific circles. Back on the job as surveyor and engineer, he extended the Union Pacific line of location down the Columbia River and up the Truckee, crossed the Sierra Nevadas through Beckwith Pass, descended to Feather River and on to Sacramento. Then he announced to the press that the survey revealed a line from Ogden to San Francisco, far superior to the one over which the Central Pacific had built and that the Union Pacific proposed to continue its road over this new survey to San Francisco Bay and compete with the California company clear across its own state. It might have been only a bluff but it worked, and the Central Pacific manifested a better spirit of cooperation in making the two great roads one line from the West to the East.

During this same year Dodge became involved in a bitter controversy over bridging the Missouri River between Council Bluffs and Omaha in order to give the Union Pacific direct connection with all other roads terminating on the Iowa side. He warned the railroad company that its eastern terminus, by law, was on the east bank of the river in Iowa and not on the west bank in Nebraska where the company had always considered its initial point to be located. The Union Pacific disregarded his warnings and continued to strengthen its terminal position in Omaha. Oddly enough, the citizens of Dodge's home town became embittered during the controversy, played into the hands of the Nebraskans, led by ex-Governor Saunders, and Dodge was denounced in a mass meeting within three blocks of his own residence. The Council Bluffs citizens, blind to their own interests, wired Senator Harlan, of Iowa, and urged him to defeat the bridge bill sponsored by the Union Pacific. Harlan did so and his act paved the way for his political undoing, for Dodge laid his plans from that hour to defeat

him by advocating the candidacy of William Allison. In a word, the bridge controversy had marked bearing on Iowa politics and ultimately gave Senator Allison to the nation.

General Rawlins, now Secretary of War, struggled hopelessly against tuberculosis. Knowing that the end was not far off, he sent for General Dodge and quietly said:

“Dodge, I want you to succeed me in the Cabinet.”

Dodge looked away and finally muttered something about his own health not being very good.

“If you keep on, Dodge,” Rawlins said, smiling and shaking his head, “you will convince me that you are a sicker man than I am.”

Dodge never saw Rawlins after this interview, and when Grant’s old chief of staff, Cabinet officer and general adviser breathed his last, a movement was launched by some of the well-meaning but hasty friends of Dodge to get Grant to name him as Rawlins’ successor. But Grant requested General Sherman to fill the position temporarily, which he did for six weeks, and then Sherman went to Dodge upon a delicate errand.

“Dodge,” he said, “Grant would like to appoint you but your connection with the Union Pacific precludes the possibility of him doing so. As Secretary of War you would have to decide many railroad questions and you know what this would mean.”

Dodge communicated with President Grant at once and told him that under no considerations would he accept a position in his Cabinet, and Rawlins’ position went to General Belknap.

In March, 1871, the board of the Union Pacific was reorganized and Dodge became a member; Oliver Ames retired from the presidency and was succeeded by Colonel Thomas Scott, vice-president of the Pennsylvania system. Scott had directed the railroads and the telegraph during

the war and was considered one of the ablest railroad executives in the country. Dodge was neither happy nor sanguine over the change, for he had been given free rein while Ames was at the head of the road and he now doubted his status. He revealed his feelings in a letter to his wife and, incidentally, he mentioned men whose names became household words in finance and railroading.

"Dear Annie: The board of directors has just been elected,—Thomas A. Scott, Oliver Ames, John Duff, Elisha Atkins, Oakes Ames, Levi P. Morton, R. E. Robbins, James Brooks, Sidney Dillon, C. S. Bushnell, John E. Thompson, Andrew Carnegie, Gordon Dexter, George M. Pullman and myself. Scott will be president and matters, so far as I am concerned, will not be as they used to be."

But Dodge's fears were groundless for he soon became intimate with Thomas Scott. Scott made the first move. He was building an extension of the Harrisburg and Baltimore Road from Baltimore to Washington and he was anxious to locate the station at Washington in a park near Pennsylvania Avenue. His plans required congressional action, and Garrett of the Baltimore and Ohio fought him at every step. Scott feared Garrett, who was a powerful figure both in railroads and in politics. Then some one told Scott that Dodge was the ablest railroad lobbyist in the country, so the new president of the Union Pacific wired him at Council Bluffs, begging him to come to Washington and assist in the fight.

Dodge went to Washington, won the support of middle western congressmen, defeated Garrett at every turn and secured action favorable to Scott. Six weeks later Scott offered Dodge the position of chief engineer of the Texas and Pacific, and he accepted.

The Texas and Pacific purchased the property and

franchises of the Southern Pacific and the Southern Trans-continental, and Congress, by a supplemental charter, approved May 2, 1872, granted the new company powers to build and equip a line from the lower Mississippi River to the Pacific coast. The Texas legislature granted a subsidy of ten thousand dollars per mile and later, in lieu of cash, gave the company more than fourteen million acres of land. Under the charter the land subsidy to the company was at the rate of forty sections per mile of road constructed through New Mexico and Arizona, and twenty sections through California. The total land grants to the Texas and Pacific exceeded thirty-one million acres.

In order to build the Texas and Pacific, a company was organized known as the California and Texas Railway Construction Company,—a sort of Crédit Mobilier without its more radical speculative features, although speculative features were not entirely wanting. The stockholders of the Texas and Pacific Railway Company were to participate in the profits of the road by putting their capitalization into the construction company, equal to their original subscription in the railway company.

The principal stockholders in the construction company were, J. Edgar Thompson, president of the Pennsylvania; Matthew Baird, a noted locomotive builder; J. M. McCullough, superintendent of the Pennsylvania; and Colonel Thomas Scott, himself. Dodge, chief engineer, was also a heavy stockholder.

It is interesting to note that, in justification of the organization of the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, Thomas Scott entered upon a campaign of special pleading:

“It may not be generally known that the idea of a railroad across the continent to the Pacific was originally conceived with reference to the route adopted for the present Texas & Pacific Railway as early as 1852, when the legisla-

ture of Texas granted the first charter. The fact was, the original projectors of this enterprise were a decade in advance of the times. Of course nothing was done during the war, but the completion of the Union Pacific reawakened interest in the southern route, particularly when it was found by experience that the completed road could not be depended upon during the winter months. With each successive winter, since the completion of the Union Pacific road, it becomes more and more apparent that the wants of commerce demand a more southern line, where there can be no interruption from the severity of the weather."

As Thomas Scott saw fit to ignore the quarter-century battle between the sectional groups north and south that contended for the line of the first transcontinental road, it must have been a source of satisfaction to Jefferson Davis to learn that northern railroad builders, in 1870, made use of his very arguments, given in 1855, in justification of a southern route for a Pacific railroad. The Texas and Pacific was to be built along the thirty-second parallel that Davis had designated as the ideal route for a road to the Pacific.

It is of more than passing interest that Dodge, chief engineer of the first transcontinental road, had been selected as chief engineer of a proposed line through the South that lacked only a few miles of being as long as the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific combined.

The plan to build the Texas and Pacific was not unlike that of the Union Pacific, except that there was a clearer understanding among the stockholders. They simply pooled their capital, organized the construction company to build the road, and then made a bid for public favor by contrasting the route for their road with the route of the Union Pacific, for the Union Pacific trains were floundering through snows. Snowsheds in the mountains and fences on the plains had not been devised, and promoters of other

roads, hoping to secure Federal aid, were quick to point out the advantages of southern routes. As Dodge wrote his wife:

"The snow blockade has had a bad effect on us east, and people are turning their attention to a Southern Pacific road. Scott proposes to build 400 miles to begin with and raise \$5,000,000 before any bonds are issued. This is giving the enterprise a big start, and if he succeeds it will help greatly in negotiating the bonds."

In the spring of 1872, Colonel Scott conducted a party of prominent men to look over the railroad situation in the South. They were met at New Orleans by a representative southern group, and a mass meeting was held in the opera-house.

It had been but seven years since the surrender of Lee, but the southerners vied with one another in making the northern promoters feel at home. For example, there was General Jeff Thompson, who had surrendered to Dodge while he was in command of the Department of Missouri. This ex-Confederate General had been thoroughly reconstructed, and was chief engineer for the state of Louisiana. He was big-hearted and talkative, and when called upon for a speech at the opera-house he turned suddenly, grasped General Dodge by the collar, dragged him to the front of the stage and told the audience of delighted southerners that here was the man who had reconstructed him. Then General Thompson forgot all about railroads and narrated his surrender in detail.

The northern railroad builders went on to Shreveport, the eastern terminus of the Texas and Pacific. Even before the war, General Frémont started to build a road known as the Memphis and El Paso, and thirty miles of rails had been laid between Shreveport and Marshall. At Shreveport

Dodge organized his first engineering party for the Texas and Pacific and went as far west as Fort Worth, then a cowtown on the fringe of the more settled communities; from Fort Worth he went to Dallas to make a selection of station grounds; then he returned to New York.

While in New York, Dodge perfected an organization of engineers to make a survey of the entire line and he employed most of his old Union Pacific outfit. He was given full power in surveying and also in building, and Colonel Scott announced, "General Dodge's reputation and personal experience in the construction of Pacific railroads is the best guarantee for the manner in which his work will be performed for the Texas and Pacific."

Dodge was promised twenty thousand dollars a year. He had built the Union Pacific on a salary that was but one-fourth as much. With this salary and interest in the construction company, a new financial day seemed at hand. But he had not reckoned with panics.

Scott was quite free with money because he had implicit confidence in himself that he could raise five million dollars to build the first five hundred miles of the road without any bond issue, and he succeeded in interesting Dutch capitalists as well as several men of strong financial rating in the East. He seemed to bank a great deal on the enormous grants of land secured from the government; but thirty-five cents, at that time, would buy any acre of land between Fort Worth and the border of California.

If the people of Louisiana and Texas were interested in the Texas and Pacific project, the citizens of California were indifferent, although it was believed that the southern part of the state would react favorably to the proposition. Colonel Scott decided that he would head a party to California, and he selected a half-dozen men, whom he believed to be representative, for the work in hand. In the group

were Governor Throckmorton of Texas, the Honorable John Sherman of Ohio, the Honorable J. S. Harris of Louisiana, Congressman J. McManus of Pennsylvania, Rinehart, an artist from Rome, and General Dodge.

First, they went to San Francisco, for Scott had a scheme to build a line from that city to Los Angeles and connect with the Texas and Pacific. He also designed to influence the citizens of northern California to build a line southwest to the Colorado River and tap his road at another angle. He made known his plans in a speech at the opera-house:

“The question has been asked me since I have been in your city whether the enterprise was on a basis that insured success and completion. Its basis is sound; its capital is so well in hand that within the next five years, if you will build a road to meet us at the Colorado river, we will take pleasure in carrying you through to the waters of the Atlantic. The line as proposed by us will give you an outlet at New Orleans and shorter than any other line can be built.”

Scott and his party headed for San Diego, then a small town of limited financial resources. But they came to terms with the citizens, secured title to the lands of the old San Diego and Gila Railroad Company, the right of way through the town and county, six hundred feet of waterfront, and one hundred acres of tide lands.

After securing these concessions Scott was ready to return to the East, but Dodge had work to do. He had sent James Evans, long associated with him in Union Pacific surveys, searching for a crossing of the Coast Range, and Evans joined him at San Diego and made his report. Dodge finally selected the San Gorgonia Pass near San Bernardino, as being the most feasible for the line of the Texas Pacific crossing the mountains. So Colonel Scott and

party returned to the East believing that the way had been paved at New Orleans, Fort Worth, Dallas, Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco for a rapid extension of the Texas and Pacific, little dreaming of the financial panic at hand.

Dodge went to Texas, established his headquarters at Marshall and began work. His health was poor and his letters to his family breathe illness and loneliness; but his family joined him in Texas late in the autumn of 1872 and he was better satisfied.

In a letter to Oliver Ames he unburdened both railroad and personal affairs, and expressed his faith in the pioneering railroad project through the South.

"I have drifted so far away from you that I do not hear much about the Union Pacific. I hope you are getting along all right. I have about 500 miles of road here covered with workmen, shall have nearly 100 miles of it ready for track January 1st. This is a beautiful country, finely timbered, well watered, good climate, and there is no doubt but that the road through this state will pay largely locally. After we get out of the timber 50 or 100 miles west, you can not tell the difference between the prairies and those of Iowa or Nebraska, except that here they raise all the cereals, cotton, figs and all kinds of fruits in the same field. It only wants emigration here to make this country as well developed as the roads through Iowa and Nebraska have developed those countries.

"My health is good; much better than it has been for six months before; climate appears to agree with me. I have my family here but have not abandoned my home in Iowa, nor the old Union Pacific. Remember me to all my friends and send me the news when you have any. I have read with a great deal of anxiety the details of the Boston fire; wondered if you or Oakes were hurt much. I hope not; how is it?"

The following spring the yellow fever crept up from

New Orleans to the railroad camps of the Texas and Pacific and all but halted the work. The building materials were at Shreveport and Dallas, and both towns were under strict surveillance. Shot-gun quarantines were active in each place and Dodge had to use four different intermediate organizations to secure material. He stayed on the job with men dying every few days. He said he knew that if he left the end of the tracks every one else would follow suit. He remained because the road would have forfeited great subsidies if he had gone. At times he had only one engineer and the convicts, for they said they would rather face yellow fever than return to the prisons.

The yellow fever was not the only menace, for, two months later, the house of Jay Cooke and Company crashed, and this was the beginning of the end. Thomas Scott of the Texas and Pacific was, with Jay Cooke, interested in the Sterling Iron and Railway Company and in its subsidiary,—a construction company formed to build a mountain road from the Erie at Sloatsburg to the Sterling mines in Orange County, New York. Scott was also in the Northern Pacific "pool" with Cooke, and when the crash came Scott nearly collapsed physically and mentally, as well as financially.

Just before the panic, Scott, on the advice of Dodge, attempted to connect with the Missouri, Kansas and Texas and secure touch with the Missouri River and the Burlington, which, under the management of James F. Joy, of the Michigan Central and the New York Central, was spreading southwest. But into the abyss of the Cooke failure went many railroads and Thomas Scott. It was no wonder, for the roads had not only been over-capitalized; they had been over-built.

Dodge had closed the Texas and Pacific tracks and was in Council Bluffs when the final crash came. Scott was in Switzerland where he had gone in the vain hope to secure

more capital and to steady his nerves. Dodge hurried to New York, and on September 30, 1873, with the walls of the nation's financial structure tottering about the ears of the Grant administration, he wrote his wife:

The year o' the Great '73 Panic

"I have never gone through such a week. The papers will tell you the whole story. In Texas we are closing up as fast as possible. Scott is still in Europe and urges me to hold on. I suppose that even in war-times the excitement was never greater than all day Sunday. Grant and Richardson were here all day Sunday and one could hardly get into the room where they were."

The Texas and Pacific owed thousands of dollars in the South; indeed, its indebtedness in Texas alone approximated a quarter-million. Dodge made five trips from New York to Washington within six weeks, succeeded in raising three hundred thousand dollars of overdue subsidies and began to pay off the construction obligations of the company. He also sent one thousand dollars to the Howard Association in Texas for the relief of the sick in the various camps. Scott's absence had left the Texas and Pacific without a head in its greatest crisis, and Dodge did what he could to face the situation. "You have no idea of conditions here," he wrote his wife. "In all my life I never went through such a struggle. The best, strongest and wealthiest have gone down, and the bad feature about it all is the want of integrity among moneyed men and institutions."

In the midst of this panic it was inevitable that the construction company building the Texas and Pacific be likened to the Crédit Mobilier, and the whole enterprise was termed "a huge swindle." The eastern press was particularly loud in its denunciation of all southwestern railroad enterprises. Colonel Scott returned from Switzerland a broken and beaten man; and, in sheer desperation wrote Dodge a long

letter, advancing a well-nigh hopeless plan to enable him to recover lost ground in the Southwest.

Scott based all his hopes on securing additional congressional aid. He aimed to have Congress not only authorize the payment of long-overdue subsidies but to make such legislation as would enable the Texas and Pacific to receive subsidies in advance of any completed line. From believing that he could build one-fourth of the road without any bond issue at all Scott had, at last, resorted to desperate measures to enlist congressional support in a direction that was foredoomed to failure.

For legislative influence he turned, as did Farnam, Durant and the Ameses at an earlier day, to General Dodge, appealing to him to see the President on behalf of the scheme. But Dodge was dubious about the plan because even the portions of the road said to be completed were not in any condition to be scrutinized by government commissioners. The lack of building materials, the long siege of yellow fever, and the desertion of many competent engineers and workmen left the Texas and Pacific's construction work in a bad way. Moreover, the President himself was in no position to aid the Texas and Pacific in securing its subsidies except through the strict letter of the law; and when Dodge wrote Scott and frankly told him that a half-million dollars would be required to complete the road between Fort Worth and Dallas before a dollar of subsidies could be secured, the latter was about ready to give up.

"You should see the president yourself, and before he sends his message to Congress. I have had my say with him. Suppose you back it up by suggesting that nothing be said in the message that strikes directly or indirectly at any of the great interests. He might say a kind word for both the northern and southern roads, regretting that the panic had crippled them. At any rate, he should not follow the hue and cry in the west declaring against aid of any kind."

The truth is, Colonel Scott appealed to General Dodge at a most inopportune time, for John A. Kasson, whom Dodge defeated in 1866, had been returned to Congress by the voters of Iowa, and he was watching every movement that Dodge made. Dodge explained this in another letter to Scott:

"I notice that Kasson of Iowa is a member of the committee to pass on the act in which we are interested. He is not very friendly toward me, not having spoken to me since I defeated him for Congress. But Platte of New York will likely be influenced by Jay Gould, as they have always sustained intimate relations. The way to get Garfield is to overwhelm him with petitions from his own district."

The real hope of the Texas and Pacific Railroad Company lay in the next House becoming Democratic, or at least Democratic enough to unite with the pro-railroad Republicans in the Forty-third Congress. Northern railroad promoters began to see that the South had to be cultivated in a new way if railroad plans were to be consummated, for the West and the Northwest had developed deep-seated antagonism to most any project that called for the throwing up of grades and the placing of a rail. The Granger movement was gathering great momentum, and people were unfriendly in general.

Dodge sent a final communication to Thomas Scott that reveals something of the wide-spread distrust of railroads in the West and the Northwest, and of the less hostile attitude of the South, provided certain conditions could be met.

"I do not believe that any plan can be put forward with the hope of success until the drift of opinion is different from what it is today. The west, northwest and southwest under this raid of the Grangers will be solid against us. If the

press could be made to change its tune, it would help the whole country. We should combine the south and bring it up solid under the leadership of Alexander H. Stephens. I doubt very much the power of the Northern Pacific to control its line. As I wrote you before, these things should be brought to the attention of the president. I am disposed to think that he would aid us from the news I get."

Further aid was not forthcoming, and the people of Texas, inflamed by most of its press, turned against Scott and the Texas and Pacific, and the road failed. Doubtless its people believed that a land grant of fourteen million acres was sufficient, while Congress, with the bad effects in mind of the scramble for subsidies of the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific, effectively closed the government treasury against all railroads.

The effort of Scott and his associates to save the Texas and Pacific, risking every personal fortune involved, is one of the most singular stories of railroad transactions that comes to us out of the upheavals of the 'seventies. Dodge had revealed the more intimate things of these transactions. They are given here just as they were found written among his old and long-forgotten papers.

"We were all called to Philadelphia. I owed more than a million of dollars in Texas and the shock was so far reaching that it stunned everyone. I remember this group of men stayed all day and nearly all night in Scott's room at Philadelphia headquarters and considered and discussed the situation. The question was, Shall we save the property or ourselves? I told them of the outcome of a similar meeting when Ames said, 'Save the road and let the individuals go to the wall,' and Scott answered that is what we will do, and these men sat down and assumed the entire debt of \$10,000,000 or more, putting out their individual notes, known as the five name paper and the three name paper. This was a bold move, when not one of them could really

say or know whether at that moment he was worth one cent. After signing these notes they distributed them to each one of us to take them to such financial institutions as we might know and to try to sell them.

"One million was assigned to me of the five name paper, of which I was signer. I had no idea where I could raise one cent on it. I thought every one would look upon us and our credit as I knew our financial condition to be, and would judge the value of our notes accordingly. I took mine to New York City; I considered it to be the hardest and most uncertain problem that I ever had to solve. In New York, I had a small account with Gilman & Son, prominent private bankers. I called on them as soon as I reached the city, and met Mr. Gilman, a very astute, clear-headed, calculating banker, and showed him the paper. He read the five names, looked up at me and said, 'Why, that looks like pretty good paper; I think our clients would like to have some of it,' and asked me to leave it with him. You can imagine my feelings, and how my barometer went up."

Nothing came of the effort of these men to save the Texas and Pacific, which, of course, was also a movement to save themselves; and Dodge induced Jay Gould and Russell Sage to buy Scott's interest. The deal reads like a newspaper story.

Scott had agreed to take three million five hundred thousand dollars for his holdings in the Texas and Pacific, and Gould, Sage and Dodge went to his offices in Philadelphia to negotiate the deal. On the conclusion of the transaction Gould left the room, first requesting Dodge to express the securities to the Gould offices in New York. But Sage demurred, secured two valises, packed the securities in them and said that he would take them to New York and place them in private boxes in his bank. Dodge did not object, but he went with Sage; and, on reaching New York, he insisted on having a receipt from Sage's bank that the securities had been deposited there. Sage turned on him

angrily, but Dodge won his point; and Jay Gould, after the incident, always said he could depend on Dodge to do anything he agreed to do.

General Dodge's relations with Jay Gould in the latter's development of the southwestern system were peculiar. Gould was speculative; Dodge was not. Gould seems to have thought but little of the upbuilding of the country through which a railroad passed; Dodge was never able to escape his early motive in railroad building—the development of the country. Gould often aimed to turn quick money, consequently he could not await the slow processes of development; but Dodge worked wholly on the theory that the greatest and most lasting profit accrued from building substantially and from encouraging settlers to come in and take up land.

Gould, in all probability, sought connection with Dodge because of the latter's ability to influence legislation, nor was he disappointed in this, for Dodge came off victor in more than one congressional battle on behalf of this eastern promoter. But Gould came to rely on Dodge in other vital matters, and when there was a consolidation of the Union Pacific, and the Denver Pacific and the Kansas Pacific under the Gould system, it was General Dodge who outlined the agreement, based on his superior knowledge of the value of the roads. Four thousand miles of western railroads came under the control of Jay Gould at one stroke. The truth is, Gould had but little practical knowledge of the western and southwestern roads, while Dodge understood them from surveys to rolling stock.

There came a time when Dodge influenced Gould to attempt to develop the Texas and Pacific; to expand it apart from speculation; and to settle immigrants along the line, especially in Texas. Gould took heed finally, and set aside a fund of nearly four hundred thousand dollars for

this purpose. For more than two years they worked at their plans; and, assisted by the immigration authorities, set in motion a great tide of European settlers. Texas politicians opposed the whole scheme as being detrimental to the state, and prejudiced the people against the plan. This immigration ultimately was deflected and entered the Northwest instead of the Southwest, and this was the end of Jay Gould's efforts to build up a state at the same time he speculated in one of its railroads.

By 1872 Dodge had completed the Texas and Pacific to the Pecos River, five hundred miles west of Fort Worth and graded on to the valley of the Rio Grande. Simultaneously, he extended the International and Great Northern from San Antonio to Laredo, and then began to build the New Orleans and Pacific from Shreveport. In order to complete the Texas and Pacific from Fort Worth to El Paso he organized the Pacific Railway Improvement Company and became its president. Gould aimed to join the Texas and Pacific and the Union Pacific in southern Utah and build on to San Francisco. He took over the uncertain Missouri, Kansas and Texas and made Dodge its president, and Dodge, organizing the International Improvement Company, built the line from Fort Worth to Taylor. Then Jay Gould decided to enter Mexico.

General Grant became interested in Gould's Mexican railroad ventures and was made president of what was known as the Mexican and Southern. Dodge was vice-president and Russell Sage treasurer; Gould was chairman of the road's executive committee. Grant, at the close of his trip around the world, entered into this railroad scheme with zest, and President Diaz became a party to Gould's plans to secure a general railroad law in Mexico. Gould hoped for very liberal government support in Mexico apart from any supervision at all, and he counted on Grant and

Diaz to help him attain this end. That the whole venture proved unprofitable, and the Mexican government anything save tractable are now well-known facts in the history of Mexican railroading.

When Grant failed financially it was charged that he had been led blindly into several ventures, and that his speculation in railroads in the Southwest was a disaster he might have avoided but for the itch of the railroad promoters to fleece one more victim. Certain writers have intimated that General Dodge was a party to this guilt. The insinuation is wholly without foundation, for Dodge really warned Grant against his deep-seated desire to push the Mexican and Southern to Mexico City, and then on to the Pacific coast. Dodge had surveyed the line and told Grant that the mountain ranges and torrential rivers made the road too expensive to build, and strongly advised him not to attempt to do so.

When Grant failed Dodge's purse was opened very wide to him; indeed, the Grant family, in the years that followed, leaned on Dodge in many trying experiences. His correspondence with Julia Grant, Ida and Fred Grant reveal his lasting devotion to their interests. Just how great was this range of interest, and how Dodge worked to aid the Grant family, will be shown in a future chapter.

The Gould system in the Southwest, in so far as Jay Gould was personally concerned, dwindled in the late 'eighties, and other masters came to rule. Despite his critics, Gould attempted to perpetuate his system. The decade in which he operated in the Southwest—roughly from the panic of 1873 to the 1884 panic—constitutes the most colorful page in the history of southwestern railroading. General Dodge was associated with him every year of this period and assisted him in building, developing and consolidating nearly nine thousand miles of road. As late

as 1912, Dodge gave an estimate of Jay Gould that widely differs from all conventional notions about him:

"I never was with a more reliable and considerate man than Jay Gould. I spent many millions in building the Southwestern System, but as far as I know, I never had a dozen letters from him. Everything was done by word of mouth or by telegram. When we discussed any question and came to a conclusion and Mr. Gould said, 'General, we will go ahead,' or do this or that, no matter what it meant or into what difficulties we got, I never had doubts as to where Jay Gould would stand. He never went back on the support of me or tried to evade, as some others did, the responsibilities he had assumed. When the projects looked unprofitable, he had plenty of opportunities to avoid great losses, but he stood by, no matter who deserted. And when I compare where he put his brains and millions with those who have criticized him so severely, who would not invest a cent, except it was secured and brought a safe interest, I feel it was to him that was due the credit instead of the criticisms. Year after year he had faith in the outcome of his interest in the southwest."

General Dodge often declared that Jay Gould never winced and whined, although those who sought to squeeze him, when squeezed themselves, made bitter complaint against his methods. That Dodge had great influence with him in turning him from some of his speculations to a genuine interest in developing the resources of the western country, is a well-established fact. But Gould soon came under the suspicion of several prominent politicians in the Southwest, who inflamed the people against him and checked what interest he may have had in making his work more permanent.

CHAPTER XVI

INVESTIGATING THE FIRST TRANSCONTINENTAL ROAD

THREE years after the completion of the Union Pacific there was a congressional investigation of all its affairs that "rocked the nation." Dodge was building the Texas and Pacific when the investigation began and he remained in Texas most of the time until it was concluded. It was widely disseminated at the time that he "hid out" in the wilds of the Lone Star State and refused to obey a summons to come to Washington and testify. He always denied this, asserting that no summons ever reached him. This was probably true, for the yellow fever was raging and the government agent was afraid to make a trip within the yellow-fever lines and serve his papers.

The truth is, Thomas Scott, who was building the Texas and Pacific, wired Dodge to remain in the Southwest, not because Scott was afraid for Dodge to testify, for Scott had no connection with the Crédit Mobilier Company that built most of the Union Pacific. Scott's own pet enterprise, the Texas and Pacific, was in a bad way in 1873. The work of construction, on the basis of an exacting charter, had to go on or the company would suffer the loss of needed subsidies, and Dodge's presence was imperative along the line of building.

The collapse of the Texas and Pacific, as told in the previous chapter, was at hand, and Thomas Scott, depending on Dodge to ward off the final blow by securing sub-

sides through a constant extension of the road, was perfectly sincere in wanting his chief engineer to remain on the job.

But the failure of the Texas and Pacific came at the close of the Crédit Mobilier investigation, all the work in Texas stopped, and Dodge had neither reason nor excuse, if he sought them, to remain in the South. And he did not,—he wired William Chandler, attorney for the road, that he was leaving for St. Louis and would come on to Washington if wanted. Certain members of the congressional investigating committees learned of his whereabouts and hurried an agent to St. Louis to arrest him. Blissfully unaware of this action, Dodge registered at the Southern Hotel, and—"I caught a train the next morning for Council Bluffs, leaving my secretary in St. Louis. The men who had the subpoena for me did not know me and arrested my secretary and took him before the United States Commissioners. When I reached my home my whereabouts were known at Washington, but they never sent for me."

Dodge once offered an explanation of his relations with the Crédit Mobilier Company, and while he was not believed by those who made up their minds beforehand, his statement is germane to the chapter. He said:

"The investigating committees labored under the idea that I was the engineer of construction. I had nothing to do with that. My duties commenced and ended with the development of the country and the determining of the line across the continent. I disbursed no contractor funds and I had no control over contract and contractors. The contracts were not even submitted to me for approval.

"And as for the different actions of the company with the Crédit Mobilier, well, I knew nothing of them at the time. A large part of the transactions I have learned from the printed reports of the testimony. I did not even have the Ames contract until it had been in operation a year or

more. . . . If the Congressional committees had shown half the energy to get at the truth as I did to get a line across the continent of low grades and light curves, their conclusions would have been far different."

On the other hand, Dodge's wife owned Crédit Mobilier stock and he, beginning his work as chief engineer of the Union Pacific, had been promised a block, while there is some evidence to show that the Ames contract was based on certain figures that the chief engineer submitted to the company when the road began to be constructed by the Crédit Mobilier Company west of Fort Kearny.

At any rate, Dodge could not, and did not, escape the Crédit Mobilier investigation; and as certain charges were made against him, and against his wife as well, it becomes necessary to tell the story of the congressional inquiry and to tabulate some of its findings. And the story itself is filled with gripping interest to the student of the history of the first great transcontinental road. The reader should bear in mind that there was nothing culpable in being a stockholder in the Crédit Mobilier Company but only in the attempts, if any, to bribe certain members of Congress and to give this construction organization the right of way in making unlawful millions out of building the Union Pacific.

Our first literary muckrakers, in so far as railroads are concerned, appeared in 1873, shortly after Congress concluded its investigation of the Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Crédit Mobilier of America. The latter was the construction organization that built all but a few miles of the road. This congressional investigation, regardless of its developments, gave impetus to the phenomenon in American literature that Roosevelt, years later, coined his significant word to designate. *The New York Sun*, early in the newspaper field as a sensational organ, led the way in telling the world of that railroad investigation.



Courtesy Union Pacific Historical Museum

Oakes Ames, storm center in the investigation of the Union Pacific and the Crédit Mobilier

The Sun charged that the Crédit Mobilier had bought its way through Congress by passing out "princely gifts" to most every committee chairman of the House, and that the company was being shielded by the guilty congressmen. "The most damaging exhibition of official and private villainy ever laid bare to the world."

Among those who were considered guilty of "official villainy" were Schuyler Colfax, Vice-President; George Boutwell, Secretary of the Treasury; James G. Blaine, Speaker of the House; and James A. Garfield. Two Iowans, close friends of Dodge,—Senators Grimes and Wilson,—were included in the charges; and by the time the investigation closed Dodge himself was supposed to know far more than he ever divulged, while he was accused of being so entangled in the affairs of the Crédit Mobilier that his personal interests were adverse to the larger interests of the Union Pacific Railroad.

"The public has long known in a vague sort of way that the Union Pacific railroad was a gigantic steal," *The Sun* cheerfully observed.

This bold assertion of *The Sun* is significant, and indicative of certain ill-defined beliefs fostered by the public regarding the country's first great transcontinental railroad. A portion of the public had always believed that the whole enterprise was a swindle. The belief was carefully fostered by various railroad groups bitterly disappointed not only over the route the road took but also over the charter itself. It is now clear that the men who built the Union Pacific were also the ones who defeated a half-dozen other groups that wanted to build it—groups at Memphis, St. Louis, Kansas City, New Orleans and Cincinnati. They were defeated in earlier congressional battles over routes, charters, land grants and subsidies; but they did not forget. Besides, the congressional investigation of the Union Pacific was too

close to the Civil War to admit of unbiased thought and action on the part of many to whom that struggle had meant political, social and financial ruin.

Then, too, the discovery was being made that certain men had enriched themselves while others fought and bled; that the chauvanists of the 'sixties were the bondholders of the 'seventies; and that the nation's first transcontinental railroad—a Federal enterprise—had passed into the hands of a few men who made millions in building it and who would make millions in operating it. The 'seventies was a period of disillusionment—the drab years after the panoply of war; for the land was filled with the halt and the diseased and the impoverished; agitators roamed at will in the rapidly growing cities; and social problems—unknown in their particular form before the war—now loomed on every political and industrial sky.

Just as there was an aftermath to the enthusiasm of building the Union Pacific Railroad, so there was a prelude to the Crédit Mobilier investigation—a controversy both with the railroad company and its auxiliary, the construction organization.

But for internal strife in both groups, it is doubtful if the peculations charged, the peculations admitted and the peculations denied, would ever have come to light.

In less than a year after Dodge became chief engineer of the Union Pacific a fight for control began between the directors that came near halting all construction, if not ruining the road. Basically, it was a battle between Thomas C. Durant and the Ames brothers, shovel manufacturers of northeastern Massachusetts. Oakes and Oliver Ames identified themselves with the Union Pacific in August, 1866, but earlier than this they were interested in the Cedar Rapids and Missouri Railroad Company—later the Northwestern—whose chief promoter was John I. Blair.

The Ames brothers were quite unlike, Oliver being conservative and Oakes quite daring in financial ventures, if not reckless. Oakes Ames loved a risk. As General Dodge said, "Oakes Ames interested himself in the Union Pacific in 1866 more from his desire to take a risk and from the boldness of the enterprise rather than the profit he expected to make. John I. Blair, who was much more of a railroad man, declined to take any part in it. He thought it was too far in advance of the times."

Oakes Ames entered Congress in March, 1863, and he and Durant worked together to secure amendments to the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862. But he made no investment in the Union Pacific until 1866. He and his brother, Oliver, seemed to hold aloof from the enterprise until they felt sure that they could dominate it, and from the hour they entered the company they waged a battle against Thomas C. Durant, vice-president.

First of all, it was a fight to control the construction company known as the Crédit Mobilier, then building the road across Nebraska. The Ameses were quick to see that the control of the Crédit Mobilier Company of America would mean the control of the Union Pacific itself, as the stockholders of the construction company mostly received their pay in the stock and bonds of the railroad company.

A sketch of the history of the Crédit Mobilier Company of America is germane to an understanding, both of the battle that was made by the Ameses and Durant to control it, and of the congressional investigation of 1873 that brought forth the fact that it was ineradicably bound up with the Union Pacific Railroad.

Dodge's connection with the Crédit Mobilier Company was too nominal to admit of any attempt here to give its history in detail, or to try to clarify the maze of its manipulations.

In brief, a man by the name of Duff Green, whose political activities dated back to the administration of President Jackson, organized, in 1859, what was known as the Pennsylvania Fiscal Agency. Just what the old gentleman expected to do with the Pennsylvania Fiscal Agency is not clear, but the state of Pennsylvania gave him a rather elastic charter to operate as a stock brokerage company, investment company or railroad company. Perhaps Duff Green organized the Pennsylvania Fiscal Agency just to sell it, for he did this very thing. The deal was negotiated by Thomas C. Durant and George Francis Train, whose financial ventures constitute a vivid page in early railroad history. Dodge was in the army at this time and knew but little of the proceedings. Earlier historians of the Crédit Mobilier Company believe that Train had in mind the Crédit Mobilier of France when a new name was given the Pennsylvania Fiscal Agency.

At any rate the Crédit Mobilier of America was destined to pay dividends on the building of the Union Pacific Railroad, even more excessive than those paid by the Crédit Mobilier of France for railway and building enterprises over most of Europe; and when all parties concerned learned that this was true they divided into two camps and fought for control. Even the aged Duff Green, who had organized the old Pennsylvania Fiscal Agency and to whom Durant had paid a stipulated sum to secure its charter, now turned and got out an injunction against the Crédit Mobilier; and James Fisk, who figured notoriously in the Rock Island and the Erie Railroad scandal and controversy, also plunged into the affairs of the Crédit Mobilier and the Union Pacific, joining with Durant in his battle against the Ameses. This was during the summer of 1868, and Oliver Ames wrote Dodge of the trouble:

"James Fisk, the fellow who figured in the Rock Island and the Erie steal, and who made a good deal of money out of them is one of the parties Durant got in to subscribe to 2,000,000 of our stock last fall. Fisk then got out an injunction for Durant in his fight against the road. Fisk now claims that Durant agreed to pay him expenses and didn't come up, and he is willing to take what he can get. He has just served an injunction on Cisco, our treasurer, and will serve one on me if he gets a chance to tie up the road. He will do every possible thing to annoy us and make us pay him a liberal sum to withdraw his suit. Bushnell thinks he can buy him off for \$5,000."

When Oliver Ames became president of the Union Pacific the period of watchful waiting was over, and Durant was crowded off the Crédit Mobilier board of directors. This was May 20, 1867, and at that time the Ames brothers held 6,015 shares of the stock of the Crédit Mobilier as against 5,558 shares held by Durant. Oliver Ames wrote Dodge again and apprized him of the change:

"There was a meeting of the stockholders of the Crédit Mobilier at Philadelphia Saturday at which time Durant, Williams and Gray were left off the board of directors, and Dillon, Alley and Hazard were put on—Dillon to be president. I think that the new board will have all of the efficiency of the old one, and will have the confidence of the stockholders and the public, and will bring needful economy into the construction of the road."


When Durant was forced off the board of directors of the Crédit Mobilier he turned and struck back savagely. No one at that time fully realized the consequences of the fight. In all probability he never expected the Union Pacific Railroad Company to return any great dividends to its investors, at least not within his own day; but he did know that the Crédit Mobilier Company had a good thing in the

construction contracts. It seems quite evident that Durant aimed to make his stake out of the construction contracts between the Missouri River and the eastern base of the Rocky Mountains.

The Ameses had come to the Union Pacific with different motives. They designed to build a good road. Of course they saw that there would be profit in constructing it and sought to control the construction company; but more than this, they believed that the road itself would pay when completed, and they laid their plans to secure control.

When Durant fully realized that the Ameses had secured control of the Crédit Mobilier Company he turned and fought against their securing control of the Union Pacific. He hit hard; he flung mud; and he charged all his foes with all the evils that had been laid at his own door. The new board of directors of the Crédit Mobilier Company had simply asked for an accounting, and Thomas C. Durant launched a counter-attack against the Union Pacific Railroad Company. Oliver Ames, president of the road, sought to explain the situation in a letter to Dodge two weeks after Durant had been forced off the board:

"The ejection of Durant from the presidency of the Crédit Mobilier has raised the very devil in that amiable gent, and he has come down upon us with injunctions, and proposes to visit us with every form of legal document to keep us honest. Such a lover of honesty and fair and open dealing can't bear to see the money of the U. P. R. R. wasted on such scoundrels as make up the balance of the board of directors. I can not understand such a change as has come over the Doctor—the man of all others who is today, we think, holding stock, and a large portion of his stock, on fictitious claims and trumped-up accounts. He is now in open hostility to the road and any orders he may give you, or any parties under you, should be entirely disregarded. Durant has been, and is now, seeking to favor other roads



Oliver Ames, President of the Union Pacific Railroad when it was built

and other interests, and at our meeting yesterday it was voted that the power to direct action on the road should be placed in the hands of a committee, and that committee is Duff, Dillon, Carter, Bushnell and Ames."

The Ameses did not parley; they turned and forced the issue of a new contract for constructing the Union Pacific the remainder of the distance across the plains and through the mountains. It was known as the Ames contract, and it was destined to become the chief target in the congressional investigation of 1873. Oliver Ames wrote a letter to Dodge about this contract that never appeared in the investigation:

"We had a special meeting last week, and gave out a contract to my brother, Mr. Oakes Ames, to construct the road 667 miles beyond the 100th meridian—this takes the road on 914 miles beyond Omaha, and according to your last report, within 110 miles of Salt Lake. This contract has no provision to favor Durant or any other individual, and will be managed very much as the road construction is now being managed, only we hope to have additional economies carried into the construction every year and by better line and better management make the road a paying institution. We want—now we are in the mountains, where the best engineering talent is required—to have an abundance of the best men to aid you in finding the best lines that can be procured and then the best men to see that the construction is properly done and honestly measured."

It was impossible to ignore Thomas Durant in the completion of the Union Pacific Railroad, for when he was removed from the presidency of the Crédit Mobilier Company he was holding more than thirty thousand shares of the railroad's stock and he would have something to say about the building of the road. Indeed, he forced a compromise and became one of the seven trustees to whom Oakes Ames assigned the contract to build the next six hundred and sixty-

seven miles of road. The seven trustees were all heavy stockholders in the Crédit Mobilier Company, so in reality it was the same construction company doing the work. Durant became satisfied only when it seemed that he would be one of seven men to share the construction profits under this six hundred and sixty-seven mile contract; and it was under this contract that the road was built to within one hundred and twenty-five miles of Salt Lake.

In less than five years after the completion of the Union Pacific, two select committees in Congress were attempting to get all the details of its construction; its cost of building, and the profits that accrued to its builders. The first was known as the Poland Committee, as its chairman was Luke P. Poland, of Vermont; the second was called the Wilson Committee whose chairman was Jeremiah Wilson, of Indiana.

These committees were appointed by the House of Representatives in January, 1873,—the first to investigate the acts of the stockholders of the Crédit Mobilier Company to determine if “any member of this House was bribed by Oakes Ames, or any other person or corporation, in any matter touching his legislative duty.” The second committee was like unto it and was appointed specifically “to make inquiry in relation to the affairs of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the Crédit Mobilier of America and other matters specified in said resolution.”

Some political futures were wrecked by this investigation, as that of Schuyler Colfax, and some remained unimpaired, notably that of James A. Garfield. The heaviest blow fell upon Oakes Ames but for whose genius, investments and planning the Union Pacific Railroad might have ended a streak of rust between the hundredth meridian and the base of the Rocky Mountains.

The charge against Mr. Ames that brought him a vote

of censure in the House of Representatives was that he attempted to bribe any and all of the members who were found holding stock in the Crédit Mobilier Company. His chief difficulty was that he had sold this stock to members of Congress at less than market value and at a time when the stock was rising by leaps and bounds. He was really tried on what his motives were supposed to be, and received a vote of censure.

A final review of the manner in which the Crédit Mobilier Company became involved in the affairs of the Union Pacific Railroad will clarify the investigations and reveal the part played in it by the subject of this biography. But it should be borne in mind throughout that the results of the investigations are far too complex for analysis. Finally, only that portion of the congressional investigation which touches the career of Dodge, need be appraised.

The stock of the Union Pacific Railroad Company at the time the Crédit Mobilier entered its affairs was two million eight hundred thousand dollars, upon which there had been made a payment of ten per cent., or two hundred and eighty thousand dollars. This stock was bought outright by the Crédit Mobilier Company, thus giving a small group of men immediate control of the Union Pacific Railroad, and government control—if ever really contemplated in the Pacific Railroad Act at all—receded into the background. The par value of the shares at this time was one thousand dollars, but Congress soon passed an act canceling this stock at one thousand dollars a share and a reissue was made to the stockholders of the Crédit Mobilier in shares of one hundred dollars. Thus, at one stroke the stockholders of the two corporations became identical and the two companies interlocking. This was largely the scheme of Thomas C. Durant and took place nearly three years before the Ameses entered the field.

It should be remembered that the first few miles of the road west of Omaha were let in small contracts and under the supervision of Peter Dey; and when Mr. Durant worked out his plans that called for a letting of a larger contract to Herbert Hoxie, of Des Moines, Iowa, Mr. Dey was thrust into the background. The Hoxie contract called for constructing one hundred miles of the road at fifty thousand dollars for each mile completed.

As pointed out in earlier chapters, Dodge and Hoxie were close friends; but the Hoxie contract was made two years before Dodge became chief engineer, and while he was yet in the army. The Poland Committee, in making its report, said, "This contract was at once assigned by Hoxie to the Crédit Mobilier Company, as it was expected to be when made." The month the contract was made, Hoxie wrote General Dodge:

"I have just returned from Saratoga, New York, where I went to see T. C. Durant. He's going to push the Pacific railroad and wanted me to enter his service. I partly declined for political reasons; still I shall have a connection with him and may make something out of it."

This letter would have been of interest to the Poland Committee in 1873 if its existence had been known. But poor Hoxie failed to make very much out of the transactions, whatever may have been the agreement. Thomas C. Durant was in the saddle and he was holding the reins. Doubtless he had discovered by this time that, at fifty thousand dollars a mile, the contracting company would make good money, so he concocted a little scheme to extend Mr. Hoxie's contract all the way from Omaha to the one hundredth meridian, a distance of two hundred and forty-seven miles. On October 4, 1864, Mr. Hoxie presented this new proposition to the Union Pacific Railroad Company:

"On condition that your railroad company will extend my contract from its present length of one hundred miles, so as to embrace all that portion of the road between Omaha and the one hundredth meridian of longitude, I will subscribe, or cause to be subscribed for, five hundred thousand dollars of the stock of your company."

Of course Mr. Hoxie was in no condition financially to subscribe a half-million dollars to the stock of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, nor did Mr. Durant intend that he should do so: Mr. Durant intended that Mr. Hoxie should assign this new construction contract to build two hundred and forty-seven miles of the road at fifty thousand dollars a mile to the Crédit Mobilier Company of America.

The truth is, that, instead of being compelled to take five hundred thousand dollars in the securities of the Union Pacific Railroad in order to get a larger contract for its construction, Hoxie was promised a good block of railroad stock if he would act as dummy in the transaction. This conclusion is based on a letter—one which the Poland Committee also would have liked to see—that Hoxie wrote General Dodge December 6, 1868, in which he said:

"The Chicago Tribune of Wednesday contained specials from Washington that are rather good. Seymour evidently wrote the article. Blickensderfer will hardly relish it. How is the fight? Under my original contract the company was to give me \$10,000 in stock. They have never done it. Had I better go for it now or wait till spring? The money is due me, or rather the stock."

On the completion of the Hoxie contract to the one hundredth meridian, Durant executed another contract with a Mr. Boomer, for the construction of one hundred and fifty-three miles west of the one hundredth meridian. This particular contract was never ratified by the Union Pacific

Railroad Company although one-third of the distance was constructed. No one will ever know what this next fifty-eight miles cost the company, for Mr. Durant possessed all the evidence and he refused to divulge it.

By this time the Ameses had become identified with the Union Pacific and were fighting Durant, and the company ignored the Boomer contract of one hundred and fifty-three miles and voted to extend the old Hoxie contract farther west. Durant fought the company's move and succeeded in blocking it. His personal affairs had been interfered with; his chances for exclusive gain had been dealt a blow; henceforth he would be opposing the other directors of the company—especially the Ames brothers—and out of this controversy grew many of the more detailed features of the Crédit Mobilier investigation.

But on the first of March, 1867, another contract was made with the Crédit Mobilier Company for the building of the Union Pacific west of the one hundredth meridian. This contract was to cover two hundred and sixty-seven miles at the cost of fifty thousand dollars a mile. Durant fought this contract also and made the charge that there was collusion between the Crédit Mobilier and certain directors of the Union Pacific to secure fifty thousand dollars a mile over fifty-eight miles of railroad already completed. He made out his case so well that the company backed down. Then the Crédit Mobilier Company made a tactical blunder,—*it declared a dividend of one hundred and eighty per cent.*

The declaring of the dividend itself was not the blunder; the blunder inhered in the failure of the construction company to make clear that the dividend was not in cash but in first-mortgage bonds and in stock of the railroad. Any announcement at this time that the Crédit Mobilier Company's one hundred and eighty per cent,

dividend was eighty per cent. in bonds and the balance in railroad stock would not have caused a ripple, for no one believed that the Union Pacific would develop into a paying road for a quarter of a century, if at all. Pessimism concerning the railroad was deep seated.

That the stock ultimately proved to be of great value is now a bit of the clearest railroad history we possess, but a crap game could not have been more hazardous in 1868 than taking stock in the Union Pacific Railroad Company. The Crédit Mobilier Company, in failing to reveal that its one hundred and eighty per cent. dividend was in the securities of the Union Pacific, including first-mortgage bonds, income and land-grant bonds, common stock and government bonds, and not cash, left the door wide open for a concerted rush on the part of old political and industrial foes. Ultimately, the construction company's profits for building the Union Pacific from the Missouri River to a point near Salt Lake ran into the millions,—anywhere between nine and thirty—but the group that played for such big stakes risked more than their critical public ever knew. General Dodge once put it thus:

“The theory of the great profits in the building of the road was a myth. The capitalization of the contracting company was only \$1,000,000 at first and that company had to raise and expend \$55,000,000 to build the road so when you apply the profits of those days to that large sum of money, it was small, but when you apply those profits to \$1,000,000 of capital it was very large; and everybody took it that the simple investment of \$1,000,000 carried these great profits to those men, when, in fact, they had to raise the \$55,000,000 and go under obligations and take chances that very few would touch when the opportunity was presented to them.”

When the Wilson Committee made its report, a para-

graph was devoted to the purchase of Crédit Mobilier stock by General Dodge's wife. This particular paragraph in the report is a singular combination of facts and of special pleading. It said:

"In addition to all this, your committee finds that the wife of the engineer-in-chief, General Grenville M. Dodge, who was appointed to succeed Mr. Dey, whose letter of resignation has been given, was the owner of 100 shares of stock in the Crédit Mobilier, which was issued in her name when the capital stock of that corporation was increased from \$2,500,000 to \$3,750,000. This stock was paid for originally by John Duff, and General Dodge was written to by Mr. Ham, secretary of the Crédit Mobilier, to forward \$10,000 to reimburse Duff. Whether Dodge paid for this stock with money of his own, or whether it was paid for with money of his wife, is of little consequence. Whether it was the one way or the other, it placed him in a position where his pecuniary interests were adverse to the interest of the railroad company he was representing in this most vital capacity."

An analysis of this paragraph reveals several things. In the first place, the committee investigating the Crédit Mobilier and the Union Pacific Railroad sought to leave the impression that Peter Dey had been forced to resign as chief engineer of the road in order to secure a more tractable engineer, and that such a one had been found in General G. M. Dodge. Of course the Wilson Committee knew nothing of the old controversy between Dey and Durant and less of the terms upon which Dodge had become chief engineer of the road. And the sinister conclusion that the Crédit Mobilier stock held by Mrs. Dodge placed the chief engineer "in a position where his pecuniary interests were adverse to the interest of the railroad" was puerile, and a revelation of the extreme position the committee felt forced to take in making its report.

The career of General Dodge, in connection with his work as chief engineer of the Union Pacific, belies the covert charge of the Wilson Committee. In a letter to George W. McCrary, a member of the Poland Committee, Dodge broke a long silence and said:

"I am told that McComb tried to blacken me in the Crédit Mobilier matter.

"When I became chief engineer of the company in May, 1866, in addition to my salary as chief engineer, I was to have an interest in the construction company as part of my compensation, which was never given me. In 1868 when they distributed the additional capital they failed to meet their agreement on one plea or another, but through the action of Sidney Dillon and Mr. Alley they let Mrs. Dodge buy 100 shares of Crédit Mobilier stock which she paid for with her own money and the proceeds of which she has today. When I took charge of the company in 1866 Crédit Mobilier stock was worth about 50 cents on the dollar. It became valuable under my surveys and reports. The company put me off and, although I did the hard work, I got none of the profits.

"I was connected with the Union Pacific railroad from its inception in 1853 to its completion, and in its service using up the best part of my life and health. I made a record that I look back to with more satisfaction than to any other part of my life and I do not intend to have it impugned by any of those who are fighting over the spoils."

It would seem that Dodge was misinformed concerning McComb's attempt "to blacken" him in his testimony before the Poland Committee. As a matter of record, McComb's statements tended to justify Dodge's indignation in the letter he wrote to Congressman McCrary, of Iowa. McComb testified that Dodge's wife may have been holding one hundred shares of Crédit Mobilier stock at the time of its fifty per cent. increase, but that she, or General Dodge,

had never been allowed any increase upon the stock they held. Henry C. Crane, assistant treasurer of the Crédit Mobilier Company, when asked who were the stockholders at the time the Ames contract was made, stated that Anna Dodge's one hundred shares had not been transferred to her.

So there is nothing in the Crédit Mobilier investigation to show that General Dodge entered into any sort of plot to plunder the resources of the Union Pacific Company. The statement that his wife's holding one hundred shares of Crédit Mobilier stock made his interest in the building of the road of doubtful value is sheer nonsense. The reverse was true, for the holders of stock of the Crédit Mobilier Company, in so far as dividends were concerned, were being reimbursed in the securities of the railroad company.

Anyhow, as has been said, Dodge's devotion to the building of the Union Pacific is one of the clearest facts in its whole history. That devotion amounted almost to a mania and, at times, came near ruining both his health and his home. He never denied the ownership of stock in the Crédit Mobilier, nor did he ever deny that the investment proved a good one. When Colfax, Blaine, Garfield and others fled, Dodge stood his ground, though of course he had no political fences to build, nor is there anything to indicate that his position would have been other than it was even if he had been an office-seeker.

James F. Wilson, of Iowa, one of the government directors of the Union Pacific who had invested in Crédit Mobilier stock, was greatly disturbed because of Dodge's failure to appear at Washington and testify. Two months after the Poland Committee made its report Wilson wrote Dodge a long letter regretting that he, as chief engineer of the Union Pacific, had not seen fit to answer a summons. In a letter dated March 25, 1873, Dodge replied:

"Dear Wilson:

"I am in receipt of your letter. I value your opinion highly and with you am aware that it would be better for my reputation if I had testified before the Wilson Committee.

"I am constrained to say to you what I have said to no other person that my whole reason for not coming to Washington was the condition of affairs in Texas, which were in such a state that I could not leave for any length of time, except at great pecuniary loss to myself and, as the company thought, to it.

"I could have given no evidence of any value unless I could have had time to examine all my records, maps, profiles and estimates and this would have occupied my time during the entire setting of the Committee."

There is but one thing more to add—the Poland Committee, investigating the relation between the Crédit Mobilier and the Union Pacific, came across an item of one hundred and twenty-six thousand dollars, designated "special legal expenses" that had been paid to C. S. Bushnell, and Bushnell had split in three ways. Twenty-four thousand five hundred dollars had gone to Dodge. Why?

The Poland Committee charged that it had, at last, come upon the specific theft of one hundred and twenty-six thousand dollars, and that the money stolen was clearly government funds because the Union Pacific had really been built from government subsidies, and not out of the pockets of its stockholders. In other words, the Poland Committee declared that the total cost of the Union Pacific had been fifty million dollars and that the government had really bestowed this amount upon the railroad company in subsidies of cash and of lands. "The builders received in cash value at least twenty-three million dollars as profit, being a percentage of about forty-eighty per cent, on the entire cost," the committee argued.

Perhaps the builders of the Union Pacific did make this amount. The amount varied between nine million and twenty-seven million, according to who was doing the figuring. But our concern here is to determine if General Dodge, chief engineer of the road, was a party to the specific theft of one hundred and twenty-six thousand dollars, of which his share was twenty-four thousand five hundred dollars.

Fortunately, he has left a record of this very transaction, although he made no revelation of it until many years afterward. It will be given in his own words and one may draw one's own conclusions. Just one thing will be pointed out—Dodge's statements reveal that he then was in Washington in the capacity of a lobbyist for the Union Pacific, and that the matter in hand had nothing to do with the Crédit Mobilier but was largely on behalf of the railroad's sinking fund.

"In the spring of 1871, there came up the question of the interest that should be paid upon the sinking fund of the Union Pacific. The question was taken to Congress and the Union Pacific Company requested me to go to Washington. I appeared before the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General and obtained decisions favorable to the company, and when the question came before Congress I appeared before the Judiciary Committee of the Senate. With me were the attorneys of the Union Pacific,—A. J. Poppleton, Caleb Cushing, Montgomery Blair and Curtis of Boston.

"In payment for my services there, Mr. Bushnell, who had charge of the matter for the company, gave me a call upon the Union Pacific stock at 23. The action of the Congress in our favor and of the departments, of course, increased the value of the stock so that upon that stock there was a profit of \$24,500. Mr. Bushnell, instead of buying the stock and carrying it as he agreed to do, as it was supposed by the company that he did, simply made a bill against



Courtesy, Laramie Plains Historical Museum

Schuyler Colfax and party see the Union Pacific in building, Echo, Utah, 1868

the company for this and other calls that he gave out as expenditures, that he made in behalf of this legislation of \$126,000, which, of course, created a scandal. But when it was thoroughly understood it was seen that none of this money was spent for the purpose of influencing any member of Congress or anything else, it was simply given for services and expenses made by the attorneys and agents of the company and their expenses in Washington."

That the Union Pacific paid Dodge handsomely for this service is evidenced on the face of the transaction itself, but there is not the slightest proof that Dodge used a cent to bribe any one in Congress.

CHAPTER XVII

LINCOLN'S LOST RAILROAD ORDER

IT IS of more than passing interest to note that the first bridge to span the Mississippi River—the one between Rock Island and Davenport—involved Abraham Lincoln, as a lawyer, in a lawsuit, and the first bridge to span the Missouri—the one between Council Bluffs and Omaha—involved his name as well as his official acts in a legal battle to compel the Union Pacific to establish its eastern terminus in Iowa and to run its trains on a through line from Dodge's home town to the West.

Of course it was a physical impossibility for the Union Pacific to run its trains from Council Bluffs, Iowa, to the West until the bridge was built; but after its construction the railroad company made no move to establish its eastern terminus on the Iowa side, and in keeping with Lincoln's executive order. More than this, the Union Pacific officials were unwise enough to organize what was known as "The Bridge Transfer Company" and to charge fifty cents for each traveler and ten dollars for each car of all eastern roads terminating at Council Bluffs that were in search of a western outlet for their traffic.

Dodge, as early as 1869, pointed out to the Union Pacific Company that its legal eastern terminus was in Council Bluffs and not in Omaha, and now, in 1874, and right on the heels of the Crédit Mobilier investigation, he

tried to convince the directors of the folly of contesting the claim of the relators.

But the Union Pacific Railroad Company, with its shops and offices established in Omaha from the beginning—and of physical necessity, was in no mood to heed Dodge's warning that it was violating the law in refusing to move its eastern terminus to the Iowa side of the Missouri River, and it arrayed powerful legal talent to prove that the corporate limits of Omaha were, and always had been, the initial point.

Dodge found himself on one side of the dispute and the remainder of the directors of the Union Pacific on the other. He stood his ground and in a letter to J. W. McDill, of Iowa, a member of the Pacific Railway Commission, he flatly called in question the railroad company's policy of evading the letter of the law. Dodge wrote:

"Mr. Dillon, president of the Union Pacific railroad, will be before the Pacific Railroad Committee this week. I want you to press him on the bridge question. Ask him if it was not the original intention of the company to make its terminus on the east side of the river, and if land was not bought for that purpose."

It was a pointed question, for Dodge, acting on behalf of the Union Pacific, had purchased a thousand acres on the Missouri River, at the western edge of Council Bluffs, and held most of it for shops and the terminus. This land was near the tract on which Lincoln loaned Norman B. Judd the three thousand dollars, and this fact was about to involve the dead President's name in real-estate speculation and the use of his authority to fix the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific at a point that would greatly enhance the value of his holdings.

In the bitter suit that followed, which the Union Pacific

lost and carried to the Supreme Court and lost again, Lincoln's name and his executive orders touching the Pacific railroad, were invoked by both sides, especially the one that attempted to define the location of the Union Pacific's eastern terminus, or initial point. Judge Dillon, of the United States Circuit Court, in handing down a decision that was adverse to the company, said:

"On the 17th day of November, 1863, President Lincoln, by an executive order, fixed 'so much of the western boundary of the State of Iowa as lies between the north and south boundaries of the United States township within which the City of Omaha is situated, as the point from which said line of railroad shall be constructed.'"

Two difficulties inhere in Judge Dillon's quotations and in his consequent decision. First, he could not have quoted from Lincoln's first executive order of November 17, 1863, for it is lost and its exact wording may never be known. Lincoln wrote it, gave the original to Thomas C. Durant, and did not so much as keep a copy for himself, much less file one in the Interior Department at Washington. Lincoln made this admission to the Senate when called on, in 1864, for information "respecting the point of commencement of the Union Pacific Railroad." But in his reply to the Senate he declared that the executive order he delivered to the vice-president of the Union Pacific Railroad Company "*fixed the point on the western boundary of the State of Iowa . . . within the limits of the township in Iowa opposite the town of Omaha, in Nebraska.*"

Certainly this would have been definite enough but for the fact that Judge Dillon, in handing down his decision, quoted from what had always been considered an exact copy of Lincoln's first executive order, which, apparently, flatly contradicts Lincoln's statement to the Senate; and

which, on its face, should never have caused the Union Pacific to move its eastern terminus to the Iowa side of the Missouri River.

If Judge Dillon had confined his citation to Lincoln's second order, dated March 7, 1864, his decision could not be gainsaid, for Lincoln's second order embodied all the salient features that he vowed to the Senate were contained in the unrecorded order. But Judge Dillon, in his laudable effort to get at original sources, followed the traditional and current wording of Lincoln's first order. On the other hand, if Lincoln's first executive order was really worded as Judge Dillon quoted it, then the Union Pacific, as was said, is for ever justified in the fight it made to retain its eastern terminus in Omaha, Nebraska. For between Lincoln's first order, which Durant always claimed authorized the initial point at Omaha, and Lincoln's second order that definitely located it in Council Bluffs, Iowa, was a lapse of five months in which the road fixed the eastern terminus on Nebraska soil.

During the suit, A. J. Poppleton, one of the attorneys for the railroad company, claimed to have photographed Lincoln's original order, then in Durant's possession, and that its exact wording was:

"Executive Mansion,
"Washington,
"November 17, 1863.

"In pursuance of the fourteenth Section of the Act of Congress, entitled 'An Act to aid in the construction of a Railroad and Telegraph line from the Missouri river to the Pacific ocean, and to secure to the government the use of the same for postal, military and other purposes,' approved July 1, 1862, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby fix so much of the western boundary of Iowa as lies between the North and South boundaries of the United States Township, within which the City of

Omaha is situated, as the point from which the line of railroad and telegraph in that section mentioned shall be constructed.

“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”

Durant, at this time, was living in New York City, with an office at 20 Nassau street, and had no official connection with the Union Pacific Railroad Company. But forgetful of old quarrels, he seems to have aided Mr. Poppleton, the road's attorney, in every way possible, and stated that Lincoln's first executive order on locating the initial point was written and signed in his presence. Durant showed the order to Poppleton and to W. H. Smith, Assistant Attorney-General, and then the photographs were taken.

But J. P. Usher, Secretary of the Interior under Lincoln, once testified before the United States Pacific Railway Commission that he accompanied Durant when he visited Lincoln on the subject of fixing the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific and that Durant told the President that the point should be in Omaha. “I remember very well,” Usher went on to say, “that Mr. Lincoln looked at the map and said, ‘I've got a quarter-section of land right across there, and if I fix it there they will say that I have done it to benefit my land. But I will fix it there anyhow.’ So it was done that way.”

Of course Lincoln, if Usher's statement was true, referred to the tract of land in Council Bluffs on which he had loaned Judd the three thousand dollars. Then, did Durant alter Lincoln's original order? There isn't a shred of evidence to prove that he did so, or that he forged one. Durant preferred the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific to be located in Omaha instead of Council Bluffs and he chose to place his own interpretation on the order the President had given him. Lincoln, and every one else, always spoke of the road beginning at Omaha, and even

after he gave his second order on the subject,—an order that stated specifically that the eastern terminus must be on the Iowa side,—he continued to speak of Omaha as the “initial point” of the road. The Union Pacific Railroad Company used the phrases “eastern terminus” and “initial point” interchangeably; Lincoln may have thought of them separately. At any rate, despite the vagueness of his first executive order, he aimed to locate the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific Railroad in Dodge’s home town, where he and Dodge, and many other railroad figures, speculated in land between the town and the Missouri River.

Dodge also seems to have been confused in differentiating between the accepted wording of Lincoln’s first executive order, unrecorded, and the second recorded one. Dodge may never have seen the original in Durant’s possession. Durant’s statement of its wording passed into usage between 1863 and 1874, and Dodge, in keeping with every one else, so accepted it without attempting to explain its apparent contradiction of the President’s second order. To conclude, the first order, universally accepted, but actually unknown, mentions Omaha as the point from which the road was to be constructed; the second order, recorded, definitely specifies the township in Iowa opposite Omaha.

When the Union Pacific Railroad Company carried the suit to the Supreme Court, Dodge, who felt that he knew Lincoln’s mind on the whole question of the road’s eastern terminus, reviewed the situation in a tart letter to Sidney Dillon, the president of the road and a firm believer in the right of his company to retain its terminus position on the Nebraska side of the river.

“My understanding with you was, that when the mandamus case was taken to the Supreme Court, you desired a decision upon its merits. But the company’s attorney is

now attempting to make his chief point upon the right of a citizen to sue, thus hoping to get the case thrown out of court. Is this in good faith?"

Dodge here referred to the fact that private citizens of his home town were the relators in the suit, and he resented the attitude of the company's legal talent that would question the humblest citizen's right to challenge a great corporation in its violation of the law. But Dodge had more on his mind and he spoke it freely:

"The tax case, on the question of taxing the railroad bridge as a part of the railroad itself, subjects the company to great criticism. Our attorneys appear in the mandamus suit on one side of the question and in the injunction case upon the other side. It looks fishy to say the least, and it is a great deal worse to see a great company like the Union Pacific railroad appearing in the United States Supreme Court in the same month on both sides of the same question:—on one side trying to prove that the bridge is not a part of the road, and on the other side trying to avoid taxation by proving that the bridge is a part of the road."

His analysis was clear and the nub of the whole terminus and bridge suit. But his position as a director of the road sorely wounded his colleagues, and some of his enemies in his home town, while not loving the Union Pacific Railroad Company, took occasion to say that his sole motive in having the terminus removed to Council Bluffs was to enhance the value of his real-estate holdings near the point where it was bound to be placed.

However, when the Union Pacific was compelled to establish its eastern terminus on the Iowa side, and hard by the land to which Lincoln had held a quitclaim deed, there was no great change in real-estate values. As for Lincoln, if he had hoped to enrich himself—as critics of his railroad

policies declared—by establishing the eastern terminus of the Union Pacific near land in which he was interested, then the removal of the initial point from Omaha to Council Bluffs came too late, for he had been in his grave ten years. And the relocation of the road's terminus would not enrich Lincoln's widow, then in pitiful financial straits, for Norman B. Judd, five years before the change was made, paid the Lincoln estate the three thousand dollars, the amount of the note, and twenty-four hundred dollars interest.

To-day, travelers through Council Bluffs may note a solitary brick building that squats on the flood-plain of the Missouri River, not far from the east end of the Union Pacific bridge. It is known as the "Union Pacific Transfer," and it marks, approximately, the road's legal eastern terminus. Once this building was the center of great railroad and social activity, but through the years its importance as a transfer station for passengers has steadily diminished, and now it is but little more than a symbol of the Union Pacific's eastern terminus.

But some of the men who speculated in land adjacent to this old transfer building passed on before it was erected and, consequently, before the Union Pacific established its eastern terminus in Council Bluffs. None of them made money from their speculations. In old and forgotten county records the story of their transactions may be read. The operations of the Credit Foncier of America, of which George Francis Train was president, promised to make this property of great value, but the bubble burst, as did most of the bubbles blown by this land and railroad speculator. None of the financial dreams came true for the men who believed that the flood-plain of the Missouri River west of the town of Council Bluffs would become the greatest industrial center in the Middle West; but greater dreams came true for the whole country, and by these must it be measured.

When Dodge heard of the final decision that forced the Union Pacific to relocate its eastern terminus he said:

"This was the aim of Congress and the intention of Lincoln."

The Union Pacific directors, his colleagues, grimaced and then grinned at the man who had fought with his home-town citizens and against his own company.

"Dodge was always stubborn," Sidney Dillon remarked. "But that is the reason he built the Union Pacific," he added thoughtfully.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE DECADE BEFORE THE WAR WITH SPAIN

BY THE middle 'eighties General Dodge had attained a position of eminence and authority in the railroad world, not alone in America but in Europe as well. Indeed, his reputation as an engineer had gone around the world. Both the Russian and the Chinese governments sought his advice in railroad building, and the latter began negotiations with him as early as 1884, looking toward the development of lines throughout the empire.

There was a group of American capitalists in China who were anxious to control all railroad development and who sought to influence the Chinese government to allow them to do so. Edwin Stevens, United States Consul at Ningpo, wrote Dodge under date of November 17, 1884, and stated these facts to him:

"D. C. Jansen, of Shanghai, one of the capitalists of that port, has been to see me in reference to procuring the best American civil engineer for the building of railroads in China. I at once informed him that you were the man, and that if I had my selection, I should at once put myself in communication with you. Mr. Jansen proposes devoting his entire time and capital to this matter, and if practicable, in conjunction with others, such as yourself, have American engineering skill build the railroads for China, and have them equipped by American cars and locomotives. Being a thorough American, able to speak the Chinese Court dialect, he needs no interpreter,—a great advantage.

"There can be no question that as soon as the pending difficulty with France is settled, the Chinese Empire will at once embark earnestly in this great enterprise; the building of railroads—tens of thousands of miles—must and will be done in the near future in this Empire. Should you desire to take an active part in this great work, or should you decide upon naming some one else, allow me to say that one word from General Grant will prove of great value with Li Hung Chang, the Premier, and other Chinese authorities."

D. C. Jansen, in a lengthy communication to General Dodge a month later, further elucidated the railroad situation in China. His communication is an interesting commentary on the struggle made in the middle 'eighties between the French, the English and the Germans to control railroad developments in the Far East.

"Only a few days ago an English firm secured the contract for building a short line from the capital to the coal mines,—an insignificant affair in its way but of immense importance to the railway men of the world, for it shows that the barrier to railroads in this country has been thrown down and that the English are already in the field."

Jansen further declared that Li Hung Chang and other Chinese officials had sensed the importance of building railroads; moreover, they were also alert to the danger of having foreign nations in control of transportation. In a word, the Chinese government wanted railroads but was dependent upon other nations to build them; and in having them built the Chinese did not wish to lose control of them.

Both Jansen and Stevens, the United States Consul, hoped that railroad interests in the United States could be influenced to send General Dodge to China, with letters of recommendation from Grant, urging upon the Chinese government the necessity of railroad building and the su-

periority of American construction. Efforts were made to interest George M. Pullman and the Baldwin Locomotive Works. But Grant died, the presidency of the Mexican and Southern came down on Dodge's shoulders, and the whole proposition suffered through a lack of interest on the part of American railway promoters.

When the house of Grant and Ward failed in 1884, Fred Grant went straight to General Dodge with a delicate family problem. The creditors were about to dispossess the Grant family of its personal belongings. A few days later General Dodge wrote Grant's son:

"Dear Colonel:

"What you said to me the other day impressed me so much that I want to sit down with you and your father and freely talk these matters. It seems impossible to me that anyone should think of taking away from him the possessions and relics of a life time. I know that if the people of this nation knew the facts they would rise in their might and prevent it. The question arises in my mind, Do not Mr. Vanderbilt and Mr. Neville understand this matter and do not they intend to preserve to the general and his family all they had, if his personal obligations are paid? I know from a trip to Europe with Mr. Vanderbilt of his respect—I might say his love—for General Grant and I believe he intends to protect him in the possession of all that really belongs to him. Your father must know that there is no soldier living who fought under him but who understands that his misfortune does not come from any fault of his."

Dodge visited Grant a few days later and tried to comfort him, but he was inconsolable, and his humiliation was so great that he could scarcely meet any one. A few months later, and in rapid decline, he wrote Dodge—which the Grant family said was the last letter ever penned by his own hand—and made a personal request:

"My dear General Dodge:

"I am sorry to trouble you, and would not but for the circumstances under which I am placed. Since my injury of nearly a year ago I have grown very weak. A sore throat of six months standing has given me much trouble. In addition to this I have been a sufferer from neuralgia. I think a visit to the Hot Springs of Arkansas would do me much good. Can you furnish me a special car out and back? If I go I would like to start sometime between the fifteenth and twentieth of this month, to return soon after the beginning of the new year.

"Very truly yours,
"U. S. GRANT.

"P. S. Mrs. Grant will accompany me, and two servants, a maid and a manservant."

After the death of General Grant, Dodge assisted his family in every way possible. He took a deep-seated interest in Colonel Fred Grant and worked hard to get President Harrison to appoint him as minister to China. He wrote Blaine:

"I have no doubt that it will lay with you whether or not you go to the head of the State Department. If you should see proper to do so, I would like to make a suggestion, which would go far towards bringing us into more friendly relations with China, now so greatly strained. It is this—to offer Colonel F. D. Grant the position of minister to China. We all know the friendship of China for General Grant. Every year their authorities decorate his grave. Every holiday season they send presents to his family. Such an act on the part of our government would be hailed in China as an indication of our friendliness towards them, notwithstanding the nature of the laws which our country has seen fit to enact—laws apparently antagonistic to them."

Blaine became Secretary of State, but Colonel Fred Grant did not become minister to China; instead he was

sent to Austria, and, under date of June 23, 1889, he wrote General Dodge:

"We arrived safely May 9th and I was presented to the Emperor on the sixteenth. After handing him my letter of credence we had quite a conversation, during which he spoke often of father, and expressed great pleasure in having known and entertained him during his visit to Vienna in 1878. I am most fortunate in coming here to live near a court which is so military, where my father's fame and name insure me a warm reception."

It was in the middle 'eighties that a new Union Pacific administration—that of Charles Francis Adams—turned to Dodge with certain complex problems threatening its very existence. As a director of the road, Dodge had been more or less in touch with its activities up to the time of the retirement of Jay Gould. The Gould administration of Union Pacific affairs had scarcely been conducive to good will, and the road faced its gravest crisis since the days of the Crédit Mobilier investigation.

The Union Pacific was in a bad way when Gould unloaded his stock in 1883 and left a floating indebtedness of nearly seven million dollars. Moreover, Congress was in one of its old moods affecting this road, as the number and kind of bills that flooded the House amply attest. The entire decade of the 'eighties was a period of great stubbornness on the part of Congress and a portion of the public. The Union Pacific in particular had aroused the ire of both state and national legislatures; and, impelled or compelled by the powerful Granger organization, they were out to deal the "octopus" a blow.

General Dodge bluntly advised the directors of the Union Pacific to face about and attempt to build up good will; and, on the retirement of Jay Gould from active in-

terest in the road, Charles Francis Adams, grandson of John Quincy Adams, was made president. This was a most adroit move on the part of the Union Pacific, and Dodge warmly supported the company in it; for no one could have been placed at the head of the road's affairs at that time who was more trusted, by the public as a whole, than the new president. He was a close student of railways in America, but came near being a "reformer," and, in many ways, he was the antithesis of the men who had just surrendered control.

Almost the first thing that Adams did on assuming the presidency of the Union Pacific was to call on General Dodge for a practical plan to reorganize the road; and, which was greater and more difficult, to formulate other plans to reach tidewater.

Now the story of the Union Pacific's battle to reach tidewater constitutes one of the most vivid pages of its colorful history, and the part that Dodge played is germane to an understanding of this period of his career. Fortunately, we have a series of intimate letters that passed between Adams and Dodge on the subject of the Union Pacific's final effort to gain an outlet to the sea, and these letters, involving personages like James Hill and Oscar Henry Villard, guarantee salient and gripping features.

In the beginning, it was in the dreams of the Union Pacific builders to reach tidewater. From the hour rails were first laid on the banks of the Missouri River, until the driving of the last spike that connected the road with the Central Pacific in a western desert, the promoters of this first great transcontinental line hoped, prayed and toiled for its extension to the Pacific coast. And, although the road's original charter did not contemplate a tidewater terminus, its builders fought to push it to the Pacific Ocean until halted by an amendment, in 1866, to the original act

Month to action time of the 20th
beginning of the new year.

My best love
Abraham

My good Sir,
Dec. 30th.

With kindest regards

When you come to town
you can afford not to be for the
circumstances under which I am
placed during my injury of health
I can give you three hours very well
at a stretch of six months standing
and you will find little in
relation to this I have been a sufferer
from rheumatism. I think a visit to the
Hot Springs of Arkansas would do me
much good. When you have time
I should be out and ready. If so
I would like to shoot some time between
the 10th and 15th of this

if I then want to accompany
me and his anxiety, a friend
and a true servant.



Gen. Grant
Fields Building, Broadway

Atg.

Courtesy Iowa Historical, Memorial and Art Department

General Grant's final request of General Dodge, said to be the last letter Grant wrote with his own hand

of 1862. Thomas C. Durant, despite all his faults, was genius enough to see that a route for the Union Pacific to the sea was vital to its fullest development. The Ameses saw this with greater clarity and never ceased to hope that the way would be paved for its extension.

But one thing that the Central Pacific did not want the Union Pacific to have was a tidewater terminus, and the legislation of 1866 met the former road's wants. The Central Pacific now held the whip-hand, and drove. It stood as a barrier between the Union Pacific and its early dream, and it stood as a barrier in the beginning of the 'eighties when, more restless than ever and with greater power, the Union Pacific began its historic drive and maneuvers for a tidewater outlet.

The Central Pacific blocked the way to the Bay of San Francisco and the Southern Pacific blocked the way to the Gulf of Mexico, for there was an understanding between the two companies that the Union Pacific should not reach these two outlets. The only way that was not blocked—though it might be—was the Pacific Northwest. But when Charles Francis Adams came to head the Union Pacific he launched a vigorous plan to gain an ocean terminus for the road over the only route that seemed left. And he turned to General Dodge for assistance.

Dodge had, as early as 1867, made a survey from Salt Lake to Puget Sound, seeking an outlet for the Union Pacific. Upon one occasion he said:

"When Congress passed a law in 1866 [really an amendment to the act of 1862] giving the Central Pacific the right to build east of the California state line until it met the Union Pacific going west, I knew that the original plan of the Union Pacific to build to San Francisco was ended, and immediately I gave my attention to reaching the coast at some other point. And I made a close study of the

country from Utah to the northwest, through Idaho, Oregon and Washington territories."

At this early date Dodge strongly advised the Union Pacific to build to the northwest and reach the sea. The Ameses felt its importance but doubted the strength of the Union Pacific Company to undertake the task. But Dodge urged it upon the company, saying that by building five hundred miles of road all the vast territory could be tapped years in advance of the proposed Northern Pacific.

Whether the Union Pacific procrastinated or whether it did not have power to extend its lines into the northwest at that time is a matter that has been disputed by more than one interested group. But it did not then attempt to build.

But by 1885, some fifteen years later, the company completed a branch road from its main line in western Wyoming to Huntington, Idaho, thereby closing about half the gap through the Northwest to tidewater. On reaching Huntington, Idaho, the Union Pacific joined tracks with a road controlled by the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company. This line extended from Huntington to Portland, and no sooner did the Union Pacific secure trackage over this Oregon road than the directors began to plan to secure control of the road itself.

The Union Pacific faced a shrewd railroad promoter in Henry Villard. Villard was the dominant figure in railroad circles in the Northwest. He was a German and had been sent to America by certain German bondholders interested in the Oregon Steam Navigation Company. This was after the panic of 1873, and by 1879 Villard had formed a company of his own, secured control of the Oregon Steam Navigation and the Oregon Steamship Companies, organized the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company; and

stood ready to block both the Union Pacific and the slowly building Northern Pacific in their efforts to reach tidewater in the Northwest.

Still, Villard feared the Northern Pacific—which seemed ready to ignore him and reach the coast despite his opposition—and he laid his plans to secure control. Backed by a capital of eight million dollars, representing a wide range of investors, Villard gained the ascendancy in Northern Pacific affairs and stood ready to dictate terms to the Union Pacific seeking an outlet through the Pacific Northwest. Ultimately, he leased a road between Huntington, Idaho, and Portland to the Union Pacific, thus giving the company its first tidewater outlet. This was in 1883, the year before Charles Francis Adams became president.

But the Union Pacific had secured only half a loaf or less, for the Northern Pacific was in a position to discriminate against it, and Villard, not on speaking terms with Adams, increased the friction. So the Union Pacific directors decided to attack the Villard interests on the grounds that they had violated the articles of the lease and, as a consequence, violated the laws of the state of Oregon. Primarily, this was Adams' plan, but Dodge advised a more adroit move: he proposed the purchase of the stock of the holding company known as the Oregon Transcontinental and thereby secure ascendancy in the Oregon Navigation Company. Charles Francis Adams was a novice in such jobbing and manipulating, so he wrote Dodge:

"I suppose you understand that, so far as these Wall Street complications are concerned, I consider myself worse than useless. Every man has some sort of an idea of what he can do and of what he can not do. Well, when it comes to handling the intrigues of Wall Street, I am conscious both of a lack of natural capacity and education. On the other hand, although your own education in this direction may

have been neglected, I have confidence in your natural hard sense, courage and directness. Accordingly, I am anxious at this juncture that you should come to Boston and assume charge of operations. I am perfectly willing to follow your lead, to accept orders from you and carry them out to the best of my ability."

But Dodge couldn't go to Boston. He was laid up in New York with an attack of rheumatic gout, so Adams, Sidney Dillon and Fred Ames made a hurried trip to the latter city and suggested action. Dodge advised going quietly to work to buy up the stock of the holding company known as the Oregon and Transcontinental, the leased line of the Union Pacific between Huntington and Portland. This was done and, in due time, Dodge went west to meet Villard to inform him that the Union Pacific held one hundred thousand shares of Oregon and Transcontinental (a four-million-dollar investment), and that his road stood ready to reorganize the board of the leased line. But Villard replied that he still held the majority of stock and that no board could be elected inimical to his interest. Dodge then told him that he had power enough to place the property in the hands of a receiver on the grounds that the contract between the Oregon Navigation Company and the Union Pacific was not being carried out.

Now Henry Villard and General Dodge had kept their friendship intact throughout the four years' squabble, so, after the first outburst, they sat down and talked over the whole situation. Dodge told Villard that, in the final analysis, the Union Pacific would parallel the line of the Oregon and Transcontinental, for it was determined to secure a tidewater outlet. Villard knew this was true; he also knew that his road could be forced into a receiver's hand on account of its violation of the lease made with the Union Pacific; and he was a great enough railroad

executive to know that, in the light of the years, more roads than the Union Pacific would push into a territory that he, hitherto, had dominated. So he surrendered and sold, and the Union Pacific after twenty years of effort reached tide-water. Later, Villard and Dodge went to Mount Tabor "and picked cherries," which was better than throwing stones.

Shortly after the Union Pacific secured control of what is now known as the "Oregon Short Line," Jay Gould began to beat back into its affairs, and much to the alarm of its president, Charles Francis Adams. Dodge, now weary of all railroad burdens, was anxious to go abroad and Adams was just as anxious to keep him home, for he feared Gould and believed that he was out to scalp him, if not to wreck the whole system.

But Dodge sailed for Europe in the autumn of 1890, and on the eve of his going Adams wrote:

"You must take care of yourself and get thoroughly restored, for when you come back you must be prepared to relieve me and take charge of this property. I am not going to carry the burden of the presidency another year and you are the only one who can relieve me of it. It will mean the proper rounding out of your career. I hope you will come back a well man and make me a free one."

Before sailing, Dodge requested General Sherman to give him letters of introduction to certain military leaders in Europe and Sherman did so, but in sending the letters he wrote in a less formal manner and said:

"I received your letter of September 25th and have just written something which I suppose will answer your purpose. You know Robert Lincoln, Whitelaw Reed and Fred Grant, so you will need nothing in the diplomatic line which they will not gladly supply. I have limited my letter to the mili-

tary and have reason to believe that it will be of use to you at any of the English, French, Austrian, Italian and Russian establishments. I do not suppose my credit is as good with the Germans, who seemed so stuck-up at their success over the French. They need taking down. I may have said as much before and it may have reached their ears, for every-where else in Europe I seemed as well known as here at home. Every fort, arsenal, and school were thrown open for my inspection, especially in Great Britain and Russia."

Dodge no sooner sailed than Gould began his drive at the Union Pacific. It seems to have been his aim to "bear" the stock, pick up enough for his purpose and oust Adams from the presidency. Adams had given affront to George Gould in some particular, so the knowing ones declared, and his father was out to make the president of the road suffer. Anyhow, Adams suffered.

Adams appeared wholly at sea while General Dodge was abroad, and in November he sent a strong appeal to Dodge's New York associates to cable him to return to America. "My belief is," Adams wrote, "that it would be prudent for you to cable him that it is desirable for him to return immediately, even if he goes back to Europe by the next steamer."

But Dodge was neither in the mood nor the condition to return to America. He was taking baths and was otherwise under medical treatment. Still, he was not idle, for one of his purposes in going to Europe was to try to allay the fears of certain Dutch capitalists who had invested heavily in Union Pacific stock and, if possible, get the French to invest in its securities.

In a diary note he tells us something of his movements and of his efforts to interest European capital:

"I spent the day in Paris; rode out to the Bois de Boulogne and visited some of the bankers. It is hard to

get the French bankers interested in anything American. They make their clientele, the French people, invest all their money in French securities. . . . I met Victor Nervourtex, who informed me that Whitney, Hoffman and Paine got up the money scare in New York to break down the Administration, but that Windom, Secretary of the Treasury, came to the rescue and prevented it. . . . I failed to accomplish anything in the money line at Paris and left for my baths at Aix-le-Bains."

When word came that Gould had secured control of the Union Pacific, Dodge went to Amsterdam to secure the opinions of the Dutch stockholders, but they seemed non-committal and he was left to interpret their feelings as best he could. Accordingly, he wrote Adams:

"Since I saw the interview Gould gave out, assuming that with Dillon, Rockefeller, Morgan and others, even mentioning Ames, that he had control of the Union Pacific I took means to ascertain how the foreign security holders would act. They say that nothing would take them away from the present management of the road unless the Vanderbilt interest took a hand in control, and if that was against the present management it would divide the vote. When I see how strong the Vanderbilt influence is over here, the more I am disposed to make closer alliance with it. If you can interest them in defending their contracts with us it will add greatly to Union Pacific strength over here, and the reflection will be as great in America."

Dodge returned to London the day before Christmas and found money conditions as bad as in Amsterdam, in so far as the Union Pacific was concerned. European investors, no less than those in America, did not know whether the change meant Gould control or whether there had been other great combinations. Anyhow, on reaching home Dodge learned that Charles Francis Adams had been removed from the presidency.

Gould had caught Adams and the Union Pacific with a large floating debt, depressed the stock, undermined him in every corner, destroyed his borrowing power, and all but destroyed Adams himself. As Adams wrote Dodge:

“Gould rounded me up into his den in the handsomest possible fashion. The alternative was Gould or the receiver. The failure of the house of Barings finished the job. After that he could only call me in. I had no power to resist. What he is now going to do with the property remains to be seen. As you know, my own idea was that you should succeed me. You are the only man who understands the situation and would have carried out the work already begun. The fact is that the Union Pacific is frightfully overloaded. The financial burden piled upon it, first through the old Crédit Mobilier and then through Gould’s manipulations, is more than the property can stand.”

But Gould had plans of his own, and while he and Dodge were friendly, he was determined not to let Adams name the next president of the Union Pacific; accordingly, Sidney Dillon, then in ill health and practically in retirement, was made president of the road—a position that he had held ten years before. But it soon became evident that Jay Gould was at the end of his rope in so far as guiding the destinies of the Union Pacific were concerned. The Southern Pacific and the Santa Fé jockeyed the Union Pacific out of business. Gould’s health failed and the Union Pacific went into the hands of receivers.

When Dodge returned from Europe he met Sherman, who expressed a desire to accompany him in his private car on a tour of the West. Dodge went to his home at Council Bluffs, Iowa, and had been there but a few days when he learned of Sherman’s death. He hurried back east to attend the funeral, acting as a pall-bearer.

Released from railroad duties at home, Dodge decided



Dodge speaking at the dedication of the Sherman Monument, in the building of which Dodge had played a leading part

to go abroad again, and did so in the spring of 1892. He was anxious to make a study of European railroads.

When Dodge reached Paris there was a letter awaiting him from the law firm of John F. Dillon of New York City,—a letter that started him on a journey to Russia to meet certain engineers of that country to discuss a proposed Siberian railroad. The letter is a curious commentary on Romanoff credulity on the one hand and of suspicion on the other. Judge Dillon, who sent the letter, wondered if "there is anything to this matter." Dodge seemed to think there was and, as has been said, started for Russia. Dillon's letter said:

"A friend of mine by the name of Cragg, who lives at the Continental Hotel, Paris, states that a friend of his from St. Petersburg is in Paris. This gentleman is a close friend of the Czar of Russia and holds in his pocket the Czar's concession to build a railroad from St. Petersburg to Siberia, the bonds to be guaranteed by the Russian government, which will promote and aid the undertaking in every way, if undertaken by a practical railroad man. The Czar is determined that no Rothschild shall have any voice or interest in the matter, and prefers to interest Americans. It is said that Winans and other Americans are after this plum. Cragg hoped to interest Mr. Gould in the matter, but you know Mr. Gould is out of the railroad building line. He is still in Colorado, which indicates to my mind that it is not considered safe nor prudent for him to return to this climate at present. If you think there is anything to this matter, call on Mr. Cragg and show him this letter."

Dodge got no farther than Stockholm, for the cholera was raging in Russia. With him were several railroad contractors from the United States, anxious to secure the Russian contracts. But the Russian engineers who met them at Stockholm were too evasive for Dodge, so he advised

his American friends to remain out of the affairs of Russian railroads. Two of them did not and went broke.

In 1892 Dodge became president of the Union Pacific, Denver and Gulf, but the road was in a critical condition and, in keeping with the Union Pacific itself, went into the hands of a receiver the following year. The panic of 1893 swept half the roads of the country to the verge of an abyss. The Union Pacific, with a mileage of nearly nine thousand, seemed ready to disintegrate. A notable group of railroad men were assembled and organized into a committee to head off such a contingency. Dodge was made a member, and he was associated with A. Boissevain, of Holland, who represented European security holders; Samuel Carr, on behalf of the estate of Frederick Ames, recently deceased; Colonel H. L. Higginson, of the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company; General Louis Fitzgerald, of the Mercantile Trust Company; and Senator Brice, who was a member of the Senate Committee on Pacific railroads.

But this group labored in vain, and for two years. Populism had come to succeed the Granger movement, and the Union Pacific tapped Populistic strongholds. Over against any proposition made by this committee on reorganization were a score of proposals by radical leaders, both in Congress and out, to take over the Union Pacific by foreclosure, and the government would operate the line, "as was intended" on behalf of the "people."

With the failure of this reorganization committee, and when the Union Pacific went into the hands of a receiver, Dodge severed his active connection with the railroad. This was the year before the war with Spain.

Dating from his first surveys for a Pacific railroad through the Platte River Valley in 1853 to the close of his work for the Union Pacific in 1897, he had given nearly a half-century to the line of this first great transcontinental

project. He fought for it to be built along the line of the forty-second parallel; he advocated to Lincoln the amendments to the Pacific Railway Act of 1862 that really enabled the builders to go forward in 1864; he built the road from forty miles west of the Missouri River to where it joined tracks with the Central Pacific in Utah; he discovered a pass through the Rockies that enabled and encouraged the promoters to advance with the construction; he fought the road's battles through sixteen different congressional sessions; and he had lived to see it expand from a few miles of rust out on the prairies of Nebraska to a ten-thousand-mile system that was basic in the development of the West. Considered alone, his career with the Union Pacific would give him a sure place among the great railroad builders of all time.

The decade before the war with Spain found General Dodge active in many military organizations that grew out of the Civil War. He became Commander of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion for the State of New York and President of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, and he was kept busy planning reunions, giving addresses and in setting in motion the forces that led to the erection of memorials and monuments. The range of his personal correspondence was amazing; his benefactions, not alone to scores of his old soldiers but to the families of some of the military and political leaders of the Civil War, would create surprise if fully revealed; and he became, at least to them, a symbol of that higher patriotism untinged by chauvinistic swagger and unspoiled by the patronage that often goes with personal success. He rounded out the decade of the 'nineties by acting as Grand Marshal at the dedication of Grant's tomb; and on that April day in 1897, when this tomb first became a shrine for the American people, not many among the thousands who witnessed the military

parade knew the grizzled soldier who directed the long lines of marching men, and only a few understood how close he had been to the great commander whose body was at rest at last under the marble dome above the Hudson.

CHAPTER XIX

OLD WARRIORS AND NEW WARS

IN KEEPING with most Civil War officers, both Federal and Confederate, Dodge was opposed to going to war with Spain, and even after the *Maine* was sunk he was reluctant to heed public clamor that seemed to be a singular mixture of patriotism and retaliation.

He gave expression to his objections in vigorous letters to President McKinley; General Alger, Secretary of War; Adjutant General Corbin; Senator Allison, of Iowa, and to other statesmen and government officials. He felt that the Spanish government did a great deal to avoid the conflict, and that Ambassador Woodford was working toward peace-solutions when war was declared.

In February, 1898, just two months before hostilities began, Dodge went to Washington on the request of President McKinley and discussed the whole military situation. The United States Army was but a skeleton, although Dodge and many Civil War officers—most of whom were dead—had worked from the middle 'seventies to build up an efficient peace-time organization. He advised McKinley to send for General Schofield and the President did so, but this veteran's presence proved so objectionable to General Miles that Schofield soon let down the top of his desk and went home.

The plight of the United States Army was such, and the probability of bettering it through public education seemed

so remote, that there were a few military leaders who considered a war with Spain—provided that there was any justification for it at all—as an opportunity to strengthen both the army and the navy. Alger wrote Dodge something of this sentiment and Dodge replied, "I appreciate fully the opportunity it gives the Army and the Navy to do what should have been done twenty years ago,—that is, to put the country in condition for any emergency, but I do not think that these great military preparations should await wars."

On returning home Dodge wrote McKinley:

"The people who would push the country into war would, as soon as they felt the distress that war brings and saw its cruelty, be the first to denounce your administration for bringing on the conflict. The unthinking who are clamoring for action would hasten to denounce you if you acted as they now demand. . . . I am opposed to war and, under almost any circumstances, would prefer arbitration. This nation can not afford to go to war unless it be to defend its integrity. I fear that a war with Spain would bring other nations against us."

One month later General Dodge was engaged in a lively correspondence with Alger on the issues involved and the motives that seemed to actuate war-groups, both in Cuba and the United States. In a sharp paragraph in one of these letters, Dodge charged that certain business interests in the United States wanted the war. His statement is enough even to make the anti-militarists gasp.

"There is no question," he wrote, "but that the Insurgents over there would accept very nearly what Spain has offered them if it were not for the belief that is kept alive in this country through interested parties, who expect to make money out of the operation, that we are going to interfere for the independence of Cuba." He believed that

the Cubans were incapable of self-government and he also believed that the better classes among them were not in favor of continuing insurgent operations against the Spanish power. He continued:

"The point I wish to make is that our government ought to have it known, so that our people would understand, that we are not proposing to go into Cuba and make war out of charity, or because some of their people are starving, or do not receive all the rights they think they should have from Spain. . . . I know that from the President's acts up till now that nothing will force him to war except to maintain national integrity. That is the reason why I think something should come from him to let those Cubans and speculators know that they can not depend upon him, or this government, to throw this country into the unknown out of charity."

Final letters that passed between Alger and Dodge reveal almost polar beliefs concerning the Cuban Insurgents. Senator Proctor had made his strong analysis of the Cuban situation—one that greatly impressed Alger, but Dodge was skeptical. He not only believed in the incapacity of the Cubans to govern themselves at that time, but he seemed also to have doubted if they would ever be able to do so.

On the other hand, Secretary Alger, accepting the conclusions of Senator Proctor, felt that insurgency in Cuba was by no means confined to the rabble. His letter, written in strict confidence to General Dodge on March 19, 1898, while purely a personal view, is not without general significance.

"My dear General:

"I have your valued letter of the 18th instant. Senator Proctor's statement made a deep impression upon me, for the reason that I have been led to believe that the Cubans

were a lot of guerrillas, incapable of self-government. His statement that bankers, commercial men, business men, merchants, and others, all Cuban born, are in sympathy with Cuba, and that the Spaniards who have come there since they arrived at maturity represent the Spaniards and the Cubans, and that the Cubans in sympathy, in heart and desire, who wish independence, are in a large majority and largely predominate in intelligence, has been to me a revelation.

"The question of stopping those starving people of course appeals to one's heart. I agree with you about the war status in that. I might question calling the Maine disaster simply an incident, and starving people none of our concern except to do what we can in charity for them; yet beyond that is the fact that Spain has been unable to conquer and to bring about peace, and that the vast commerce heretofore carried on between Cuba and this country, and the great amount of investments made in Cuba by Americans, has all been destroyed; and this condition of affairs right on our border is a constant menace, a menace politically and a menace to the stability of our finances. One day we get a report that peace is declared. Values go up millions of dollars; and the next day there are rumors of war, and everything tumbles down. I would rather meet this question and settle it forever now than to postpone it. I dread war as much as you. I saw so much of its ravages, destruction and suffering, that I dread it beyond measure.

"So I say, always believing what has got to be done is best done if done quickly, that there is but one course for us to pursue, and that is to give these people notice as I said to stop the war, or we will intervene. This of course is in strictest confidence to you alone because if it got out it would do the administration great injustice, as I think the President feels more as you feel, a good deal more than as I expressed my feelings; but I have written in frankness and friendship, and told you how the picture looks to me from my standpoint.

"Sincerely your friend,
"R. A. ALGER."

But Dodge, in his reply to Alger's forceful letter, doubted the source of Senator Proctor's information in the hurried trip he had made to Cuba. He declared that the more intelligent of the Cuban Insurgents greatly feared the results that might obtain from forcing the Spanish government to abdicate without the United States government immediately taking its place in the island. In a word, many prominent Cubans feared their own insurgents; mistrusted the irresponsible adventurers who were just as apt to turn on the United States as they had on Spain. According to General Dodge, whose knowledge of the Cubans was by no means limited to a search for materials for a speech, the more outstanding Cubans desired intervention on the part of the United States provided annexation could be guaranteed. But independence—which might take the form of the autonomy of isolated groups of warring factions—was undesirable. So his reply to Alger said:

"My individual interests probably would be aided by war, as they are almost entirely in transportation, but I can not consider this. I am simply looking at it from the standpoint of what we always suffer in a war. My knowledge of Cuba is fair. I have made it my business to ascertain its conditions. To ascertain as much as Senator Proctor seems to have learned in three weeks would have taken me a year. I fear he obtained his information through the English speaking element on the island; through interpreters and people of that class who, being anxious to please him, naturally would talk in the strain which his report indicates. I consider his report as being the most misleading that has been given to the American people."

But it was in a letter to Senator Allison of his own state that General Dodge made a rather singular confession of the necessity of some of the methods being pursued by the Spanish government in its efforts to suppress rebellion,—

methods that Senator Proctor had played up and thereby inflamed the people of the United States. Dodge did not justify the military methods of Spain, but he did contrast them—and not unfavorably—with those of the Federal government in the war between the states. He wrote:

"Senator Proctor lays much stress upon the suffering in Cuba. He forgets what war is. I can see no limit to what a nation may do in war in maintaining its jurisdiction over its own people. We have only to go back to our own war, in which we burned, destroyed, starved and killed to hold our positions. We swept out whole towns and left the inhabitants to take care of themselves. We threw our armies around places and starved them out. There were whole counties in the Confederate lines where the people were starved and driven into our lines by the acts of the Confederates, but this was not a reason for the intervention of other nations, but only the fortunes of war."

"The concentration by Weyler of the families of the men who had gone into the Cuban army was similar to movements that we often made in moving the families of Confederates in our lines through to the lines of the enemy, which was virtual starvation for them. I can see nothing in this that would justify the United States intervening without making a very dangerous precedent for ourselves and without contradicting the position we took in our late war. I have no doubt that the liberal terms that have been offered by Spain to the Insurgents would have been accepted by this time were it not for the belief that we are going to interfere for their independence."

But when war was declared, General Dodge, who was just sixty-seven, offered his services to his state. "Now that war has been declared," he wrote Leslie M. Shaw, Iowa's governor, "I desire to say that my duties are first to my state,—if the war should assume such proportions that my services would be needed."

Others were thinking of the services Dodge might be able to render his country and Senator Allison wrote:

"You will see that the President has called for 125,000 men [volunteers]. This will make probably thirty brigadier-generals and, say, ten major-generals. I have no doubt all our people would gladly ask that you be made one of the latter, if you feel that you would like it. I have said nothing to anyone except Henderson, who agrees with me that I should write you first; so please say nothing to anyone and tell us whether we shall present your name to the President."

But even before Allison wrote, Secretary of War Alger wired Dodge and asked him if he would accept command of a corps. Dodge replied, questioning his physical fitness, at his age, to take the field. He went to Washington and conferred with Allison, Henderson and Gear of Iowa; with Alger and General Corbin, and then with President McKinley. He gave half-hearted assent to their wishes, doubting if he would be able to go into the field. But McKinley made him a major-general of volunteers and said, "I won't accept your resignation, but will hold it and see what develops."

Dodge was never commissioned, holding only the appointment made by the President. Of course there was no need for his service and his physical condition would never have permitted him to undergo a campaign. But he followed, with interest and satisfaction, the career of Civil War officers who became active, especially that of ex-Confederates like Fitzhugh Lee and Jo Wheeler, and he felt that the war with Spain reunited the North and the South as no other issue could have done.

General Dodge, who had always been interested in the military career of Colonel Fred Grant, now busied himself in helping his old commander's son to be promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. Dodge had a great deal of faith in Fred Grant's military ability,—belief that was not shared by many military groups. He wrote President

McKinley and said that Fred Grant had "many of the qualities of the soldier that his father had possessed."

Strong opposition to Colonel Fred Grant being advanced to the rank of brigadier-general rose in certain quarters, and then Ida Grant, his wife, took a hand. She wrote General Dodge a most appealing letter, urging him to dine with her and with Julia D. Grant at their New York residence and discuss Fred Grant's military affairs. She regretted that she was compelled to intrude upon the General's valuable time, but she assured him that she had an important message for him from her husband. She spoke of the old friendships; of the deep interest Dodge had always manifested in Fred Grant; and of how well he was doing in every responsibility. And then she could not forbear to add that his course was noble, yet quite like his dear dead father's.

Dodge was deeply touched by her appeal and he set about to overcome deep-seated prejudice and jealousy in certain military quarters against any and all things that Fred Grant might do or desire to do. It wounded Dodge to learn that the son of his old commander was being made the victim of petty spite and that there was a new military generation that knew not the child of the hero of Appomattox. Here is an unwritten page of the acts of mischievous politicians, augmented by the ulterior motives of a powerful military clique, to prevent Fred Grant from securing recognition.

Whatever else Fred Grant may have been able to do there was one thing he seemed utterly powerless to achieve—to make a good impression on others by pleading his own case. As Dodge said in an appeal to Senator Allison, "Fred Grant, somehow, seems to put his worst foot forward." Dodge went on to say that Grant had plenty of military ability; that his range of military knowledge was wide; that

he knew the island of Cuba by heart, and not to advance him would be short-sightedness, bordering imbecility. But all Fred Grant could do for himself was to address a short note to General Dodge and modestly say, "I fear I may be forgotten amidst the great procession at Washington."

Not so Ida H. Grant. She believed in her husband; in his military ability; and she saw with great clearness that her husband was more handicapped, in this particular, by being the son of U. S. Grant than if he had come of an unknown family.

Fred Grant was made a brigadier-general, thanks to Dodge, Allison, Platt and Senator Elkins, and Ida Grant would have been happy but for the seeming military exigencies that kept her husband's command at Camp Thomas when several other—and perhaps lesser trained—units went to Cuba.

Fred Grant's wife believed that her husband was being discriminated against in the order that left his command at Camp Thomas during the first invasion of Cuba, so she once again carried her troubles to General Dodge. It was a pathetic little letter that she wrote,—one that declared Fred Grant would be broken-hearted if left at camp. Then she launched into a spirited defense of her husband's military abilities and declared that he was really gifted in military art; that he was so born, and that he would reflect credit upon his country's cause if given an opportunity.

She appealed to General Dodge to set forces in motion at Washington to prevent her husband's command from being left behind, for fifteen other regiments had been ordered to go south. She had unbounded confidence in Dodge to transcend most any difficulty on the score of military matters, and she had faith that his influence at Washington was greater than that of any other Civil War veteran. Even after the close of the war with Spain, when

Fred Grant wanted to become a brigadier-general in the regular army, his wife went straight to Dodge and enlisted his sympathies. Twelve years later, at a meeting of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee in Dodge's home town, Major-General Frederick Grant spoke freely and with deep feeling of the services General Dodge rendered the Grant family in the quarter-century following the Civil War.

Julia Dent Grant, in her declining days, wrote but little, but among General Dodge's cherished possessions was a letter received from her during the war with Spain,—a letter that expressed her appreciation for his efforts to hasten the work of the contractors in placing a second sarcophagus in the Grant tomb above the Hudson.

“My dear General Dodge:

“Your letter informing me that the second sarcophagus had been shipped and would soon be placed does indeed give me great peace of mind, knowing as I now do that when the General calls me my couch will be ready by his side.

“JULIA D. GRANT.”

Shortly after the war with Spain, Dodge dined with Julia D. Grant, who told him of an incident that transpired at the tomb of General Grant that is not without its dramatic side. Accompanied by her daughter-in-law, Ida Grant, she went to the tomb with flowers and finally asked the keeper if she might be alone for a short time at her husband's side. All the visitors were quickly dismissed and the wife of the great commander was alone with her sainted dead.

When Julia Grant left the tomb an aged woman went to her and embraced her. Mrs. Grant drew back, embarrassed, and was about to pass on when the other said:

“I am the wife of Jefferson Davis, and I and other members of my family, often come here.”

There was a moment's silence and then Julia Grant placed her arm around the trembling form of the widow of the president of the Southern Confederacy and the two women, now with a common sorrow, went slowly down the steps of the great gray tomb above the Hudson.

At the close of the war with Spain, Dodge was made president of a commission of twelve men to investigate the conduct of the War Department. The other members of the committee were: Colonel James A. Sexton, Illinois; Colonel Charles Denby, Indiana; Captain Evan P. Howell, Georgia; ex-Governor Urban A. Woodbury, Vermont; General James A. Beaver, Pennsylvania; Brigadier-General John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers, U. S. A.; Major-General Alexander McCook, U. S. A.; Dr. Phineas S. Conner, Ohio; Richard Weightman, Secretary; Lieutenant Colonel F. B. Jones, Chief Quartermaster of Volunteers, Disbursing Officers; and Major Stephen C. Mills, Recorder.

General Dodge was reluctant to accept a place upon this commission. He was in a position very much like that of a man about to be selected for jury service but who had talked beforehand, for he had expressed himself quite freely throughout the war, defending the War Department against all popular outcries. So he wrote the President and frankly said:

“I fear that I have placed myself on record against all these criticisms, or the greater part of them, so as to prohibit me from serving upon the commission. No matter how impartial I should be this record might be used to discredit the findings of the commission and to provoke criticism of your appointment.”

But President McKinley insisted and General Dodge finally consented to serve, although the very criticisms he feared, owing to his pre-commission statements, became

realities during the progress of the investigation. For example, General Sherman's son, P. T. Sherman, a warm friend of General Dodge, wrote several months after the Commission had been at work, expressing deep regret that General Dodge had ever accepted a position on it and warning him against any whitewash. Father Sherman wrote that if the commission should happen to make a favorable report on Camp Wikoff at Montauk Point, it would be so much opposed to the truth that he would "join with others and endeavor to have the truth disclosed."

But when Sherman read the Commission's report concerning this particular camp, which had been established hastily as a place of rest and recuperation for thousands of soldiers from Cuba, he seems to have modified his views; for the first detachment of these troops was hurried up from Cuba before the camp could be well established, and confusion and sickness were inevitable. Still, he thought that the Commission's report as a whole was too extenuating and he made free to express his opinion in a letter to General Dodge:

"I do not think that you arrived at the truth, due to the innate difficulties of the situation, and to the conduct and bias of some of your fellow commissioners. I have seen and talked with many of my friends in the army and all of them—particularly the company officers—feel very bitter towards your commission. I do not believe that there was any personal corruption in the War Department during the war; but I do believe that there was an abundance of politics. I believe that politics controlled all appointments and all assignments to command; that politics controlled the selection of the camp sites, the contracts with the railroads, and the contracts for supplies. This belief is universal and I believe that the position of the Commanding General is attacked because he is a bulwark against such methods to the extent of his power. The true remedy is to return to



Courtesy Iowa Historical Memorial and Art Department, Des Moines, Iowa

Commission to investigate the conduct of war with Spain

*Standing, from left, Phineas L. Conner, General James A. Breana, Captain Even R. Howell
Sitting, in left, John A. Wilson, Colonel Charles Danby, General Dodge, Major General Alexander McCook*

him the power that General Schofield surrendered, and fought hard, during the latter part of his term, to regain."

General Dodge replied in a frank and friendly letter to Sherman:

"Dear Cumph:

"I am in receipt of your letter and note your criticisms. They, of course, give your opinion without having a very large knowledge of the facts in the case. I think when you get at the evidence and read the facts you will change your mind. I will be glad to discuss the question with you at any time and answer any questions in relation to the matter you have in your mind. I have no fear of the future on the report. We gave nearly five months hard work to it, and I think we were competent to find a verdict in accordance with the facts."

Basically, all the controversy about poor food, lack of sanitation, war contracts and care of troops came out of the country's unpreparedness, at least General Dodge thought so and said so. The Commission, composed of veterans of the Civil War, could reach no other conclusion. Dodge thus gave his opinion which was followed by loud and skeptical guffaws from the places where one might reasonably expect them to issue.

The "Dodge Commission," as it was popularly known, had been in session three months before General Miles made any public charges that refrigerated beef, chemically treated, had been supplied to the army and was basic in wide-spread sickness. Commissary-General Egan, a Civil War veteran, made his reply to Miles on a day when General Dodge, because of illness, was absent. General Dodge once declared that if he had been present and presiding he would not have permitted Egan's personal abuse of Miles, although Dodge considered the commanding general to be characterized by ulterior motives, chiefly political, as will be shown.

But on hearing of Miles' charges, he rose from a bed of sickness, went to the War Department and requested that specimens of all meats being used by the army be chemically analyzed. This was done and the findings were unanimous that no beef supplied to the army had been chemically treated.

"This attack is not on beef; it is on the administration," Dodge wrote General Boynton of the War Department. "I think some one should go to the President." But McKinley did not wait for some one to come to him; he sent for General Dodge and told him that if the Commission would file a report against General Miles he would be relieved of his command. Dodge strongly advised against such a course and told the President that a group of political aspirants in the background hoped to goad him into this very act. General Boynton, in replying to General Dodge, said:

"The attempt of General Miles' attorney to drop Mr. Hanna into beef contracts is a very clear indication of what we have seen for some time, namely, that this whole business is an attack, not on the War Department, but on the President."

On April 1, 1899, the political aspects of the whole controversy had become so pronounced that General Dodge wrote Boynton:

"There is a good deal of talk here [New York] about the statements made in the papers that Croker's candidates for president and vice-president are Miles and Van Wyck. Such statements explain a great many things to many people that they did not understand before, but it is still beyond their comprehension to conceive that the commanding general of the army should make these attacks without any real basis for them. It is an unheard-of thing, as you know, for such attacks to emanate from the army, as its officers have

such high standards and are careful never to make a statement they can not prove. For this reason very strong refutation will be required to make the people believe that the charges are not true. When the truth comes out—as it will—it may be too late to overcome the sentiment now being created; besides, you can not explain to the people the necessity of making charges and having court martials as the regulations require."

At this juncture a portion of the press launched a systematic attack upon General Alger, Secretary of War. *The New York Herald* led the way. Alger was greatly agitated and would have resigned from the Cabinet but for the manner in which the newspaper overplayed its hand. The McKinley administration had reason to believe that *The Herald* was attempting to force Alger from the Cabinet and would name its own man. General Boynton practically made this charge in a letter to Dodge on April sixteenth:

"Your letters have, I am sure, been of great consequence. All have been read by Colonel Davis and, I think, by all members of the Court of Inquiry. The last one I showed General Corbin came back with the indorsement 'read by the President.' Yesterday I gave it to Secretary Alger. I suppose you saw his statement yesterday in *The New York Sun*. You'll be interested to know that soon after the attack upon Alger became hot, James Gordon Bennett caused the President to understand that the attack of *The Herald* would stop if Alger was put out and the man *The Herald* would name put in. This man proved to be Horace Porter. This will explain all that you have seen about Porter going into the cabinet. I take it that the President is not a man to surrender to Bennett in the rôle of a road agent, and this is not private."

When the Probosco Letters began to appear in *The New York Sun*, drastic in their charges against the War Department on the letting of contracts, the McKinley ad-

ministration seemed on the run, for there was strong evidence that a certain individual had attempted to "black-mail contracts" that had been let by General Miles, demanding twenty-six thousand five hundred dollars, or ten per cent. of two hundred and sixty-five thousand dollars paid to a Pittsburgh firm for gun carriages. But when the Court of Inquiry gave its decision censuring General Miles and, at the same time, sustaining the Dodge Commission in most of its findings, those in Miles' background beat a precipitant retreat. Just before Alger retired as Secretary of War to be succeeded by Root, Dodge, becoming anxious over the fate of the report of the Commission on the conduct of the war with Spain, wrote General Boynton:

"If you have an opportunity I wish you would talk with the Secretary of War and tell me the real secret of not printing any of our evidence, reports and documents. We were just getting ready to print 5,000 copies, which the President and I had agreed upon. I know there is some reason outside of the expense, but have no way of getting it unless you or somebody can give it to me confidentially. I have an idea that it may be because of foreign complications."

General Dodge does not state where he received his idea that the report of the Commission was being kept out of print on account of "foreign complications," but Boynton's reply made it clear that the government had wind of something. He said, "The only reason I have heard assigned for stopping the issue of the testimony of your Commission was that Germany was waiting for the official publication, so that portions of it could be used to help shut out our beef by aiding in the passage of restrictive laws." But Major Stephen C. Mills, Recorder of the Commission, wrote Dodge even more frankly:

"The report is not to be printed for the present. I saw the Secretary [Alger] after a cabinet meeting and he told me that the expense was too great to print at present. But the real reason seems to be that Germany wants the testimony in regard to the meat. I told the Secretary that the best thing to do was to send Germany a supply of the entire proceedings. It is the best vindication of American meat I know of. I see the papers are after stopping the printing."

Throughout the controversy that involved nearly all of the departments of the government, General Dodge, after the investigation of the Commission, stoutly defended its findings, which involved him in a defense of the McKinley administration as a whole. In a final communication to the President, he said:

"Seven months of continuous investigation, so far as I can see, has found nothing against the administration of the War Department, except mistakes that occur in every war, but it has received a system of attack that has been so destructive to the army that it will take years to put it on its feet again. Every commanding officer in the field has, upon the stand, stated that he had no knowledge of the state of affairs as charged by the commanding general [Miles] of the army. This seems impossible to an old soldier. It certainly could not have occurred in the Civil War and, I take it, that at the time the evils were said to occur they were considered slight and of no importance. But they have been built up into importance by continued misrepresentation, not so much against the army or its food, nor yet on behalf of the soldiers, but simply to discredit the administration because of its general policy."

The report of the Dodge Commission on the conduct of the war with Spain became basic in the Miles Court of Inquiry and was the most telling factor against the commanding general. Miles had made many charges and now in turn,

which he might have anticipated, was charged with unbecoming military conduct because of his sweeping denunciations and his proneness to rush into print with his views. The report was comprehensive and conclusive, and Miles could not escape its evidence. Made as it was by eight veterans of the Civil War, any of whom might have taken pride in attempting to demonstrate the superiority of a past war administration over a present one, they summed up their findings in a paragraph of strength and restraint:

"In concluding its labors it is with much pleasure that the Commission reports that notwithstanding the haste with which the nation entered upon the war with Spain, the resulting and almost inevitable confusion in bureau and camp, the many difficulties of arming, assembling, and transporting large bodies of hitherto untrained men, the carrying on of active operations in two hemispheres, the people of the United States should ever be proud of its soldiers, who, cooperating with its sailors, in less than three months put an end to Spanish colonial power, enfranchised oppressed people, and taught the world at large the strength and the nobility of a great Republic."

CHAPTER XX

A LINCOLN REPUBLICAN AND ROOSEVELT

ON ONE of many yellow cliffs that lift above the flood-plain of the Missouri River at Council Bluffs stands the commodious house that General Dodge completed the year the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific joined tracks in Utah; and it was to this old residence that Dodge was about to return to spend the final decade of his life.

Perhaps no house west of the Mississippi River has a social background more interwoven with western railroad history than this old brick mansion with its architecture reminiscent of the decade that followed the Civil War, and its furnishing a page out of a past that is all but forgotten. The library looks out over a network of the tracks of eight trunk lines of railroad that wind around the yellow cliffs and point to the long-disputed terminal territory down on the Missouri bottoms. But when General Dodge purchased the abrupt hill on which this house stands, none of the roads from the East had reached the town, and when he moved into his new residence only three of the lines—little more than streaks of rust across the prairies of Iowa—had crept to the Missouri River.

But the military and the political background of this house is equally as colorful, for to it came the great captains of the Civil War and four men who became President of the United States. On the walls of the library hang pictures

of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and Rawlins, all of whom broke bread with Dodge under this roof and sat before the open fire and discussed the past of war and the future of the Union Pacific Railroad. And there are pictures of McKinley, Taft and Roosevelt, but none has a more prominent place than that of the man who finally came to head the Bull Moose Party and separate himself from so many old-line Republicans.

Dodge and Roosevelt kept intact their friendship through all of the upheavals of the Republican Party, for the spirit of toleration in the former was strong. Dodge's criticism of public men was always guarded, and even in his widest disagreements, he never allowed himself to question motives and call names. But it must not be thought that he lived impervious to the new moods of the Republican Party, nor should it be imagined that he was out of step with the new generation of industrial progress through great social changes.

The final decade of General Dodge's life, instead of being reminiscent and querulous, was active and even aggressive. He was anxious to have a part in the digging of the Panama Canal, and Roosevelt told him that if he were ten years younger he would give him the job. He was in the forefront of the battles on behalf of the railroads, and in opposition to the belligerent mood that characterized Congress in the opening years of the new century.

At the close of the war with Spain, General Dodge and Sir William Van Horne, president of the Canadian Pacific, set forces in motion to build railroads in Cuba. They planned to construct a line from Havana to Santiago, and they believed that the United States government would be sufficiently interested to bestow land grants and a charter. But Senator Foraker blocked the way, convincing both the President and Congress that the usual ills growing out of

land grants and charters for railroads—ills that had befallen the United States—would now descend upon Cuba.

But Sir William Van Horne, on a visit to Cuba, discovered that, under an old Spanish law, most any one could build a private railroad. On his return to the United States he asked Dodge if he was willing to run such a risk, and Dodge told him that it all depended upon the capitalists they hoped to interest.

Before the United States' occupancy of Cuba, concessions to private parties to build railroads had been dealt out with a free hand by one Señor Dolz, minister of public works. A Spaniard by the name of Casteneada secured three of these concessions and sold them to an English group that already owned a number of short lines in the island, under the company name of the Central Railway of Cuba.

Señor Casteneada, acting on behalf of the English interests, attempted to block Van Horne and Dodge, and a resolution was presented to the Cuba Constitutional Convention protesting against the American railroad builders. But Casteneada proved a child in the hands of railroad promoters and builders like Dodge and Van Horne, and the English group had to be content with stiff competition.

Every foot of the right of way of the railroad Dodge and Van Horne built across the Island of Cuba had to be obtained in fee simple. Any property owner could have nearly ruined the whole project by refusing to deed his land. But in spite of these handicaps Dodge and Van Horne organized the Cuba Railroad Company, built rapidly, and, by the beginning of 1903, their road reached from Santa Clara to Santiago, and was in operation. It had cost close to ten million dollars and promised to be one of the best investments of Dodge's whole career. By 1906 he had planned to construct an additional five hundred miles, but the Cuban insurrection forced him to change his plans. This

was the end of his active railroad building, rounding out fifty-four years of daring and initiative.

The relations of Roosevelt, Root and Dodge, beginning at the time of McKinley's assassination and continuing down to the year of General Dodge's death, hold deep interest for the student of politics from 1901 to 1915.

Secretary Root, who had succeeded Alger in McKinley's Cabinet, had been acquainted with Dodge several years, but now they drew closer together. On the death of McKinley, General Dodge wrote and he replied immediately. In this exchange of letters, touching political, social and military problems, there is a prophecy of a deepening friendship. Dodge wrote:

"Freedom seems to be an expensive luxury at the price the American people pay for it. The most despotic rulers of the world are safer than our presidents. I trust some law will be passed that will prohibit the preaching of the doctrines so openly proclaimed by anarchists in this country. . . . Roosevelt has had such an extended and varied experience in all parts of the country, west as well as east, that he is well-equipped to administer this high office. His few words upon taking the oath show that he has grasped the situation."

Secretary Root replied:

"I, too, think we should have legislation to exclude and expel persons professing anarchistic doctrines. I have taken the liberty to send your letter to President Roosevelt. I am sure it will gratify him. I have great confidence in his making a safe and conservative president."

But in a letter to General Horace Porter, Ambassador to France, Dodge betrays the fact that he warmed rather slowly to the opening months of the Roosevelt administration:

"We feel the loss of McKinley in many directions. I think Roosevelt is doing fairly well. When he gets a little more experience and comes a little more in contact with that negative crowd, the United States Senate, I think he will settle into his harness. He is endeavoring to do two good things. One is to get back the old discipline in the army. He sat down on Miles very heavily. The other is the Sampson and Schley affair. He will settle this dispute, too."

But by the beginning of 1903 Roosevelt is seen to be confiding in General Dodge, and his letters to the railroad builder indicate friendship and trust. In one written from Cinnabar, Montana, dated April 22, 1903, Roosevelt says:

"My dear General:

"I thank you most heartily for your letter. Now, I can not answer it off hand. I do not intend to speak, save generally, on the financial question because I am not clear on what to say, and I have endeavored to say nothing where I was not perfectly sure of my ground. Take the tariff speech, about which you speak so kindly,—it not merely presented my carefully thought out views, but those of men as diverse in feeling as Hanna, Spooner, Aldrich and Allison. In financial measures I do not want to find that I am asking for something which the leaders of the party in Congress violently oppose, unless of course, it is necessary. I regret now that I did not get you on to Washington and talk over the financial situation with you and with a dozen of the leading Senators and Congressmen. I should not like to commit myself to details, for instance, until I found how far the next Speaker of the House, Cannon, would go with me. The Senate seems to be red hot for the Aldrich bill. I wish to see you as soon as I get back."

When the question of negro suffrage promised to become acute in the forepart of Roosevelt's administration, General Dodge wrote the President and urged him to take a decided stand in favor of equality of franchise throughout the South:

"It must be evident to the people of the South that the Democratic party in the North is as much against them on this question as is the Republican party. I think the South would take kindly to advice coming from you. There is no question of social equality involved, but simply equality of opportunity. Perhaps you could be more effective in talking to the South's senators and members of Congress than in a formal message.

"But it seems to me that it is along these lines that the Republican party should work rather than along the lines of reducing representation. It is evident from the feeling throughout the North that if the South does not take kindly, friendly suggestions on this problem that more drastic measures are apt to be adopted."

President Roosevelt replied at once, and his letter betrays his uncertainty in dealing with the problem.

"My dear General Dodge:

"Many thanks for your letter. I am greatly puzzled to know what to say about the South, and as to when and where to say it. I would like, if I could, to make it evident to the South that I have the welfare of the Southern white man as close to my heart as the welfare of the Northern white man, and that I shall do everything to promote that welfare save to do injustice to the black man. I agree with you that the way is not to reduce their representation, because while this would remedy the wrong now done to the Northern white man, it would do no good whatever to the negro. I wish to emphasize that we are not fighting for social equality, and that we do not believe in miscegenation; but that we do believe in equality of opportunity—in equality before the law.

"Now, whether to say this in my message or in private talks, or whether to say it in an address to a Southern audience, is a matter which I find it difficult to determine. I also find it difficult to strike the happy mean in addressing these people; that is, to speak in a way that will not irritate them, and at the same time not to show weakness in abandon-

ing my principles. I am fussing away at the thing, and will try to work it out.

"Faithfully yours,
"THEODORE ROOSEVELT."

Dodge, being very much in earnest about the question, decided to carry the issue straight to Clark Howell, editor of *The Atlanta Constitution*. Howell's father, Captain E. P. Howell, a Confederate officer, had served with Dodge on the Spanish American War Commission, and each thought highly of the other. In a lengthy communication to the editor of *The Constitution*, Dodge urged him to take a decided stand in favor of negro suffrage. He told Howell that a changed attitude on the part of the South toward negro suffrage would wipe out the last vestige of sectionalism:

"Nobody would have any objection to the legal restrictions you might put upon negro suffrage provided that both white and black be treated alike. The feeling among most northern business men is hopeful that the South will prosper, build up and take a greater part in the affairs of the Federal government. In my opinion all that is necessary to bring the South into full accord and wipe out all sectionalism is to eliminate from the laws of all states the parts that are admitted to discriminate against the negro."

Howell replied in a friendly note that paved the way for a conference with Roosevelt. "Your suggestions meet my full approval," he wrote. "We have already discussed the matter referred to on the line you propose and the effect has already been apparent." Howell further stated that he expected to be in New York within two weeks and promised to call on General Dodge "and go over the whole matter in person."

Dodge moved at once to bring Roosevelt and Howell

together. But Roosevelt balked a little. On December 3, 1904, he expressed his feelings to General Dodge in a characteristic letter:

"My dear General:

"I have your letter of the 24th. I would rather you did not show my letter to Howell, because he would construe an expression of a present intention on my part into a promise. My view is that it is not now wise, and that it will not now serve a good end, to try to reduce the suffrage in the South; but what future conditions, brought about by the South's attitude, will require, nobody can foretell.

"Could you not bring Mr. Howell on here and let me have with him and you together a frank talk? He has not treated me well in his paper, and I would a little rather not have him at dinner. So I will get you to take some meal alone with me, either before or after the time when I get you and him to call on me together.

"Faithfully yours,
"THEODORE ROOSEVELT."

Dodge never revealed whether this particular conference was held or not, but Roosevelt's final note does betray his frame of mind toward Howell.

In 1905 Dodge became interested in the possibilities of building railroads in South America, or perhaps it would be more nearly correct to say that there was renewed interest on his part in such a project. A Pan-American railway, extending from the southwestern part of the United States, through Mexico and on into the heart of South America, had been advocated by Jay Gould and Russell Sage in the early 'seventies, and Dodge and General Grant agreed to assist. Grant was to secure Mexican concessions and then try to influence the President of Mexico to participate in the enterprise, obtaining the right of way through South American countries. Dodge was to become chief engineer and build the road with as many of his old Union Pacific and

Texas and Pacific heads as he could secure. Grant's failure and his declining health halted the initial step of the project and everything else went by default.

Interest in railroad building in South America revived during Roosevelt's administration on account of a conference Secretary Root had with Andrew Carnegie and other capitalists. In the summer of 1905 Root planned a South American trip and Dodge wrote:

"I see you are going to South America in July, and I suggest that you look into this matter of building railroads. I know you could bring about concessions that would induce capital to take hold. We would not only need concession;—we would need neutrality. The building of a road would not be a difficult matter, and the whole line could be constructed within five years."

Whatever part Dodge was to have played in the scheme of a Pan-American railroad came to an end when his physicians, in 1906, told him that he was threatened with an organic disease and that he should retire from active business life. For the first time in his long career he heeded the warnings, and within three months he resigned from the board of directors of four different railroads and made his preparations to return to his old home at Council Bluffs.

A few weeks before he returned to Iowa he wrote Roosevelt and urged that something be done to prevent the Cuban Insurrection from destroying "the last vestige of property of United States investors." His early disbelief in the capacity of Cubans to govern themselves seemed ready of confirmation. The railroad owned by Sir William Van Horne and himself had fallen on evil days, and the Canadian appealed to Dodge to urge Roosevelt to take a hand.

Unfortunately, Van Horne had said something that did not suit Roosevelt's fancy, so when Dodge approached him

he was full of fight. In a vigorous letter Roosevelt took occasion to defend his whole Cuban policy, investors or no investors, and it is far too illuminating not to be published in full.

"My dear General:

"Sir William Van Horne and Mr. Manduley are utterly in error in their advice; although it is most natural that they should give such advice. Sir William, however, furnishes the refutation for his own request when he says the Island is perfectly adapted to guerrilla warfare and that something like ten men to one would be required to suppress an insurrection and a great many lives would be lost in doing it. I think his figures are exaggerated; but surely he ought to see that when he himself emphasizes the difficulty of the task, I can not possibly—having due regard for the interests of my own country—go lightly into it.

"The talk about encouraging the insurrectionists has no bearing upon my action taken through Mr. Taft. I stood straight by Palma until Palma refused to stand by himself. I did not send Taft to Cuba until Palma had telegraphed us that his decision to resign was irrevocable and that neither the Vice-President, the members of his Cabinet nor a majority of the Congress would continue in office, and that chaos was therefore about to come.

"In my judgment this country would not support a proposition now to take possession of Cuba and hold it by war, which is what Sir William proposes. He seems to be ignorant even of the fact that I can not as a permanent policy do what he says without Congress; and already such influential members of the Foreign Affairs Committee as Foraker and Hale have written me protesting emphatically in advance against the very course that Sir William advises, while Lodge, one of the most advanced members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, has written earnestly hoping that we may carry out just the policy which as a matter of fact I have inaugurated. In other words, we are bound in good faith to make one more effort to let the Cubans govern themselves.

"If there is further failure, then I believe we should have nearly the whole country back of us in taking possession of the Island and restoring order; whereas now there would be a very large number of men, perhaps a majority, who would believe that we had acted hastily and without justification.

"Sincerely yours,
"THEODORE ROOSEVELT."

When Sir William Van Horne was shown Roosevelt's letter he expressed great surprise that his own position had "been so widely misconstrued." Both he and Dodge felt that Roosevelt, for the first time in his career, was hesitant about doing something that needed to be done. Neither desired the United States government to assume permanent control of Cuban affairs, but to take a hand and stabilize one faction or the other. Of course they had to accept Roosevelt's position as conclusive, but they believed that it was unfortunate and short-sighted.

Van Horne, who had spent considerable time in Cuba, declared that the trouble-makers were the idlers, and he also pointed out in a singular letter to Dodge that the insurrection had really begun during "the rainy season when there was not much to do, otherwise it might not have occurred at all."

General Dodge always deplored the attacks made on the Roosevelt administration in the building of the Panama Canal. He compared the attacks with those made on the building of the Union Pacific Railroad forty years before, and he warned Roosevelt that there would be no cessation of the criticisms until the work stood completed. But he complimented the administration upon the vigorous manner in which replies were made to all strictures. "This is one thing we failed to do on the Union Pacific in the beginning. We did not consider the charges of enough importance and

let them drift along until they became fixed in the minds of the people," he wrote. Finally, he reviewed the old troubles in the building of the first great transcontinental railroad thus:

"Every disappointed applicant for position, every discharged engineer and workman, and every disappointed contractor knew that they could air their grievances, get the papers to take them up, and get Congress to consider them. Committee after committee was authorized to investigate the road, and without any exception they reported against the charges and in favor of the way the road was being built. I have no doubt but that the Panama Canal will have to pass through the same experience and I have no doubt but that it will come out in the same way."

President Roosevelt replied to this letter and he did not mince words:

"My dear General:

"I thank you for your letter. What you say is absolutely true. There are a few sentences that I wish I could have published as coming from you, and I suppose you prefer not. The obstacles to the speedy work of the canal are to be found in papers like *The New York Independent*, *The New York Times*, *The New York World*, *The New York Herald*, and the Senators and members of the House who greedily snap at repeated lies of these unscrupulous papers. As soon as we get the type of canal fixed we shall let sections of the work by contract, and I am trying to make it as nearly under one head as possible.

"Sincerely yours,
"THEODORE ROOSEVELT."

When General Dodge returned to Council Bluffs, he surrendered many business duties but he did not lose interest in world affairs. In the next four years he watched with deep concern Roosevelt's increasing liberalism in politics and

wondered where it would lead. He felt that the former president was going rather far afield, but his admiration for him and his belief in him were too great to admit of any disloyalty. And even when Roosevelt began to advocate the control of transportation corporations by the Federal government, instead of by the separate states where those corporations might be doing business, Dodge thought it to be a wise move. The impact of Roosevelt's personality and ideas proved to be an irresistible combination, and in 1910 General Dodge is found writing the former President and saying:

"I have been thinking a good deal about your theory for the control of corporations by the Federal government, and I am heartily in favor of it. The fact is, the consolidation going on in the country, both in the transportation and the industrial companies, has resulted in their business becoming so inter-state that State regulations hardly affect them. It is an impossibility for corporations, whose business takes them to the different States, to comply with State regulations and, at the same time, comply with Federal regulations. I feel that the transportation people generally are favorable to Federal control as against State control. The fact is, the railroad people have changed their views since you first took up the questions of rebates and control."

In replying to this letter Roosevelt stated that he was in entire agreement with the sentiments General Dodge expressed, and added, "The National government must take charge of the railways, and it must be as scrupulous in giving justice to the railways as in exacting justice from them."

But while General Dodge thought it would be wise to have Federal regulation of the railroads instead of state regulation, he did not confuse this with government ownership as did many of his associates of more than a quarter-century ago. Two years after this correspondence with

Roosevelt, General Dodge, in a letter to General E. F. Winslow, Ambassador to France, stated that he thought the former President had gone too far and that he was "drifting into a mild form of Socialism." At any rate, Dodge believed that between 1908 and 1912 Roosevelt's views underwent drastic changes.

Dodge became greatly perturbed when a contest between Roosevelt and Taft seemed inevitable, and he did what he could to help the Republican Party avoid it. He felt that Roosevelt was making a mistake, but he could not forget how the former President had fought with him on behalf of the railroads and the army—two problems ever dear to Dodge's heart. He was not sure that Taft had acted wisely when he allowed Attorney-General Dickinson, in the government's suit against the steel trust, to reflect upon Roosevelt's sanction in the purchase of the Tennessee Iron and Coal Company. Dodge, in writing an old friend on the Roosevelt debacle, could not forbear to say:

"We who were in the panic know that Roosevelt saved us. There is no telling how far that panic would have reached if he had not given the United States Steel Company permission to buy the Tennessee property, and no matter whether it was right or wrong it should have been sustained by the following administration. Both Taft and Roosevelt are friends of mine and I hate to see this contest. Both are strong men and the country is safe with either of them."

Finally, Dodge wrote Elihu Root and asked him point-blank if there had been anything fundamentally wrong in the Chicago convention that proved Roosevelt's undoing. Root replied:

"Most of the cases appeared clearly to be decided right, and as to the others, they certainly were fair subjects for

honest differences of opinion. Upon the best information I could get, both by asking questions and listening to arguments, there was no foundation for the charge."

This personal statement from Root, as touching the question of stolen delegates in the Chicago convention, may not prove conclusive for any who wish to believe otherwise, but it holds interest for those who have always believed that Root did not have to ask questions and listen to arguments in order to know when and where irregularities took place.

Dodge's correspondence with Ambassador Winslow, nearly four years prior to the beginning of the World War, forms an interesting prelude to the struggle itself, for Winslow saw with clear eyes and tried to cause others to see. As early as 1910 he wrote:

"When we see Germany, not only preparing for an increase of its already immense army, but preparing as well for the mastery of the seas, there must be something behind the plans. The first German Dreadnaughts were not built to cross the ocean. The working details of putting on ship-board at four different places, at one and the same time, four army corps complete, or 52,000 men, 130 guns, and 13,000 horses, are completed. We can but wonder what is the intention of Germany and where such bodies of men are to be landed and used. The docks are ready; the ships exist. I guess these four army corps would be hard to resist *en surprise*."

In reply, Dodge stated that, while he had attended the maneuvers of the German army a few years before, he did not realize that it was possible for them to ship such a force on so short notice, and he wondered if England could be the German objective. Winslow told him that he believed it was Germany's intention to strike England, and that England slept in fancied security.

Ten months before the storm broke, Ambassador Winslow wrote again a long letter to General Dodge, stating in detail the political, social and military situation in Europe and especially in the Balkans. He predicted war within a few months and said that England would not be ready. Winslow desired that his letters be treated confidentially and Dodge complied with his request. He felt that Winslow wouldn't be believed anyhow; moreover, he could hardly credit the startling revelations the Ambassador made.

Dodge, as a consequence of his correspondence with Ambassador Winslow, was not surprised, as were most Americans, when the World War began. But he looked upon it as needless, without any worthy object, and he designated it "a great crime." He did not believe that it would "make the world safe for democracy," nor did he believe it was a war that would end wars. In response to an Iowa editor, who had asked him for some statement on the strategy and the probable results of the conflict, he replied, "I am so absolutely opposed to war, and as I can see no reason for this one, I have not tried to follow it."

But the last letter he ever wrote to Roosevelt, and the reply he received, touched on the world conflict. He had sent Roosevelt his pamphlet on *How We Built the Union Pacific*, and the ex-President acknowledged the gift in a communication that breathed good will and admiration. The letter reveals Roosevelt's final estimate of the railroad builder.

"Curiously enough, not twelve hours before I received the very interesting book you sent me, I had been speaking about you to my eldest boy. Ted is a thoroughly successful young business man, but he has got the right stuff in him from the standpoint of the country, and he would never be happy if we went to war and he was not in it. I was telling him about you; of your efficiency as a soldier, your efficiency

as a business man, and the fact that among all the men I knew, there was no one whom I felt more anxious to regard as representing the real American type. Under the circumstances I was particularly glad to get the book with the inscription. Believe me, I value your remembrance. You have indeed a right to be proud as you look back at all you have done during the eighty years that you have lived."

General Dodge had just passed his eighty-fourth birthday when Roosevelt wrote, and the old railroad builder was in certain decline. His more serious trouble dated from an operation for cancer he had undergone in 1913, followed by another one in the autumn of 1915. In response to a letter from Mrs. John A. Logan, following his second operation, he said:

"I have been too sick to write, but they read all the news to me. The operation at New York was severe, and as yet I am not so that I can get out of the house. . . . I hope our people will have some sense and put up a Reserve that is fit for the nation. I can not see how anybody can object to it."

His opposition to war—opposition that grew more and more pronounced as the years passed—did not diminish his faith in the rationality of a strong military reserve for the country; and, as ill as he was when he wrote the widow of General Logan, the old spirit of aggressiveness flared up; he would contend to the end for the things he, in keeping with Grant, Sherman and like comrades of the 'sixties, had deemed vital in national preparedness.

Dodge made a brave but futile attempt in the final weeks of his illness to mark certain letters he desired to have embodied in "The Dodge Records," but the effort, according to his secretary, confused him, and he gave up for the first time in his long career.

Scores of letters came to him, from people in all walks of life, but he could not reply. Finally, Mrs. John A. Logan wrote his daughter, Mrs. Lettie D. Montgomery, and expressed the hope that General Dodge might be laid to rest in Arlington:

“It seems to me that Arlington is the place, of all others, where your father should sleep. I have been tempted to write him and ask him about this myself, but I was afraid that I might distress him. But I can not now resist the temptation to ask you if you do not think that Arlington is the place for him to rest. I know that he has been identified with Iowa for a long time, but he is also a national character. . . . We would select the finest place left unoccupied in Arlington, where he would be with the brave men of the old army.”

But when he died, as he did on January 3, 1916, he was placed in a stone mausoleum on a high hill in a cemetery at Council Bluffs, Iowa,—a mausoleum that faces the West, overlooking the broad flood-plain of the Missouri River, now a network of great railroads whose beginning he knew.

THE SOURCES

THE SOURCES

I. MANUSCRIPTS AND LETTERS

“The Dodge Records”—a discursive narrative, autobiographical in form, of the first forty years of Dodge’s life, or from 1831 down to the completion of the Union Pacific in 1869. This manuscript, incomplete and uncritical, deals with battles and leaders of the Civil War, with the part Dodge played in various campaigns, including the ones against the Indians, and with the building of the Union Pacific Railroad. Unfortunately, the manuscript ends at the very beginning of western and southwestern railroad expansion—expansion in which he played a leading part.

“The Dodge Letters”—a carefully preserved and orderly arranged file of letters written and received by Dodge between 1851 and 1916. As some of this correspondence was with outstanding political, military and railroad figures, the letters illuminate many obscure phases of national history. Indeed, the period of Dodge’s life from 1870 down to the year of his death has been reconstructed from these letters, although many of them contain guarded utterances and often merely hint at the deeper factors involved—factors that become clear only in the light of an extensive bibliography.

“The Grenville M. Dodge Diaries”—which are incomplete and even fragmentary, but which, allowing for their gaps, contain certain information of his movements and minor experiences that proved of great value in establishing the sequence in his life, as well as giving occasional glimpses of his varied career.

"The Nathan P. Dodge Diaries"—from the pen of General Dodge's brother, and authoritative in narrating the early experiences of the family in eastern Nebraska and western Iowa.

"The Julia Dodge Beard Diaries"—written by General Dodge's sister, containing glimpses of the pioneering of the Dodge family from 1855 to 1860.

"The Dodge Recollections"—the most of which the author studied in manuscript form, but which were embodied in a number of brochures of Lincoln, Grant and Sherman and in booklets and pamphlets on *The Battle of Atlanta and Other Campaigns*, *How We Built the Union Pacific*, *Driving the Last Spike*, *The Civil Engineer in War and Peace* and *Address of General G. M. Dodge*.

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